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

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**A JOURNAL OF
THE GREAT WAR
IN TWO VOLUMES**

VOLUME I

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

Military Board of Allied Supply
Coubert, France, 1918

General Enrico Merone, Italian
Army in France: Brigadier-
General Charles G. Dawes, American
Expeditionary Forces: Brigadier-
General Charles Jean Marie Payot,
French Army: Major-General
Reginald Ford, British Expeditionary
Forces: Major Curnont, Belgian
Army

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**A JOURNAL OF
THE GREAT WAR.**

BY
CHARLES G. DAWES
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ¹¹ENGINEERS

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME I




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PREFACE

WE, of this generation, are too near the Great War to write its history. Time alone can give perspective and then only to the historian and his readers. It alone can assign to past events their relative importance. This generation in the United States is living and has lived amidst such a succession of great events that it has ceased to be greatly impressed by them. Among our people the war is largely forgotten, or remembered because of some personal consequence or some prospective personal consequence. Yet an elemental convulsion of humanity has occurred, so profound in its effects upon life on the earth that it will be studied and described for thousands of years.

Of all ages and epochs this is the greatest, and the one to which all those of the future will hark back — this, in which, though we played our great part, we yet live heedlessly and with little thought of the future.

The war itself was conducted on so vast a scale, involved so many nations and armies, covered such an extent of territory, and included such a number of campaigns, that only the trained mind of the future military student will follow it in its details. But out of the study of the war in its larger aspects, already commencing in Europe, there is arising the first of many great generalizations, to wit: the stupendous and unnecessary loss of life and waste of wealth, man power, and material due to the selfish resistance among the Allies to an earlier central control of military and supply operation. When in March, 1918, Foch, who in my judgment will be regarded in history as the greatest of all soldiers, was finally conceded the central control of Allied army movement, it was as a result of a crushing defeat of the British which wiped out their already exhausted Fifth Army. To the support of this

army no Allied reserve could be called because bitter opposition to even such a partial measure of central control had thwarted a plan of the Supreme War Council, suggested by Foch and Sir Henry Wilson.

If the English had not then yielded a central control the British Empire, together with the Allied cause, would, in all probability, have fallen. To such extremities does the pride of nations bring them! The attitude of opposition toward any release of national power by one ally to another, either over operations or supplies, was essentially the same on the part of all. While emergency as a rule effected the only exceptions — and these exceptions are but few — yet this journal records the action of one great commander who offered to surrender power for the common good before an emergency became acute — John J. Pershing — and whatever condemnation history may visit upon others in this regard, his fame will only shine the brighter.

As the Chief of Supply Procurement for the A.E.F., under a plan devised by General Pershing, which superimposed a centralizing and coördinating authority over the decentralized services of our own army, the uncoördinated condition of the rear of the Allied armies in France naturally forced itself upon my attention.

About two weeks after the agreement for the Foch command on March 27, 1918, I proposed a plan to General Pershing for coupling up the rear of the three Allied armies in France as they were coupled up at their front, which was, in effect, to be an extension over the Allies of his plan in our own army supply procurement which I was carrying out as an officer. He adopted the plan in principle, and appointed me as his representative to endeavor to secure its adoption by the Allies, authorizing me to offer his own control over the rear of the American army to French command provided the English would do likewise.

The importance of such a plan, if adopted, cannot be overstated. With the theoretical power to command the move-

ment of the three armies, Foch had no power over any lines of communication except those of his own army. With the central command he could fight the three armies as one army only so far as the rigid supply organization of the English and American armies, of which he had no control or essential knowledge, would allow of their movement. That he acutely felt this handicap is evidenced by the fact that in August, 1918, he asked that the supreme control over the Allied rear be given to General Payot, of his staff, the Chairman of our Military Board — which was, in effect, exactly the same proposition that I had made the Allies in our inter-Allied conferences in April.

Apart from the unification of supply activity in the immediate rear of the armies, the release of men from the Service of Supply for the front which coördination would effect, and the creation of supply reserves as bearing upon future operations such as the motor reserves for surprise attack or pursuit of the enemy, this central control of the immediate rear would have extended its economizing influences, all tending toward increased military effectiveness, over the more distant rear of supply production — England, the United States, and the south of France. The continued piling-up behind each army of unnecessary supplies, many of them carried in ships otherwise available for the transport of combat soldiers, which resulted from the lack of any bird's-eye view of the supply situation of the three armies considered as one, would have been checked. Incalculable wasted effort and wealth would have been rendered effective in securing earlier victory and saving precious lives. But we succeeded, through international agreement, only in placing the control over the Allied rear in the hands of a Military Board which could issue orders to the Allied armies by unanimous agreement.

As a matter of fact, although our Board was called the "Military Board of Allied Supply," apart from its order pooling French and American ammunition, it concerned itself largely with matters other than supply. My journal and my

official statements, printed with it, sufficiently cover what we did accomplish. My purpose in referring to this matter in this Preface is again to call attention to the results which we might have achieved, in addition to what we did achieve, if our Military Board, which, for over four months preceding the armistice, conducted many activities in the rear of the Allied armies, had come into existence at the beginning instead of the end of the war.

So important did I consider this demonstration to military students that, through this Board, of which I was the American member, I secured the issuance of orders to the Allied armies for coördinated reports of the status of the armies on October 31, 1918, and the history of their supply organization from the beginning of the war. This great compilation has taken two years of work by the staffs of the different armies, but is almost ready for publication, its form having been finally approved by representatives of all the Allied armies in Paris on October 19, 1920. From these records the military student of the future will continue the study where we ended it, just as any allies in war hereafter must start the work at the point where we ended it, if they are to wage war with their full effectiveness.

In the pages of this journal, therefore, may be traced the evolution, under great difficulties, of certain military principles whose recognition hereafter is necessary if allied armies are to be effectively fought as one army. In proposing and establishing them, notwithstanding the innumerable obstructions interposed by the authorities of the independent armies and governments, — doubly formidable because national pride can always be invoked against the establishment of a superior coördinating power, — results were effected important enough, from a military standpoint, to make these principles certain of acceptance in the next war fought by allied armies.

At the time I prepared the monograph on the "Principles of Army Supply and Purchase," which appears in these

pages, I was much burdened and pressed for time, but I knew then that in the future this exposition of principles must always be considered authoritative for the reason that under an organization based on them, there had been gathered, from countries in Europe supposed to be stripped of supplies, over ten million tons of material for the American army as compared with about seven million tons which were shipped to it from the United States. I have been amply repaid for its preparation in its recognition by the War Staff College of the United States in its course of instruction.

The contemporaneous notes here published were made under pressure, but always with a sense of responsibility and a desire for accuracy. From them can be obtained a true picture of the great American Commander-in-Chief in action. Here again time, and time alone, will give to the thoughtful people of our nation the true measure of his greatness.

CHARLES G. DAWES

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**A JOURNAL OF
THE GREAT WAR**
August 21, 1917–August 2, 1919

A JOURNAL OF THE GREAT WAR

August 21, 1917—August 2, 1919

St. Nazaire, France

August 21, 1917

I GAVE up a journal in 1912 after the tragic death of my dearly beloved son Rufus Fearing. In the course of the "day's work" I have become a military man, and am living in the midst of events so important that a record of them will be interesting to others and to myself later.

Through the friendship of S. M. Felton, Director-General of Railways, a member of the Board of Directors of the Central Trust Company of Illinois, and with the coöperation of John Pershing, my old friend, I received a commission as Major in the Engineers (17th Regiment, National Army). I reported at Atlanta, Georgia, leaving Chicago May 27, 1917, with Colonel Sewell (then Major) who commanded the regiment. I cannot overemphasize my debt to Colonel Sewell. My selection was approved by him. In all circumstances, some of which must have been extremely annoying to him, he was the courteous, kindly, loyal friend. He is a man of great executive ability, of wide engineering experience, of broad culture and high education. A graduate of West Point with twenty years' experience in the army and ten in an active business in civil life, he is the ideal commander of a regiment of engineers.

I took a private car with me to Atlanta and Colonel Sewell and I lived on it while we were there. Mrs. Sewell and Caro and Carolyn¹ joined us for several weeks. During the two

¹ My wife and daughter.

months I was with the regiment in America Colonel Sewell and I, together with Captain Coe (of Co. A, the engineer of the Florida East Coast "Sea-Going" Railway during its construction) and our families, went to Marietta and New York. At Marietta, my old home, we recruited forty men for our regiment under the direction of D. B. Torpy and H. E. Smith. I bade "good-bye" to my mother and to the rest of the Marietta branch of the family. My mother is a great and good woman. She is also a dear mother.

Assisted somewhat in recruiting the regiment (17th Engineers, Railway) through my railroad friends in the North. At length we had about three hundred and fifty men from the North and seven hundred and fifty from the South — a splendid group. Our time at Atlanta was spent in hard work, drilling and organizing. The tactics came a little hard for me; but I was soon drilling a battalion and feeling thoroughly at home in it. Colonel Sewell was more than kind in giving me every opportunity to develop along military lines. I found I did not mind long marches or horseback riding, and became acclimated soon.

Our battalion drilling-grounds were on South Gordon Street, Atlanta, probably named after the famous and splendid old Confederate Major-General, John B. Gordon, whose name is revered throughout the South and especially in this section. I rode out to see his old home "Southerland," a fine example of the best Southern architecture. Talked with many who knew him. One told me of a remark of his to a young man who wanted to get his uniform quickly so that he could drill his men. "Young man," said Gordon, "if you are not a Captain in your shirt-sleeves, I can't make you one with a uniform."

We left Atlanta for France on July 26. I had in the meantime received my commission as Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel Sewell his commission as Colonel. I forgot to say that when I was in Washington applying for my commission I met my old friend John J. Pershing, who had been put

OFFICERS OF THE 17TH ENGINEERS (RAILWAY) AT ATLANTA, JUNE, 1917

Left to right, first row: Colonel Sewell, Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, Major Atwood. *Second row:* Captains Causey, Coe, Cooper, Ryan, Lieutenant Bullard. *Third row:* Lieutenant Roop, Captain Maddox, Captain Perkins, Lieutenant Howard, Lieutenant Rhodes. *Fourth row:* Lieutenants Dickinson, Halleck, Yarcho, Farrington, Welch. *Top row:* Lieutenants Heinz, James, McCarty.

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in command of the United States Expeditionary Force in France. I took lunch with him and Charlie Magoon at the Metropolitan Club and spent the balance of the day with him and his staff at his headquarters at the War Department. He sent one of his aides, Captain Margotte, to the Army Surgeon with me for my physical examination, and made himself a lot of trouble in helping me get my commission. At lunch Charlie Magoon¹ remarked that he (Pershing) would become the great hero of the war, etc. John answered: "Tell me one man who started in this war in supreme command who lasted. What I am going to do is simply the best I can, and there is nothing in what you say worth thinking about."

I also took lunch with Hoover (the food control man) and Fred Delano, of the Federal Reserve Board. Hoover wanted me to become the head of the organization he proposed to make to control the prices of grain in the United States. He talked with me an hour or so, and was very emphatic in his invitation. He said, "I can find a hundred men who will make better Lieutenant-Colonels of Engineers and I want you right here." He is an extremely able man. He will succeed if any one can in such a difficult task as confronts him.

After reaching Atlanta and receiving my commission, Hoover gave me a great scare by wiring, "Would you bear me implacable resentment if I asked the President to assign you to me?" I answered: "Under no circumstances do such a thing. It would be unfair and cruel, and I know you would not consider it." Heard no further from the matter to my great relief.

We reached New York on July 28 and were embarked on the ship *Carmania*, together with the 12th Regiment of Engineers. In all there were about 2500 soldiers on board. The ship was commanded by Captain Charles, the senior

¹ Charles E. Magoon, now deceased, was an old Lincoln, Nebraska, friend of General Pershing and myself. He was at one time Governor-General of Cuba.

Captain of the Cunard Line, formerly Captain of the *Lusitania*, though not on her when she was torpedoed. The Chief Officer was J. Close and the First Officer E. W. Bamber.

Colonel Sewell placed me in command of the regimental "boat drill," to devise the method of getting the men on deck most expeditiously opposite their assigned boats and rafts in case of submarine attack. It was a very important and responsible assignment, and I worked hard at it, gradually getting it into good shape.

We went from New York to Halifax Harbor, where we spent two days and where we met the balance of our fleet, the *Adriatic*, the *Ordona*, and the *Bermudian* — the latter loaded with colored troops from Bermuda. As we steamed out of the harbor in the evening of a wet and foggy day, the crew of an English battleship in line on the decks gave three cheers while their band played the "Star-Spangled Banner," to which our men responded.

From the commencement of my assignment in command of boat drill I slept with my clothes on in the "after wheel house" where the "officers of the night" could reach me at a moment's notice, and from where I could reach the top of the "after island" which was to be my post in case of attack. During the long nights I made friends of the gunners who served the six-inch gun on the stern and of the after crew of the boat. They were very considerate. If they thought I was sleeping they all walked on "tip-toe." They were interesting companions all the way over. From them I gained much information about the submarine warfare, as I did from the ship's officers, who had most of them been on torpedoed vessels. A torpedo travels about thirty-five knots per hour. The submarine itself has to be aimed to discharge it at its mark. Hence the zigzagging of the ships expecting an attack. Our fleet zigzagged all the way across. Ships are continually attacked, and the situation is much more dangerous than would seem to one on shore. From the beginning of the voyage I endeavored to gather informa-

tion, and after having made a good record in the time consumed in getting the regiment on deck from the hold, I compiled a report which was commended to General Pershing by Colonel Sewell and recommended for distribution by Captain Charles. This report and my instructions to our Captains in case of attack I shall sometime attach hereto, as it will give a better idea of what a ship and its officers constantly confront than anything I could write here.¹

During one night when we were in the danger zone the sea was rough, and while it would have been difficult for a submarine to hit us I realized that if it did our loss of life would have been very large. It was very dark and cold, and it would have been almost impossible for the men to reach the rafts as we threw them off. To hear a discussion of a raft detail on a cold, dark, and foggy deck as to whether it would not be better in case of a sinking ship to take to the water without life preservers, in order to have things over quicker, only indicates how hopeless the outlook sometimes seems when one is on the sea and up against it, as compared with a discussion as to a course of action held on land before sailing.

While I do not know what use General Pershing may make of my report, I feel that something of the kind should be sent to landsmen officers in command of troops on army transports. During the whole voyage I worked so hard at "boat drill" and making up my report that I had little time for anything else. After a long time one foggy evening a little light appeared away to the front. It was the signal light on one of the six British destroyers sent out to convoy us in. Captain Charles told me afterward how relieved he was when he saw it. His rendezvous with the convoy had been changed on the way over and our course was very erratic — made so to avoid submarines. We went apparently far north and then south again. We were about eleven days at sea from Halifax to Liverpool, and two weeks traveling from New

¹ See Appendix D, vol. II, pp. 253-266.

York to Liverpool. The New York, which sailed from New York after us, reached Liverpool before us, and was attacked on the way over. The Belgic was attacked just before we arrived, and two of our destroyers left us to chase the submarine. And here I may say that there are a large number of hostile submarines off this coast now hovering around this American base (St. Nazaire). Yesterday (or the day before) five torpedoes * were discharged at the Finland. I suppose the most dangerous part of our passage was the trip from Southampton to Havre. At some time some of our transports will likely be struck, and with the crowded-in soldiers the casualties will be large, in all probability.

We arrived at Liverpool on the 11th of August and found trains at the dock ready to carry us to Oxney Camp near Borden. The English liaison officer assigned to us was Lieutenant F. C. Covell, with whom I became "good friends." I was put in command of the train carrying the first battalion of our regiment, Colonel Sewell following on the second train. It was a long but interesting trip across England. Everywhere the people were waving flags and cheering along the route. It took us until eleven o'clock at night to reach Borden. The men had had only a sandwich at noon. It was a cold, dark, rainy night. A British officer on our arrival asked me to form the battalion on the road near the station, which I did. And then occurred a demonstration of the reviving effect of music, for there appeared to lead us to camp a splendid British band. As it played the American marches and airs as we marched in the dark, it meant to us all that we were welcome, that after all we amounted to something, that somebody was glad to see us. I do not think that in the great London demonstration, when we marched for hours through cheering crowds, — the first American troops ever to pass through the British capital, — our men were so uplifted as when we marched along that lonely road that night, after a weary day, to camp. When we got there we found a fine

* (Later.) This report is recently denied.

SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT ENGINEERS AT ATLANTA, JULY, 1917, ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR FRANCE

supper waiting for us. I managed to get four lines of men passing the soup cans at once instead of the one line our British friends had arranged, and in this way saved an hour of time at least.

In cordiality and the anxiety to show us ~~us~~ kindness and make us welcome, the English officers could not have been surpassed. We slept under tentage and were comfortable. From that day to this our life as officers has alternated between luxury and the extreme opposite — from the routine work of a new and drilling regiment in camp to the most interesting and unusual experiences. For myself I find everything new and interesting — the few hardships and all. As summary court officer for the regiment which I have been from the beginning, as a drillmaster and pupil, as a principal and a subordinate, as a ship officer and a military commander, I have found among these new friends and associates and in this new environment a new interest in life, a new career, however humble, to make, and in thinking back the only experience in my life with which I can compare it in its excitement are the early days of college life with its new friends and duties and competitions.

One's civil accomplishments help some, but not much. Young and bright men are around you engaged in similar tasks. Comparison is always present. Competition sits at your side. All the artificial barriers which civil success and wealth have built around one fall away, and leave you but a man among men to make or unmake yourself as in the time of young manhood. And then as before, work and character and personality — tact and initiative and common sense — will commence to count. Humbleness and naturalness are the great protection against ignorance. I feel that I learned much in military life from the beginning by letting those "who knew" know that I did not know, but that I wanted to learn. This was especially the case in my association with English officers. To "put on a front" because of my rank would have condemned me to perpetual ignorance, and so I sat at the

feet of my inferiors in rank constantly, and will continue to do so in order to acquire knowledge. And while in civil life I felt I knew something, at this time and in this life I find I know very little or nothing. But I am learning every day. My hours of work, my time of rising and of going to bed, my food, my habits, my exercise are changed in a revolutionary way from my former life. And as a result I am vigorous, can endure more, eat more, and do more than I deemed possible heretofore. The outdoor life — the camp fare — I enjoy everything. I eat beans and cabbage and beets and rice with zest which I never could stand before. Even onions and a small degree of garlic do not stagger me. As for being particular as to whether the service is clean, as I used to be, it never occurs to me to look for dirt, I am so anxious to get something to eat. I am writing this right here for the benefit of middle-aged business men. The joys of youth are still within our reach if we will only give over physical and mental indolence. When in army life you have some hardships — and you certainly do have them — there are a lot of good fellows going through the same thing at the same time, and the whole thing becomes laughable.

The day before the London parade I went to London taking my orderly, Francis Kilkenny and Eddie Hart with me. I called on the firm of Morgan, Grenfell and Company and was cordially received. Mr. Grenfell and Mr. Whigham took us to lunch at the City Club and devoted their time to us when we were at their office. Lieutenant Covell joined me in the afternoon. We stayed at the Ritz and dined in the evening at the Carlton, going afterward to the theater.

The next day Covell and I went to the depot with an American flag for the regiment, which I borrowed from Captain Warburton, of the American Embassy; our own colors being still on the way.

In the parade there were four regiments of engineers, about 4500 men in all. To each regiment was assigned a fine English band, the best in the Empire. Our regiment was the fourth

in the column. Walked with Colonel Sewell at the head of the regiment and with a British peer—Lord Erskine, I think—as the liaison officer. From the station to the end of the march, and in the afternoon on the return to the depot, the streets were jammed with lines of cheering people, and the American flag was everywhere. We were reviewed by the King and Queen and by the American Ambassador. Lunch was served to the officers and troops in a park near the palace. After lunch the officers were taken to the British officers' quarters near by, where every attention was given us. In the afternoon we marched back to the Waterloo Station through the poorer parts of the city.

As we did not expect to leave Borden until Friday, Colonel Sewell gave permission to the officers to remain in London. I gave a dinner, which Covell very efficiently arranged for at the Carlton, to the Colonel and regimental staff officers and Captains. While at this dinner, which was served at a large, decorated table in the main dining-room, there suddenly came the order to move the next morning, which was entirely unexpected. As a result the Colonel and the necessary officers took taxicabs for the fifty-mile ride to Borden—the balance of us taking an early morning train. We left with the regiment about noon, arriving at Southampton in about three hours, where we were put aboard a cattle ship. It was a very cold afternoon and night. The men were quartered in the stalls and the officers in one room—none too large—on the upperdeck. All through the ship the men in the stalls imitated the “mooing” of cows and the bleating of sheep. In the night we sailed—every man wearing a life preserver all the time. We officers slept on the floor so crowded that if any one left his place in the night to go on deck the natural expansion that ensued made it impossible for him to get back and find space enough to lie down in. As a result he slept thereafter on deck. It was a contrast to the Ritz at London. We lived on travel rations, but had a ship's breakfast in the morning when we landed at Havre.

At Havre we marched to camp headed by our band, for which organization, by the way, I am responsible, having presented the instruments to the regiment after we had failed to get them from the War Department. During the day I heard that the Belgian seat of government was in the city and determined to call on M. Van de Vyvere, the Belgian Minister of Finance, whom I had met on his trip to Chicago and with whom I had become well acquainted. We found in America that we had a liking for each other, and he spent most of his day in Chicago in my company, going to the opera with me and deserting his suite most of his time. Instead of calling him "Your Excellency" as did most of the Americans and his retainers, I called him "Boss," which I explained to him was the American way of conveying an idea of companionability and good-fellowship as well as authority. So on going to the seat of the Belgian Government I sent in my card to him presenting my compliments to the "boss." Out he came, and thereafter during my stay I became the guest of the Belgian Government. He sent for his big automobile and went to camp with me for my things and set aside a suite of rooms for me at the Villarie, the hotel assigned to the Belgian Cabinet by the French Government. He insisted on my making up a dinner party for him to entertain in the evening, which I did by inviting Colonel Sewell, Major Atwood, and Major Cushing. In the afternoon at the camp at regimental inspection I had the regiment "present arms" to him. We spent an interesting evening with him and the Minister of the Interior on a balcony overlooking the beautiful bay of the sea.

After the guests were gone, we two sat up until nearly midnight, and he talked over the affairs of his unhappy country — now only about twenty miles long and ten miles wide, so narrow that great shells from the German army sometimes pass over it. He is a friend of King Albert and he invited me to visit the King (who is at the front) with him and go over the Belgian line, which I hope to do later. There are 160,000 Bel-

THE GREAT ADVENTURE

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gians still in the army. As he talked in his quiet, earnest way of his plans for his countrymen — of their probable plight after the war — of the difficulties and perplexities with which he was contending, my heart went out to him and he seemed more the "boss" than ever. How majestic is naturalness! I have never met a man whom I really considered a great man who was not always natural and simple. Affectation is inevitably the mark of one not sure of himself. It is above everything the real hallmark of inferiority. We are liked for ourselves over here, if we will only be ourselves and not try to imitate anybody. I stayed all night at the Villarie, and after breakfast and another visit with my friend and the Minister of the Interior I went back to camp in M. Van de Vyvere's automobile which he insisted on my keeping during the day.

In the afternoon we took the train for St. Nazaire. We were rather crowded in the officers' car and I don't think I ever passed a more uncomfortable night, being half-frozen from the waist down. We arrived at St. Nazaire in the evening, were met by the American officer in charge of the base, and were conducted to the camp in which we are at present quartered. This was on August 19 (Sunday). The camp is situated about two miles from the docks on high ground. The officers' quarters are floored; the men's quarters are similar to the officers' except they are not floored. The camp has been erected by the French and by German prisoners of whom there are said to be about three thousand in the city. These prisoners work around the camp under a French guard. They are given plenty to eat and receive good treatment. A more contented set of men I have seldom seen. Talking with them is prohibited for military reasons.

Our regiment was almost immediately set to work in connection with improvement of the camp, as it is yet unfinished. We are leveling it and putting in drainage. We have furnished several hundred men for changing the location of about 1200 tons of coal in the hold of a transport. This is extremely

hard work for the men, but they stand up under it finely. A splendid spirit exists throughout the whole organization.

The 147th French Regiment is quartered here in St. Nazaire, being back from the front for a rest which they sorely needed. During our stay here there have occurred several engagements with German submarines, which attack our ships as they approach the harbor. It is said two submarines have been destroyed, but this is not authentic. There is much exaggeration.

Colonel Rockenbach, the American commander of the base, took Colonel Sewell and myself to dinner at La Baule, a watering-place situated about ten miles away. He talked over the situation he confronts and the next morning took Sewell, Atwood, and myself over the entire dock and transportation system of the base. Rockenbach strikes me as an exceptionally competent and able officer. He has decision and energy, and common sense. He is sadly overburdened with work. Five transports arrived the day after we did, and I had an opportunity of judging how the embarkation of men and troops compared with the Liverpool experience of our own. Notwithstanding shorter preparation and more inadequate facilities, the way the men and freight were handled here seemed fully up to the Liverpool standard save what was due to lack of facilities. Too much freight is now warehoused here which should be immediately forwarded and thus saved extra handling. But this will be bettered in time.

The camp life here is not especially exciting. We were all greatly disappointed not to be sent to the front as we had expected, but we hope that will come later. While here we received our first mail from home. All our letters sent from the regiment have to be censored. This task falls to the company officers and it is a heavy one. After a while, when the men come to understand that one cannot write home about anything much except the state of their emotions, the work will be less.

From this point on I shall endeavor to keep a diary by days.

St. Nazaire, France, August 24, 1917

AFTER mess went with Captain Ryan, Regimental Supply Officer, to St. Nazaire. Called at American base office. Brought back regimental mail in a truck. Studied Court Martial Manual preparing for Special Court Martial of which I am President, the first session being held to-morrow. At camp in the evening.

St. Nazaire, France, August 25, 1917

SPENT the morning at regular Saturday inspection of the men of the regiment and their quarters. Presided at Special Court Martial in the afternoon. The trial of one of the Master Engineers for attempt to commit manslaughter occupied nearly five hours. The Court was composed of Major Cushing, Captain Burkhalter, Lieutenant White, and myself. Lieutenant Kraft was Judge Advocate and Captain Estes counsel for the defense.

At camp in the evening. Colonel Sewell is having a report made relative to possible improvements in present methods of handling freight at this base. When this report is completed it will point out important improvements which should be made. Major Atwood, Major Cushing, and Captain Causey, all experienced railroad men, are studying the situation. It seems desirable that the regiment be kept together as a construction unit, but it is authoritatively intimated that some of our officers may be taken on details on outside work. We hear that the 13th Regiment Engineers is at the point where we had hoped to be, wearing gas-masks and steel helmets and building narrow-gauge roads behind the lines. If we are not ordered to the front am going to make an effort with Pershing to be sent there myself.

St. Nazaire, France

Sunday, August 26, 1917

THE officers of the American base here, and some of the officers of the different military units in the camp and five

hundred men are to be the guests to-day of the city of La Baule, the French watering-place which I have already mentioned. As we shall not start for a time I will indulge in a few generalities.

At the time the United States entered the war I judge the Allies were much more discouraged than we had supposed. The French, having stood up under the worst of it, were, and perhaps are, a little more that way than the English. But it was not the discouragement which for a moment suggested anything but a fight to a finish. The spirit and determination of the French and English under discouragement are wonderful. One has to be here, to see the long daily hospital trains from the front — not here as yet, but to the French and English bases — to see the columns of fine men crossing the Channel and others going north from this port to France to be fed into the awful furnace of modern war, to understand what these people have stood up under for three years. The women are in black everywhere. The faces of the men from the trenches bear a look which often haunts one.

The French have been fought until they feel the war in every phase of life, but one realizes that this cannot be so in France and England and not be so in even greater degree in Germany. There being in Germany a military aristocracy against which the inevitable psychological reaction against continued war can find an outlet in attacking, I feel that the war will be ended by the internal revolt of the people of Germany. If that does not come, the end of the war now seems several years off. Yet who knows what will happen in this tremendous and unprecedented upheaval of the whole world!

St. Nazaire, France, Sunday evening

COLONEL SEWELL, Major Atwood, and I are back in camp after an interesting afternoon. The Mayor and city officials of La Baule gave the American officers a fine banquet at the Royal Hotel. They made addresses welcoming the American troops, of which we were the first to visit their town in a body.

SAMUEL M. FELTON, Director General of Military Railways, accomplished with highest success one of the greatest tasks of the war. He organized the first nine regiments of Transportation Troops which were sent over-seas and, following that, organized all the Transportation and Construction Troops for the army, amounting to a total at the time of the armistice of 70,000 men in France and 14,000 men in the United States ready to embark.

In addition, he secured and shipped to the American Expeditionary Forces their railroad equipment machinery and supplies amid the greatest difficulties and embarrassments. In this connection, he made contracts involving over \$600,000,000.

Declining a military commission as tending to lessen rather than to increase his high powers and efficiency he modestly and quietly rendered his unique and invaluable service.

He was among the first to receive the Distinguished Service Medal, with the following citation:

"Mr. S. M. Felton, Director General of Military Railways, for especially meritorious and conspicuous service in supervising the supply of railway material and the organization of railway operation and construction troops. By his energetic and loyal service, he has contributed materially to the success of the Army in the field."

C. G. D.

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SAMUEL M. FELTON

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The streets were crowded with people and lined with French and American flags. Colonel Sewell made a very happy response to the speech of the Mayor — much the best of the occasion. Spent some time discussing the facilities of this base and what ought to be done in preparation for the immense number of troops and large amount of freight to be unloaded here. Major Atwood, Major Cushing, and Captain Causey, in addition to Colonel Sewell, are studying the situation.

American freight is not packed so as to be economically and quickly handled in the small cars on the French railroads. The average loading of French freight per car averages at this port only thirteen tons, while the average loading of American freight, owing to the way it is packed, averages only a little over eight tons a car. Much of the handling of freight cars in the yard is done by man power. It would seem, in view of the tremendous burden soon to be placed on the facilities of this port, that the railroad from this base to the front should have American equipment with its larger units, and more machinery and less men should be used in unloading and handling freight from the ships. It is extremely important to have the naval bases operating at full efficiency. Through these funnels must be passed the military resources of our great nation. Congestion here may mean defeat further north.

The purpose of our discussion was to equip me with the technical points from a railway standpoint to be urged upon Pershing when I see him next week in Paris. Additional dock facilities are needed. Think I have the situation fairly in mind. The investigation is being conducted with the coöperation and sanction of Colonel Rockenbach, the present commander of this base. What I want to do in Paris, if possible, is to have proper weight attached to the expert railway advice on railway and dock matters. Major Cushing, for instance, in connection with the Southern Pacific ships and railway system, has gained an experience directly applicable to this situation. If I can be of assistance over here in carrying out the admir-

able policy of President Wilson as indicated by his conduct of military affairs in America, and help get large tasks in competent hands, I shall be glad.

St. Nazaire, France

August 27, 1917, Monday. (My 52d birthday)

THE figures look large — but they will never grow smaller. A very heavy wind and rain. In the morning put on my raincoat and struggled down to headquarters at St. Nazaire. On my return found the wind had blown the roof off the barracks over my little room, and that my baggage, clothes, etc., had received a baptism. Last night there was considerable trouble between our men and the adjoining Marines. A Marine policeman in St. Nazaire very much intoxicated was found beating a negro. One of our Southern privates interfered to stop it, and the drunken policeman drew his revolver and attempted to shoot the private. Thereupon the private, who — accidentally, according to him — happened to have a bottle of champagne in his hand, delivered the same with telling effect across the head of the policeman, knocking him out. He then divested him of his revolver and immediately came to camp and surrendered himself (in a rather dilapidated state) and the Marine's revolver to me. Turned him and the revolver over to the officer of the day with instructions to make an immediate and thorough investigation. Some of the Marines, hearing of this encounter in which their man had been worsted, proceeded to arrest and beat privates of the 17th as they came back to camp and took eighteen of them to the guardhouse in the town. Investigation of the affair by Marine officers resulted in an apology being sent Colonel Sewell by the Marine officer (Major Weston). The offenders will be punished. All of which illustrates what will happen around camps where liquor is sold. At Atlanta where there was strict prohibition there was little trouble with the men. The transition from a drouth to a flood region of drink has proved too much for the equilibrium of many of our men. The action of the Southern

man who intervened to protect a poor colored man from a severe and undeserved beating, and went into a fight for him, recalls what some one has said, "The North may be a friend to *the* negro, but the South is a friend to *a* negro."

Major Cushing told an incident which occurred yesterday. There are a number of American negroes from the South who were brought here as workmen. Their lot — wages and work — has not been satisfactory to them, to say the least. One of them approached the Major and said, "I done think sumfin' is wrong inside my head." Upon the Major inquiring the cause of his belief he said, "'Cause I'se over here, Majah, an' I did n't have to come. Jes 'cause I'se over heah. Did anybody fetch you over heah, Majah, or did you jes come?"

In the evening at the Hôtel de Bretagne the regimental staff and the Captains gave me a birthday dinner. Their kindness and their evident regret that I am to leave them for detached duty affected me very much. Colonel Sewell tells me they have commissioned him to buy me a loving-cup; but I asked him just to get a small cup which I could carry with me all the time in remembrance of them. I hope I may see them often. I can understand now after three months with them why army associations are so binding. The life makes intimate all acquaintance among officers. There were about fifteen at the dinner.

At camp all night very windy and wet.

Paris, August 28, 1917

TOOK train for Paris. Had sent Francis Kilkenney on the night before. On train all day, arriving at Paris about 8 P.M. Chauncey McCormick and Francis met me at the train and took me to the Ritz Hotel where I had engaged rooms. Chauncey took dinner with me. He has done splendid work at the front caring for French children.

Paris, August 29, 1917

CALLED on General Pershing in the morning. Spent an hour with him. He tells me he wants me to organize and head

a board which will coördinate all purchasing for the United States Army in France, including the Red Cross; that he expects to publish for the use of the army my report on "boat drill" and method. Went over the method of handling freight on line of communications and gave him what ideas I had gathered, chiefly from the experts of our regiment — Colonel Sewell, Majors Atwood and Cushing, and Captain Causey. He had already anticipated to a large degree the situation. He is fully alive to the dangers of congestion. Agreed entirely as to necessity for wooden docks; for one supervision of entire process of unloading from ship to trains; for authority to rest in a railway expert. Thinks Wilgus is equal to it. Agrees that American equipment must be used to large extent and gave me the number of engines and cars he has already ordered. He is selecting men for results and holding all to a rigid accountability to produce results. He issued order attaching Francis to me as an orderly.

Pershing is the man for this great emergency. He has an immense faculty for disposing of things. He is not only a great soldier, but he has great common sense and tremendous energy.

Went to Morgan-Harjes office. They were very kind. Mr. Carter called in his purchasing experts and I asked them some questions as to their methods. Wish I had time to discuss the appearance of Paris, etc., but cannot get my mind upon details to-day.

Since I apparently am to be closely associated with headquarters as a member of Pershing's staff I am going to have this book deposited under seal at Morgan, Harjes and Company so that I can write freely and contemporaneously in it, and yet not run any risk of losing it and thus doing injury. I will probably be able to write in it once a week anyway.

Paris, Sunday, September 2, 1917

Now that I have a little breathing spell this afternoon I will struggle at this diary. On reaching Paris I reported to Gen-

July 27
Camp 19

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

A 2x4 grid of dot patterns representing the numbers 10, 11, 12, and 13. The top row shows 10 (two vertical lines), 11 (two vertical lines), 12 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top), and 13 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top and a diagonal line). The bottom row shows 14 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top and a diagonal line), 15 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top and a diagonal line), 16 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top and a diagonal line), and 17 (two vertical lines with a horizontal line at the top and a diagonal line).

eral Pershing. He has made me head of a board of ten officers representing all the purchasing departments of our army, including also the Red Cross and Army Y.M.C.A. In addition he has made me General Purchasing Agent in Europe for the American Expeditionary Force in France. He gives me practically unlimited discretion and authority to go ahead and devise a system of coördination of purchases; to organize the board; to arrange the liaison connections between the French and English army boards and our own; to use any method which may seem wise to me to secure supplies for the army in Europe which to that extent will relieve our American transports in their enormous burden. He gives me authority to select my assistants from within or without the army. He will ask for commissions as Captains of such civilians as I may desire to impress into the service. He gives me such authority as I may deem wise to execute in regard to all methods of purchase and general supervision of them. In other words, he makes me an important element in this war.

As I proceed to build up the organization, the communications which pass between me and the Commander-in-Chief will contain the best record of what I shall or shall not accomplish and these will be available after the war. I called the first meeting of the board yesterday (Saturday). The following reported to me for duty:

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkins, Quartermaster Corps.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles E. Stanton, Quartermaster Corps (General Disbursing Officer).

Major D. P. Card, Medical Corps.

Colonel Thomas A. Jackson, Corps of Engineers.

Major Edgar S. Gorrell, Aviation Service, Signal Corps.

Captain James B. Taylor, Signal Corps.

1st Lieutenant Olney Bonar, Ordnance Department, U.S.R.

1st Lieutenant J. H. Matter, Signal Corps, U.S.R.

Carl Taylor, Purchasing and Disbursing Officer, Red Cross.

F. B. Shipp, Purchasing and Disbursing Officer, Y.M.C.A.

—representing all purchasing departments of the army in France. Announced to board its functions and my purposes

in connection therewith. Appointed James E. Dunning, Captain Quartermaster Corps, Purchasing Agent for England. General Pershing later in day issued him orders to report to me. Ordered Red Cross to make all its English purchases through him. Instructed Corps of Engineers and Red Cross to take joint action in lumber purchases to avoid competition.

However, it will be impossible for me to make any comprehensive record of my military activities. They will relate to many outside matters, as, for instance, I found and brought to Pershing's attention that probably three ships instead of one could be used in transporting supplies from England to our army in France. He will immediately ask for such additional ships as I find can be effectively used — a matter I am now engaged on. Each boat working from England to France will do the work of three from America to France if we can fill them. We must have from the 1st of September (to 1st of June), for instance, 30,000 tons of coal per month. We hope to get all this from England and in my judgment shall if we can furnish the transports.

General Pershing expects me to study and make decisions for reference to him of questions relating to what shall or shall not be requisitioned from America in the matter of supplies. It is a man's work, but I am thankful beyond words that, now that I have come here instead of remaining in America, it is work which will count for my country in its time of greatest trial.

In the occupation of work I find little else to write of. Colonel Harbord, Pershing's Chief of Staff, took dinner with me at the Ritz and spent the evening Thursday. I have been with General Pershing each day, taking lunch on Friday at the house (or rather palace) at which he is staying. Dear fellow, and loyal friend. I hope I do not fail him. We have both passed through the greatest grief which can come to man. As we rode up together there occurred an instance of telepathy which was too much for either of us. Neither of us was saying anything, but I was thinking of my lost boy and of John's loss and looking out of the window, and he was doing the same

thing on the other side of the automobile. We both turned at the same time and each was in tears. All John said was, "Even this war can't keep it out of my mind."¹

We lunched in a house owned by Ogden Mills which was formerly the palace of Marshal Lannes. Colonel Harbord and the Adjutant-General — Colonel Alvord — and Captain Collins were with us. As I looked around me I said, "John, when I contrast these barren surroundings with the luxuriousness of our early life in Lincoln, Nebraska, it does seem that a good man has no real chance in the world." To which John meditatively replied, "Don't it beat hell!"

Colonel Sewell arrived Saturday morning. Took him to see General Pershing. Am getting even with him by degrees for all his kindness and forbearance with me. Got him to agree to let me have James, Ryan, and Grafton from the regiment. Am going to send Ryan to Spain and Grafton to either Switzerland or Italy as representing me. Pershing is issuing the orders for them to report for duty.

In the evening my ankle broke down and I endured the torments of the damned until I got a physician who reset the little devil of a bone which every year or so will persist in slipping out of place for a few hours. Why it does not do this during a ten-mile march, but only when I am quiet, is an anatomical mystery.

My nephew, Beman Gates Dawes, dined with me on two days. Called at an American Field Service office for him and my nephew William, but the latter was at the front somewhere at work. John Pershing moved his headquarters yesterday to the front. My headquarters will be in Paris. We shall have quick telephonic communication, Harbord says. The hand of death seems laid on this city. Can hardly realize it is the same Paris I visited twenty years ago this year. Pershing has ordered my "boat drill" report printed for the benefit of the American army.

¹ The death by fire of the General's wife and three children at the Presidio and the death by drowning of my son.

Paris, Monday evening, September 3, 1917

I ONLY hope that I will persevere in keeping this record contemporaneously with my connection with events here. (There is such a field for my useful activity that the evenings find me tired.

Discovered this morning that the arrangement that requisitions for our army upon the French Government on purchases had to pass through our Chief of Staff, which resulted in two to three days' delay, which would be increased now that the Chief of Staff has moved to Chaumont. Discussed this over the telephone with Harbord (C. of S.), and then personally with General Pershing, which resulted in orders being issued passing all these requisitions for approval through my office instead of that of the Chief of Staff. This will save much delay, as my headquarters will remain in Paris. To consummate this arrangement General Pershing took me with him this afternoon to call upon the French Minister of War, M. Painlevé, and acquainted him with the arrangement. General Pershing told him that I was to centralize all our army purchases in Europe, taking control of them, and would organize a system in Europe for locating and transporting supplies to our army. The Minister expressed his satisfaction at this arrangement and said that the French Government would coöperate, notifying me of their prospective purchases and appointing a French liaison officer to attend my headquarters in furtherance of our understanding of unity of purpose and action; that in some cases he would wish me to represent the French Government in purchases outside of France. He and General Pershing arranged for a review of the American troops by the President of France. He also urged the importance of getting our engineers at work as soon as possible in cutting the French forests, stating that the need of lumber for the winter could not be overestimated.

Through Pershing and his War Department route wired W. T. Abbott, C. H. Sabin, and Clarence Dillon in America with the purpose of getting Abbott, Dean Jay, and Dillon to

COLONEL JOHN STEPHEN SEWELL AND LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES G. DAWES
17TH REGIMENT ENGINEERS (RAILWAY) AT ATLANTA

accept Captains' commissions and join my staff. These telegrams will appear in the records of my office which I am keeping. Took lunch with Colonel Sewell. My foot was so much better that I commenced to walk in the morning without crutches. Met William Allen White at breakfast.

Spent so much of the day with General Pershing that he had time to fully discuss the situation as it was when he came and as he sees it at present. What I write he has said to no one else, but it will be safe in Morgan-Harjes's vaults until after the war. He said that when America entered the war the wonderful French spirit was enduring its greatest strain; that it almost seemed to him, after he had met the French and English authorities, that they realized that through exhaustion the end was near; that matters were better now since the recent offensive. He said that one trouble which he saw was the difficulty the French, English, and Italians experienced in securing between themselves the best methods of coöperation; that this condition was improving, but that the recent offensives of the French and English, though arranged to be simultaneous practically throughout, failed to be so, and as a result after one offensive was through the Germans could move and did move their troops over to combat the other. He stated that the Russian situation was bad, and that it might result in the releasing of more German troops for the western front. He stated that Spain was under great internal strain; that if strikes or revolutions tied up their transportation the Allies would run out of lead within a short time; that German influence was strong in Spain. While he called attention to these difficulties, however, he said the encouragement to our allies from America's entrance in the war was tremendous. He emphasized the necessity and importance of my work to increase the volume of European purchases for our army so as to save as much ship space as possible, and thus get his army and American supplies over as soon as possible; that he could hope to have twenty divisions over by spring, but had told Haig and Pétain that he could not do any-

thing effective before that time. He felt, however, that now there was no question, whatever happened in Russia or Spain, that the Allies would hold out and that the aid of America would inevitably bring a victory. He predicted this would come by Christmas, 1918. He thinks we may have to bring 2,000,000 Americans over, and believes that the United States is equal to the task of in some way providing the transportation. He especially praised Cadorna whom he said he had met. He said he had told him and Haig and Pétain that the United States was in this war to the finish with all its resources of men and material, but that America, like England had been, was unprepared when it entered the war, and it would take time for its full strength to be felt. He believes that everything he said in connection with the exhaustion of strength of France and England applied in as great if not greater degree to Germany; that in estimating his difficulties he never forgot that; that victory for the Allies is certain.

Paris, Saturday night, September 8, 1917

THE operations of my office are so vast, the matters of vital importance with which it is concerned are so varied, the demands it makes upon my time so pressing that of necessity this record can only be of things of a very general nature. The record of what I am accomplishing, however, will all be kept in the shape of my official correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief and his replies thereto in the orders carrying out my requests and suggestions. I am keeping copies of what I consider especially involves personal decision and initiative in a file which after the war I will have bound to accompany this journal.

Being in a position with power to control, supervise, and direct purchases of the army in Europe — the head of each purchasing department reporting to me for duty — I am not only coördinating purchases between the different branches of our own army and between our army and the English and French Governments, but I am engaged in the organization

of effort both within and without the purchasing departments of the army to locate supplies and the transportation therefor in Europe in order to lessen the burden upon the American transport system across the sea. I am therefore fighting German submarines. In exactly the proportion that I secure supplies here which otherwise would have to be transported across the Atlantic, I offset the result of hostile submarine activity.

The General Purchasing Board of the Army which I head owes its existence to the resourceful mind of the Commander-in-Chief, who overrode an adverse report upon the advisability of its creation. To my suggestion that it, and my powers as General Purchasing Agent, be used in the effort to broaden and extend, as well as to centralize, European purchases, he immediately acceded. In every possible way he is using his vast power to strengthen and uphold my hands. Now that he has gone to Chaumont he telephones me on important matters, and I am in daily telephonic communication with the Chief of Staff and Major McCoy of his staff. He has sent word to me through Major McCoy that no written request for the issuance of orders from me will ever be denied; that if they disclose any tendencies which he believes need discussion from his standpoint it will be verbal. He has asked me to come to Chaumont every week, but until I have my organization better built up to handle the volume of important matters passing through it, I have asked him to communicate with me by telephone and through his staff.

Underneath me I feel his strong support as does every other officer who is doing his work as it should be done. General Pershing demands results. Unless one can show them, he must step aside. When one does show them, the General does not stint his appreciation either in word or act. He has told me how much he relies upon me and how gratified he is at what I am doing and at what his officers say of it. He will never know how much these words mean to one in the quiet of the night, when, weary with the work and battle of the day,

he takes mental account of himself and his task. Great is a commander who inspires in his followers a love and devotion toward him only second to that which they feel for the cause of their common effort.

Paris, Sunday, September 9, 1917

GENERAL PERSHING called me by telephone at my headquarters this morning and we discussed the coal situation for the army. I told him we needed 60,000 tons of freight space in ships from England to France now—50,000 for coal and 10,000 for general supplies; that by the 1st of February when our railroads here would commence to consume coal, we should need space for 150,000 tons of coal monthly in addition. England notifies us she can furnish coal at government regulated prices, but can give us no transportation. Discussed form of request to make of War Department for dispatch of colliers or barges to England immediately to get this coal started. Pershing sent me copy of notification he has wired War Department of my appointment as head of the General Purchasing Board. Logan of staff at Chaumont called. Pershing at first wanted me to go to England at once, but finally decided my presence here just now is more important. Logan says they are working over form in which my "boat drill" method will be published for the American army. Discussed with Pershing idea of borrowing Great Lakes shipping during time lake navigation is closed, to work between England and France. Suppose American Shipping Board has already looked into that, but Pershing says he will suggest it and be sure in this way it has consideration.

Spent a time with my nephew Beman and we went for a short time to the Louvre, my first "sight-seeing" in Paris.

Busy at consultations and plans most of day. Am thinking now of sending Captain Ryan, of the 17th Engineers, to England, keeping Captain Grafton and Lieutenant James, both of the 17th Engineers, at my headquarters.

Received letter from William C. Dawes, head of the Eng-

CHAUMONT
General Headquarters of American Expeditionary Forces

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lish family of Dawes, urging me to come to England; but anything but work is out of the question now for me until the war is over. Decided man for Switzerland¹ and also for Spain.

Paris, September 12, 1917

THE more one learns of the actual conditions the less certain he feels as to the outcome of things. I came to France believing an Allied victory was only a matter of time. Now I can only feel that it is probable. The loss in tonnage (ships) for two weeks has been submitted to me. It is about 240,000 tons, or at the rate of nearly 500,000 tons per month. French officials are apprehensive as to the effect of the coming winter on the morale of the army and the people of Paris. Unless they can be kept warm, revolution is feared, or rather disorganization. General Pershing has placed upon my shoulders largely the responsibility of securing from England the coal supply for our army the coming winter in addition to my other work. He has ordered our officers there to wire me direct from England to save it passing through the General Staff office with ensuing delay. Am in contact with the French Government on the situation. We must and shall get the coal, but we have to get the transportation facilities for it as well.

There is a great shortage of lumber. Pershing telephones me every day. He wants simplicity in operations of the army as far as possible, and immediately puts into effect any of my recommendations along these lines. He telephoned me about the organization of a general supply and shipping commission between the three allies, concerning which he had asked for a general recommendation from me, which I had given. Says decision should be reserved until Mayo gets here on account of England's reluctance to release any degree of control of her shipping, and that then he wants me to discuss matter

¹ My selection for Switzerland was Harold F. McCormick, now President of the International Harvester Company, who as the representative of our army there secured thousands of tons of material and supplies at a most critical period. His service was distinguished and invaluable.

with Mayo. Lassiter has already recommended such a commission to the War College. I agree as to its great desirability.

The submarine figures emphasize the great importance of my work. The official records of correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief will show what I am doing in the formation of my organization. It is no use for a tired man to try and epitomize it in the evening. There is too much of it. Spent the evening at the hotel with Captain Grafton, Junior Ames, and Francis Kilkenny. My foot has given me great trouble and pain the last two days, and I am temporarily on crutches. General Pershing has ordered me a limousine for my use in getting around on official business. Want to get to see the front anyway, where I had hoped to go, but am tied like a dog to a stake when it comes to anything not connected with my duty.

Hope the Russians will make a stand. Everybody — Germany included — except America seems "fed up," as the English put it, with the war. No wonder, for they have been in it for three years. I shall not write of its horrors as I run across them. Others will do that.

Paris, Sunday, September 16, 1917

OVER and above all is the problem of coal and transportation for it for our army. This Pershing has put up to me alone at this time. Winter is coming. France fears a revolution unless her people and army are kept warm, and can give us no coal and little wood. England can give us coal without transportation for it. I have caught up the threads of information from the different branches of the army. I am rapidly getting the elements of the problem of handling the coal when we get it from England to France. I know now what we need, where we can get it, how we can get it from the ports in France to the points of consumption, and it only remains to get the transportation from England to France. That "only" seems an inappropriate word. Some one has said that

authority like the nettle must be firmly grasped if one is not to be stung by it. It may not seem modest (if anything I write does I am surprised), but I must, in justice to the facts, state that if I fail in my military career it will not be because I have failed to firmly grasp all the authority within reaching distance of me.

General Pershing having asked me to handle the coal situation and suggest the cable to go to the War Department requisitioning the ships, there was so much information to get to do this intelligently that I had to go to headquarters everywhere. Finding that Admiral Sims was in the city I called on him and endeavored to get the navy to help us out. The minute I said "coal" he started on a strong complaint that the situation needed some one to handle it who knew it, that it was being handled piecemeal, that "this and that" was the way to do it. What I came for was to borrow a ship, not to get a statement of what I knew to be the fact up to the time I took hold of the coal matter about a week ago. I got (apparently only) angry and proceeded to give him a good imitation of a man who knew what he was talking about, descending, I regret to say, to extreme statement. Immediately the gold lace dropped away and a clear-headed, helpful man emerged — one who could not give us a ship, for he did not have one to give, but one who gave helpful suggestions and kindly encouragement. I realized then that Sims was a big man, and what he had said at first was to find out whether I was, or not, in the shortest possible time.

After failing with Sims, to our mutual regret, I met with Major-General Blatchford (a constructive, natural leader of men), General Langfitt, Colonel Stanley, and Captain Moore (a ship expert). They met to discuss my requisition on them for Moore whom they want to use at Bordeaux and I want to use here. Blatchford said that absolutely nothing was more important than to help in this coal crisis and gave me Moore. Have used him all day and shall try to get through with him soon in order to release him for his own most important work.

I saw Beckingham of England and put him in contact with Moore. My official papers will explain who Beckingham is, and my relations with him, therefore.

By to-morrow morning I shall have for Pershing the form of a cable for the War Department, and a statement of the whole coal situation as I have found it, with recommendations for appropriate action.

Dined with Greyson Murphy, Perkins, and Swan Saturday evening and agreed upon the relation of Red Cross to army activities here and in England.

Am writing this between 6 and 7 P.M. and start into conferences again on coal matters after dinner to-night.

Paris, September 19, 1917

HAVING rounded up the coal situation for the army, and General Pershing having requested me to write the necessary cablegrams to the War Department for him to send making the requisite suggestions and requisition for ships, I took automobile for Chaumont Monday afternoon after having had the first meeting of my French Auxiliary Committee with the Purchasing Board in the morning. Took Chauncey McCormick (who speaks French) and my army chauffeur with me. We made good time and covered the 156 miles by about 9.30 P.M. The General and his staff were at his quarters where I spent the night. John and I sat up in conference and visiting until nearly one o'clock. He approves my selection of Moore to take charge of coal and supply transport from England. Major-General Blatchford (C.G., L. of C.) has agreed to loan me Moore for thirty days; but am inclined to think the Commander-in-Chief will be insistent on his remaining on this detail permanently owing to its vital importance.

The next morning I worked incessantly until about 1 P.M. preparing my cablegrams and report on coal. Then presented the matter to Pershing with Rogers (Chief Quartermaster), Harbord (Chief of Staff), and Alvord (Adjutant-General) present. Programme and cables all were approved. They

MAJOR-GENERAL J. G. HARBORD
Commanding Second Division

cover suggestion of requisitioning lake vessels during winter, methods of adapting them for salt-water service, methods of loading to utilize all space, and a requisition for ships (steamers) to carry 41,000 tons dead weight. In addition they provided for Moore to take charge of transporting from England and eventual control of this work by the Commanding General, Lines of Communication.

After lunch with the General and his staff spent a time with Major Robert Bacon, who took me to see the old tower and wall. Bacon is commander of the Post at Chaumont. He was formerly Ambassador to France and Secretary of State, U.S.A. Chauncey and I then started for Paris. Everything went well until about 10.30 P.M., when we got our automobile, a big Panhard, in an impossible tire difficulty. We turned off at Grisy (I think that is the name), a little village twenty miles from Paris and off the main road. It was dark as pitch, and there were no lights anywhere. Everybody was in bed and everything barred and bolted. We gave up looking for an inn and were about to compose ourselves for the night in the machine, when Chauncey spied a light through a crack in a street window on a side street. He knocked on the shutters and they were opened on a French wedding party of about twenty people seated around a table. They all rose and crowded around the window. They passed us out wine to drink the bride's health. The groom was a young French soldier on a week's leave, the bride a beautiful girl of the village. She took some of the white wax flowers from her bridal wreath and handed them through the window to Chauncey and me. The groom's father left the party and walked with us a long distance and helped us rout out a sleepy innkeeper. I told Chauncey to ask him if he would take a wedding present back to the bride and he answered that a Colonel's wish was to him a command. So I gave them a start for housekeeping when the war is over; that is, if the poor fellow comes back. It was not a gay wedding party, but one from the class of people who make France glorious before the world.

We stayed all night at the clean little inn, and this morning, our automobile having been repaired by our chauffeur, reached Paris. The French of our chauffeur is confined to two words — "Oui" and "Tray Bone" — and he greatly feared he would be left alone to get back to Paris.

Had a conference with General Blatchford and Moore in the morning. (Moore is going to be made a Major for the good work he has done for us.)¹ Worked hard all day and here is where I go to bed.

Paris, Monday, September 24, 1917

LAST Thursday General Pershing took me to lunch with Admiral Mayo of the navy, Commander Sayles, Atterbury (Director of Railways), and two or three other officers. There we discussed the coöperation of the navy with the army in France. At the request of Lindeboom (French navy) and Chairman of the French Naval Purchasing Board for America, who brought me a letter from the highest French naval authority, I arranged with General Pershing for the transmission of a cable from him to Washington requesting authority for the transfer to the French Government of about twenty vessels (aggregating about 31,000 tons) from the American Shipping Board, which after the purchase by the French had denied permission for the ships to leave. The French naval authorities impressed upon me the desperate need of coal for their navy which these ships would transport from England. Some of their warships had only two or three days' supply ahead. Since a part of these steamers would patrol and help make safer the French ports where we are landing American soldiers and supplies, and since this war involves France and America in a common effort, it seems to me extremely important that these ships go to the French. This war from our (the Allies') standpoint resolves itself into a question of holding out until America can really come into the struggle. Am bending all my efforts to carry out the policy of Pershing

¹ The first promotion for efficiency made in the A.E.F. (H. B. Moore).

to make the influence of the United States strongly felt in creating a better coördination of effort between the three armies which he feels is needed.

It is a joint struggle for a joint cause. What helps one helps all. We must not lose sight of the common need in the search for relief for our own needs. This I am especially mindful of in my operations involving European purchases. Shall allow nothing to be done to weaken our allies for our own benefit. Distrust of each others' intentions is fatal to quick action in time of emergency. The French seem greatly to appreciate my attitude.

In trying to think back over the past five days I find that this record will be less interesting if I try to catalogue all important things — my official correspondence and papers must do that — and will be more valuable if I speak at greater length of a few things than to merely mention many. The important thing above everything else is coal, and I rejoice that in the last two days great progress has been made. General Pershing telephoned me from Chaumont this afternoon that the War Department had answered his cable which I had drawn up at Chaumont; that our suggestions as to the requisitioning of Great Lakes boats while navigation is closed on the lakes in the winter, for use in bringing us coal from England, was being acted upon; that the result of Admiral Sims's refusal to me of a collier, which he (Pershing) had reported to the War Department, had been a cable to him (Sims) to turn over to us one or two colliers, and instructions to help us in every way possible; that coal was starting to us from America. Pershing seemed much relieved, especially since we heard from Lassiter yesterday that coal shipments would start from England this week. We seized the Berwind at Dartmouth, having been too late at Havre to catch her. Wired Lassiter hoped he could provide tonnage capable of landing us 30,000 tons monthly. Ordered first two cargoes to Bordeaux. I now hope, with the better coöperation of the navy, that we can do better than this from tonnage secured on this side, having the 41,000

tons dead weight carrying capacity which we asked for from America in addition.

(The night-flying aeroplanes guarding Paris have an irresistible attraction for me, and I have stopped three times while writing this to watch one from my window. They carry lights. They are so high up at times that the sound of their propellers resembles the buzzing of a mosquito.)

To-day I lunched with the officer second in command of the French navy and Mr. Lindeboom, and Marshal Joffre's secretary (whom I asked Lindeboom to bring, as he helped me out of an embarrassment at the Joffre meeting at the Stockyards arising out of the jealousy of Viviani of Joffre's popularity).¹

To-day sent Pershing the outline of the order establishing the organization for handling the transports from England to France. Blatchford and Rogers approved of same, and Pershing will issue order immediately. Have put the power and its twin sister, responsibility, in the hands of Captain Moore (who because of his great help to us is soon to be a Major).

Pershing telephoned me asking if I could use in my work Major Harjes, of Morgan, Harjes and Company, Paris, and I gladly requisitioned him. Verily, war gives me an authority to which peace is a stranger. The weather has been beautiful, though I have not had time to enjoy it. Lindeboom is going to America and will take with him the beautiful birthday gift of the 17th Regiment to me. It is inscribed, "A token of the respect, admiration, and affection of the personnel of the 17th Regiment Engineers." I greatly value it and the more because of my own attachment to those who gave it; but I remember Balthasar Gracian's caution that it is not the applause which greets one on entrance, but on exit, which is important.

¹ In the early part of the year I had presided over the meeting at the Chicago Stockyards, Chicago, Illinois, held in honor of Joffre and Viviani.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HERMAN H. HARJES, of my staff, who afterwards became Chief Liaison Officer of the American Expeditionary Forces, rendered the most important assistance in the earlier work of my office with the French Government and Army.

His residence and acquaintance in France as the head of the firm of Morgan, Harjes and Company gave him access at all times to those in French authority able to assist us. His advice and guidance were invaluable.

In the matter of the cession of the Belgian locomotives and other important supply crises, Colonel Harjes contributed an energy and intelligence that insured success.

In the performance of his duty as Chief Liaison Officer, he suffered a broken hip in an automobile accident, but throughout the last two months of the war, notwithstanding acute suffering, he carried on his army work from his sick bed.

He received the Distinguished Service Medal of the United States.

C. G. D.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HERMAN H. HARJES

Paris, Saturday, September 29, 1917

For the last five days have devoted most of my time to the matter of coal supply for our army, endeavoring to complete the organization which I have already at work. At my suggestion a group of officers was appointed by General Pershing to formally meet the French authorities in charge of the fuel situation in France, to close definitely with them the question of the joint action necessary to handle properly the fuel question — both wood and coal. He appointed Brigadier-General Taylor (Engineers), Chief Quartermaster (Colonel) Rogers, Director of Transportation Atterbury, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkins (Assistant Chief Quartermaster), and myself (General Purchasing Agent). This morning we held a preliminary meeting at my office and outlined our position to present to the French. Captain Hill (a very able man) reduced it to writing. I was selected to verbally present our position to the French whom we met at 5 P.M. at the office of the French Minister of Supplies. All the French officers having authority to definitely close the matter were present. Our interview was satisfactory and the French will outline in writing the principles agreed upon, leaving the method of carrying them out for further consultation. My official papers will show the action in full.

Yesterday (Friday) General Ragueneau, the head of the French Mission at Pershing's headquarters, called with a letter of introduction from General Pershing, and we discussed the relation of our purchases for our army to the French situation. He pointed out how France was practically stripped of supplies, and asked the closest coöperation of our army in the matter of purchases. I told him I was determined that we should do nothing without the approval of the French Government; that I was holding up independent purchasing; that as Pershing had put me in control of the matter he (General Ragueneau) and his associates must if possible place a liaison board of the French at my headquarters empowered to act with the same authority as to the

French attitude on any question as I had in regard to that of the American army — this to simplify and expedite as much as possible our work. He agreed as to this. I earnestly hope and shall steadfastly endeavor to keep in closest coördination of purpose and action with the French Government.

In the afternoon (Friday) Lieutenant-Commander Lindeboom of the French navy (General Staff) called for me and took me to call on Marshal Joffre. Took Major Cushing and Captain Coe of our regiment (who happened to be in the city) with me. At Joffre's office met Colonel Fabry and Lieutenant De Tessant, and a French naval commander who with Lindeboom had all been to America with Joffre and Viviani. Had an extremely pleasant visit with them. The Marshal was delighted with his American reception, as were all the others. He was very cordial. They all spoke of how they were impressed at the Stockyards meeting with the singing of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" — "Glory, Glory, Halleluiah, for God goes marching on." They repeated these words.

While very busy on the fuel situation during the week have progressed in my organization for securing supplies in England, Spain, and Switzerland. Christie, the man I have appointed to take charge in Spain, will leave for there the coming week. Upon him much will depend. Shall have him report on the matter of the possibility of importing Spanish labor to help build our railroads.

Am coöperating with the officers of the 17th Regiment Engineers in presenting their plan for building piers at St. Nazaire capable of handling 50,000 tons of freight a day.¹ Colonel Sewell and his staff have discovered that this can be done at this harbor, despite French engineering advice to the contrary. Their discovery has come in time, I think, to check the other plans, which are much less desirable. Took Captain Coe to Major-General Blatchford and other officers of the Lines of Communication who will decide the matter.

¹ The beginnings of the Montoir project.

General Pershing telephoned his appreciation of my coal work. I have had a busy but a satisfactory week. If the plan of the 17th Regiment is adopted, it will be a wonderful contribution to the effectiveness of our army and to the reputation of the regiment.

Paris, Sunday, September 30, 1917

At our conference with the French yesterday an interesting incident occurred. Some time ago, hearing that the French coal mines were not being operated to full capacity, I started a plan to have a report made as to this with the idea of suggesting the sending of miners from the United States if this proved the case. The French Government heard that I was about to send an expert to make the examination and requested that I defer doing so. Yesterday, in answer to my question as to whether this would be agreeable to them, they said that the labor situation and trades-unionism in France were such that the importation of miners would involve them in great domestic embarrassment. We therefore had to give up a plan which I am sure would have greatly relieved the coal situation both for them and us.

Having finished the organization for supplying coal and moving it, which has consumed much thought and a large part of my time, I spent some time to-day preparing orders for submission to the Commander-in-Chief which when issued will relieve me from attention to the details of coal operation. Coal will start landing in a few days, and the machinery being in motion will continue throughout the war. Its foundations are so broad that it will expand as the burdens upon it increase.

At the Saturday afternoon conference the French Government also suggested that we turn over to them the ship tonnage we had, and were gathering, to transport coal from England, and in return they would give us our entire supply of coal from France. I had had an intimation that they would make this proposal and called General Pershing by telephone

Copy
of
this
letter
to
General
Pershing

and discussed it. He instructed me to decline the proposition if made. In doing so at the conference I referred to the co-operation of the General in the matter of endeavoring to secure transfer to the French Government of certain sea-going barges and tugs — as well as the 31,000 tons of shipping to which I have before referred in these notes. It would not do for us to lose control of our transport system from England to France in any degree. The reasons for this are too obvious to discuss. I hear much criticism from the French themselves of their complex organization and the delays it entails — and this from those highest in authority. As for my own contact with it, I can say it has worked so far very well in its relations to us, offering the minimum of reasonable objections to our movements.

Paris, October 4, 1917

THIS war involves the United States in a supreme test as to its ability to coördinate — not only the various lines of effort relating to its own military preparation, but its collected and consolidated results of preparation with those of its allies. As one laboring constantly to effect this coördination, its importance is daily the more impressed upon me. When the source of main military supply is so far distant from the point of use, as is the case with the United States and its army in France, the importance of coördination increases in proportion to its difficulty. What, as officers on the field of consumption of military supplies, we are seeking, is to locate the control of the movement of supplies from America as a base, at the point of use. The President and the War Department indicate, by their every action and their endeavor to speedily comply with Pershing's suggestions, that they recognize the importance of this principle; but to put it into effective operation will require time and thought.

Priority in shipments, route of shipment (ports of disembarkation), and relative necessity of material should be, barring exceptional emergency, determined here and not in

CHARLES G. DAWES
Brigadier-General Engineers

America. Ships now come loaded with material for St. Nazaire and Bordeaux. Since a steamer cannot land at both ports, land transfer and double handling of freight result. If loading and routing of ships were determined here and not in America, freight for two ports would not be mixed — freight needed most three months from now would not displace freight whose lack holds our engineers idle, and delays work on our lines of communication, keeps our foresters out of the forests of France from lack of sawmills and axes when Paris fears revolution this winter from lack of fuel, and the armies in the field face a fuel shortage.

Coördination of our own activities is our first problem. We are rapidly — but none too rapidly — solving it. And then must come effective coördination of supplies, and military effort with our Allies. The war would best be fought if one commander-in-chief controlled the movement of the ships, supplies, and men of the three nations. Since that is impossible, liaison boards, representing the three governments, with final power, are desirable. It is conceivable at times that the most effective military results would be obtained if our United States ship tonnage was devoted largely to supplying England's fighting army; at another time that England's tonnage would be devoted to carrying supplies for the army of France and the United States. If we fail (that is, the Allies) in this war it will be because we do not coördinate quickly enough. Pershing and all of us see this. We are working for it night and day. I am glad that my particular service is largely along these lines. The enormous destruction of shipping by German submarines makes coördination the salvation of the Allies — the lack of it, their defeat. We must not deceive ourselves.

General Pershing over the telephone indicated that in addition to my other heavy duties he wishes me to take up the question of labor. We need 50,000 men for the building of our railroads, and to do other construction work. Where to get them, to what extent we can use our troops, to deter-

mine the Spanish and Italian situation in this connection — all this is involved. I do not quite know to what extent he wishes me to take hold of the matter. If I cannot do it thoroughly I must not attempt it. He wanted me to supervise the selling of Liberty Bonds to the soldiers for its stimulating effect on American subscriptions, but I asked him, in view of my present heavy burdens, to assign this work to others.

Received letter from Van de Vyvere relative to going to the Belgian lines with the Belgian Cabinet who meet the King there every Monday; but how in the world I am going to get the time to do it I do not know.

Paris, Saturday, October 6, 1917

SPENT most of the morning at my office with Major-General Bartlett, who is to succeed General Lassiter as Military Attaché of the American Embassy at London. Went over the character of problems he would have to meet based on those we have encountered the past thirty days. Informed him as to the relations of the General Purchasing Agent and Board to his organization as we understood them. Had him meet Captain (Major) Moore and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkins, who are now handling the coal transports and shipments and the coal exchange at ports with the French for coal at the points of our use. We reached a good understanding. I explained to him that the serious questions in my judgment which confronted him were those which would arise out of the request of England for use of our tonnage from America to England in return for the coal and other supplies she is furnishing us in England for use in France. The request for the use of the 41,000 tons' capacity of steamers we have just requisitioned, to carry on the first trip steel billets to England, is in point. My feeling is that we must go to every extreme in our efforts to coöperate with England and France. If we do not the war may be lost before we are ready to enter it.

On Friday called with my aide, Major Harjes, on Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador. Was cordially received

and assured of his hearty coöperation in my work. At his request and that of the French Minister of Blockade, who was present, am delaying sending army purchasing officers to Switzerland until diplomatic negotiations are nearer completion looking toward an adjustment of the embargo situation between the United States and Switzerland. Hope that our country will make some concessions to Switzerland which will result in Switzerland's lifting the embargo on certain supplies which we can get there for our army. In the afternoon met the French Minister in charge of medical and surgeons' hospitals, etc. (*Service de Santé*) and his staff in formal session, and arranged the details of coördination in this work and securing medical supplies between the French and our own army. The interpreter at this session was James H. Hyde, formerly of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, New York.

Was greatly pleased (to-day — Saturday) to receive the word of our large coal loadings in England. Moore has just returned from a hurried trip there.

The war has resolved itself in a large degree into a freight tonnage situation for the present. Great Britain is making a splendid offensive while the mighty work of American preparation goes on.

Paris, Tuesday, October 9, 1917

YESTERDAY Colonel Stanton and I, having received orders from General Pershing, met the representatives of the French Treasury and considered the matter of the material furnished by the French Government to our army up to September 30, the payment therefor, and the method of payment hereafter after the system of checking material and accounts is more fully worked out. After going over the statements presented we wrote the Commander-in-Chief recommending that \$50,000,000 be placed to the credit of the French Government in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as against material already delivered. We also recommended that

Major H. H. Harjes be appointed to represent the United States in determining amounts, and carrying out a system in the future for settlement of balances. The French officials estimated they would furnish us from \$60,000,000 to \$100,000,000 per month of supplies including ordnance and aviation material. Agreed upon the desirability of fortnightly settlements, as France needs the credits for use in America. This matter took us the entire day.

To-day am considering the question of our relation to Swiss and Spanish markets, having received a letter from the American Ambassador Sharp and the French Minister of Blockade in this connection. The matter is one of more or less delicacy owing to the necessity for complete coöperation between us and the French and English.

Our army system here seems more centralized than that of either the English or French, of which I am glad. I believe in extreme centralization in army matters. Through it comes a quicker perception of the necessities of a situation, and a more rapid correction of a difficulty. Heaven knows we need quick action these days!

Am delighted that Congress has made John a General — settling once and for all questions of relative rank among not only our own Generals, but among those of our allies.

Paris, Friday, October 12, 1917

Busy days. Thursday at a long conference with General Carter, the Director of Supplies, British Expeditionary Force, laid the foundation for what I hope will be the eventual coördination of all Continental purchasing and handling of supplies among the Allies. Carter and I prepared a cable which General Pershing has sent to Lord Derby opening the way for a London conference, and we also reached an agreement between us which we shall now take up with the French for joint action in Spain. My official correspondence will show the details. General Pershing telephoned me Wednesday that he would come in and spend Thursday evening with

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MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EVAN E. CARTER
Director of Supplies, British Expeditionary Force

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me. He did so and we took dinner and spent the evening in war discussion. He is naturally pleased at his promotion to the great position of Lieutenant-General, but is properly impressed with the great responsibilities of his position. Read me a letter from Baker, Secretary of War, commending his course thus far; said (that is, Pershing said) Wilson told him he had chosen him to be the Commander-in-Chief in France because of the way he had conducted himself in Mexico. He has suggested to the French that we use some of the Russians now in France as laborers. It has been kept a profound secret, but two divisions of Russian troops — about 40,000 men — on the French line revolted after killing many of their officers. The French have them in barbed-wire enclosures, and are rather at a loss to know what to do with them.

I told him that it would be impossible for me to properly attend to the labor situation in addition to my other duties as he suggested. He was greatly pleased with the way I am co-operating in the Switzerland and Spanish supply situation with the American Ambassadors to France, Spain, and Switzerland. Pending the diplomatic negotiations on embargo between the United States and the latter two countries my constant coöperation, as controlling the activities of our supply departments with our diplomatic representatives, is essential. My official correspondence, prepared with much care, shows the questions at stake and our method of procedure.

John is master of his great place. It has not affected his perspective or changed him in any way. He has the proper mixture of caution along with his tremendous initiative and executive capacity. He thinks a thing out, and then acts without indecision. He is very wise. When he starts our offensive it will be kept up. His mind is on essential things, and yet he does not overlook the importance of details in their relation to greater things. I have never worked in greater accord with any one than with Pershing. Reason, and never prejudice, rules with him. He is in the midst of

great events — and still greater ones await him, and those of us associated with him in our humbler posts.

The French believe in the sacredness of fixed procedure at dinner. When I told our head waiter at the Ritz that General Pershing was to dine with me, and was ordering dinner in advance, he was much distressed because I ordered no soup. His protests were polite, but extremely insistent. Soup should be served. The General would expect soup. Was I sure he did not want it? He would prepare it anyway — and if the General did not want it, it would not be put on the bill. Was I very sure that the General could get along without soup? "Well," I replied finally, "when the General and I patronized Don Cameron's 15-cent lunch counter at Lincoln, Nebraska, he was able to get along without soup and nearly everything else I have ordered that costs over ten cents." This remark, designed to impress his sense of humor, was unnoticed in his profound depression over my obstinacy — and so I let him make his soup and pass the question directly to the great chieftain himself for decision. When the General, dining at my expense, decided for soup, the waiter's joy was so evident that sacrilege had not been committed when threatened, that I was glad I had raised the question for his sake.

Letter to my mother

Paris, October 23, 1917

MY DEAR MOTHER:

I realize that my letters to you have been brief and unsatisfactory, which arises not out of any lack of affection or consideration for you, to whom I owe in every way so much, but from the fact that during my whole life my training in correspondence has been to eliminate what has from a business standpoint seemed to be non-essential. In that way I have lost the art of narrative letter writing. When I start to write such a letter I am constantly sitting in judgment upon the question as to whether the facts are important enough to record, forgetting that to those we love and who love us most

no fact is trivial if it concerns ourselves. And so to-night, despairing of any effort to write you, I have brought my stenographer to my room to undertake to dictate an account of the trip to the Belgian front from which I have just returned. As a matter of fact none of the personal incidents which I shall mention are really important as compared to the incidents of the work which General Pershing has given me to do, but the latter would prove uninteresting as compared with what follows.

I have told you of my friend Mr. Van de Vyvere (pronounced Van de Fever), the Belgian Minister of Finance, of whom I have come to think so much. His Bureau is concerned with all matters of Belgian finance and I had some questions to discuss with him relative to the coördination of the work of securing supplies for the Belgian and the American armies. I met him at Abbéville, to which point I went by motor from Paris, starting Saturday morning. I took with me on the trip Major H. H. Harjes, one of my aides, a member of the firm of Morgan, Harjes and Company, Paris, and my friend Cornelius N. Bliss, Jr., of the Executive Council of the Red Cross, who happened to be here. I had arranged to take Colonel Sewell of the 17th Regiment Engineers, but at the last minute he had written me of his inability to come. After lunch with Mr. Van de Vyvere at Abbéville I got into his motor, a fine Rolls-Royce machine, and at a speed which I think must have averaged forty-five miles per hour, reached the old French town of St. Omer, where we waited an hour before my own machine with Harjes and Bliss joined us. Mr. Van de Vyvere took me to visit the old cathedral, to which no one could have a more interesting guide. In culture, education, knowledge, and ability, he is a most unusual man. Fortunately for their own present stock of interesting reminiscences, Harjes and Bliss got into Mr. Van de Vyvere's automobile with us for the balance of the journey to La Panne, the point of our first destination.

Dunkirk is the town in which, sometimes at noon and some-

times at seven o'clock in the evening, practically each day, there is received a German shell fired from a gun about thirty-three miles distant. Signals are given from the flash at the gun from points far ahead and the inhabitants have about one minute from the time of receiving the signal to seek shelter in the cellars. The town is, of course, considerably damaged. We passed through this town a little after seven o'clock in the evening. As the entire section is under more or less bombardment, especially from airplanes, we ran with no lights at a comparatively slow pace. Just after we had passed the town a siren sounded and Mr. Van de Vyvere announced that an airplane raid was in progress. This first raid had but a comparatively mild interest for us, since the bombs struck at a very considerable distance. We could hear the anti-aircraft guns and saw the searchlights seeking the hostile airplane. We had not proceeded, however, more than half an hour when we suddenly found ourselves surrounded by great shafts of white light directed toward a spot above us in the sky, which, of course, we could not see through the top of our limousine. We were proceeding slowly in the dark very near a factory used for making shells, to destroy which was the evident purpose of the hostile airplanes. Around us on all sides the anti-aircraft guns were firing at the airplanes. It seemed to us even then that we had a center seat for an interesting performance. Suddenly to the right of the road occurred about four great crashes, each one of them sounding like a ten-story sky-scraper falling down, and then, a few seconds later, three more tremendous crashes occurred on the other side of the road. If the Germans had been aiming for our automobile instead of the munition factory, they would have been considered extremely good marksmen, for two days later when we came past this spot on our return we paced the distance from the nearest crater to the point on the road where our automobile stood, with an estimated allowance for the small canal at the side of the road, and the distance was about one hundred and forty yards — only a little

over four hundred feet. Into the crater formed by this bomb a small-sized house could be comfortably placed. Our safety consisted somewhat, no doubt, in the fact that the nearest bomb struck a soft, swampy field instead of rocks or hard earth. When the bomb struck I did not notice that it gave off any light, but only sparks such as would be caused by striking red-hot iron with a hammer in a blacksmith shop. There were not very many sparks at that.

We finally reached La Panne, where Mr. Van de Vyvere took us to the apartment rented by him and the Minister of the Interior for use when they go to La Panne at the time of their cabinet meetings with the King of Belgium. Mr. Van de Vyvere lives at Havre, France, which is the present Belgian seat of government. The apartment was plain and simple, but very comfortable. We arrived at about nine o'clock at night and after dinner had a most enjoyable evening. Sunday morning, October 21, two Belgian Commandants called at eight o'clock to take us to the Belgian front. I went in the automobile with Commandant Le Duc and Mr. Van de Vyvere, and Mr. Harjes and Mr. Bliss followed with Commandant Scheidt. On the way Mr. Van de Vyvere stopped at the office of his colleague, General De Couninck, the Minister of War, a man of very pleasant but aggressive character, to whom he presented me. He was living in a handsome house which in some lucky way had escaped bombardment.

And now a word about Belgium. Belgium is now only about twenty miles long and six to eight miles wide. Upon this narrow strip of territory the King of Belgium and his army, consisting of about 160,000 men, have made their stand against the Germans. The whole country is subject to constant bombardment, and the larger guns of the Germans constantly fire clear across it into French territory. Its little villages are many of them practically demolished, but a considerable proportion of their original inhabitants dwell in some of them. The Belgian front extends for a long way through what is called the "flooded district" in Flanders. At

the cost of immense labor the Belgian army has built into the flooded regions roads and erected trenches which consist of ramparts of sandbags for the most part. The roads leading to the Belgian front are protected by camouflage strung on wire screens and consisting apparently in large part of straw and reeds. Practically all the distance which we traveled from the office of the Minister of War to the front was thus protected.

About halfway we stopped and left the automobiles and proceeded on foot along the road which at that time was not bombarded, but which at night, when supplies are brought forward over it, is subjected to constant bombardment and machine-gun fire. We spent a time in the second trenches and then went forward to the first trenches, walking about forty feet apart so as not to attract special attention. We reached the front-line trenches and spent quite a time talking with the Major commanding the battalion there. At that time the artillery firing from the Germans and the Belgians was quite light and we decided to go still further to the most advanced posts from which we could get a better view of all the proceedings. We reached these points by going behind a rampart part of the way and then through a narrow lane of sandbags arched over at intervals with iron where an enfilading fire from the Germans could otherwise be directed along the trench. On the way I was taken to an observation post which was hidden halfway up a ruin of a farmhouse. I climbed the ladder to the observation station and with the glasses of the soldier who was there looked at the German line which was about four to five hundred yards further on.

About this time the firing became more general between the Belgian and German lines. The shells would pass over our heads. Some of them sounded almost like a railroad train; some of them whined,¹ and others made a sound similar to the firing of a sky-rocket. The airplanes were very

¹ I came to know afterward that the "whining shells" were from the enemy and were nearing the end of their flight.

IN THE BELGIAN TRENCHES, OCTOBER, 1917
Major Harjes and Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes

active. Whenever the French or Belgian airplanes would come near the line, the German guns would open upon them and we could see the shells bursting around them. The Germans would also fire at them with machine guns. A machine gun sounds a good deal like a pneumatic hammer on a skyscraper which is being built, but since in Marietta you have probably not heard one I will bring you to a realization of it by stating that when in our childhood we boys used to run along the pavement in front of the house holding a stick hard against the pickets of the old fence the resultant noise sounded like an infant machine gun. Finally a German airplane almost directly above my head was engaged by four Allied machines. I counted eight or ten shells bursting at one time around the Allied machines. Machine guns also were firing from the German lines, from the airplanes themselves, and from a little Belgian who was in the trench where we were. The engagement ended by the German airplane flying back to its lines with apparently no casualties on either side. All this time, while an intermittent firing was going on around us, there was a dull and continuous roar to the east. It was an inspiring sound, like the roar of distant thunder — or rather it was the roar of the splendid British lion, grievously wounded, but fighting the greatest winning fight of his life.

From my observation post I could see the town of Dixmude in the distance, which is in the hands of the Germans, and just beyond this town the English guns were at work. The blood of my ancestors stirred in pride within me when I realized the tremendous scope of this magnificent artillery effort. We stayed in the trenches all the morning. No shell burst near us with the exception of one after Mr. Van de Vyvere and I had gotten into the automobile quite a distance back of the second line. The name of the point which we visited I have written down and in peace-times I should like to revisit it. I shall never be able to remember the name. Here it is — Stuyvekenskerke. At one o'clock we went to the headquarters of the Belgian army. The attentions which

were paid to us you must not attribute to my own military standing, but to the high regard in which my friend the Minister of Finance is held by everybody in Belgium. We found the American flag flying from the headquarters and we were greeted by Lieutenant-General Ruquoy of the Belgian Army, First Chief of Staff, General Détail, Second Chief of Staff, Colonel Maglinse, and the General in Command of Artillery, General Arnould. Here we were entertained at lunch. It was a most interesting occasion, and while the General and his staff could not talk English, Mr. Van de Vyvere and Mr. Harjes and Commandant Le Duc interpreted for all. The Commanding General lost his only son, a boy of twenty-two years, the year before in action, and himself was badly wounded. He is a simple, unaffected, energetic, kindly man. As we left he asked me to step out on the porch and there had the official photographer take a picture of the party, which, when I receive it, I shall forward.

I cannot speak too highly of the work of the Belgian army. What it was in the early history of the war the world knows, but in the interest inspired by the larger armies within the last two years it has been almost forgotten. But there it stands, fighting in the midst of swamps, mud, and conditions of indescribable discomfort with the same steadfastness and unflinching courage which drew from Julius Cæsar his praise of two thousand years ago. Later in the afternoon we visited one of the ruined villages of little Belgium and a base hospital. We then returned to La Panne, where with Mr. Van de Vyvere at his apartment we passed the evening and night. The Belgians insisted the next morning upon carrying us by automobile from La Panne to Amiens, about one hundred and fifty miles on our way home, since their fine machines out-classed my own.

On the way we passed the reserves of the magnificent British army, some of them just starting for the front to go into action. It is difficult to state in terms which will convey a proper impression, the strength, fitness, and splendid bear-

ing of these men. In equipment of all kinds, in thoroughness of preparation, in *esprit de corps*, and, above all, in morale, they have no superiors, but in time we know they will find an equal in the troops of the United States, with which so many of their blood will march. As we passed along the road a regiment of Gordon Highlanders in their kilts passed us, headed by a splendid band including its squad of bagpipers. The effect of the music upon the men and upon us who saw them reminded me of what the men of the 17th Engineers felt the night they marched through the rain and in the dark from the railroad station at Borden to their camp at Oxney, led by an English band. I had commanded the train which carried the first battalion of our regiment from Liverpool to Borden. The boys had had only a small ration at noon and we did not arrive until late at night. They came out of the cars tired and hungry and formed in the darkness and rain along the road. When this band came down from the English camp and marched back at the head of our line, playing American airs, it seemed to say to the discouraged and tired men, "You amount to something after all." "You are welcome." "You are one of us." I do not think that the march afterwards through the crowded streets of London produced the effects upon the minds of the regiment as did this march in the night along the quiet lanes which led to Oxney.

This letter is long, but the burden will fall chiefly upon my stenographer. I cannot take time to write often in this way. My work is exacting, but inspiring, for it is related to the general preparation of the army which before long will march by the side of the Allies in the final effort. I am glad to be here, and am glad that William and Gates are here. Between the three of us we will try and leave the family mark on the record. If Rufus were alive he would be with us too. I hope you keep well. I wrote you on our mutual birthday and the length of this letter is in part an apology for having written only once since. With much love

Your affectionate son

• *Paris, Thursday, October 25, 1917*

I REACHED Paris from my trip to the Belgian front Monday evening. In a letter to mother I have recorded the incidents of the trip and will file a copy of the letter in these notes.

Before leaving I wrote to the American Ambassador to France suggesting a method of solving the grave exchange situation between France and Spain and France and Switzerland by having the Governments of Spain and Switzerland establish a debit balance on the books of the Treasury of the United States which would be created by their purchase of cotton for their factories direct. The United States would pay the cotton producers of the United States direct and charge Spain and Switzerland on its books for the amount. The debit balance our purchasing agents would extinguish by the payment of the amount due for importations for our army of supplies — simply giving Spain and Switzerland memorandums of the amount due which would be credited against the debit balance in the United States. The Ambassador cabled my letter to the State Department strongly urging the plan, and Ribot for the French Government stated that he would cable the French Ambassador to the United States to urge the adoption of the same. The United States is considering the lifting of the embargo on cotton to Spain and Switzerland in return for embargo concessions from them.

Spent much of Wednesday afternoon with General Pershing discussing important problems, the chief being the relations of our purchases to those of France in connection with the effort I have inaugurated to centralize all Continental purchases of the Allies. The General has placed the Claims Settlement Bureau, to adjust the claims for supplies currently furnished us by the French Government, under my board (G.P.B.).

My organization is now well in successful operation, and the General is inclined to constantly extend our responsibil-

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MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES P. SUMMERALL
Commanding First Division

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ities. This is gratifying in one way, but as our army operations grow, our energies are going to be heavily taxed. The executive ability of Pershing impresses me more and more as time passes. He is the man for the place. He has just returned from the French offensive which was so successful. Nothing counts with him but results. The law of the survival of the fittest among his officers and the army is at work. It is cruel, but inexorable. In war no excuses count. Performance alone answers. Conducted as this war is, no reputations will be made by accident. But whether it is the military method or not, I am trying, where I find men unfitted to carry out certain lines of work assigned them, to change them, without breaking their hearts and spirit, to work better adapted to their abilities. In proportion as power has come to me in life, I seek to avoid its ruthless use. Its exercise is no less effective — indeed, I have found it much more effective — when with it is exhibited patience, reason, and moderation. The law of compensation is ever at work. Unhappy will be the man in power who for one minute forgets it. God keep us all humble in mind.

*Paris, Saturday evening
November 3, 1917*

How to save shipping space from America — that is the greatest problem which engrosses me and my office. I am trying to effect this, first, by locating supplies in Europe which otherwise would have to come from America; second, by ordering prime materials like sheet tin which can be manufactured here with resultant saving in space; third, by endeavoring to substitute in army use articles of less bulk for greater serving the same purpose. I requisitioned ten thousand and fifty tons of sheet tin the other day for manufacture into milk cans and other bulky articles which will save from sixty to ninety thousand tons cubic capacity shipping space. In our work there can be no cessation of effort. Every ship sunk increases its importance. In the meantime I am

securing a steadily increasing coördination in the work of securing and purchasing supplies. My efforts to make this coördination inter-Ally are progressing. My official correspondence indicates the steps taken. General Pershing has now ordered the entire volume of European purchasing through my office. I have prepared for him a statement of the conditions which surround us which General Harbord tells me he is going to place in the official war diary. It is for the purpose of having a contemporaneous statement preserved of the reasons for important decisions in supply matters.

General Pershing took a trip to St. Nazaire and other ports last week and part of this. He was here two or three days, leaving for Chaumont Saturday morning. Was in daily consultation with him. Thursday night we had planned to spend alone in going to dinner and the theater, but a party of fourteen Congressmen arrived, and the General gave them a dinner at the Ritz which I attended. We then all went to the circus.

Friday night General Harbord dined with Major Atwood and me. Friday afternoon the delegation of Congressmen called on me at my office. In the early part of the week Colonel Sewell and Coe were also here. Had Pershing invite Sewell to his dinner. John is in good spirits. He is gratified at the way things are progressing. Says Haig is nervous all the time over the politicians at home, but that President Wilson, the censorship, and the distance home all unite to save him such worry.

The Italian reverse is sobering. Eighty-five thousand French and English troops have been rushed there. But it seems to me that this war will be won or lost on the western front. No reverse elsewhere will shake the morale of the great English troops soon to be joined by Americans. And the splendid French are advancing. Next year Germany should be conquered in the west. In my judgment she will not have time to organize for great military assistance her conquered

territory. It seems to me that in unconquerable spirit will come the final test of victory. Who will break first in spirit under the tremendous punishment both sides must bear? Not the Allies in the west with America just entering the war. In the meantime into the maelstrom is pouring a large part of the best life of the earth.

Paris, Friday evening, November 9, 1917

THE last two days have been ones of progress. I met M. Métin, the French Minister of Blockade, at the office of the American Ambassador, and arranged to start our purchases in Switzerland. We also discussed the plan for the coördination of all Allied purchases in Spain and Switzerland, and arranged for a meeting at 6 P.M. Saturday at which the representative of the French army and the representatives of the French War Office and Treasury will be present. There we expect to complete the plans for inter-Allied coöperation in the securing of supplies. We shall start with an agreement between France and the A.E.F. to which we shall ask the acquiescence and coöperation of England and Italy later. Am in constant contact with the American Ambassador, who is helping in every way possible in my efforts to secure an opening for supplies for our army in Spain and Switzerland. Much depends upon the action of our State Department in connection with embargo negotiations.

During the week spent a time with the Commander-in-Chief, who asked me to lunch. We took a long walk. When we rode my nephew Gates, a private soldier, was our chauffeur. Italy seems breaking down, but the English and French troops are rushing to her assistance. This afternoon read the final proof of my "Boat Drill" soon to be standard for the American army. The torpedoing of two transports adds to its importance. My official correspondence indicates how continuous is the procession through my office of important decisions. To help the Commander-in-Chief — my dear friend — to carry his burden, to help my country in this time of

need, to push onward and look upward, to be patient, to get things done, to count for something in every way — all this is my weary but happy lot. But it is not difficult to be happy when one feels the sense of progress.

I miss my dear ones on the other side of the ocean sorely. I have little sense of the passage of time. The weeks pass like days. The disinclination to write grows with the sense of the impossibility of delineating the magnitude both of our task and our accomplishments. With the latitude John gives me I feel as if I were exercising the powers of one of the old monarchs. To negotiate single-handed with governments comes to but few men.

Paris, Friday, November 30, 1917

AM fighting a disinclination to write due to weariness at night which, unless conquered, will be a great source of regret to me after the war when I look back on things. So much happens — I talk and negotiate with so many people of importance on things of importance — that the temptation is to make of these brief notes a catalogue of names and conferences. To-night I shall try and picture the situation as the thinking heads of our army look at it, just stating matters of apprehension and then matters of encouragement.

1st. We fear invasion of France by the Germans through Switzerland. Eighty per cent of the Swiss army is said to be pro-German. If Germany starts through, it is doubtful if Switzerland will fight them. She may fight for Germany. The situation there seems bad.

2d. If the Germans come through Switzerland the frontier defense calls for troops which it will be difficult to furnish.

3d. France is "fed up" with war. Only the entrance of the United States into war prevented her from going to pieces before this. In the case of invasion through Switzerland the effect on the morale of France may be disastrous.

4th. In getting troops and supplies from America we are not as yet handling the shipping problem right. We are not

loading ships to fifty per cent of their carrying capacity — lacking coördination on the other side between the source of supply and the docks, and proper handling of the docks. We are not unloading ships expeditiously on this side. In America the control of ships is still considering commerce with South America, for example — when we are in a death struggle.

5th. Military coördination between the Allies is sadly needed.

6th. Revolution is feared in Spain which will much lessen France's current supplies if it occurs.

7th. Our line of communications is delayed by lack of equipment (engineering, etc.) from the United States. In this our danger lies in our being blocked with freight when its real movement commences, say three months from now.

8th. The release of the German divisions from the Russian line, the capture of over 2000 Italian guns, means increased pressure on our French lines eventually.

9th. Peace seems in the atmosphere.

The matters of encouragement are these:

1st. France will probably hold for another season. If she does, especially on the western part of the western front, a general retirement of the Germans can be forced. This should greatly impair German morale and perhaps cause internal and political collapse in Germany.

2d. English morale is in no danger. The United States is new in the struggle, and if she gets in in time will greatly improve the general morale.

3d. Germany probably cannot organize any considerable system in her conquered territory which will prove of *immediate* military importance to her. She is wearing down in man power. The Allies are still increasing.

4th. We probably underestimate the extent to which the German army and morale has been affected, and also the strength of the internal desire for peace which, with a proper basis such as an important military reverse, should crystallize into revolution.

5th. We have the best of the food and supply situation.

6th. Coördination is improving, though far from what it should be along all lines.

7th. Only about 40 of say 160 German divisions released from the Russian lines will probably be effective military forces.

8th. Italy is holding.

9th. The *status quo* is against Germany.

The commission headed by Colonel House is here. The members have been in constant consultation with me as the authorized spokesman for the supply needs of the army. So far as advice as to how to coördinate our army business, they seem to realize, being able business men, that we have it accomplished. I am impressed with their ability. Mr. Vance McCormick is a clear-headed, practical business man. The commission should carry home information as to our needs which should enable the work of coördination *there* to be expedited. Mr. McCormick having the embargo treaties in hand is getting a grasp of the situation which should enable him to force supplies to us from Spain and Switzerland if they do not collapse as governments. McCormick was broad and wise enough, however, to recognize that our steps to coördinate Spanish and Swiss purchases with the Allies were well taken, and instead of objecting to them at the conference with the Ministry of Blockade, when the French Government officials read my note and their answer of November 13 making full provision for the matter, adopted them. The French have promised to name their members of the Franco-American board this week (to-morrow). Mr. McCormick's visit expedited this action I am sure. His commission cannot, however, help us in handling purchases, but in making Spain and Switzerland agree to let us buy and ship from there.

Have furnished Perkins and his statistician my collected estimates, just being completed, of the needs of the army for the next three months. When I met formally the mem-

VANCE C. McCORMICK

bers, many of them at McCormick's room at the Hôtel Crillon at first, I took occasion to express the appreciation of the A.E.F. of Ambassador Sharp's coöperation with army activities. Have not met House yet, but expect to meet him at Harjes's at dinner to-morrow night with Pershing and Sharp.

Yesterday was Thanksgiving, and I took about my first half-holiday since coming to Paris. General Harbord, — also a little in need of rest, — of whom I have become very fond, came to the office in the morning. Took him, Major Cushing, Wade Dyar, and Dean Jay to lunch at Frédéric's. Then Harbord and I dug into second-hand books at Brentano's for an hour; then we went to my hotel room after a walk to read them; then at 5 P.M. we went to a reception of United States Army officers at Ambassador Sharp's; then to the hotel; then to John's (Paris) house; then to dinner with Colonel and Mrs. Boyd; then with the Boyds to the circus. When it was over made up my mind I had not rested much. Everybody has a bad cold including myself. Have moved a piano into my bedroom at the Ritz, and will get my mind off work a little with it in the evenings. Also got a fox terrier for company which the servants at the hotel take care of for me.

Paris, Monday night, December 3, 1917

I FEEL weary and ill from this cold which for weeks seems sapping my strength, but so far I am able to keep the pace. The last two days really deserve attention for their accomplishments. But first merely interesting things!

On Saturday night I went to dinner at Harjes's, which he gave for Pershing and House — only the latter did not come, sending word at the last minute. Those present were the General, Colonel and Mrs. Boyd, Mrs. House, Frazier of the Embassy, Carter (Harjes's partner), his wife, her cousin (a naval Lieutenant), and myself. During a lull in the dignified conversation at a wonderful table in a wonderful house, I said in an earnest way so that all could hear, "General, I know

Mrs. Harjes will be interested if you tell her about the old Spanish nobleman, Don Cameron, who used to entertain us in this same way in the old days." (Don Cameron kept a ten-cent lunch counter at Lincoln, Nebraska, where John and I used to eat in our days of poverty.) John never relaxed his dignity, but entered upon a forcible statement of the impossibility of properly militarizing an old friend. He then told her in detail.

Sunday I worked hard — explained in detail the army system to Perkins of the War Industries Board for his use in the United States and also arranged with Van de Vyvere, who is here representing Belgium at the Inter-Allied Conference, an effort to get Belgium to turn over to the A.E.F. 600 locomotives which are now rusting on the tracks idle, and which Belgium declines to give to England or France, having already given them 1100 and wishing to retain these so as to be sure to have them to start business with in that poor country when the war closes. He took me to a dinner given by the Belgian Minister to France Sunday evening. Here, let me add, that England and France (that is, their War Offices) are very angry with Belgium for not turning over these last 600 or 700 engines. At this dinner was the Belgian Minister of Transportation (Paul Segers). (Also General Ruquoy, the Belgian Minister to The Hague, and other leading Belgians.) Both he and my great and good friend Van de Vyvere agreed to my representation that here was the opportunity for Belgium to show her appreciation of what the United States has done for her in her distress, and, to make a long story short, agreed to give us the engines on the same terms as the other ones had gone to our Allies.

Realizing that we must turn them over at first to France (and perhaps a part to England), since we are not yet in charge of any operating railways, I secured their agreement that we could so turn them over if we desired; in other words, the A.E.F. by this initiative settled something desired by *all* the Allies. Monday (to-day) Segers called on me and we closed

the matter. I took him to Pershing who formally thanked him; also to General Patrick who did the same. Took lunch at Harjes's with Van de Vyvere (dear man), Tom Lamont, of New York, and young Whitney. Am sick and tired to-night — but "got there" as the official records will show.

Just a little more: Harjes saw Joffre — I think it was on Friday. Joffre is very apprehensive about the military situation. Is feeling aggrieved because he is not given "unique command"; that is, over all the Allied armies. Says Lloyd George prevents — also blames Clemenceau for not demanding it. Says Military Committee of Allies is not sufficient. Says Lloyd George is influenced by political considerations, which, however, Joffre does not underestimate. Says Painlevé had no right to agree with Lloyd George in Italy on committee programme when he (Painlevé) knew he was about to go out of power. .

The labor problem is still a matter of discussion between the Commander-in-Chief and myself. I dread, and yet want, to take hold of it.

Paris, Sunday, December 9, 1917

THE reason why valuable contemporaneous comments on war are scarce is because so many important things happen in such a short space of time that any one in important relation to them loses the sense of their importance. One becomes so accustomed to the unusual that it seems the usual, especially when one becomes fatigued. The Belgian locomotive matter — the series of interesting things about it — I should like to write about, but I shall let my official files tell the story. What I do must be forgotten or some one else must tell about it — that is, must tell about the details.

I am finding so much material in Europe for our army that we really run the gauntlet of criticism from the different departments that we are finding them too much too quickly. They say now we have found too many machine tools. Of course we do not have to take them if this is the case. Not-

withstanding 400,000 ties (railroad) are at present under requisition from the United States and 2,400,000 are needed in all, the Engineer Department seemed dazed when I got them an offer of 145,000 in Portugal, 50,000 in Spain, and some from France which they had not located, just as a starter. But it is a gratification unspeakable to feel that if you make criticism, it is by doing work well instead of poorly.

The regular army is a magnificent organization. I work with it incessantly and without friction. One of our officers has been criticizing Belgium, saying it is not playing its part. "*Belgium not playing its part!*" Belgium — twenty miles long by six miles wide — all under bombardment — holding the line as Russia did not! Belgium, ground to atoms under the heel of Germany because it did "play its part" and fought like a tiger against overwhelming odds until a battle of the Marne *could* be fought, and a world saved!

My cold is better. But I stay in my room in the evenings, and outside of my business endeavor in every way to save my nerves. They have got to last through the war — and then, if we win, I guess they will remain in my possession.

Have finally asked Pershing not to give me labor. I have ten men's work now, it seems to me; and yet, evidently at the suggestion of headquarters, I find a question relating to 9000 Italian laborers on my desk for action. Have suggested Woods, Police Commissioner of New York, to head labor under an organization to be attached to the Lines of Communication. Tom Lamont called my attention to Woods.

Paris, Saturday, December 22, 1917

NOTHING seems important any more except the tremendous task on which I am engaged — the saving of shipping space for our army by securing its needs on this side of the ocean. Any incidents connected with that stand out clearly in my mind. It is, however, unnecessary to write of them here, for official records and history must preserve them for those who are interested in the great economic side of the greatest

struggle of the ages. Each day brings its new problems — each day, thank God, sees something done toward meeting them.

I think I wrote last about two weeks ago. To-night I shall note a few personal things. Last Sunday I went to Chaumont to place before General Pershing the Spanish and Swiss situations relative to army supplies. He had telephoned me to come, and that he would return to Paris with me to insist on action along my suggestions on the part of the French and English. I reached Chaumont and took lunch with John and Harbord and others. With them I discussed matters at length. I had intended to return on the afternoon train, but John wanted me to stay and meet General Pétain, Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who was coming to dinner. In the afternoon late John and I took a long walk. Pétain is a very alert man. After dinner he arranged with John for the latter to visit him at French headquarters to go over the plans for the winter for the French army which I understand John is doing to-day.

The following will be of interest to those who do not know our Commander-in-Chief. When I got up next morning it was very cold and snowing. General Harbord came to my door and asked me to come and dress in his room as he had a wood fire. Notwithstanding the fire it was freezing cold, and I was quite proud of myself for forcing myself through my morning gymnastic exercises. While I was so engaged I looked out of the window, and there was "Black Jack" clad only in pajamas, bathrobe, and slippers, his bare ankles showing, running up and down in the snow outdoors. I never saw a man more physically fit at his age.

I spent the day hard at work with the Staff — Harbord, Logan, Rogers, and McCoy. In the evening went with John in his private car to Paris. General Ragueneau, Chairman of the French Mission at General Pershing's headquarters, and his aide, Colonel de Chambrun (a descendant of Lafayette), went with us. The General and I took Ragueneau

into a compartment and secured his acquiescence in the changes we desired in the methods of handling requisitions on the French Government by the A.E.F., all of which centralize in the hands of Ragueneau and myself. Then John and I had a long visit together alone going over the old times and the old struggles and the old friends. He said the first speech he ever made was at the dinner I gave for him in Chicago in 1903. I am so proud of him, and of his mastery of his great opportunity. Hardship, self-denial, tragedy have all been his lot, but work — always work — has brought him to the heights.

I am in splendid health again. The Chief of Cabinet of the King of Belgium, Comte Jehay, called on me and took lunch with me Thursday. He invited me to visit the King, whom I should like to meet, of course — but I cannot leave my work.

We are all expecting a great attack from the German forces. Germany must make its supreme effort before the American army becomes effective. Work — work, always work — that is the meaning and the only meaning of time to those preparing the American army for action.

To-night the sirens sounded for an expected air raid on Paris. The lights in the hotel were extinguished, but nothing happened. The Parisians seem very confident that the Germans will never make an air raid on Paris — why, I do not know. I have been told, however, that the French will not allow the English to raid Alsace-Lorraine nor do they do so themselves. Perhaps there is reciprocity here.

Paris, January 6, 1918

I DO not remember when I wrote last — whether after the first of my two recent trips to see General Pershing at field headquarters at Chaumont or not. The second trip was to discuss the cable from the State Department at Washington asking him to permit me to represent the Government of the United States in negotiating the commercial treaty cover-

MARSHAL PÉTAIN

**WORLD
AMERICAN**

ing imports and exports with Spain. Important as this task was, it was so much less important than my work here, which I would have to leave, that the General was compelled to decline the request, much to my relief, for it would have been impossible for me to leave even for a week without endangering most important tonnage-saving negotiations. Was at Chaumont on this matter New Year's Day, and stayed as usual at the General's house. I had my nephew William visit me at the house, and he came fresh from his hard work as a private soldier up to General Pershing's bedroom, where before a wood fire he talked with the General and myself. I also took him to General Harbord's room. After a long conference with him gave my approval of his desire to go into the artillery, and Harbord ordered him to the artillery officers' training school. William has made a splendid record and wants only to be useful. He is a fine and brave boy.

My Auxiliary Advisory Committee joined in a "round-robin" attack¹ upon our department of army service this last week, for "purposes of record" among other things. They accomplished it all right; but I am doubtful if they will be pleased with the "record." I dissolved the committee in consequence. General Pershing has recommended me for promotion to rank of Colonel, cabling really more than I deserve. William spent the evening with me. Worked at office most of day. Wired the General about my advisory (civilian) committee revolt. In preparing my answer to their letter I kept in mind that that defense is best which is concurrently planned with aggressive attack.

Paris, Friday, January 11, 1918

THE following may sometime be interesting. John Pershing called me over to his house yesterday and after a conference

¹ The committee really did not realize what they were doing, in my judgment. They were badly advised, and had been treated so well by me that they became a little unbalanced, and misconstruing my amiability as weakness, tried a little horseback riding. The great majority of them did not mean to do anything detrimental to the service.

we went to the Ritz for lunch. He was passing through the city. After disposing of business relating to my department of the Staff he told me that he had ordered the American troops into the line on January 15 — that is, a large part of them. Told me the British and French wanted them divided between them, and discussed this, deciding — at least it was my inference that he decided — to keep them together as an American unit. America has a pride which should not be ignored unless extremely strong military considerations demanded it. These do not seem to exist. Our country would be disappointed at any loss of what might be termed the "individuality" of our troops. I strongly urged him, for its moral effect and for its expediency, to immediately announce this movement to the world. It should have a strong effect if Germany is wavering. He was inclined to agree, but said he must have due regard for the War Department in the method of announcement. I pointed out that peace seemed in the air; that I diagnosed Wilson's address to Congress as an able modification of his former positions to place him and our country in proper relation to an early armistice request from Germany and a peace to result from it on the general lines of the Lloyd George proposals. Wilson omitted former references to the impossibility of negotiating with present German authorities. His present address will always be considered properly as one of the causes of what seems to me to be a rapidly approaching peace; but in making it I think the President had in mind, nevertheless, the wisdom of the ancients who understood so well the working of the public mind when they coined the phrase, "*Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.*" I told John he could well think of the same thing in deciding to move quickly. And yet, who knows how long the war will last!

In my dealings with the higher French authorities I notice an accession of spirits, an increase in activity, and promptness in business coöperation, which have been especially marked the past two weeks. Somehow I think, like myself, they feel

victory in the air — in other words, internal collapse in Germany. With all the world war-weary except the United States, our entrance into war has tipped the balance.

Sent Colonel Sewell and Major Atwood to the Belgian front in Harjes's automobile and by arrangement with my friends Van de Vyvere and General Ruquoy — the latter wiring that he was sending two officers to meet them at the Belgian frontier.

Called my officers of the General Purchasing Board together in the morning to consider proposal of methods of expediting the filling of requisitions submitted to me by the French.

Am in good health. Am very proud of the magnificent work done by my wife in furnishing sweaters to our troops. By this time she must have equipped over two full regiments — one of them the 17th Engineers. Our men would have suffered much without them. My nephew William has gone into the artillery. Gates is hard at work. They are both fine soldiers. My nephew Charles has also enlisted in America.

Paris, January 16, 1918

RETURNING his hospitality to me at the Belgian front, on Sunday took my friend Van de Vyvere and Major Harjes to Chaumont. We went out with General Pershing in his private car. On the way out we discussed the Belgian locomotive and freight-car situation with the General. It is possible that by furnishing the iron parts we can get a large number of freight cars manufactured by Belgian workmen out of lumber they furnish from French forests.

At the General's house, where we stopped, Major-General Bell was visiting. At General Pershing's request I had not bought any eagles to mark my promotion, as he said as a matter of sentiment he wanted to give them to me. And so just before we went to lunch John appeared and pinned the eagles on my shoulders. We spent the night at John's house, and then in the morning Van de Vyvere and I went

to Neufchâteau, the headquarters of Major-General Edwards, commanding the 26th Division — an old acquaintance and friend of my Washington days. He devoted all his time to us, entertaining us at lunch and then taking us to the practice trenches where we saw a battalion drilled in the new warfare. Edwards is a splendid soldier. If the Germans hit his front they will get action even before his men are fully trained. When he gets them ready he will lead them anywhere. Was much impressed with his qualities of leadership and personality. Returned and had a little time with John before leaving for Paris on the late afternoon train. John said that Pétain objected to the announcement as to the entry into the line of American troops, as it might provoke a German attack on his front. The troops will get into line by the 22d at least. Bullard's division will be the first, I understand.

Am suffering from a severe cold again — and with my daily burden of work find it very annoying. Junior Ames on his way to the artillery school spent the afternoon at my office and took dinner with me at my room at the hotel. He is a very promising young man with high purpose and fine ambition. He will succeed.

Paris, Monday, January 28, 1918

WE live in the midst of events. Colonel Boyd is making contemporaneous notes of the conferences of General Pershing on the important question of the hour — the manner in which the A.E.F. shall continue to enter the line; but it may be interesting to note the impressions which in his confidential talks the General gives me. The English, notwithstanding their steadfast refusal to mix small units of their own troops with others — even their colonial troops with their own — and the French, are endeavoring to persuade the United States to scatter their troops in small units throughout the French and British line. General Bliss has acceded to the idea. General Pershing is obdurate in his position against it. Bliss has not yet gone to the extent, as I under-

U. S. OF
C. A. P. N.

MAJOR-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, COM-
MANDING TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, AND A. VAN
DE VYVERE, BELGIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE,
NEUFCHÂTEAU, JANUARY, 1918

to the
university

stand, of making to Wilson a recommendation contrary to Pershing. John is therefore in one of those crises at the beginning of military movements alike so annoying and yet so valuable as establishing his unquestioned leadership. To me, his firmness and his great strength of statement — his breadth of view and his utter indifference to the personal importance of any one opposing him — are a source of pride and satisfaction as well as relief. The President of France, the British authorities, Lloyd George, General Bliss — all arrayed against John — mean nothing to him except as they present reason. This sense of the relative importance in great matters of fact and reason and of the relative lack of importance of personality is one of the essential attributes of greatness. No man who unduly reverences name, reputation, title, who is awed by pomp or circumstances, who unduly cares for the semblance as distinguished from the substance of things, is fit to be entrusted as a military commander and negotiator with the lives and fortunes of his fellow-men. John Pershing, like Abraham Lincoln, "recognizes no superior on the face of the earth." He is the man for this great emergency — and I know Wilson will stand by him in his position, for he is right.

John wants his troops to go into the line in *divisions*, thus preserving their *esprit de corps*, the pride of their country, the support of the American public, the honor of our nation. He has no objection to their going into the British or French lines, provided they go by divisions. Despite Bliss's disagreement on policy John regards him as a good and loyal friend.

General Pershing spent yesterday and Saturday in the city. Was with him in his room Sunday afternoon. In the evening had him, Colonel and Mrs. Boyd, General Harbord, and Colonel Bacon to dinner at my hotel, and we then went to see "Thaïs" at the Opera House. As usual the General and I talked only war and army organization. He has decided to put labor under me — and this time I have accepted. It is my duty — for an emergency exists — but I am heavily

laden already. Still, "between us girls," I am glad of the opportunity. If I only keep well! I can't understand why I should want to risk my reputation for success in this additional and great undertaking, for, like the jumping horses at the horse show, if one fails to clear the *seventh* bar the audience forgets that he negotiated the sixth. And unlike the horse-show bars, the bar I have to jump is nailed to the posts. If I don't clear it I shall break my legs. But I shall clear it — with space to spare.

Paris, February 5, 1918

GENERAL PERSHING has placed upon me the responsibility of procuring labor in Europe for the work of the A.E.F., which will require in the aggregate 100,000 men, 50,000 of whom are needed now. I am forming a labor bureau in my office and have appointed Major Jackson, formerly Labor Commissioner of Pennsylvania, as chief. This afternoon I took up, at a formal meeting with the Chairman of the French Mission in charge of French relations with A.E.F. (Maurice Ganne), the subject of the French relation to our efforts. I stated our immediate needs at 50,000 men. Requested permission to import Spanish labor. Ganne is to take the matter up with the Council of Ministers. I asked for an allotment of the military labor about to be brought by France from Italy, on the ground that it would result in the release of a proportionate number of our troops now engaged in labor for combative contact with the enemy in the line.

I have also established, under authority given by the Commander-in-Chief, a Board of Contracts and Adjustment and appointed F. W. M. Cutcheon chairman of the same. By means of this board we will try and settle difficult business questions and contracts with the French and British Governments as we go along — not leaving a mass of unfinished and complicated negotiations to consume the time of international commissions after the war. I consider this board a very important body.

Have also recommended an organization for the supervision of the technical service of the A.E.F. to function under me.

General Pershing took dinner with me last night. Have been much with him lately, as he has been in the city in connection with the meetings of the Supreme War Council. At his request I called this afternoon on the new Chief of Staff, General March, who is about to leave for America, and gave him a general picture of the work of the A.E.F. in France to date, as General Pershing asked me to do. Had the pleasure of telling him our European purchases now amounted to 2,690,000 tons, and that in my judgment 300,000 tons would cover our replacement agreements, making the tonnage from America saved net 2,400,000 tons. To try to keep a record of what my organization is accomplishing is comparatively useless. Have made up my mind that everything is so important these days that our work will always be comparatively obscure. But so far we have done "our bit" all right. It is relative and not abstract importance nowadays that determines what should be a matter of public consideration. I liked General March very much. He is a friend of my good friend General William H. Carter.

Major Belmont got back from Spain after a very effective trip representing the State Department in the Spanish commercial treaty matter. Sent him to the United States to make a verbal report to State Department and War Trade Board.

Am in splendid health again. Colonel Sewell is in the city. Wayne Stacey, one of Rufus Fearing's classmates and friends, called on me to-day. He is a Major. I do not seem to get over the loss of my dear, dear boy.

Paris, February 24, 1918

THIS is a war to win. Any officer in the United States Army who puts system above success, who does not exercise his initiative and his ingenuity to adopt any and all means to secure results, had better leave France upon his own request before

he is sent back. This is the spirit of General Pershing. In the ultimate struggle of a war like this, system, precedent, habit must give way to emergency. The system of military procedure is devised to win battles, and to win them because its methods bring out the ultimate possible effectiveness of troops and their machinery of the rear at the time it is needed in battle. If peace-time army methods and customs fail to do this at the test, they must be, temporarily at least, altered to meet the test.

In connection with the transfer of my section of staff work in certain particulars to the jurisdiction of the C.G.S.O.R. (so that the C. in C. can take his place in the field) along with all the other sections of the administrative and technical staff, I discussed certain principles before the committee of the General Staff and Staff of the C.G.S.O.R. at the request of the C. in C. These principles will be found applied practically in my section of work set out in my orders, directions, and correspondence, which, because of the magnitude and importance of the transactions and their relation to the military and business activities of the army, must hereafter be the subject of study and discussion by students of military science. But realizing that in the mass of documents underlying principles may long be buried, or misunderstood when extracted by the student, I took advantage of a few hours' leisure this afternoon to dictate to a stenographer some of my conclusions, based upon a unique experience, as to the proper principles which should govern modern army purchase and supply. This I hope to do again and from time to time, for I have learned from experience that mental work is best done by me when I am under pressure and theoretically have no time for it. Then again I am writing more than mental conclusions; I am only recording the principles which necessity has compelled me to adopt as right. Let those who attack them — and there will be many who will maintain that I am wrong about them — remember that for six months I have been (put there by General Pershing) in a position rela-

GENERAL PEYTON C. MARCH
Chief of Staff, U.S.A.

tive to our army supply and purchase operations in France to which there is nothing similar in the armies of England and France.

I am in control of purchase and supply matters relating to *all* services of the army — not only one or a few of them. The board of which I am chairman has purchased in six months in Europe over 2,900,000 tons of material and is still at it. In addition, I am in control of labor accumulation. I feel the pressure from *all* points of demand, and am in touch with *all* sources of supply. I get the viewpoint from the mountain peak of hard and burdensome experience. It is not a theory which has confronted me. My conclusions are compelled by fact; and the commentator upon them, before he condemns them because some of them seem inconsistent with principles of business axiomatic in peace, must consider and keep in mind the vast experience from which they are drawn. And then it must be remembered that I am primarily a business man and business organization man, and entered my great work a firm believer in the infallibility of certain business principles in their application to any collective effort of man, including war. I have been convinced in spite of myself by experience. And thus convinced I have succeeded in my task.

These remarks occur to me in connection with what I dictated this afternoon, which after revising I shall attach to these notes.¹ I keep no track of the passage of time, and do not recall when I last wrote at these notes.

¹ *Principles of Army Purchase and Supply as suggested by Experience of American Expeditionary Force in France*

(Dictated February 24, 1918, and carefully revised
March 6, 1918. For insertion in War Diary of
American Expeditionary Force)

War is the oldest occupation of mankind, and the system of organization for war has been the result of evolution for the longest period of any collective human activity. Therefore, what seems to be in military organization an anachronism must always be considered as to whether our regarding it in that light is due to the different functioning of an army organization in times of peace, as compared with a time of war. The current

Major-General Kernan, C.G.S.O.R., called me to Tours this last week and we talked over the relations of my work to his

criticism of army organization is based largely upon the assumption that it ignores certain fundamental principles of normal business organization, which should be applied to the business system of an army notwithstanding the ultimate purpose of an army's existence is military, as distinguished from business, success. The conventional view of the army purchase and supply system, held by the non-military business man, is that the system of independent departmental purchases is a failure, because, while it is susceptible to an outside, coördinating control, this control is not accomplished, as in the normal business organization, by a complete centralization of purchase and supply through one agency acting for the army as a whole. The argument of the business man is that if all purchasing and supply activities were centralized in one distinct army department, created to supply all other branches of the service, there would be obviated competition among the various departments, piecemeal and wasteful purchases, loose methods, insufficient estimation of forward collective needs, and many other objections now incident to some extent to the present system. It is contended that the needs of an army and their satisfaction will be better ascertained and accomplished by a central body, having always the bird's-eye view of the situation, and that equally satisfactory results will not be incident to any method of central control reached through a coördination of independent agencies. It was with this belief that I took up my duties as General Purchasing Agent of the American Expeditionary Force, under a new system of central control devised personally by General Pershing against the advice of a reporting army board to whom the subject had been first referred. This report, attached hereto, with the comments of General Pershing thereon, indicates clearly the legal limitations under which he acted, his entire perception of the business and military principles involved, and the final plan he placed in operation as the best solution possible, in his judgment, under existing law, of the problem of reconciling the existing army and supply system with the fundamental principles of normal business organization without jeopardizing its efficiency from the military standpoint in time of actual war.

I wish I could claim a share in the conception of this plan, but the General had worked it out fully before I arrived at his headquarters and only selected me to put it into effect, and as General Purchasing Agent, American Expeditionary Force, and Chairman, to assemble the General Purchasing Board and direct its operations. My idea, as that of many other business men, had been that the law of the United States, which so jealously guarded the independent right of purchase and supply in departments of the service, was on our statute books as a result of a lack of business knowledge and foresight on the part of legislators, instead of its being, as it is, the logical, legitimate, and necessary evolution of thousands of years of actual military experience. Now, after six months in time of war, in a peculiar position relative to army purchase and supply activities such as does not exist in the British, French, or other army, so far as I know, I

new position. He gave me a large portion of the day, taking me to lunch at his house with General Patrick and his aides.

am prepared to say that any change in legislation or War Department regulation, designed to bring the organization of army purchase and supply more nearly into accord with the principles of modern business organization, should provide an agency of supervising coördination, which, while it will permit the application of rigid business principles under normal conditions, will not take away from independent departments the right of purchase and supply, especially during the time of actual military activity, the preservation of such independent powers being absolutely essential at times to military success, which of course is the ultimate object of the whole system.

The statement is frequently made that the business organization of an army is the same in its purposes as the business organization of any great corporation. This is misleading. The chief purpose of the organization of successful business is the creation of wealth; the chief purpose of the organization of an army is the destruction of enemy life and wealth. The prime consideration, in the establishment in normal business organization of central control of purchase, is the surrounding of purchasing activity with checks and balances compelling due consideration of every purchase from the standpoint of its relation to a prospective profit; in other words, to compel the deliberate application to every transaction of the test as to whether, if consummated, financial profit or something related to it will, immediately or ultimately, be the result. The first purpose of the army business organization in time of war is the securing of necessary military supplies irrespective of any question of financial profit, yet as cheaply and expeditiously as possible without prejudice to military effectiveness. If the application of all the principles of normal business organization would mean the failure of supply in military emergency, business principles, in the last analysis, must yield, wherever necessary, to military emergency. The principles, however, of normal business as affecting army business organization can be made to apply through a coördinating system as we have done in the American Expeditionary Force, where these principles are applied to any army purchase or supply transaction not involving a preponderating military necessity. I cannot emphasize too strongly that for the preservation of a requisite system of supply for an army in action, the feeling of responsibility on the part of a supply procuring agent must be first to the officers needing the supply. From my experience with the field system of army supply and purchase in this war, the only reason I can imagine why anybody suggests the contrary is because a large portion of the supplies for our army is being collected by the War Department in a country of large resources which, when collected, are shipped from America to the army in France. Business principles, for obvious reasons, can be given a wider application by the War Department in the United States than it is possible to give to the purchase and supply organization of an army in the field. In the business organization of an army in the field, nothing must prevent the immediate application of the greatest possible pressure,

Reached a very satisfactory understanding with Kernan and feel that our relations will be extremely cordial. He has a directly from the point of military and emergency need, upon an agent of purchase and supply directly responsible to it. Therefore, the central business control of purchase and supply activities of an army in the field, while operating in all normal cases, must not interfere with a perfect device for the operation of a collateral independent system controlled by military necessity. Only in this way can all the needs of an army in time of action be properly met.

Let us assume for purposes of illustration that the American Expeditionary Force in France, at a time when military operations are under way, had an existing central purchase and supply organization for all departments of the army without there being in existence machinery for independent collection of supplies. To that central organization would come a series of demands which we might epitomize as follows: From "A" on the line, two thousand blankets by night-time which if not supplied meant that soldiers would perish from exposure; from "B," one thousand shells for an expected attack the next day; from "C," one thousand cots for wounded soldiers lying on the floors of hospitals; from "D," certain medicines and surgical apparatus with available supplies entirely inadequate, and wounded still coming in; from "E," food for men who had been without it for two days. The central organization, in transmitting to its purchasing and collecting agents these demands, would use an emphatic tone of voice, but that tone of voice would not be the same, nor interpreted by the agent in the same way, as the voice of each officer responsible for the situation at each point of necessity speaking to a man directly responsible to him, and located at a point of possible supply. If a demand came for timber to build a bridge necessary to carry 100,000 troops across a stream for reinforcement of a sorely pressed army corps, questions of the price to be paid, or the manner in which it was to be secured, would not, advantageously, be first referred to a central agency for consideration of the business bearings of the transaction. It is no reply, in such a situation, to maintain that an emergency supply and purchase organization can be created for use in times of war which can function when and where it would be impossible for the central organization to do so. A purchase and supply machine, to function well, must function continuously. In this war the use of troops in restricted localities, the transportation to masses of stationary troops of large shipments of supplies, the fact that the different units of the army, as a rule, are not separated by long distances or isolated by lack of railroad or other means of communication, all make more plausible the demand for the abolition of the great army system of independent departmental supply and purchase. But if any other system is put in its place which does not recognize that the first responsibility of the supply and purchase agent must be directly to the responsible officer nearest the point of necessity, the system in time of military emergency will fail; and the whole object of the military system is not to fail in time of war. In order to give our army organization in France the benefit as far as possible of all the

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS J. KERNAN

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difficult place — none more so — and he shall receive my undivided loyalty and help. He is giving me the same wide discretion as the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff. The latter (through Colonel Logan) wires, however, to-day that the Commander-in-Chief is issuing special instructions that in all my work involving negotiations and relations

admirable safeguards and advantages of normal business organization, and yet not destroy that which is above all things important, the system which, irrespective of business considerations, supplies most quickly articles at the point of use during military operations, General Pershing originated the idea of the General Purchasing Board, American Expeditionary Force, which, while operating under some disadvantages, has applied to the purchase of army supplies in France the safeguards of normal business. It has insured collective purchasing, prevention of competition, and coördination of effort without interfering with a principle firmly established in legislation and military procedure as a result of thousands of years of evolution.

If nothing is added to the foregoing, it may seem to overemphasize the relative importance of independent agencies of army purchase and supply, as compared with the coördinating and controlling central system, which must function with it. In the American Expeditionary Force certain large conceded and evolved powers of central control, arising out of the exigencies of war and confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief, are being exercised by the General Purchasing Agent, which powers are in effect direct and not negative. It is these direct powers not used to impede, but to regulate, expedite, and widen the action of collateral agencies, which are largely responsible for what results have been accomplished through the organization of the General Purchasing Board.

That the lessons in army supply and purchase taught by this war will find their future legislative interpretation and expression, there is little question. It will be difficult legislation to frame; for unfortunately it cannot be assumed that in the administration of the system in time of peace, it will be characterized by the high degree of coöperation and disposition to subordinate individual interest which exists among the officers of a military force in active operation, welded together by the powerful pressure of military emergency, by strong leadership, and the sacredness of the cause of their common effort. But even though it may not as yet be possible to frame a law recognizing the principles upheld herein without creating some field for bureaucratic dissensions in time of peace, yet such a law in time of war will afford the competent leadership, which always develops on such an occasion, its proper engine of highest effectiveness.

CHARLES G. DAWES
Colonel, Engineers, N.A.
Chairman, General Purchasing Board
General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

with other governments I must remain in first-hand relation to the C. in C. This is because, although still a member of the Staff of the C. in C., I told him, when he called me up over the telephone, that unless the General Staff and G.H.Q. ceased to deal with me direct that he would embarrass me in my relations to Kernan; that if I am to work at my best there must be no sense on Kernan's part or mine of a divided responsibility on my part. I had before made this a matter of record by wire, as I do not want any system to spring up at the beginning of Kernan's and my association which later may lead to embarrassments.

John has to be at the front. The service of the rear must no longer divert him from his greater task. The change in staff organization is imperative to free him for more military and combative activity. But his success depends on the proper functioning of the S.O.R., and I wanted to see it start in a way that will enable me to do as good work in the future for Kernan as I have done for him in the past.

Am busy at the labor organization. My papers at the office tell the story. Try to walk outdoors an hour each day. Have to take lunch on my desk, but stay quietly in my room at night and am keeping in the best of health.

Paris, March 27, 1918

HAVE about concluded to cease these notes, as writing them in the evening consumes more or less energy which should be conserved for the momentous work of the days. I do not remember when I wrote last. The Chief of Staff, C.G.S.O.S., has asked me officially to send each day a report of activities and I have been doing it since March 9. These brief reports of the general nature of my work will preserve the record which I want to keep.

The great and long-expected German offensive is on as I write. Two days ago matters looked dark, but they are improving. Officials of the French Government sent for me and asked me to get ready to receive at any moment 40,000

militarized French laborers (miners) employed in coal mines behind the English lines from which (four mines) they said nearly one half of the coal produced by France was being taken. They are under bombardment. If these mines have to be abandoned it will be an irreparable loss. But at my conference with the Minister of Mines and his staff this afternoon, when I announced to him that the American army had completed its preparations to receive the laborers and discussed the methods, it was hoped that the emergency would not arise. My labor organization is well under way in its work. We have already secured about 6000 men monthly from the French. I am now certain of success in it. From the C. in C., the C.G.S.O.S., and General Patrick I have received words of commendation and appreciation, all of which are most welcome and stimulating. I try and pass them on to my faithful associates, so much of whose efforts and abilities are going to enhance my own prestige when it should wholly go to their own. But thus it is always in life — that credit crowns especially the head rather than the members of the body of organization.

I have a splendid group of men with me. Many interesting things happen which will never be recorded. Let me register one hope — that this war will end the custom of our country of appointing men of wealth only in our diplomatic service. Sharp has done well. — is a failure. Poor — is pathetic, from a military standpoint at least. My official papers in the latter case will indicate my reasons for this opinion. To pass an ultimatum through — is like trying to pass live steam from a locomotive boiler to the cylinders through a rubber hose. The State Department at home is virile; but their agents, such of them as we inherited from peace-times, have not well represented them with the exception of Sharp.¹ They have recognized this and are using others to help us. George McFadden, who was sent by Vance McCormick, the

¹ This only covers my personal opinion of those with whom I came in contact in army supply procurement matters.

able head of the War Trade Board, is a success and is really helping us.

In war every man who succeeds must work on his toes. God save us from leaders of society as agents to wield in time of war, for the assistance of an army, the mighty powers of the civil branches of our Government.

Secretary McAdoo cabled through the War Department to Pershing that he had recommended me for appointment as one of the directors of the proposed government finance corporation, but the C. in C. answered that my field of highest usefulness was here. I do not think I could survive being taken away from this great work of mine here, to which I am giving and shall give all that is in me. As compared with it, nothing that I have done heretofore in life seems important.

We have had a bombardment here in Paris this week, and one morning a shell fell every fifteen or twenty minutes; also some air raids from time to time. But when we think of what is going on on the western front this is not worth notice.

I really don't know whether anything I have written is worth while. Everything is on such an immense scale these days that one feels very small and humble.

*Paris, March 31, 1918
(Easter Sunday) (Evening)*

SOME things disquiet me; for instance, an offer wired this morning to me from the British Government, through my representative there, offering us 500,000 camp outfits, as the troops for which they were intended "will not be available." Cutcheon arrived in the afternoon and telephoned me. Cutcheon made his point, and if the events of war do not upset our transportation as it is doing now we will get this labor. Everything in war is liable to change overnight. Cutcheon says no word has been received from Washington as a result of the cable of Pershing and myself, but the fact that we told them in Italy that we sent it may have done a

GEORGE McFADDEN
Representative in France of War Trade Board

little stimulating. Cutcheon deserves a promotion for this service alone — to say nothing of his other splendid work.

"Big Bertha" (the long-range German gun) has been pretty active yesterday — and started again this afternoon. Went for a minute into the church where the shell killed and wounded 160 at one shot on last Friday. As I came out of the door of the church another shell exploded in the neighborhood. The crowds were kept away from the church, but the officers passed me through. We are being bombarded and "air-raided" right along these days.

I was interrupted here by an officer who came to my room with reports from the front which he said he had received from the French. These reports may be inaccurate, but they must be similar to those we shall receive later. He says the 69th New York is practically wiped out; that the Americans in the line have suffered terrible losses; that a division of the English in front of Amiens was almost destroyed (this must refer to the first two or three days); that the line is now being held. I doubt whether the 69th was in the battle. Cutcheon also telephones that Italy expects an attack on April 8 and that we must hurry our labor shipments. But the railroads are burdened to the limit with the English and French troops recalled from Italy to take part in repelling the offensive on the western front.

General Pershing made a wonderful statement when he offered our army to the French. He made it in his own characteristic way. His sincerity will ring through the world.¹

¹ Au cours d'une réunion qui fut tenue le 28 mars 1918, sur le front et à laquelle assistaient le général Pétain, M. Clemenceau, et M. Loucheur, le général Pershing s'est présenté au général Foch et lui a dit:

"Je viens pour vous dire que le peuple américain tiendrait à grand honneur que nos troupes fussent engagées dans la présente bataille. Je vous le demande en mon nom et au sien. Il n'y a pas en ce moment d'autre question que de combattre. L'infanterie, l'artillerie, l'aviation, tout ce que nous avons est à vous. Disposez-en comme il vous plaira. Il en viendra encore d'autres, aussi nombreux qu'il sera nécessaire.

"Je suis venu tout exprès pour vous dire que le peuple américain serait fier d'être engagé dans la plus belle bataille de l'Histoire."

He called me by telephone yesterday to congratulate me on my labor work and I told him how the French officers had come to my office with tears in their eyes to express their appreciation of his statement to Foch. We do not know what a day will bring forth — except that men will die for duty. Thank God for our American soldiers! They will not have died in vain, whatever comes.

Sunday evening, March 31
(continued on arriving from Davison's)

TOOK dinner with Harry Davison and his Red Cross staff at Perkins' apartments. He has done a great work and the Red Cross coöperation with the army has been wonderful. We are on the eve of great changes. My work is so entirely engrossing that I have not time even to ask any one about outside happenings during the daytime, and at night-time I seldom see any one. My news from the front is never very quick unless it concerns some need of action on my part, and then it is immediate. One cannot be an onlooker and observer and do his work right at the same time. Therefore, as a rule I have only written about the things I know of my own personal knowledge. Everything is on the verge of momentous change. All I know is that we have done and shall do the best we can.

Paris, April 13, 1918

From: The General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F.
Subject: Military control, allied service of supply.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

From the time that you landed in France you have exerted an influence for coördination of effort and centralization of authority on inter-Ally activity which has had the most far-reaching results. You have exerted this influence among the Allies during the time that you were creating a coördinating

and centralizing system in your command. To carry out the purpose of the centralization of purchase and supply in your own army, to become connected with which effort you called me from St. Nazaire, you have as a matter of fact devised the plan the extension of which to the entire Allied operations would seem now vitally essential to Allied success in the war. What I am to suggest to you arises from conclusions based upon knowledge and experience gained in the position in which you have placed me. Even with the conviction which I have of the vital importance of the matter, I should hesitate to call it to your attention, were it not for your constant demonstration of the desire to subordinate everything, including your own personal authority as an independent commander, to the common purpose of an Allied victory. To willingly sacrifice individual authority and individual prestige in time of emergency for the sake of a common cause is the highest test of greatness and one which, in all your actions over here, you have stood. The power and influence of the great people of the United States, and their assets in men and material with which to secure victory, are in the hands of the President and yourself, and you have rightly interpreted their spirit when you notified General Foch to do with you and your army as he might desire. In this offer you have already taken the step, the proper carrying-out of which I am going to suggest in this letter. The peculiar position of the United States in this situation, including your own relation thereto, is such that upon the initiative of our Government alone is it possible to accomplish it.

The general proposition is this, that just as there is now a unified military command of the Allies at the front — in other words, a merging and consolidation of three distinct independent military authorities into one military authority (General Foch) — there must be a corresponding merging of all separate individual authority of the Allies, in reference to the service of supply, into one military authority responsible to the corresponding military authority at the front.

One is just as necessary as the other. In fact, for every argument for the necessity of the Foch command at the front, there exist two arguments for a similar authority for supply and transportation in the rear. I mean by this, supplies from America, supplies from England, supplies from France, and the land and sea transportation therefor, warehousing and handling thereof. The Foch command at the front necessitates similar control of the rear, and in this case the rear means France, England, the United States, and perhaps Italy. Before discussing the method of accomplishing this, let me illustrate, in a manner which has no doubt often occurred to you, its overwhelming importance. The United States is at this time using an immense amount of tonnage for the purpose of building enormous warehouses and dockage facilities. It is doing this notwithstanding the warehouses of France and England are being emptied and will continue to grow emptier. The French Government has used to a very large extent private warehouses for storing of supplies. Owing to the steadily lessening amount of supplies there is a large amount of French warehouse capacity now idle, and at the same time we are proceeding, at the heavy expense of current tonnage, on plans to immensely increase our warehouse facilities. Who is there, with authority to act, to determine from a bird's-eye view the relation of existing English and French warehouse capacity in France to the present warehousing and transportation projects of the A.E.F.? It cannot be done, except in a haphazard and inefficient way, unless by one man with military authority extending over all the Allies. This man, for the same reason that led to the selection of General Foch, must be a Frenchman, and England and the United States must accept him. He must be given exactly the same authority toward the ocean and land transportation, engineering and supply activities of the entire Allied forces, which you have given me in connection with purchase and supply and certain other activities of the A.E.F., his authority being created by the same method. The posi-

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tion of General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F., you built up by a system of compelling the partial cession of independent authority. The weight of your own great powers and personality was thrown into the effort of compelling the creation of this authority, and when any independent head showed signs of not recognizing the necessity for it or bending to it, you broke him on the cross. What has made the success of the organization of my office is its now unquestioned power and authority over independent agencies. I never have had a meeting of the General Purchasing Board except on minor matters such as the distributing of office space or matters relating to the collection of information — never on the determination of action. Our organization is military. The reason why our Allied boards fail is because action has to be by a board and not by an individual. The organization of the entire transportation and supply of the Allies must be military in its nature and not based upon the principles of either oligarchy or democracy. I do not have to argue this to a man like you. Sometime after this war is over get Herodotus and read the discussion of the seven Persian Generals when they were riding horseback on their way to Persia, discussing the best form of government for them to set up in the place of the monarchy of an assassinated king. If we do not have military management and military control, we may fail and a German army at the ports may save us the trouble of unloading some of our engineering material from ships, thus devoted, which should have been bringing men and food to have stopped our enemies where they are now. It may be that our present plans may not have to be abandoned or materially altered, but the point I make is that it is impossible, with this great multiplicity of civil boards, criss-cross authority between the Allies, and lack of coördination in supply effort, to properly determine the matter or properly act after its determination. Take the question of joint supplies. Impelled by the same emergency pressure that compelled unity of command at the front, the French and the

English are calling upon me for information as to supplies of our army, with intimations of the necessity of pooling, etc. I am working the best I can in coördination with the French and English in all these matters, but I am in a position where I realize that these questions can only be settled, in time to be of avail, by military authority, which, gathering its information, acts, and does not discuss. Who knows to-day, considering the Allied forces as one army, whether or not the great supplies of steel, oil, barbed wire, rubber tires, chloroform, sugar, picks and shovels, forage, clothing, etc., existing in France, England, and the United States are being marshaled in Foch's rear by the quickest routes to proper points, to warehouses built or to be built, considering both present and future needs and the present military emergency? In this present great military emergency shall we again pursue the time-worn policy of appointing an Allied board to secure this information, and then, after long delay, subject the self-evident conclusions arising therefrom to the discussion of three separate authorities, influenced by personal or national considerations, personal ambitions, and counter-purposes?

In writing this way I almost feel as if I was insulting your intelligence, who have been the chief leader and have made the greatest personal sacrifice in the effort to apply remedies for this sort of business. If the suggestions herein you cannot force into adoption with the weight and prestige of your country and your own personal power, then we must go back at this time to a new effort to concentrate authority in a new board of the Allies, to do by common consent and town-meeting methods that which should come at once from central military authority extending over all. No one knows better than you what this means in delay, and what delay may mean in a time like this, in a war like this. Can you not force the Allies to agree to adopt immediately the principles involved in the relations of your own military purchasing board to the entire service of supply of your own army, through

which this entire Allied supply and transportation situation shall be placed in the hands of a French military officer with the same kind of authority over the Generals in command of the different services of the rear of the Allies that your General Purchasing Agent has over the separate purchase and supply services of the American army? The authority for the French command of these services could be created by the same method through which you have placed authority in me for our purchase and supply situation in the A.E.F. The three Generals in command of the Allied rear should be coördinated and controlled by French military authority as are the members of the General Purchasing Board by the General Purchasing Agent. As in the case of the purchasing board of the A.E.F., this does not mean the radical interference with the conduct of current activities. It does not even mean the lessening of current activities. It means their proper coördination and intelligent direction, and above all it means that when once a necessity is determined, the authority is in existence to compel its immediate relief. The influence of such unified military command of the service of the rear of the Allies upon the question of tonnage, use of material, economy of construction, and general betterment of conditions, must be self-evident. To go with unified military action at the front must come unified military support at the rear. You are the only man that can bring this about. If it was anybody else than you, even under the tremendous pressure of the present emergency, I should hesitate to suggest it; for human nature is weak. Nothing but the weakness and ambition of human nature prevented the unification of military command which you have always advocated until the death of hundreds of thousands, and continued military failure brought individual and national ambition under the yoke of a common necessity involving existence itself.

General Harbord took dinner with me last night and spent the evening and I presented these views to him. He did not express himself, but I judge from his demeanor that he was

not entirely unimpressed. I understand from Harbord that you may be here within the next few days. I had intended to come to Chaumont to present verbally what I am writing here. There is probably nothing in this letter which has not already been considered by you. However, now that unification of military command at the front has been secured, I am sure that the application of your General Purchasing Board idea to the service of the rear of the Allies is that which will go further just now in bringing a successful conclusion to this war than any other thing.

CHARLES G. DAWES

Colonel, Engineers, N.A.

Paris, Monday, April 15, 1918 (11.10 P.M.)

I AM tired, but I know that if I do not make some notes of this time of crisis I shall always regret it.

Colonel Boyd called me up and arranged for General Pershing to come to the hotel for dinner with him and me. We discussed my letter of April 13¹ relative to placing — or rather having the United States make an effort to place — all the Allied service of the rear under one (French) military command to correspond with the military unification of the front, already accomplished chiefly through General Pershing's insistence and self-effacement.

I feel that the General can now, with the prestige of our country and his own prestige, successfully initiate military control of the rear — and the rear means England, France, and the United States, and perhaps Italy. My contact is very close with the whole supply and transportation system of the Allies behind the front. Emergency is forcing us to joint action now reached incompletely through a common perception of necessity all along the line of command. The time has come for joint action compelled by one military authority. National and personal ambition must make way. A unified front necessitates a unified rear. Our backs are

¹ See *ante*, pp. 84-90.

against the wall. England is fighting not only for Calais, but for Paris and a free New York. The time has come to abolish Supreme War Councils, Allied boards, town-meetings, and common consent discussions, and relegate discussions and diplomacy to their proper place — substituting military consideration and action. One man must control the rear, subject to one man who controls the front — a General, not a civilian, even though he be a prime minister.

I am sure that John agrees with me that for the Supreme War Council should be substituted a French General. I believe that John can and will bring it about and that he must bring it about if we are to win the war. He has devised in his own army, in my position, the plan which the Allies must now adopt for the control of their entire service of supply, including transportation. These matters are so important that I know what I write here must hereafter be discussed. I hope that my use of the personal pronoun may not create the impression that these ideas are more mine than John's. They are his ideas — for which ever since he has been here he has fought, for which he willingly sacrificed his independent command, for which to-day, if necessary, he would step aside. He is a great leader. I love and revere him. Whatever may be the outcome his country has had his best — unselfishly and unconditionally. Surely greatness requires no harder test than the willingness in an historical crisis to suggest supreme power for others at the expense of our own. But John never thinks of that — only the best way to accomplish it for victory's sake. He arrived from Chaumont last night. Sergeant Kilkenny delivered him my letter of the 13th on Sunday the 14th (yesterday noon). It contains a discussion of the steps which should be taken. To-morrow I am going with John and Boyd to the front, where John will address the officers of the 1st Division before they go into battle.

During the week was at Tours arranging plans for the labor corps of the A.E.F. which I am collecting and will com-

mand. So far we have gathered 12,000 men, but we should add at least 2000 per week to this number, perhaps many more. Ran down to St. Nazaire and visited for a day my old regiment. It was there that the thought occurred to me that only military unification of the rear could bring about a proper perception — and then take the action called for by it — of the relation of what we are doing and propose to do for our army as a unit to what we should do and propose to do for our army as merged with the other armies. I knew that as French warehouses were emptying we were building new ones, and that no one was in position to authoritatively coördinate the situation immediately as should be done. This idea must cover all supply effort — if we are to win.

Paris, Tuesday night, April 16, 1918

GENERAL PERSHING sent his automobile for me at 8.30 A.M., and at 9 A.M. we left for Chaumont-en-Vexin, the present headquarters of the 1st Division, Major-General Bullard commanding. Colonel Boyd and Captain de Marenches followed in a second automobile. Arrived at about 10.30. In the rear of General Bullard's headquarters were gathered the commissioned officers of the 1st Division — about 1000, I should say.¹ The General (Pershing) addressed them, as they leave for battle (any time — probably to-morrow night) — our first division to be engaged in the great struggle which is now going on. It was a solemn occasion and an historical one. It marks the real entry of our nation into actual battle. General Pershing, in a few simple words, gave his message, and that of the President and the American people, of confidence in them and what they would do to uphold the traditions of their country. General Bullard afterwards said a few

¹ As I saw these young men there came to my mind the following words from Gen. Sir A. W. Currie's order to the Canadian troops who were about to go into action: "To those who fall I say, You will not die but step into immortality. Your mothers will not lament your fate but will be proud to have borne such sons. Your names will be revered forever by your grateful country, and God will take you unto Himself."

GENERAL PERSHING ADDRESSING THE OFFICERS OF THE 1ST DIVISION AT CHAUMONT-EN-VEXIN

APRIL 16, 1918, JUST PRIOR TO THEIR ENTRY INTO BATTLE

General Robert Lee Bullard commanding the division stands at left of picture in fur coat

words. There was no effort on the part of either to be dramatic — the scene and occasion required no emphasis. They were a magnificent body of men. They are to give of their blood and young lives in the cause. They were as every American would expect them to be — calm, intensely earnest, and confident. I met many friends among the officers — Bertie McCormick among the others, who asked me to do certain things if anything happened to him. Young Mayo of Evanston was there. There we were joined by General Harbord and went to General Duncan's headquarters for lunch.

After a hurried lunch we left for General Foch's headquarters at Sarcus. He had asked Pershing to get there as soon as possible, as he had to leave at 3 P.M. to meet Haig at Abbéville. On arrival at the little town and small brick building where Foch was, the General took me in with him and introduced me to General Foch, who strikes me as very alert and very cool. I was not present at the conference, but John told me about it as we rode back to Paris together. It was in reference to our troops — what we should give and when. While we were there the guns of the French were sounding in the distance. Foch is confident.

On the way back General Pershing and I discussed *military* unification of the Allied rear much of the time. Harbord had written John of my views, but seems hesitant in his opinions of them. It *must* come, if we are to fight at our best. In this I believe the Commander-in-Chief fully and entirely concurs; but as the responsibility is upon him he must consider the matter in all its phases. No one in the A.E.F. is more in touch with the Allied supply situation than is my office, and I am feeling now a pressure of a great emergency. Let the Germans advance ten more miles and there will be no argument then. It will be done immediately. It will *have* to be done then. Then surely it ought to be done *now*. If it is the best step for relief after disaster, it is the best step now to avert it.

We arrived at John's house at about 6.30 P.M. Harbord, Boyd, and de Marenches went to dinner with me. The General went to work. He has every confidence in Foch. On most of our long ride we talked over war matters. He says he is ordering combatant troops rapidly to the front, trusting to me to fill their places by our rapidly recruiting labor corps. It was an important and solemn day. In a few days the splendid 1st Division will be in the fiercest and greatest battle of history. No one who knows them can doubt them. God be with them, and those of them so soon to die. I shall never forget them, whatever may become of them, as I saw them to-day.

*Paris, Wednesday, April 17
(Night, 11 P.M.)*

I THINK I should keep notes, for General Pershing's sake, of what he is considering and the environment under which he plans. Upon some of his decisions, soon to be made, depends the outcome of the present war, in all probability. Whatever may be the result of his decisions, this contemporaneous record of what confronts him should be made by some one. It cannot be made by him, for a man cannot be General and historian at the same time.

In the General's bedroom to-night (Rue de Varenne) — he is suffering from a cold contracted on our trip yesterday — he went over matters fully. Haig is calling him for a conference. What Haig wants is men — Americans — to be fed into his hard-pressed army. He maintains that unless he has a minimum soon of 150,000, and more later, his army may not be able to withstand the tremendous onslaught of the numerically superior enemy. He is being pressed in around the Channel ports. General Pershing must decide for himself Haig's real situation, and the full nature of the apparent emergency. The rate of destruction of men is so great that once in, the American 150,000 will be so reduced in numbers by counter-attacking that the foundation of the American

military organization now forming will be largely destroyed. If the emergency is such that it seems necessary, the men will be fed in; if the emergency seems less acute than represented, more care can be had for the relation of present American losses to the future military effectiveness of the American section of the Allied forces. The General, and he alone, must decide in the next few days to what extent immediate amalgamation of American forces into the English army is necessary. With the natural intense desire of an American and an army commander for the preservation of national and personal independence, he yet will fearlessly make any decision inconsistent with their preservation which is necessary to ultimate victory or the escape from an immediate Allied defeat. If the emergency, in his judgment, does not involve immediate Allied disaster (after a personal inspection of the battle area), he must preserve from unnecessary destruction, as far as possible for the future of the war, the existing vital germ now here of the future vast army of the United States. This is what he tells me — and whatever his action, these are the principles which will control it. It is due to him to state them now "*in medias res*." His head is very cool. His judgment will be formed from conditions and facts uninfluenced by emotionalism, politics, ambition, or personal considerations of any kind. After three hours of a visit with him alone, all of which were devoted to a discussion of the situation, I came away knowing that he is the one American to be in his present place. He says again that Foch is very confident.

Am a little worried for fear of pneumonia attacking him, and made him promise to get a doctor to-morrow if he did not feel better. He wants to start for Haig's headquarters to-morrow. John expects to have fifteen divisions by June. Men are coming rapidly. But of the men now going into the English and French battle lines it can be said that, though their numbers may be comparatively few, they may yet determine which way the balance of the nations shall swing.

Paris, Thursday night, April 18, 1918 (10.30 P.M.)

GENERAL PERSHING sent word (telephone from Colonel Boyd) this evening to come again to his house. I had had another conference with him at his house this noon on the subject of military unification of the entire Allied service of supply along the lines of my April 13 letter. Pershing in the afternoon called on Clemenceau (also Milner). He is to meet Haig to-morrow evening, but has not yet seen him in the matter of the new plan. General Pershing announced to me this evening that he had finally and definitely settled on a demand for the central military control of the Allied supply and transportation system; that he had proposed it to Clemenceau this afternoon; that the latter had immediately accepted it in principle, wondering (he said) why some one had not thought of it before; that Clemenceau had asked for a written statement of the idea for study which he (John) was preparing; that he (John) proposed to name me in his letter to the French to represent him in the formulation of the plan; that Clemenceau and he had agreed to pool for the French and Americans whether the English would come in or not (subject, of course, to approval of the President and War Department); that he (John) would see Haig to-morrow, but whether Haig approved or not would leave for England to urge it on the Government immediately after seeing Haig; that he (John) was preparing a cable¹ to the War Department

¹ The following cable was sent by General Pershing:

April 19, 1918

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D.C.

FOR the Chief of Staff, No. 953. The matter of tonnage is so vital to success of Allies that every possible ton is being cut from our requirements during the next three or four months as already indicated by reductions reported. A careful study of Allied demands for tonnage as a whole makes it evident that further reduction can be made if we pool all supplies that are in common use by Allied armies and certain reductions could also be made in supplies for civil populations of Allied countries. We have at last combined military forces under the supreme command of one man and

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

which he would send to-morrow stating his intentions and reasons and asking approval of the extension of his General Purchasing Board principle (devised by himself) to the Allied service of supply and transportation and of his demand for it.

We discussed the matter further. The idea is to put a military control and military methods in the place of civil control and civil methods which have failed. The Supreme War Council has been a supreme failure. Our idea is that a General — one man — must take the place of the Supreme War Council. The latter never gets anywhere. Every reason in the world exists for the creation of an authority sought to be reached by the Supreme War Council. It has failed to exercise it effectively. Therefore its authority must be placed where it can be properly wielded. When this plan goes into effect, it means that military authority must practically control civil activities and civil bodies; that we shall control tonnage as a necessary result of the condition created; that

should do the same thing as to supplies and war material. The appointment of many coördinating boards has led to confusion and loss of positive action. Strongly urge that supply question be placed in the hands of one military head with power to determine and decide on disposition and distribution of Allied supplies in Europe and determine what shall be shipped from United States. Much information necessary for prompt action is already available, but no one has power to decide. Supreme War Council comes in the same class with other Boards in its lack of power. One man in military control of Allied supplies is necessary. Principle involved is foundation of A.E.F. Purchasing Board. The next three or four months should at least be covered by this arrangement. The class of supplies such as Aviation (which has been taken up in my cable No. 904); munitions (as far as possible considering different calibers); coal, horses, gasoline, oats, hay, meat, flour, shoes, sugar, wagons, tentage, demountable barracks, lumber, timber, supply dépôts, and warehouses are the principal items that could be pooled. Such pooling would affect material saving in our construction programme including railroad construction. Have presented this suggestion to M. Clemenceau, who approves. Shall go to London to adjust questions relative to handling our troops that go to British. While there shall submit pooling plan to Mr. Lloyd George. Have designated Colonel Dawes, who made this study, to confer with French representatives to be named by M. Clemenceau. Shall report progress later.

PERSHING

order will come out of this chaos at the rear, and that we shall commence to win the war.

I do not want to criticize English obstinacy — thank God for it! It saved the Marne — it is saving the Channel ports. It has justified and glorified itself in the blood of hundreds of thousands. But that obstinacy must now be broken. It must not lose us this war after having made victory possible. I pray God that the English may come in with the French and Americans without delay on this plan. If they do not, we must go ahead as best we can. But no other man can so forcibly present to the English their duty as General Pershing. In every great crisis where the great principles of human freedom have hung in the balance the great and fearless leader has appeared. In this one it is John.

Paris, April 21, 1918 (Sunday night)

THE General sent me copies of his letter to Clemenceau and his cable to the War Department before he left for England. Am giving thought to the method of presenting plan to the French if summoned in accordance with the General's suggestion to Clemenceau.¹

My mind has been on so many important things that this evening it reverts to some of the amusing things of which one must train one's self to think in these times of horror. With all his grasp of the great things of military operation and organization, General Pershing by no means overlooks the important relations of some little things to a general scheme. His mind is certainly open to details, no matter how impressive the surroundings. My own somewhat pronounced indifference to certain military conventions, born as often of ignorance as of intention, — though not always, — is a matter at times of some embarrassment to him. After he had finished his conference with General Foch, he was standing across the road from me and some Frenchmen, with General Harbord, waiting for Foch to take his automobile for his

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, April 19. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 101.

trip to Abbéville to see Haig. This was last week. I saw him looking at me, notwithstanding the sound of the cannon, and the general surroundings, with the look of mingled friendliness, admonition, and concern which characterizes his expression during some of my interviews with his better-disciplined military associates. It led me to make a hasty self-appraisal of my attitude, in which, however, I could surmise no fault. He spoke to Harbord and the latter walked across the road to me. As Harbord carefully buttoned up my overcoat, which was opened, including the hooks at the top, he murmured in my ear, "This is a hell of a job for the Chief of Staff — but the General told me to do it." Some soldiers told me that in England there was a kodak taken of John with one breast-pocket unbuttoned. For this picture I am going to search that country — to use it for justifiable defensive personal purposes.

Paris, Friday, April 26, 1918

I MUST keep note of these important things. General Pershing returned from England and I saw him to-day before and after Loucheur called on him in reference to his letter to Clemenceau relative to joining the supply services of the Allies. It was agreed between Pershing and Loucheur that Clemenceau was to answer General Pershing's letter naming Loucheur to meet me to discuss methods. Before leaving for England, Pershing saw Haig and told him of the plan. Haig immediately began to raise objections. I do not like to criticize this great soldier. It may be unfair to assume that his reluctance to cede military authority either at the front or rear is in any way based upon the thought of its effect upon his personal prestige. I shall not do so — I really do not feel sure about it; but I feel a pride in the fact that no one can have such doubts about the personal unselfishness of our own leader. I feel as sure of the willingness of General Pershing to make a sacrifice of personal prestige for the sake of the common good as I should of Abraham Lincoln if he

were in his place. And that is the most any one could say. General Pershing said that when he took up the matter with Lloyd George the latter agreed as to its advisability; but stated the difficulties with which he had contended in analogous efforts arising out of the perpetual strength of the English *status quo* in matters of authority and its location. Lloyd George spoke of General Nash, the English director of transportation, as one who would certainly favor it. Pershing said that he was going to write Lloyd George (this was just after his interview at his house with Loucneur this afternoon) stating that we — the Americans and French — were going ahead anyway.

From what he said it is General Pershing's present intention, after the plan is approved by him and Clemenceau, after being formulated by Loucheur and myself, to place upon me the responsibility of being his representative with the French which will automatically make my organization the instrument of coördination so far as the A.E.F. is concerned. He doubts whether the French will part with any large part of civil control of supply to their own military organization — that is, any considerably larger control than at present. If so, I must accept at first the present French machinery without much change as that with which to start coöperation along the new lines. But it is the General's hope and my own that once in continual contact with French authority, their views and my own as to the future steps best to be taken may not prove to be very divergent. Surely after we take some of the most important steps, the perception of their mutual benefit in the increase of our military effectiveness must make it difficult, and increasingly difficult as time goes on, for personal ambition and ulterior purpose to keep in existence machinery interfering with them. We have our backs to the wall. Each one must do his part. If he does not willingly do it, he must be made to do it. And there is no force in the world so potent in time of emergency and great crisis as a clear reason, fearlessly stated.

Gov. of
California

LOUIS LOUCHEUR
French Minister of Armament

As a memorandum for the General's consideration I gave him my line of thought as to the way in which to proceed *immediately* — for if we leave this thing to the Supreme Council or to general discussion before decision, it will as usual require a few more defeats and thousands of lives to bring about its adoption.

Yesterday went over the graphics of the A.E.F. with Logan, who is here. Logan has a great mind. But no one has at the same time not only the comprehensive grasp of the problem but the power of using his knowledge in correct decision and action that General Pershing has.

Paris, April 27, 1918

It is midnight and I ought to go to bed, but I shall regret it some time if I do not make contemporaneous notes of these things. Have just returned after five hours with General Pershing. At dinner the General and I put — through "a course of sprouts" in endeavoring to get a more virile coöperation from him in helping us to secure army necessities — in particular the Italian militarized labor. He agreed to another effort. In reply to a vigorous statement by General Pershing of the views he would like to present to —, who should be aggressive instead of pathetically mild in time of emergency, — said, "You might as well throw baseballs at a feather bed." The General and I, when we were alone again, discussed the military unification of the Allied rear. He is firm that it should be wholly military. Before Loucheur sees me the General (in his mind to-night) has decided to write notifying General Foch that he is ready to place our supply service at *his* disposal — thus tending to short-circuit what Loucheur is certain to propose, that American military machinery be coördinated with the semi-military and civil French machinery of supply. The idea is to establish by this letter a *status quo* with the French internally favorable to complete militarization in place of one now unfavorable to it.

Listened to the verbal report to the General of Major

Clark, liaison officer at French G.H.Q., in from the front. The General also read me his written report. The French are feeling bad about the loss of Mount Kemmel; are criticizing the British against whom the whole German army is pressing; are confident, however, that the line will hold; feel (claim) that the British are holding 700,000 men under arms in Great Britain which should be in the fighting line (to which General Pershing remarked that that was absurd); feel that time for counter-attacking is almost at hand. General Pershing told Clark to state to French G.H.Q. that they were in error relative to the number of English armed troops in England, and that the six American divisions now coming to the English, which the French would like to have in their line, come in English tonnage under an arrangement made some months ago with Pétain's acquiescence.

I write all this as indicating the atmosphere in which we live. Pershing gave me estimate of losses thus far in the offensive as about 400,000 Germans, 250,000 for the English and 60,000 for the French. The use of tonnage for troop-carrying purposes almost exclusively should enable the English and ourselves to bring over from the United States 200,000 to 250,000 troops per month for three months after the six divisions are landed. By fall, therefore, the United States should have 1,000,000 men here. Pershing told Clark to tell this to the French. He received detailed report from Clark as to location, movements, etc., of our American troops.

This morning met members of the U.S. Shipping Board — Stevens, Sherman, Rublee, and Morrow. Called on them at Crillon Hotel. Afterwards they called on me at my headquarters. Received telegram from Smithers, H.Q., S.O.S., that War Department has authorized the organization of 200 administrative labor companies by me. For this they will give me 133 Captains, 133 First Lieutenants, 134 Second Lieutenants, 1000 Sergeants, and 2000 Corporals. With these officers I can handle 33,000 to 50,000 labor troops easily. Have already secured about 15,000.

Paris, Sunday, April 28, 1918

TOOK lunch with General Pershing and spent most of the afternoon with him. At lunch were also General Crozier, Colonel Mott, and Colonel Boyd. Crozier, who had been to Italy, gave his opinions (which were favorable to action) on the matter of sending American troops to Italy, which General Pershing is again considering in connection with our conference with ——— last night when we again urged that the United States use its advances to the Italians in assistance to us in getting labor. General Pershing, of course, cannot be determined in his decision by the comparatively unimportant matter of the labor; but since a favorable decision would probably settle the labor matter, if it is to be made, now is an opportune time. General Pershing discussed it at length in all its phases — from the standpoint of the immediate effect on Italian morale; from the standpoint of its ultimate effect on morale if undue expectations are aroused by the coming of a small number of troops at first and the fact that troops sufficient to be a military factor cannot be spared; from the point of view of the French and English (since we get more troops for the front by using labor from Italy to replace soldiers now at work, they will probably agree); from the standpoint of its possibly creating a false impression of the contemplated undue diffusion of American troops. After full discussion he was inclined to take the action after notifying Foch, feeling that the immediate effect on Italian morale is important enough to take some chances on the future — especially since the Italians are clamorous for the step.¹

When the General and I were by ourselves again we took up the procedure in the supply unification plan. He is sending Colonel Mott out to see Foch, and get his ideas as to the extent to which he (Pershing) shall insist on French military authorities as the coördinators as distinguished from civil.

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, April 29. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 106.

It was agreed that at my first interview with Loucheur I should handle the subject gingerly — as we are so anxious for complete supply coördination that we do not wish to make any ultimatums or propositions until every phase of the situation can be first carefully considered.

Paris, Friday, May 3, 1918 (night)

HARBORD called by telephone from Chaumont yesterday morning saying that Clemenceau had asked me to meet Loucheur. Accordingly met him (Loucheur) at his office (Ministry Armament) at 4 P.M. yesterday. Took Lieutenant Chauncey McCormick as interpreter and Captain Barrington Moore to make notes of our agreements and discussion. Interview lasted about three quarters of an hour. I emphasized the military control feature. Loucheur very cordial in every way. Reached the agreement, which Moore has outlined, for submission to General Pershing and M. Clemenceau. Loucheur said he would not take the place — said Clemenceau desired an American. I strongly stated the reasons for the selection of a Frenchman, and it was agreed upon. Loucheur agreed to start between the French and Americans, inviting the British. Loucheur this morning sent his aide, Lieutenant de Neufize, to change slightly the first draft of our report eliminating my reference to him as an acceptable choice. Took my copy to Pershing (who arrived late last night) at his house this morning. Spent most of the morning with him. He had taken up the matter with Clemenceau and Lloyd George at Abbéville on his trip and had arranged for a meeting at Clemenceau's office between him, General Travers-Clarke, B.E.F. Quartermaster-General, and myself for Monday afternoon, 3 P.M. The General told me he expected hereafter to be occupied largely at the front, leaving Allied coördination as affecting the rear under my direction. Discussed means for this. My suggestion was to form a new division of the General Staff — say Allied coördination division — making me Assistant Chief of Staff

at the head of it, reporting to him. I could then order acts of coördination through directions, "by order General Pershing," without taking additional rank or being put in an unnecessarily conspicuous position, which I am very anxious to avoid, as I want to last through the war, and not sacrifice the permanent substance, for the temporary semblance, of power. I would then form my staff and coördinate our resources, construction, and transportation with our allies. The matter was left open until we shall have discussed it further with the Allies. Pershing says Clemenceau agrees to military control. Pershing, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George all seem to want to dodge the delays and discussion of the Allied Council and get started as soon as possible. I think nothing can stop it now — even if the Allied Council tried to *expedite* it.

Pershing told of his decision to send troops to Italy for the sake of influencing Italian morale — the French and English having approved. He notified Orlando at Abbéville. May start with a regiment and expects to build up to a division which was more than Orlando had hoped. He was somewhat impatient at the attitude of the French about our troops with the British as taken at the Abbéville meeting, and so expressed himself there. Expects 1,000,000 Americans in his army in France by the end of June.

If we get the Service of Supply of the Allies in a firm military control so as properly to use our resources, to match the military unification of control at the front, it will be the sure beginning of victory.¹

Varaigne called on me at my room to tell me this evening that as a result of my visit with him, Jackson, and that good friend of our army, M. Ganne, on the President of the Council, Jeanneney, the other day, the French had allotted us 5000 additional laborers in addition to a liberal percentage of German prisoners. This will give me a total of over 20,000 laborers in my organization. Am glad I succeeded in it, with

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, May 4. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 113.

Jackson's able assistance, before we amalgamate with the Allies. Labor, however, is one of the first things I hope to pool.

Gates took dinner with me. Got Cutcheon's well-deserved promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel at last.

Paris, May 9, 1918 (night)

I SHALL not make any extended notes of the inter-Ally conference of May 6 called to consider General Pershing's proposition to unify under military command the Allied rear, since Captain Moore's notes give a fair but very condensed summary of the meeting which consumed over three hours. I had assumed that only the B.E.F. Quartermaster-General, whom somebody had told me was General Travers-Clarke, would represent England, but when we arrived England had Cowans (Lt.-Gen., Q.M.G.), General Crofton Atkins, General Cannot, Sir Andrew Weir, and Sir J. W. Curry — a good battery well entrenched in conservatism. The Italian Q.M.G. for Italian troops in France was present. Colonel Payot, of Foch's staff, Jeanneney, President of French Council of Ministers, and Ganne were there for the French. I appeared alone for the American army representing General Pershing. Had Captain Moore there to take notes and Chauncey McCormick as interpreter. By vigor and direct and forcible statement I soon dissipated the formal atmosphere which the weak always allow to retard their purposes. Having the proposition to present gave me the direction of the argument for the most part.

Realizing that I must shake the English up thoroughly to start with, if we are to land anywhere, I tried to keep the minds of the conferees on the necessities of the immediate rear of the armies in coördination, and to prevent the English from focusing attention on the difficulties of a more widespread application of an unquestioned principle. I don't want to give an unfair picture of the attitude of these able leaders of England, but it was distinctly pessimistic as to the

COMMANDANT HENRI A. VARAIGNE, of the French Army, was an invaluable friend and assistant of the American Army in France. An aviator in the battle of the Marne, an experienced staff officer, an accomplished and brave soldier, he became, as chief of the staff of French officers attached to my headquarters, the first interpreter of our supply necessities to the French Army and Government. His devotion to the common cause, his honesty and sincerity of purpose, his great success in securing us needed help in times of acute crisis, his ever-present sympathy and encouragement, endeared him to every American with whom he came in contact.

He received the Distinguished Service Medal of the United States.

C. G. D.

COMMANDANT HENRI A. VARAIGNE

chances of success in securing agreement on the plan, to such an extent that one must assume on their part — or at least on the part of the members of the conference — an innate opposition. While agreeing on principles, they raised innumerable practical objections and difficulties. However, I did not become discouraged because little progress was made at this first meeting; but immediately went to work preparing an argument to the conference for the plan addressed to M. Jeanneney, the Chairman.¹ This I sent out to General Pershing for suggestion and revision yesterday, and this evening received it back with his comments. I will to-morrow modify my references to the English as the General suggests and send it in for the consideration of the English and French Governments.

The General approves the argument. This afternoon at his request I met M. Loucheur, Minister of Armament, and discussed the situation. He agrees with me fully — and will send a representative to the next conference to support me. In the meantime he and Clemenceau will consult and endeavor to expedite independent agreement between the French and American armies for S.O.S. coördination. The English at bottom are so splendid and fine that I do not fear for their full coöperation eventually. But they are careful, as they should be. My headquarters move from the old Hôtel Méditerranée to the Elysée Palace Hotel on the Champs Elysées to-morrow.

Letter to M. Jeanneney

Paris, May 8, 1918

TO M. JEANNENEY, President, Inter-Ally Conference of May 6, 1918 (called to consider General Pershing's proposition and plan for military unification of the Allied Services of Supply).

RELATIVE to the three questions the conference proposed

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, May 7, May 11. Appendix C, vol. II, pp. 116, 118.

at its first meeting and in accordance with your suggestion that comments be filed thereon, I submit the following:

General Pershing's plan, in so far as it involves the coördination of military supply, transportation, and construction now located in the immediate Allied rear, is susceptible of adoption by the military commands as distinguished from the civil as a strictly military measure of coördination involving activities now wholly under military control, but as yet not coördinated between the three armies. To this extent the plan may be considered as presented by the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., as a measure of military action affecting the immediate rear, and therefore as only necessary in this particular phase to be discussed in its relation to the several existing military as distinguished from civil authorities.

The plan in its more general application, involving the coördination of activities now under civil control, must be first approved by the Government of the United States as well as by England and France. But since the first conference on this subject of prime importance has developed some hesitation as to their authority on the part of members of the conference, I deem it my duty as General Pershing's representative at this conference to place on file the following statement as applying simply to the coördination of the immediate activities of the Allied rear now possible under his plan if approved by the existing military authorities alone.

Before my submission to the conference of General Pershing's plan looking to the military unification of the services of the Allied rear to match the military unification at the front, he had obtained the verbal acceptance of the principle by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. The duty of this conference, therefore, was to devise a plan, not to suggest obstacles to its consummation — to which most of its time was devoted at the first meeting. The letter of General Pershing, addressed to myself and submitted to the conference, considered together with the detailed statement of his plan, indicated that his desire is such to secure military uni-

fication of the Services of Supply of the Allied rear, that while he would prefer final authority to be located in one man he would acquiesce in an agreement by which the military authority of the proposed committee could be set in motion only by the unanimous consent of its three members. This suggestion should of itself sweep away the objections raised at this conference to this procedure. General Pershing's contention is that if British and American lives can be trusted to French control so can British and American material. This military central control of Supply Service is as essential to maximum effectiveness of effort against the enemy as unified military control of the front. The recent reverses during the first days of the last offensive were sufficient to sweep away the arguments against Allied military unification suggested by national pride and prestige for the last four years. With the difficult months ahead of us, and the urgency of unity in action and mutual coöperation, minor considerations should not now be raised against a plan involving a principle so indisputably correct that it is immediately adopted upon presentation by those first in authority and committed to us to work out and not to combat.

Given a military control committee of three, one each representing the British, French, and American armies, with authority through military channels to collect full information and then with power to put into effect by military order a unanimous decision improving the coördination of the rear, what harm would result? If it did nothing else this military committee would be a clearing-house of information, thus facilitating the now clumsy efforts, born of overwhelming necessity, to coördinate the activities of the Allied rear. Each Government retaining its control over its member could, through his veto power, save from any possible alteration its entire system of intermingled civil and military control so jealously exploited in the discussions of this conference. So vast are the possible accomplishments of good from the military unification of the Allied Services of Supply, under

one man or military committee, extending throughout England, France, Italy, and the United States, properly to be regarded as the "rear" in this effort, that we are instinctively prone to dwell constantly on the impossibility of obtaining it, overlooking the possibilities of obtaining most important advantages in the immediate rear of the armies without necessarily cutting any governmental system of internal red tape and using only existing military authority.

As charged by General Pershing with the duty of making recommendations to him looking toward the coördination with our allies of the army activities of the American rear, if this military committee is formed, and even if contrary to his advice its military authority could not be set in motion except by unanimous consent, I would ask and expect from it unanimous action resulting in the transmission of the necessary orders as follows:

- (1) Ordering information from the departments concerned of the three armies as to the status of the present warehouse capacity of the three armies in France, and if it is found sufficient to provide for the present and future requirements of the Allied armies considered as one, an order to the American army not to waste tonnage, material, work, and men in building new warehouses where sufficient empty warehouse space exists.
- (2) Ordering information from the concerned departments of the three armies as to the total present unloading capacity of the docks of France (including transportation from the docks to the front of the unified Allied army) and the amount of material now being transported to the front from these docks so that it may be intelligently determined whether the American army is building unnecessary docks and thus diverting material, work, and men from more important service.
- (3) Information ordered from the three concerned departments of the total amount of civilian and militarized labor now at the disposal of the three armies, so that

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

THE HIGH COMMAND AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THE CHIEF
OF STAFF AND THE ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL

Front row, left
C. of S.; Gen.
Gen. G. V. H.
A. D. Andrew
Brig.-Gen. D.

Maj.-Gen. J. W. McAndrew,
3 (Operations Section); Brig.-
row, left to right: Brig.-Gen.
inge, Deputy Chief of Staff;
Davis, A. G.

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A COMMITTEE OF THREE

if it were ascertained that the present supply, if used in proper coördination, is sufficient, orders be issued for its proper use and for the A.E.F. to cease the continued importation of civilian labor from adjoining countries, thus putting a further tax upon the local resources of France.

- (4) Ordering information from the concerned departments of the three armies as to the present status of motor transports in France, and, upon the development of the situation, the issuance of immediate orders preventing any one army from consuming shipping space by bringing camions to France when sufficient are available or can be manufactured here for the unified army at the front.
- (5) Information with appropriate orders as to whether central distributing dépôts for the joint use of the three armies do not now exist to that extent which will render possible an intelligent reduction of American construction projects in this connection.
- (6) Information with appropriate orders as to the collective situation of freight cars and locomotives, the use to which they are being put at present, whether economical to that effect as would render it impossible for us to cut down requisitions of this nature from America.
- (7) Obtaining information regarding normal supplies common to the three armies with a view to their equitable distribution as needed, in order to prevent unnecessary use of tonnage, to accumulate unusual quantities during the present crisis in shipping.
- (8) And many more subjects of importance — the above being only a few important illustrations.

That the members of this conference, instead of devoting themselves to a discussion of the methods necessary to carry out a plan accepted in principle by the Prime Ministers of England and France and proposed by the Commander-in-

control. The American Commander-in-Chief in his plan places his at the disposal of the Allies. The present lack of military coördination of the Allied Services of Supply of the immediate rear of the armies prevents the maximum use of our military resources against a thoroughly consolidated enemy. If as military men we fail to correct this we are responsible in blood and lives and possibly defeat — and we alone.

CHARLES G. DAWES

Colonel, Engineers, N.A.

Paris, Sunday night, May 12, 1918

By my letter, revised and improved by General Pershing, to M. Jeanneney, President of the Inter-Allied Conference, called to discuss the military unification of the rear of the armies, I think I have taken away the last ground for English opposition to it. At the conference the English evidently feared to depart from the *status quo*. Any one who desires to maintain the military and economic *status quo* of the Allies has, I notice, a desire to refer the matter under discussion to the Supreme War Council. By the time that august body is ready to apply a remedy, the need for it has generally passed. The patient dies before the doctors can decide as to the medicine he needs. But my letter, it seems to me, makes it impossible for England not to acquiesce.

Cravath came over from England to get information about the General's plan and to ascertain what relation it had to the field of activities of certain civil boards and plans. He asked me to meet him, Loucheur, and Clémentel (Minister of Commerce, France) at Loucheur's office yesterday morning, which I did. I explained that while the principle of the plan could be beneficially extended over civil coöperation with the armies, the idea was to inaugurate it in military fields and by military authority alone. It therefore would not interfere with the civil work now going on, but only make it more effective by a more intelligent and proper use

NEWTON D. BAKER
Secretary of War

of its results. I think — for he so stated — that I satisfied this able and useful man, and turned him from a tendency to question into an advocate of English coöperation under the agreement — or suggestion, rather — that a unanimous agreement of the members of the proposed board be essential to put its military authority into action. Cravath has large influence with the English, and great ability and energy. I value most highly his judgment.

This (Sunday) evening General Patrick, whom General Pershing has asked to assume charge of aviation, dined with me, having stopped on his way back to Tours from Chaumont to ask some questions as to the ability and qualifications of certain men whom he contemplates using in reorganization of the Aviation Department — the best and one of the most serious organization problems of our service. Am glad it is going into General Patrick's hands.

Paris, Thursday, May 16, 1918 (night)

ON Thursday afternoon the second meeting of our inter-Ally conference on the subject was held. The English were not present, having filed a written statement of their views. I had also filed mine, having previously delivered it to M. Jeanneney and to M. Loucheur, who had it when they prepared the French note which was presented at the meeting of the conference. M. Clemenceau was present and presided, stating that he had come because of the great importance of our subject to his Government. I took Captain Moore, who acts as my secretary, and my nephew Gates with me to the meeting. The principal French ministers, some French military officers, and General Merrone, the Italian Quartermaster-General in France, were present. I sat by M. Clemenceau, who read the French note, which was our plan of a military committee acting by unanimous agreement (in order to bring in the English in the future), and an added plan for extension of the principle as General Pershing had suggested to civil authorities and activities, which, of

course, was not possible of authoritative acceptance without the approval of the United States Government. Was very careful not to commit General Pershing any further than his military authority extended. The discussion extended over some two hours. Arranged at the meeting for the French and Americans to proceed on unification of their rear so far as military authority will permit. Also arranged with Loucheur for meeting at which to provide for pooling behind our lines of American and French ammunition and wired Colonel Moseley, of the General Staff, 4th Bureau, A.E.F., to meet Loucheur, the French artillery military authorities from the front, and myself, at Loucheur's office this afternoon. At this conference this afternoon ammunition pooling behind the lines was agreed upon. We also discussed the details of carrying out our general plan which I am to discuss with General Pershing to-morrow. Arranged with Loucheur to hold the announcement by the French to the English Government of the plan as agreed upon by the French and ourselves at the Tuesday meeting until I could revise it to be certain that in its statement to the English it clearly stated the limits and nature of the military authority under which the military control committee proposed to start functioning.

Am in so many important conferences that I despair of making these notes anywhere near complete, but hope to keep up a general outline of the methods by which we proceed.

Nearly 1000 men gassed and killed and wounded out of one regiment in the 1st Division the other day — mustard gas. Air raid on Paris last night — not much to speak of. They have become more infrequent. The long-range gun, too, seems to have been put out of commission by the French artillery. The General has been at the front — wires he will arrive here to-morrow. We are located in the Elysée Palace Hotel with the General Purchasing Board and my Staff, having moved from the Méditerranée. General

Patrick called on me the other evening to discuss aviation which he will soon take over.

Paris, May 23, 1918

I HAVE not written for some days because I wanted to record the emergence of General Pershing's plan from the fog which, after its adoption by the conference, was thrown around it by the reports of the conference drawn up by the French which did not clearly outline the division between what was adopted and what was simply discussed. Yesterday General Pershing drew up a simple restatement of the plan and took it to Clemenceau and the two signed it. This paper will go to the British and Italian Governments in place of the statements prepared by Loucheur and Lavit which had been submitted to me for suggestion and revision. As soon as I received Lavit's statement, which it was proposed to send to the English, I realized that in effect it subordinated principles to the discussion of details to carry them out, and that if it went to the English, even corrected so as to make it clear that the American *military* authority alone as distinguished from civil was being coördinated, it would probably cause serious if not fatal obstructions to their acquiescence. Accordingly in an effort to clarify and simplify things I prepared a report to General Pershing of what actually was agreed upon at the conference, which I submitted to Loucheur, and which in its statements was revised by the General himself. Loucheur at first agreed to my report as being a proper form of statement after some suggestions had been incorporated to make the plan accord with French administrative authority. The idea was to have the report go to the English as simplifying things.

But the next day Loucheur, who had taken the report to submit to Clemenceau, sent me another statement drawn by himself likewise including details which might induce dangerous delay through discussion even to the extent of endangering the adoption of the principle. So I spent an anxious

evening with the General (Pershing), and found him even more convinced than myself that the statement which Loucheur prepared might if presented destroy the chances of the plan's adoption by all. The General decided to make an effort with Clemenceau to clear the fog away. On May 21 (day before yesterday) Colonel DeGrailly, representing Loucheur, called on me stating that upon reconsideration Loucheur thought his own statement inexpedient, and that the principles having been adopted we had better leave the details of the method of applying them to our mutual agreement as time developed their need without endeavoring to make a preliminary agreement upon an outline of them. This wise decision made by Loucheur himself lifted a weight of anxiety from me, as the whole plan after this terrible month of effort was hanging in the balance again.¹

At 4.30 P.M. (May 21) General Pershing called to go over our new headquarters for the first time, and I had Colonel DeGrailly state Loucheur's suggestion to him.

The next morning, May 22, General Pershing called me to his house and showed me the restatement which he proposed to present to Clemenceau in the afternoon (or late in the morning). It was admirable, as is everything John writes and studies. In the afternoon he telephoned that Clemenceau had signed it with him and sent me a copy.

May 22, 1918

It is hereby agreed among the Allied Governments subscribing hereto:

1. That the principle of unification of military supplies and utilities for the use of the Allied armies is adopted.
2. That in order to apply this principle and as far as possible coördinate the use of utilities and the distribution of supplies among the Allied armies, a Board consisting

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, May 19, 24, 25, and June 4. Appendix C, vol. II, pp. 121, 123, 125, 126.

of representatives of each of the Allied armies is to be constituted at once.

3. That the unanimous decision of the Board regarding the allotment of material and supplies shall have the force of orders and be carried out by the respective supply agencies.
4. That further details of the organization by which the above plan is to be carried out shall be left to the Board, subject to such approval by the respective Governments as may at any time seem advisable.

We agree to the above and wish it to be submitted to the British and Italian Governments.

(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU
JOHN J. PERSHING

What I have gone through this last week has been really the hardest work I have done over here. It has nearly used up my energy — for a few days, anyway. And now must come the building-up of the new and great organization which properly effected should do so much toward bringing us an Allied victory. Real power should be camouflaged by a wise man as is a heavy cannon. To expose it unnecessarily is only to attract hostile artillery. This is the principle upon which I will try to work in forming this new organization. Only when power becomes so great that the unmasking of it demonstrates the futility of any attempt to oppose it is it safe to depart from this principle. Even then, though it be safe, it is not wise. Vanity is often the assassin of a useful career.

Paris, Sunday, June 2, 1918

WE are at the height of a military crisis. It is all a question of the ability of the Allies to hold out until we can come in with full strength. General Pershing is here for the Versailles Council. If I had time to write them, it would be interesting some time to read notes of what he tells me from day to day

about his matters and the general situation; but I cannot do so and cannot even write as I should of my own work and duties. Everything here including work and duty is for me now on a vast scale.

One week ago on General Pershing's orders I started for England to endeavor to persuade that Government to join in our plan for military unification of the Allied Supply Service. Took Dwight Morrow,¹ of the Shipping Board, and Sergeant Francis Kilkenny with me. Martin Egan, a friend of the General's who was in England, had wired suggesting that if I went to England I might straighten out some misunderstandings of their officials and remove their doubts about the wisdom of British participation in the plan. Arrived London Monday about noon. Saw Egan; then called on General Biddle, Base Commander, U.S.A., London, who took me to lunch. Went to 10 Downing Street after lunch (they had told me Lloyd George would see me the next day) and caught Lloyd George in the hall. Presented to him there the letter from General Pershing designating me as the representative of the American army and containing copy of the plan which he and Clemenceau had signed. In answer to his statement that "they" — meaning the British War Office — "were against it," I explained that this was a statement of the plan so simple that they could neither misunderstand it nor be against it. He announced himself for it — as he had already done in principle to Pershing. Arrangements were made to call the British War Council together to consider the matter, at which I was asked to be present and present

¹ Dwight Morrow was a man who without accepting a military commission performed work of the greatest military and economic value to the A.E.F. and to the Allies. Members of the British General Staff requested me to ask Mr. Morrow to visit them at G.H.Q., Montreuil, because, as General Travers-Clarke said, they wanted to meet the man whose clear analysis of the Allied shipping situation had profoundly affected the Allied policy finally adopted. His unusual work with the General Staff of the A.E.F. during the war was generally recognized.

He received the Distinguished Service Medal of the United States.

Univ. of
California

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DWIGHT W. MORROW

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the plan. This meeting was set for 1.30 P.M. the next day. In the meantime Cravath, whose aid has been invaluable in this English end of the matter, had made an engagement for me to meet Lieutenant-General Cowans, British Quarter-master-General, who was the man blocking things. Lord Milner, whose attitude was favorable owing to Cravath's presentation of the plan to him, did not get back from France in time for the 1.30 meeting of the War Council next day, and so I was notified from Cowans' office that the meeting was off until Milner returned.

This proved fortunate, for I then saw General Cowans and General Crofton-Atkins, British D.G.T., with Cravath and Morrow. We had no difficulty in reaching an understanding and Cowans signified his agreement to the plan. As Lloyd George was already favorable, and also Milner, this settled the matter and made a meeting of the War Council unnecessary. Cravath and Morrow, after consultation with Milner, prepared the letter of acceptance for Milner to sign which, after he had approved it, was submitted to me for approval. And so was completed a most important step for better Allied operations in the future.

Met my London purchasing office staff for a short time. Left for France Thursday morning. The British War Office (who were very kind) had telephoned Major-General Carter, B.E.F., at Boulogne of my coming. The latter had sent me an invitation to visit British G.H.Q. when he heard I was going to England. He met me with his motor and went with me all the way to Paris, stopping for thirty minutes at his headquarters.

Saturday presented the matter to General Pershing, who was pleased and so expressed himself. Milner's letter to Pershing sent in my care I delivered to him last night and he is preparing letters to Milner and Clemenceau. Asked him to include suggestion to the French Government to put the Belgians on the committee as the English first proposed. This heroic little army which made the Marne possible, and

therefore all possible, must never be forgotten as the larger armies march to the battle they commenced.

And now my larger work begins. It will require great patience and tact, for at first, operating as we do under a conceded authority, reluctantly granted, we must proceed by degrees; but if this war continues a year this Board, or what springs directly out of it, will, next to the three military commanders, be the chief factor in eventual Allied success. This comes not because of self-confidence (of which I have no small degree), but because we can officially clear the way for common sense — the ultimate king of all successful wars — to have its day in the rear of the armies.

I have many, many plans. But to gain power to execute them for the good of the Allied Supply Service our Board must remain humble and work very hard. This afternoon (Sunday) had a conference on the general A.E.F. dock programme with Langfitt, Colonel Townsend, and Raymond (U.S. Shipping Control Committee), Sherman and Morrow (U.S. Shipping Board). Spent part of the morning with General Pershing. Am very busy.

Paris, Tuesday, June 4, 1918

YESTERDAY I received a request from the French Minister of Armament to arrange for use of American ammunition dépôts by the French, who must hurriedly remove ammunition from certain dépôts endangered by the German advance. Communicated with General Wheeler, who came to Paris, and gave him details. This morning at my office General Wheeler met the French officers and gave them the needed space. Was pleased with the way our people were prepared to act immediately and the way General Wheeler handled the matter. We are working closer all the time with our allies, and we must if we are to win.

Saw General Pershing yesterday afternoon. He had just returned from the War Council. Clemenceau brought up the matter of our plan and it was confirmed. We were a

little afraid the War Council might mix in, but they did not. This is no day for *advisory* committees — only for action.

Am sorry I have time only to write of the general events and cannot make a picture more in detail of what is happening. One lives a lifetime in a month in time of war. The next sixty days are the critical ones. If our allies hold, we shall win.

Our Board becomes naturally the link between ourselves and the two other armies in all coördinated supply activities. The General, however, wants me to hold the position of General Purchasing Agent for a time until he can have me promoted based on my record in that position and then formally transferred to my new work, at which I am now engaged under his official designation to our allies.

Paris, June 8, 1918

AT General Pershing's suggestion I attended the conference yesterday between Colonel Logan and General LeRond, Deputy Chief of Foch's Staff, relative to the horse situation. In order to put American artillery into action 80,000 horses are immediately necessary, and 100,000 horses in all are needed to see us through the next sixty days. Later in the day the French notified Logan that they would furnish the 80,000 horses as rapidly as possible. Am busy with matters relating to the coördination of the rear of the army with our allies. Already we have arranged for coördination of munition dépôt plans. There is so much to be done, and it is so important that I am not waiting for the appointment of the other members of the Board by the French and English, but going ahead along general lines. Have conferred with both French and English military authorities. Am doing it constantly. Why on earth some one was not doing this on a comprehensive scale three years ago, between the French and the English, I do not know. But their present acquiescence in any plan for improvement is indicative of a useful future for our effort.

Our work will not involve on our part excessive attention to detail. It is only necessary to get the proper independent heads of the three services to conduct their efforts with one common purpose in mind. To bring them into proper contact and have them evolve the procedure is wiser than to attempt primarily to suggest procedure to them who have first contact with actual conditions. My experience in these first important matters is convincing me of this. The result of my calling General Langfitt and General Wheeler here indicates also that to men so intelligent and energetic as they there is little need of doing anything but bring them into contact with conditions. We must introduce the active heads of the supply services of the three armies to each other, point out the common necessity, and rely chiefly on them to suggest the steps to meet it. My experience in working for coördination teaches me that the coördinator must himself coördinate his mental activities with others. To seek to display authority is to embarrass progress. Reason must be king. A good reason carries one farther than a General's stars. Where one must enforce authority he cannot be too patient in explaining the reason for its particular exercise. This, of course, applies to the great changes we are endeavoring to effect in army policies of the three Allies. It is all just a matter of common sense.¹

General Pershing has talked over with me his wish to found a great band for the National Army. Colonel Boyd called me by telephone to say the General was sending to me for suggestions the report of a board recommending the instruments to be used. While time is precious, am going to take occasion to help in this matter, for little is of greater importance to an army than its music. My idea is that we should get a fine bandmaster to visit every regimental band in the army, and select from them the personnel. The way an organization of this kind starts determines largely its

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, June 11, paragraph 8, Appendix C, vol. II, p. 129.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN COWANS
Quartermaster-General for the British Armies

career. If it is started, not with the idea of making it a *good* band, but the *best*, it will probably become such. There should be in the formation of this great organization no concession to mediocrity; for it will some time march before one of the greatest armies the world has seen — an army sanctified by suffering, glorified by victory, and first in the love and pride of every true American.

Paris, June 12, 1918

AM still struggling to get our Military Board in operation. When I think of what one in military command of the rear of the three armies could accomplish for their greater strength in only one month's time, the delay is taxing my patience. We are waiting for the French to name their man. Shall have a conference with Tardieu and Ganne to-day and urge their immediate action. In the meantime the heavy arrival of our troops makes imperative greater coöperation in the rear. Am in daily conferences with our services as to their necessities. Kernan called on me yesterday. He is an able officer and a fine soldier as well as executive. Had a conference on Monday with General Pershing who explained his plans of fighting our American troops. He believes in keeping the men in motion.

Paris, June 13, 1918

I AM thankful that when we started nearly sixty days ago this effort to coördinate the rear of the armies, we did not realize the enormous obstacles in the way of it having their root in individual selfishness and ambition. When a man looks at a proposition involving the common interest only from the standpoint of how it will affect his own authority, he is a hard man to persuade — in fact, you cannot persuade him. The only way you can move him is so to expose his opposition to reason to all those about him in official position that his self-clogged soul suddenly realizes that if it longer opposes reason it will be hurt more than by acquiescing in it.

It has been my long, weary, and ungrateful task during the past few months to state the necessity for certain great steps of Allied self-preservation over and over again so clearly that selfish opposition to it has to unmask itself and put off the disguise and pretense of an opposition based upon sincere purposes.

The French were delaying their appointment on our Board — and seemed undecided on the man. This was explained to me by them as caused by the fact that several men wanted the place. Yesterday I had appealed earnestly to M. Tardieu and M. Ganne stating the folly and wickedness of delay, and this morning was invited to a conference which they had succeeded in having called. Present were Ministers Vilgrain and Lavit, M. Tardieu, M. Ganne, and Colonel Payot, of Foch's Staff, and myself. I think sometimes that it is fortunate I cannot speak French, for in a crowd of Frenchmen I stick to the text better. I have no temptation to digress, for I can't understand anything.

All I have the patience to record here is that somehow, some way, they all agreed to do as I asked, after about two hours "go" at it, and stated that they would unanimously recommend to Clemenceau to appoint Payot. I want also to record appreciation of the help of Tardieu and Ganne. It was effective, unselfish, and most opportune.

This afternoon the representatives of the Belgian Government called, as I had suggested to Van de Vyvere to have them do, and I explained the plan to which they acquiesced.

No wonder the Allies have not coördinated better on the battle-fields! No wonder it took terrible defeats to bring about military unification at the front! To achieve real leadership in the army, intelligence, energy, and *ambition* must (with other things as well) be united. The soldier in high position is often consumed with an intense pride. Everything contributes to inflate his egoism. Suddenly an emergency requires him to submerge himself for the common good. If he has a Commander-in-Chief over him, his will is

bent as needed through military discipline. But when the soldier to make a sacrifice is one in independent command!!! John Pershing is about the only one over here who is big enough to do this — and he has done it. Because there are no more like him my task is so hard. But once we are started we shall make rapid progress.

Paris, Sunday, June 23, 1918

AM writing this, 3 P.M., upon my arrival in Paris by automobile from Tours.

Last Monday morning General Pershing called me by telephone to come immediately to Chaumont. I took Captain Jay with me for company. Left by motor and arrived at the General's house in time for dinner. In the evening in his room he outlined his plan of action and programme for the American military effort. This was in effect a preliminary statement to me of the announcement he made to the conference of his officers the next morning. But to me he gave his reasons more in detail. The General believes that just as the present — since it is the moment of the Allies' greatest weakness — has called for Germany's supreme effort, so the time immediately following the collapse of the German offensive is the period of greatest weakness for them, and the time for our supreme effort as quickly as it can be delivered. He fears reinforcement next year for the Germans from western Russia. He feels that he must fight vigorously all along the line, utilizing against a worn foe the fresh and eager army which he commands. From the standpoint of enemy morale and our own, vigorous movement will lower theirs and increase ours. He desires to keep the war one of movement as far as possible. He believes in a constant harassing by raids in the intervals between larger attacks, thus in every way keeping the enemy nervous and on the defensive. Therefore he has determined to demand that America continue until next April a schedule of shipment of 250,000 troops per month, which by April 1 will give him an army

of 3,000,000 (or more exactly 2,850,000 men). But in the meantime he will begin to fight with the men he has along the lines above mentioned. He will take command under Foch — or, as he has told Foch, under any one Foch may name — of the American field army. He has notified the Secretary of War that he will take care of the men asked for over here. In other words, he purposely burns the bridges behind us in order to win victory by insuring our maximum effort as soon as possible. By August 1 we shall have 1,250,000 troops here. He called the conference of his leading officers to announce the plan, and to notify them of the tremendous burden of effort it will impose upon them in connection with the supply service. Asking my opinion I heartily approved. I told him that I believed the supply service could make good.

Much will depend upon how we can make our Military Board of Allied Supply function, for to support this programme coördination of the rear of the armies becomes imperative. Told the General that emergency, more than anything else, compels unity of Allied action; that this was illustrated by Great Britain furnishing sea transport for American troops when defeat threatened if she did not; that the emergency in supplies which he would create by the execution of his programme would operate to compel greater unity in their handling; that troops in the line would not be allowed to starve; that in emergency all warehouses, all supplies, everything, would be treated as a common store; that coördination, impossible to a proper extent between allied armies not under great pressure, was *unavoidable* in matters of food supply when under great pressure; to sum up that he had a right in making this programme to assume that behind a united front were all the resources of supply of the armies of France and Great Britain and our own army supplies to be handled as one. In the accomplishment of this our new Board must be made a great factor. This Board makes it possible if it is properly handled.

~~ANDRÉ TARDIEU AS CAPTAIN OF ARTILLERY~~

GENE RITH 274, 6000

Next morning at his headquarters the General announced formally his plan of campaign to the officers he had invited to meet him. There were present, besides the General, the following: McAndrew, Chief of Staff; Kernan, Langfitt (Major-Generals), Atterbury (Brigadier-General), Connor (Fox), Logan, Moseley (Colonels of the General Staff), and myself. With the General's consent I brought Jay to the meeting. Sherman, of the Shipping Board, was also present. The plan was approved by all, and we committed ourselves as representing the supply service.

The General devoted much of his time in the afternoon to the preparation of the announcement to the army of the establishment of the Military Board of Allied Supply and my appointment thereto as the representative of the A.E.F. He directed McAndrew, Logan, and me to submit a proposed draft. We did so, and the General promptly proceeded to write an entirely different and better one. Care is necessary in announcing to the army this important step so as not to have it misconstrued by either it or our allies.

In the evening at his house, the General read me the letter announcing his plan for the war to Secretary Baker and asking the approval of the President and the Secretary of War. This we discussed at length as well as the whole situation. As illustrating the completeness with which the General makes his plans, and the force with which he presents them, not one thing was suggested to be changed by any officer after the fullest discussion. He had prepared the plan some days before, as well as the letter to Baker. This is the kind of a leadership that wins — to be willing to submit to reason, but to reason so well that the submission involves neither delay nor difference. I am sure my love and admiration for John is not interfering with my cold judgment when I say that I consider him the ablest man in both action and reason in time of emergency that I have ever known or shall ever know.

Jay and I left the General's house Wednesday morning for Paris *via* Provins and Meaux. (Less than one hour, thirty

minutes by motor from Chaumont to Troyes, 55 miles: quick travel.) Stopped at French General Headquarters and called on Payot, and talked over plans for our new Board. Foch and Pétain have combined in recommending Payot to the French War Office for promotion to Brigadier-General as he takes on these duties. Payot succeeded General Rague-neau, who commanded the rear of the French army under Nivelle. He is one of the ablest men in the French army. He had his supply system — both ammunition and rations — so well thought out that the recent great German advance covering so much territory did not disarrange it. We are good friends and both feel we shall work well together. We agreed on headquarters for the Board at French G.H.Q. with an office also in Paris.

At Meaux, where I had gone to see my friend Harbord, was greatly disappointed to find him away. Stopped on the way and took mess with some soldiers (company) of the 2d Division temporarily out of line. Arrived at Paris in the evening.

Yesterday morning (Saturday) I left by motor for Tours taking with me Colonel Sewell who was visiting me in Paris. Am anxious to see this fine officer and able man called more into the center of things than he can be at a base port. Went to Tours to talk with Kernan on the methods of coöperation between him and myself in connection with the new Board. Had full and satisfactory conference. Asked him to appoint a member of his Staff to centralize information on all our army warehouse situation (all services), as this is the first thing I want to get started. Expect in this first step in coördination to effect an enormous saving in our army construction with the aid of the French. Kernan's man under our direction will match up information with the French and English and thus give our Board the basis for an order of coördination. Discussed other matters with various members of the Staff. Was entertained at dinner by my friends Smither and McAdam, of the Staff C.G.S.O.S.

Paris, June 29, 1918

YESTERDAY afternoon (Friday) the new Military Board of Allied Supply met at my office for the first time¹ marking in my judgment the beginning of an inter-Allied Staff which, if the war lasts, must be the chief factor in the intelligent use of the resources of the rear of the Allied armies for the benefit of the front.

Payot now has charge of the French rear, and this fact adds greatly to our opportunity for immediate beneficial action. Beadon, the English army representative, is a good man, but so handicapped by his superiors, who are still nervous about the way in which the Board may exercise its powers, that he acted (as every man must who is not expected to exercise authority in the company of those who do) as an obstructionist. Still we got through everything which Payot and I regarded as important.

Before the meeting talked with General Pershing on the telephone in Payot's presence and explained Payot's ideas. The General approved them, as they were along the lines which we have so long been earnestly striving for.

Nothing is slower than an Englishman to move in matters involving a possible loss of authority. But when he does move, and when he gives his word, he stands by it through thick and thin. Since England is now represented in the plan, her full and complete sympathy with it is only a matter of time. The purposes of the Board are such that, as its action develops, all will put their shoulders heartily to the wheel. Least of all will England be backward in the time of greatest emergency which is still before us. Unless this Board can coördinate the Allied rear, I doubt if in France we can handle the 3,000,000 men who, if the General's plan is carried out, will be in the American army by April 1. That is why I have been so anxious to get started. Payot and I are in complete accord. As he expresses it we have "two heads under one hat." As the

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, June 29. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 139.

chief measures of coördination are first to be taken between the French and American armies, we hope to move rapidly, and the full measure of English constructive coöperation will come a little later when the influx of our troops makes more pressing the food situation.

As it is now we are all too prone to think in terms of surplus instead of deficits, which latter we must do to bring to bear our maximum effort against the enemy at his time of greatest weakness. Pershing's insistence on troops and his general plan have been determined largely by his confidence that the rear can be made to support properly the front. And it will.

Thursday night had a narrow escape in the air raid. Two bombs dropped near the hotel. General Winn, Junior Ames, and I were watching the raid from my window on the fourth floor of the Ritz about midnight. When the appalling explosion occurred, found myself half across the room from my window *sitting in an armchair*. The hotel was not directly struck, but its glass was shattered everywhere. One man on our floor severely cut.¹ The wounded in the hotel and vicinity were not numerous, but some were severely hurt, and on the street some were killed. Junior took a wounded woman to the doctor's in a taxicab. This makes about my thirtieth air raid — or thereabouts — but it has given me an added respect for a bomb. It is certainly a case where "familiarity does not breed contempt." We have had raids for the last three nights.

Paris, July 3, 1918

THE usual meeting of our Military Board was held at my headquarters yesterday. The English are coöperating like the thoroughbreds they are. Consulted with General Pershing relative to the machinery to be installed in our own army to give me, as a member of the Board, the authority over our own services necessary to enable me to coördinate

¹ It afterward developed that this man — a waiter at the hotel — was struck by shrapnel in two places and severely wounded.

GENERAL PAYOT AND GENERAL DAWES AT ÉLYSÉE PALACE HOTEL HEADQUARTERS

our rear with the French and the English. Am in too much of a whirl of work to write details. Subsequent events will develop a record of them in official papers.

General Pershing is daily conferring with the Allies. He wants to give them enough American troops to keep their defense lines stiffened, without unduly delaying the accumulation of his army of the offensive. Meantime he is daily harassing the enemy. Thank God for this great man of *action*. The French made ceremonial calls on us at my headquarters this afternoon. But in the life of this particular individual at this particular time there is no time for extended ceremonies. Harbord sent me a bayonet with the "compliments of the Marine Brigade." This division saved Paris. Air raids nearly every night. Since my narrow escape the other night in the bomb explosion near the Ritz am a trifle "gun-shy."

Paris, July 8, 1918

YESTERDAY (Sunday) went for first time to the headquarters established by the French army for the Military Board of Allied Supply. Was accompanied by General Jadwin and about eight of my personal staff of assistants. Colonel Smither arrived at night, having been delayed. Cannot spare time to describe at length our magnificent headquarters. They consist of a château (modern) at Coubert, where the members of the Board will live (when at Coubert), and an old castle for our Staff about a quarter of a mile away, built in the year 1550 and occupied at one time by a sister of Louis XIV (so they said). The French have outdone themselves in providing impressive and convenient surroundings for us. At the meeting of the Board Payot presided. He came in from Foch's headquarters angry. At Versailles the other day Lord Milner, in the presence of Lloyd George, said to Clemenceau that it was clearly understood that Foch had no control over our Board. Clemenceau repeated this to Foch, who was irritated over it. He called Payot to his headquarters yesterday morn-

ing and forcibly expressed himself in the matter — hence Payot's attitude. Payot proceeded to take it out on Beadon. We all in reality clearly understood that Foch does not have a military control of us. It is logical that he should — Pershing recommended it — but after a long contest with the English, who opposed it, our compromise of a unanimous consent provision was reached. Everything was and is understood — but the English keep "rubbing it in," and the French kick back every time. However, somewhat through my efforts we finally settled down to business and took up warehouse and construction coördination. Have asked G-4, G.H.Q., and G-4, S.O.S., each to name a man for my Staff. We shall rapidly collect the information from the three armies necessary to base our decisions upon. We must proceed wisely and firmly. Unquestionably we have in our hands the power if we but act with wisdom.

Payot saw Pershing Saturday and the General told him that anything Payot and I recommended would be ordered into effect by him in the A.E.F., which makes it possible for Payot and me to coördinate the French and American rear even if the English do not join. I know, however, that on the essential and important things the English will coöperate to the limit. No one could ever make me believe to the contrary. They, however, are very cautious.

To-day received a telegram saying the Commander-in-Chief desires me to take up the horse situation (artillery) immediately through Tardieu. Am pressed by an emergency somewhere every day owing to the immense increase in our army. Am trying to do my best, which is all any one can do.

Jadwin is demanding more laborers. Am simply putting on a little more steam — plugging away — and not being "rattled."

Stayed all night at our palace called by courtesy "field headquarters," and came to town this A.M., about fifty minutes' ride. Stopped at the Roman ruins of an amphitheater (Rue des Arènes) for a few minutes.

Am determined that by means of our Board, Foch's needs

shall be met from the rear as they are interpreted by Payot. This is common sense. While the English will not concede the theoretical general authority necessary to make one army — with a single command covering the front and rear — they will, I am sure, when the individual propositions come before our Board, follow the dictates of common sense and agree upon remedial action rectifying present conditions. However, in any event Payot and I can put over two thirds of the rear in shape to satisfy Foch.

Paris, Sunday, July 14, 1918

MATTERS and time move so swiftly that it is difficult to keep track of either. As the practical mediator between the French Government and army and the A.E.F. in supply matters, the burdens of my position are growing heavier. The division of an insufficient supply between two imperative necessities is never easy. In artillery horses, lumber, transportation, munitions, warehouses — in almost every department the difficult situations exist. But one by one they must be met. To deserve the confidence of both sides — really to deserve it — is my constant effort. As far as possible in anticipation of decisions and actions I try to keep the French officials and the heads of our own services advised of the real conditions confronting each other. The thorough appreciation of another's necessities lessens the blow when it comes. Each must make concessions. The common purpose demands it. An attitude toward the French dictated alone by our own necessities without reference to the satisfaction of theirs is fatal to the common cause. It is very difficult for me sometimes to make our officers see this, struggling as they are under the tremendous load of our military programme.

Friday night General Pershing and I spent the evening together, taking dinner by ourselves in a little restaurant near the Arc de Triomphe. Here we discussed the best method of handling our supply problems. If it was not for his thorough understanding of the difficulties of my situation and his ever

loyal and sympathetic aid, I fear I could not keep myself at times from discouragement, which is generally equivalent to a paralysis of effort. But his words of commendation are a stimulus, equal almost in their force to the combined sense of duty and fear of failure. That is a tribute I can justly pay to his character and personality.

Saturday I visited the 164th French Division in the line, taking Colonel Byllesby and Captain Dyar with me. French G.H.Q. sent a liaison officer with us. At the front the French Colonel commanding a brigade accompanied us also, besides another French Commandant from Division Headquarters. Interesting trip — front comparatively quiet; some artillery firing back and forth. Coming back saw General Bullard at the headquarters of General Dégoutte, the latter being in command of the 6th Army. General Dégoutte insisted on our staying to dinner, although it was after he had finished — about 9 P.M. He wanted me to stay all night, as he was sure the Germans would attack before morning and thought it would be interesting for us to watch events in his office. He showed us all his maps, location of troops, preparations, etc. In the 6th Army now there are about 300,000 troops, one half of whom are Americans. Bullard, who is under Dégoutte, tells me he has great confidence in him. As General Harbord was waiting for me in Paris had to leave for there.

At French G.H.Q. they tell me they have located six railroad tracks behind the German lines which they believe are to carry the big guns for the bombardment of Paris. This they expected last night or this morning to commence with the German offensive. They expected the German attack on a front of sixty kilometers, especially heavy at three different points. Passed a brigade of French cavalry on our way back.

To-day Major-General Harbord is with me. He has received his promotion as commanding in the recent actions the famous Marine Brigade. His casualties during thirty days of fighting were about 3600 out of 8000.

At Major Collins's suggestion saw Walter Damrosch, and

PAUL D. CRAVATH

he agreed to go to Chaumont to help out the reorganization of army bands, and to assist in forming the headquarters band along the line of my suggestions to Boyd, which have been adopted, providing for its selection by competition. General Pershing's desire for a fine army band will now be realized.

Witnessed the 14th of July military parade this A.M. — or part of it — from the top of my automobile on the way to my office. Have a good automobile — a Cadillac — which takes the French roads easily and continuously from thirty-five to fifty miles per hour without shaking us up much, notwithstanding the roads are now a little rough in spots owing to the heavy army transports.

Inspected a French battery of 280 mm. guns (3) yesterday which was camouflaged better than any I have yet seen. Nothing improves on Nature's own fresh foliage for camouflage.

Worked at office this morning. Lunched and took a walk with General Harbord, who has left me for a time to visit two of his wounded Colonels in a hospital. This is a holiday.

Paris, Sunday, July 21, 1918

THE great counter-attack of the French and our army keeps bringing almost hourly emergencies to be dealt with. Have just returned from British Headquarters at Montreuil. This is noon, and am called to French Headquarters this afternoon on the ammunition and transportation situation. Received letter from Payot by messenger this morning saying Foch wants immediate pooling of French and American ammunition.¹ This we shall arrange by to-morrow afternoon at our

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, July 26. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 156.

July 20, 1918

Secret

COLONEL CH. PAYOT, *President*

TO COLONEL CHARLES G. DAWES

Representing the American Army

The General Commanding-in-Chief the Armies of the North and Northeast has received the following information which he has transmitted to the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies:

Board meeting then. If we can get the men and supplies to keep up the present counter-attack the German salient

The ammunition delivered up to this date to the American services by the French services of the interior would amount to —

3,162,000 cartouches of 75

430,000 shots of 155 Court Schneider

24,000 shots of 155 G.P.F. (Grande Puissance Fillaux)

Of these quantities —

1,206,000 cartouches of 75 { more or
and 89,000 shots of 155 Court { less

would be actually at the disposal of the American army in the French general reserve warehouse, in addition to the ammunition destined for the Armies of the North and Northeast.

The remaining part has in effect been delivered to the American services.

No new delivery on these stocks has been made to the American divisions, whose supply is secured in the same conditions as the one of the French divisions, by drawing from ammunition at the disposal of the General Commanding-in-Chief the French armies.

The actual situation of the French stocks necessitates the putting in common of the ammunition supplies.

There is, therefore, an immediate interest that the munitions belonging to the American army, mentioned above, which remain in the general reserve warehouses, remain in the common reserve as well as those that could exist actually in the American dépôts, and it would be necessary for you to have all the necessary information on the importance and location of these dépôts so that we could treat the question.

CH. PAYOT

Telegram

July 24, 1918

GENERAL JAMES W. McANDREW

Chief of Staff, G.H.Q., A.E.F.

G.P.A. 129. At meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply, at which Generals Moseley and Wheeler were both present, following decision was taken unanimously, and under the international agreement constituting the Board becomes orders for the French and American armies. The French army is to-day issuing the necessary orders and it is requested that the necessary orders be immediately issued by the American army carrying out the arrangement. The following is copy of the order: "One. The supplies of similar munitions of French manufacture in the French and American armies are placed in common. Two. Tests will be made by French artillerymen on the use of munitions of American manufacture. If these tests are favorable, these munitions will also be placed in common. Three. The French and American munition dépôts will serve indiscriminately the French and American armies. Requisitions upon French dépôts will always be made by the French Direction of the Rear; those

toward Château-Thierry can be pinched off. Great questions press. We need space in schoolhouses or other buildings for 45,000 beds along the front. Am trying to arrange this. Have been at Coubert (Field Headquarters Board of Supply, Allied Armies) at our meeting Wednesday, 17th. Stayed all night. We shall on next Monday have a map — the first one made during the war — of all installations in the rear of the three armies. When I consider the past lack of coördination of the Allied rear I wonder that the Allies have held out against the consolidated Germans. But from now on all will be changed in the rear — just as the arrival of the Americans and the unified command of Foch is changing the situation at the front. Victory — sure and complete — is in the future.

Was the guest of Lieutenant-General Travers Clarke at G.H.Q., B.E.F. Was invited to dine with Sir Douglas Haig last evening, but could not wait owing to important matters waiting for me at Paris. Major Bacon (Robert) rode back with me. On way back called on General Bell commanding 33d Division (Illinois troops). Went through deserted and bombarded Amiens.

Travers-Clarke wants to—and should—go on our Board in

upon the American dépôts by the Fourth Bureau of the American G.H.Q. to whatever army they may be destined. Four. The French and American armies will communicate with each other periodically the situation of the above-mentioned munitions existing in their respective dépôts as well as the anticipated output for the manufacture of these munitions."

DAWES

*Extract from my report as member representing A.E.F. on
Military Board of Allied Supply*

5. By its order the ammunition at the front was pooled between the French and American armies. What this meant to the American army is indicated by the fact that it fired of French 75 mm. alone about 6,000,000 rounds. On September 27, October 4, 9, 14, and November 1, our five heaviest firing days, 1,158,940 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition were fired by our First Army. The importance of entire freedom of access of the American army to French advance ammunition dépôts and dumps cannot be overstated.

Beadon's place as representing the British army. This is right, as he is first in authority over the British rear. He is going to London and will take matter up with Milner. Am sending him copies of minutes of our Board meetings. He says he has been kept in the dark about it. Sooner or later the English will be as thoroughly committed to the coördination of the rear as are Payot and myself.

On these trips of mine to the front and to our field headquarters so many things of interest occur that I regret one cannot be a historian and a participant in action at the same time. But others with more time must draw the pictures.

Paris, July 24, 1918

OUR counter-offensive continues to go well. If we only had 500,000 more American troops here I think the war would be ended. Am plunged in the midst of difficult adjustments of an insufficient supply situation with the French and English involving as well supplies in the battle area as in the rear. In it all our Military Board of Allied Supply looms greater and greater as the agency to save a future situation of great emergency which will confront the three armies when the American programme of men is nearer completion.

Have conferred much the last two days with General Pershing, with Stettinius, with McFadden.

Stettinius says in America every one thinks that I personally purchase everything for the A.E.F. as well as simply coördinate purchases — the latter being my real function. I therefore realize that in a public sense I become responsible for anything that goes amiss. So far from being made nervous by this feeling I approach the end of the war with complete confidence that the work of this great organization which I have builded, its methods, its purposes, its triumph over difficulties, its cleanness, will add its good part to the prestige of our army. So far as I personally am concerned I have given the best I have to the work. In it I have had, especially in the earlier part of it, my hard contests: but now the organization

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY, COUBERT

is builded, it has done and is doing its great work, it is honest and clean, and with the full publicity which its importance will give it when attacked, while contests are still before me, I shall fight from the strong fortifications of unquestioned accomplishment.

Referring again to the band of the National Army, sent at Collins's suggestion Walter Damrosch to G.H.Q. He came back fully authorized to comb the army for musicians and a leader. Competition will control selection of the musicians, and the field of competition being broad a wonderful band should develop.

Lunched and dined at Harjes's house yesterday with Stettinius. His presence will be a great help to all of us. Sam Felton has arrived. To him I really owe my commission in the army. Enjoyed visiting with him. He has done his great part in our transportation. Am overwhelmed with work, but will try to struggle along with these notes.

Paris, August 4, 1918 (Sunday)

DURING the last week I have been on the road most of the time. While I was at field headquarters last Sunday General Harbord left at my room a note saying he was going to Tours to meet General Pershing, who had made him Commanding General, Service of Supply. On Monday evening I joined them at Tours, and went on their special train for a tour of the ports. General McAndrew, Chief of Staff, General Jadwin, Colonel Wilgus, and a few others besides the Commander-in-Chief's personal aides, Colonel Boyd and Major Bowditch, were on the train. Have not time to describe the trip.

Followed the Commander-in-Chief before thousands of troops in line, past thousands of my own laborers, through barracks, over docks, through machine shops, and through hospitals containing thousands of our wounded. John's purpose in the trip was not only to inspect progress, but to inspire the Service of Supply with increased enthusiasm and desire to accomplish. He has developed great ability as a

public speaker. He makes six or seven thousand people hear him with ease in the open air. He is direct, extremely forceful and wonderfully impressive. He never said one weak, unwise, or thoughtless word. In the hospitals the spirit of the wounded is wonderful. Outwardly cheerful and smiling and full of encouragement, but with a heart breaking with sympathy, dear old John marched through the long aisles, with such of the poor fellows as were able standing at "attention" by their cots. What wrung my own heart most was the poor blinded men, so anxious to see their Commander-in-Chief, but standing there at attention in a darkness which would never be lifted. John talked to them. All seemed cheerful, except those too closely clasped in the arms of death to know what was going on. Under the new method of treatment the horrible wounds of the men were exposed to the air, and before our eyes were the horrors of war.

The bands which met us, the pomp and circumstance which surrounded us as we started each morning on our tour of inspection, the long lines of soldiers at attention, were one part of war. But the day wore on. In dust and heat we passed the toiling thousands bending to their work in sun and dirt. And then the long hospital trains and the shattered men in agony and suffering at the hospitals. The real impression of what war is came at the end of the weary day.

In order to be at the meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply on Friday I left the party at St. Nazaire, having also visited Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, and Bassens. At St. Nazaire I met my old comrades of the 17th Railway Engineers who have done such wonderful work. Colonel Sewell is now Commander of the base. Ten thousand men are now working under the supervision of the 17th. Montoir is their project among others. Was overwhelmed with the immensity of our army work and accomplishment everywhere. Passed by the tens of thousands my prosaic railroad ties which we had secured from Portugal, passed by Belgian locomotives, passed by our laborers everywhere, and felt a

pride that I had helped some, though the sight of the wonderful accomplishments of others must keep any one of us humble if honest in mind.

On Friday was at Coubert where we had a meeting of great importance. The great composite pictures we are making for the first time of the needs of the three armies are already profoundly affecting our plans and activities. The great experience and high authority of Payot — his wonderful ability — are invaluable assets to the Board. I like him very much. We are good friends. Every morning of a meeting he sends his representative to Paris to consult as to our prospective work at the meeting. We coöperate most intimately.

We shall secure a reduction in the forage ration of the A.E.F. at our next meeting. We are working on the mobile automobile reserve for Foch.¹ We have already pooled ammunition at the front, but no less important is the effect upon individual army policy, in the line of practical coöperation, of the wonderful pictures of common needs for the three armies which we are now making and furnishing to those whose departments are involved. From common knowledge arises coördinated effort. I marvel that the necessity for this coöperation in the rear did not force its adoption years ago before the United States entered the war in France.

At Paris Herbert Hoover, the U.S. Food Controller, sent for me and we had a long conference Saturday. This morning I took breakfast with him. Shall meet him again to-morrow in an endeavor to assist him in securing concessions of food from England (which has accumulated a large stock) for the benefit of France. He wants a letter from Pershing indicating the importance from a military standpoint of the immediate relief of the people of Bordeaux. I like him very much. He is a wonderful executive — a man inspired only by the principles of true and unselfish devotion to duty.

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, August 13. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 163.

Am leaving for Coubert this afternoon (and Provins afterward) after meeting General Pershing, upon his arrival from his trip, by his direction. Am taking Sam Felton with me. The Staff of Payot is giving him a dinner at French G.H.Q. to-night on the occasion of his promotion to officer of the Legion of Honor, and he has asked me to be present.

Paris, August 8, 1918

IMPORTANT matters press hourly. This week with Loucheur, Tardieu, Ganne, General Chevalier, and others of the French, General Jadwin and I arrived at an agreement on the railroad-tie situation through which there will be assured the maintenance of the reserve of ties behind the lines necessary to support an advance of the Allied troops.

This morning Harjes called at my rooms before I was up to warn me of Payot, whom he believed from French information to be untrustworthy and who had said to others, according to Harjes, that he (Payot) "could lead me by the nose." I replied to Harjes "that any one could lead me by the nose, provided he knew the road better than I did, and it led in the right direction." This leads me to make a few notes concerning Payot and our relations. In every possible way I encourage Payot to initiate and suggest methods of coördination for the rear of the armies because he is the best-informed man on conditions of the rear and its needs in France. In all sincerity I create in his mind a feeling of my dependence on him, for he has the knowledge and experience while I am only in the process of acquiring it, and never shall acquire it as he has it. In every way I encourage the use by the French of our Board. I declined the suggestion of my Staff that we have an American version of our meetings made as they thought the French did not include in our minutes of proceedings a sufficient record of our own part in them. It was only a non-essential and the suggestion would imply distrust as well as vanity on my part. That anybody should think they could hurt Payot in my estimation for

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ROBERT LEE BULLARD

asserting his influence, when for over a month General Pershing and I fought to transfer entire control of the rear of the three armies to the French command, shows that they have little conception of how in earnest we are to secure proper coördination. As a matter of fact Payot is entirely trustworthy. He only wants to win the war. Naturally he is ambitious — and this is no crime. Close coöperation with him by me means I can get useful things done. If I let others influence me to unwise attitudes suggested by personal vanity I shall fail to be of high service to the common cause. I have a good sense of direction. No one can lead me down a wrong road. And Payot, least of all would, if he could, deceive me as to wise military measures.

Received telegram from Harbord to-day saying that the Commander-in-Chief is issuing orders reducing A.E.F. forage ration to the English basis. Thus again our Board, by making a picture of a coming crisis, lessens the danger by compelling economy in time to help meet it.

This noon was the guest of General Sackville-West at Versailles, where I went to please my friend Beadon of the Military Board of Allied Supply. Had a pleasant time.

Deauville, France
Friday, August 16, 1918

FOR the first time in fifteen months I am taking a few days' rest — vacation. Harbord asked me to take an inspection trip with him, but I wanted more quiet than is possible on a trip with an active General like Harbord. I came, therefore, to Havre on Wednesday, spent the day and night with my friend Van de Vyvere, and came to Deauville yesterday accompanied by one of Van de Vyvere's clerks who acted as my interpreter. Find I am not as tired as I thought and a few days of sunlight — out of doors and sea bathing — will put me in the fittest shape again.

Last Sunday we had an important meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply at Coubert. Took my friend Colonel

Sewell, McRoberts, and Mr. Walcott and Mr. Bell, of the Hoover Commission, with me; also Major Fairchild, a friend of McRoberts's. After our meeting we stayed all night at our headquarters at Coubert, and on Monday morning, under the guidance of Commandants Brault and Lescanne and Lieutenant De Siéyès, all of whom are on Payot's Staff, we left for the front. Our first stop was to call on General Mangin, commanding the 10th French Army, at his headquarters in the field. Like the most of the successful French Generals he is a man evidently of intense nervous energy. When I told him of the gratification of the American people, as expressed in the American press, at his praise of the brave American troops under him in his last successful drive, he went to his desk and gave me a printed copy of his order citing our troops. He said he could not over-praise their battle qualities and the record they had made. Our next call was on General Munroe, who like Mangin was most cordial. He also said he could not speak too strongly in praise of our American soldiers. We then went on toward Soissons, taking lunch in a battle-ruined château at Longpoint. We went over the battle-field of Corsy and the St. Paul farm. My nephew Charles, whom I had with us, gathered up helmets, a gas-mask, and a rifle as souvenirs. Thousands of unexploded hand-grenades remained; wreckage of battle was everywhere. At points the dead were still being buried. Demolished tanks were much in evidence during the day. The St. Paul farm was a mass of wreckage. It was at the point of the turn in the line. It was a point of crisis.

We reached the line of Soissons in the afternoon. A French Colonel and some of his officers went with us to the brow of the hill overlooking Soissons. We reached the brow of the hill through an underground passage, but upon reaching there emerged in view of the valley and of the Germans as it proved. We watched the effect of our shells on the German positions. Our troops occupy a part of Soissons and the Germans are in the outskirts. We walked back to the Colo-

nel's dugout and when we were there the Germans opened fire, dropping four large shells within one hundred and fifty yards of us. The French Colonel and his officers insisted on our drinking toasts of champagne in tin cups, which we did to the sounds of the guns and the explosion of shells.

After our visit with them we went back to General Munroe's, where they had prepared tea for us. I cannot state my appreciation of the courtesy with which we were everywhere treated.

We then returned over the recent battle-field, through Château-Thierry, past the "Wood of the Marines" (Bois de Belleau), where Harbord and his men fought at what I think will prove the Gettysburg of this war. Great stores of German ammunition were taken. I have not time to describe what we saw. History will describe all such things. We returned to Paris through Meaux, our French escorts leaving us there. The wreckage of one of these modern battles is immense. From the effect of the shell-fire in villages, fields, and forests I wonder anybody comes alive out of battle.

*Paris, Sunday, 4 P.M.
August 25, 1918*

EVERYTHING seems to contribute to the heaviness of my burden of responsibility. Spent all day yesterday with Harbord and three hours to-day with the Commander-in-Chief. I should be well-nigh discouraged were it not for the confidence of these dear and loyal friends supporting my authority in every way, and encouraging me by words of praise and sympathy. The very extent of the powers they place in my hands is in one sense an embarrassment, for I have constantly to watch myself in my relations to others lest my usefulness be interfered with by latent opposition to them.

Foch requested of Pershing increased power over the rear in supply and transportation. Through Payot, General Foch keeps in closest touch with our Board. He naturally desires to put Payot in supreme command of the rear, but John can-

not safely part with the control of the line of communications to his own command now that the segregation of the armies has been accepted as best from a military standpoint. John so notified Foch's emissary, stating that through our Military Board the necessary measure of central control over the Allied rear could be maintained without interfering injuriously with the control of his own rear in other essentials by himself.

In the meantime on last Wednesday I made the first draft (dictated) of a letter ¹ to the Commander-in-Chief designed to

¹ August 24, 1918

From: The General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F.

Subject: Activities of the Military Board of Allied Supply and Relation of American Member, Military Board of Allied Supply, to the General Staff, A.E.F.

1. The Military Board of Allied Supply, the formation of which by the Governments was due to your initiative and strenuous efforts as Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F., has now been in existence for two months. Its activities may be summed up as follows:

- (1) The first composite picture of the motor transport of the three armies has been made, the conclusions arising from which are self-evident and are to-day affecting our army policy. It has considered the question of a mobile automobile reserve behind the Allied armies, securing the information for the respective Commanders-in-Chief in their determination of it.
- (2) For the first time a system for the proper circulation and handling of automobile transports, considering the Allied armies as a whole, is being studied and arranged and will soon be put into form to be submitted for your approval.
- (3) The first composite study of the forage situation has been made, and in connection therewith you have reduced the American forage ration to the British standard and issued additional regulations against waste, thus tending to relieve a later forage crisis among all the Allied armies.
- (4) Ammunition between the Americans and the French has been pooled along the front.
- (5) For the first time a map has been prepared showing complete installations in the rear of the three armies as to locations. When the final details of capacity are secured, the importance of this map in connection with the consideration of the construction policies of the three armies is manifest.
- (6) The creation of an inter-Allied reserve of 60 c.m. railway material and personnel is under consideration, which, whether it results in action or not, will for the first time give such information as to the

BELLEAU WOOD

set out clearly the importance of the present work of the Board, and the necessity of guarding against possible diver-

common situation as greatly and beneficially to affect the individual policy of each army.

- (7) The investigations of the Board in connection with labor have demonstrated the impracticability of pooling the same and therefore stimulated the independent agencies of recruiting.
- (8) The consideration of the general wood and tie situation, while it precipitated coördination in this particular connection with the Ministry of Armament instead of through the Board, unquestionably greatly contributed to the reaching of the recent satisfactory understanding with the French on this subject.
- (9) It has demonstrated that through it alone can a coming crisis in supply, transportation, and technical military handling of the Allied rear be measured so as to indicate and to justify the necessary and appropriate preparation for it on the part of each army.
- (10) Lastly and of great importance, no member of the General Staff or chief of independent service of the A.E.F. has attended one of the meetings of the Board and listened to the discussion of the Allied situation as a whole without having derived, in my judgment, a more intelligent understanding of how his activities, whether under authoritative direction or not, can be conducted in better coördination with similar activities of our allies.

The importance of its work from a tactical, supply, and military standpoint, in spite of great opposition, is self-evident.

2. In some respects the name "Military Board of Allied Supply" is unfortunate. It is apt to create in the minds of the chiefs of services the idea that it is an organization primarily to pool and divide supplies; in other words an organization through which somebody is trying to deprive the A.E.F. of a portion of its already inadequate supply or through which the A.E.F. is seeking to secure replenishment from the inadequate supplies of the other armies. Facing an approaching inadequacy of supply, the Chief, with this conception of the Military Board of Allied Supply, naturally sees in its existence no possible good and only a menace. We encounter a natural fear in all the armies of a possible authoritative action of any outside body enabled to interfere with supplies. This feeling ignores the useful activities of the Board in connection with the coördinated use of transportation from a tactical standpoint and of construction coördination, to say nothing of other important matters entirely disassociated with any question of pooled supplies. As a matter of fact, however, with each army confronted as it is by insufficient supplies, a situation is indicated in which in the future the existence of this Board and its powers is rendered of supreme importance not only to the A.E.F., but to the other armies as well.

The continued importation of American troops and the present condition of supplies will inevitably create a crisis. Through the force of your personality constantly exercised and through continued and stern ad-

gence of view in the future between the General Staff and myself as the American Member of the Board. In my first monition, you have taught the A.E.F. already to think in terms of emergency and deficit rather than in terms of surplus, for no one has realized better than yourself that the time is rapidly approaching when a surplus will turn to a deficit and finally an acute deficit. At such a time the military machinery upon which much reliance must be placed is the Military Board of Allied Supply. The continuance of the importation of troops during the fall, unless accompanied by a coördinated importation of supplies, — apparently impossible, — will unquestionably at times create points and situations along the fighting line where military authority and not common consent must be relied upon to insure such a distribution of supplies as will maintain the troops actually at the front. In the distribution of supplies this Board may not commence to function until the absence of its functioning means, in a way that is evident to all, that fighting troops must leave the line. We must look ahead. If one feels that there will not be a different situation than exists at present about the division of food supplies when related to the continuance of actual military operations, it is necessary only to recall the attitude of our friends the English in connection with ships up until the time of the German victory around Calais, after which they turned Allied defeat into certain Allied success by the sea transportation of the bulk of the American army. When the time of real crisis arises, this Board is the agency through which an intelligent view of the situation is practicable and through which proper measures can be taken. It is also the only body, by reason of its common knowledge, which can give advance notice of approaching emergencies and make the suggestions to the armies useful in the attempt to avoid them. If, from the minds of all, there could be removed the shadow of apprehension that an outside authority was looking with designing eyes upon our insufficient stocks, it would contribute to the feeling of earnest coöperation with the Military Board of Allied Supply. As the segregation of the troops into armies of different nationalities does not affect in any way the desirability of central military control of movement, so the fact of the existence of a large field army of the United States should not be allowed to overshadow the necessity in times of emergency, for the support of that army, of a central Allied control over certain transportation and supplies, especially in the military zone. Upon the basis of the retention by the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies of the final authority for the distribution and transportation of supplies to their respective armies, it will still be through the machinery of the Military Board of Allied Supply which you have created, and which cannot be set in motion without your approval, that part of the supply and transportation business of the Allied armies, which is inseparably connected with general tactical movements, will be provided for without interfering with such final authority.

3. Largely because of the personality of such men as McAndrew, Moseley, and Eltinge, with whom I chiefly work, there is between the

draft of the letter I advocated the appointment of the Chief of Staff as the member of the Board in place of myself; but American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply and the General Staff the closest coöperation and understanding. The crisis of the present situation from the supply and transportation standpoint will probably be reached within from sixty to ninety days. Properly to meet it the Military Board of Allied Supply and the General Staff must practically function as a unit. The authority actually existing in the Military Board of Allied Supply in connection with matters of coördination, under the terms of the agreement which you secured from M. Clemenceau, is great and it is necessary that it should be. Power governing the rear of the three armies cannot be exercised by the staff of a separate army, nor can the powers of the Military Board of Allied Supply be set in motion in the way that you intended, unless its decisions, approved directly by you and based upon a common viewpoint (impossible to be obtained by a staff not represented on the Board), are accepted by each army as automatically and in as unquestioned a manner as a direct order from a Commander-in-Chief himself. Conflicts having their roots in human nature, which are inevitable between two bodies with concurrent jurisdictions, one acting under one authority and one under another, must be avoided. A very sure prevention for this between the General Staff and the Military Board of Allied Supply is to have the supreme authority of the unit, to wit, yourself or the General Staff, represented authoritatively on any outside board which is created to coördinate and regulate the unit. It is a tribute to your great Staff that as yet the Military Board of Allied Supply has experienced from it only the closest coöperation and understanding. If this does not continue it will arise out of the fact alone that there cannot be between the General Staff and myself as the present member of the Board continuous juxtaposition and common knowledge of all the elements of a problem. The first viewpoint of the Staff is properly the necessities of the A.E.F. irrespective of necessities directly counter of the three armies considered as one. With the General Staff in possession of the complete knowledge in detail, derived from the composite pictures of the necessities of the three armies presented by the Military Board of Allied Supply, a more proper military coördination and coöperation will be reached. As you yourself have indicated, the A.E.F. may be in a position under certain circumstances and at certain times where it must subordinate and subrogate its temporary needs for the common good in order to make sure in the long run its own existence through final victory. The General Staff cannot be the judges of what is in the long run for the interest of the A.E.F. until it is put in a position by knowledge of the facts relating to the three armies as to what is essential and what is not essential for the A.E.F. to do as a unit in its own best interest. I therefore suggest that you personally appoint as a member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, either in my place or as an additional member, either the Chief of Staff, General Moseley, or Colonel Eltinge. I am of the opinion that to have the American and French rears properly coördinated, an authority to match Colonel Payot's,

upon telling Payot of my intention that evening at Coubert after the meeting of the Board, he so strenuously objected to my leaving the Board that I had to promise him I would not do so of my own volition. He stated that it was through my relation to the Board that he could secure the coöperation of the departments of the French rear under civil control, which they would not accord to him as a member of the Board unless associated with myself who have conducted in the past a large part of the negotiations of the A.E.F. with the French civil government; and gave other reasons, among them — strange to say — was his idea of my influence with the English. He stated if I left the Board he would immediately ask to be relieved and that the Board would no longer exist; that the Board was regarded as my creation and my separation from it would destroy its prestige with the French and English. I don't think any one was ever more surprised than I was to hear this from Payot.

So on going to Paris next day I altered my letter to a recommendation that a member of the General Staff be made an additional member with me. To-day I gave the letter to General Pershing. This afternoon he will see Foch if possible

who is in command of the French rear in the Zone of the Advance, should exist in the representation of the A.E.F. upon this Board. The gentlemen named have had experience arising not only out of military service, but continued contact with the technical rear of our army, neither of which I have had. They also have the bird's-eye view of the operations of the rear of the A.E.F. which is as essential to a proper understanding of its necessities as is the knowledge arising only out of a membership on the Military Board of Allied Supply of the necessities of the rear of the Allied armies considered as one. An order of the Military Board of Allied Supply thus constituted would produce a mental *status quo* on the part of the chiefs of the American services much more conducive to prompt and efficient action than would otherwise be the case. If the Military Board of Allied Supply was known by the army to be expressing the conviction of the Commander-in-Chief personally, which of course is always the case, since its every action is first submitted to you, attention would be given primarily by the chiefs of the services to carrying out its mandates with less discussion of their wisdom, which tends to delay.

CHARLES G. DAWES

Colonel, Engineers

on his way to Chaumont, and among other things take up with him this letter and the subject of strengthening the authority and machinery of our Board. The Commander-in-Chief (John) realizes what the Board means just as I do who am a member of it. It is fortunate that this is so, for if he did not I should despair of the proper settlement of many of the supply crises of the future. Experience has taught me that in the last pinch, whenever they cannot be present to attend to a supply crisis themselves, both John and Harbord turn to me, and practically to me alone, either to conduct or to supervise the conduct of the negotiations with the French and English. The more acute the crisis the surer they are to do it. Yesterday and to-day are examples on the hay and potato situation at Is-sur-Tille involving the army policy. Upon my negotiations with the French to-morrow must rest the final decision of the hay question including the question of American importation. The crisis is acute. There is no hay at Is-sur-Tille — there the telephone rang and my office tells me Payot has telephoned me he is coming to Paris to see me to-morrow. I had appealed to him for help for our army by wire.

The question of the establishment of a proper fiscal system for the army is receiving our best attention. I have recommended that this matter be made independent of me; but as is usually the case the difficulty is to convince others (i.e., the C.-in-C.) that it should not be under my jurisdiction.

I never saw General Pershing looking or feeling better. He is sleeping well. He is tremendously active. He will soon strike with his field army. I know he will succeed. He is not letting anything get on his mind to absorb it from the all-important question of how to get a military victory. He tells me how much confidence he feels in Harbord and myself, and that he sleeps well at night because we are in the S.O.S.; and that this is why he does not worry over problems which it is for the S.O.S. to solve, to an extent to divert his mind from the plan of his approaching fight. All of which only shows that John realizes the best way of getting all the best that is in us

enlisted in the work. He is a very great man — and a very dear friend.

Paris, August 28, 1918

WAS interested yesterday when Bacon (liaison officer at British Headquarters) telephoned saying that, as General Travers-Clarke, in command of the British rear, could not come to Paris on account of the battle going on, he wanted me to come to British Headquarters to talk over the demand of Foch that Payot be put in charge of the rear of the three armies. As it was impossible for me to go, I sent copy of my letter to General Pershing, dated August 25, for Bacon to read to General Travers-Clarke, and told Bacon to tell him that Pershing had notified Foch that he could not accede to the suggestion because the organization of the American field army made necessary *final* control of its line of communications in its commander. However, I pointed out that Pershing and Foch would use the Military Board, of which Payot is a member, to get the necessary central military control over the Allied rear without interfering with the right of the unit to the essential measures to self-preservation. If military experience had not shown that the men fight better with their own armies kept separate than when commingled by regiments or battalions, or even divisions, the complete military unification of the rear for which I contended so strenuously in the past would now be conceded, in my judgment.

Shall be interested to see if the British will not now cause their command of the rear to be directly, instead of indirectly, represented on our Board, as I have always urged. Everything tends to increase the power and usefulness of our Board, and my part in its conception and formation is my chief satisfaction in my military service.

Received letter from Pershing saying he had discussed matter with Foch and explained some of the difficulties of the situation of which Foch had not been informed.

In his endeavor to assist in the hay crisis at Is-sur-Tille,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR EDWARD TRAVERS-CLARKE, B.E.F.

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Payot came to Paris to see me. He responds to my every suggestion for assistance to our army to the very best of his ability. By our extremely close coöperation and understanding we are much relieving the common situation in a time of common crisis. He tells me that he will meet me prior to every meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply or whenever called for. Payot has many enemies, for with his great force he lacks patience in his dealings with the civil departments and ministers of the French Government in contact with him. He told me the other day that he was very tired and very much overworked, as is natural with our lines of battle advancing. "I am working sixteen hours a day," he said; "four hours fighting the Germans and twelve hours fighting my own people."

My Saturday with General Harbord and my Sunday (last) with General Pershing enabled me to get settled several important policies and my mind is much more quiet, though my work was never greater.

I certainly resent the attitude of some of our chiefs of services who try to excuse their own shortcomings by blaming the French whenever there is a shortage of supply. I wish I could let these officers of the French civil government and army so nobly working to help us — this people almost bleeding to death and still giving — giving — giving — know of how strongly, and to their faces, do I resent this attitude on the part of very few of our officers. In this strong feeling of overwhelming obligation to the French, I find our splendid Commander-in-Chief as decided as I am, and as stern in his attitude toward their critics who cannot know the difficulties under which they labor as do the General and myself who are more closely in contact with them.

Paris, August 29, 1918

YESTERDAY afternoon General Travers Clarke, through Bacon from British Headquarters, telephoned he would come to Paris to see me Sunday and go to the Board meeting with

me Monday. He wanted to know what the A.E.F. had done in connection with Foch's request that Payot be placed over the Allied rear.¹ I told him that General Pershing in declining acquiescence urged the greater use of our Board in military coördination of the rear as the only effective agency possible at present, and had seen Foch in this connection.

Foch yesterday ordered the French army to give us the horses we need. Thus as time proceeds the truth is apparent of my constant contention that military necessity will properly apportion insufficient supplies as we enter the critical period of the war. Am glad to note greater interest in the Military Board of our hesitant friends the English.

Paris, Monday

September 2, 1918, 10.30 P.M.

I AM just arrived from Coubert from a meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply this afternoon which was important and interesting. General Travers-Clarke accompanied me to Coubert; also my old friend Samuel McRoberts (who has just been made a Brigadier-General for his fine work in the Ordnance Department) and Colonel Smither and Colonel Harry Nut whom I knew as a boy in Lincoln. While the meeting was in progress General Pershing and General Pétain arrived, and both thanked the Committee for its work.²

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, Sept. 1. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 165.

² *Memorandum*

In the course of the sitting of the Military Inter-Allied Committee at Coubert, on September 2, 1918, General Pétain and General Pershing made the following statements:

General Pétain said he wished to express his appreciation of the excellent work the Committee had been doing toward the pooling of all the resources of the Allies in motor transportation. He observed that the Allies had been led to the conclusion that such a pooling was necessary by the experience in the French armies since the beginning of the War. In the first part of the war, he stated, every division, army corps, army commander in the French army wanted to have his own motor transportation. The result was a tremendous waste of trucks. Units at rest retained material

The subject of the mobile automobile reserve being under discussion both Pershing and Pétain emphasized its importance as well as that of the treatment by rules, etc., of the motor transport system from the standpoint of the inter-Allied armies. The new rules are nearly completed for adoption by the armies. The completeness and thoroughness with which they have been prepared by our joint sub-committee, which was much in excess of their requirements while units engaged in active operations were short of transportation. The total amount of available trucks was inadequate; the Commander-in-Chief had not at his disposal the transportation he required for active sectors of the front. Therefore they were led to centralize the motor transportation,

First, in each army.

Second, for the whole of the French armies.

The results were most satisfactory. He wished to point out that the principle which was true for motor transportation was also true for all sorts of resources, material, and facilities. He pointed out the question of artillery material and recalled the fact that units engaged in active operations required a quantity of artillery far greater than those in quiet sectors. The first thing to study, when large units are to be engaged in such operations, is the amount of artillery that must be given to them in excess of their normal allowance. This has led to the creation of the French General Reserve of Artillery, which is at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief to be distributed as he sees fit among his armies. He believes in the necessity of extending that principle, and creating a General Inter-Allied Reserve of Artillery, at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies. His conclusion was that the pooling principle was the only way to economize all sorts of material, and therefore have the material available when and where necessary. Of course its application is difficult, therefore the Committee are entitled to our gratitude for the very complicated and useful work they are doing.

General Pershing said he wished, too, to express his appreciation of the work the Committee were doing. The idea of the pooling of resources, he recalled, had been initiated by the Americans in connection with the sea tonnage. They had always considered it to be a most important factor in economy of tonnage; one that should enable the Allies to take advantage of any excess in available shipping for the general prosecution of the war. Starting from that basis, the Americans had always encouraged the principle of unification in all branches of resources and effort. He wished to state that in his opinion the object of the activities of the Committee was not to take away resources belonging to an Allied army to turn them over to another army. Their object was chiefly to establish practical rules and methods enabling the Allied armies, when it was decided to be necessary, to use the common resources in the most intelligent and effective manner. He finished by thanking the Committee for the work they were doing.

their great importance from a military standpoint in connection with our approaching offensive, the great necessity underlying them, all will contribute to their lasting usefulness. This visit of John's was made on the eve almost of our first great military attack on the front, the consequences of which are sure to be extremely far-reaching.

General Moseley, Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, G.H.Q., also came to the meeting. (Smither is Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, S.O.S.) Moseley feels we are well prepared for the attack of the first field army upon which the hopes of our cause so greatly depend. Pershing and Pétain came with Payot from a conference ¹ with Foch at his near-by Headquarters, which was also attended by General McAndrew and Fox Connor, of our G.H.Q.

The English attack of to-day is proceeding well as Travers-Clarke is informed by wire. General Travers-Clarke had completed the arrangements of the British rear before leaving British Headquarters — so he stated — so that, though the English attack would take place in his absence, his machinery would run through three days all right notwithstanding. In contrast to the attitude of some of the English high officials toward our Board, General Clarke took this trip at this important time to ask me to ask General Pershing to make a request of Lloyd George for additional representation on the Board for British General Headquarters along the lines of my letter of August 24 to General Pershing regarding our own army which I had sent him through Major Bacon. I am to see General Pershing early to-morrow morning in this connection just before he starts for the front where so many important events are impending. Everybody has been doing his best to get things ready, and General Pershing will lead into battle a magnificent and well-equipped army.

My days pass in a succession of tasks which must be ac-

¹ At this conference the employment of the American army as a unit was definitely conceded. (See General Pershing's Final Report to Secretary of War, p. 70.)

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TORONTO

no small amount

complished. It would be interesting if in these notes I could describe our gatherings in the old and historic rooms of La Grange du Roy and our dinners at the château. Now that the Belgian army is represented, there gather around the table officers of five different armies. We are great friends. The French officers especially are considerate. But the beautiful and impressive surroundings somehow I seem to see only when I have left them, for the hard burden of difficult and perplexing decision is upon one's mind all the time. When the war is long over and I am far away from all the cares of the present and from this beloved country, there will come to me pictures in detail which now I hardly notice. Now above and overshadowing all is the atmosphere of tragedy unspeakable.

Paris, Tuesday, September 3, 1918

WHILE I am waiting at his house for General Pershing this morning it occurs to me to make a note of something that happened at our meeting yesterday as illustrating negotiation from an inter-army standpoint. Pershing and Pétain had both discussed the great necessity of the motor reserve. Payot had stated with great emphasis the necessity for the American army to furnish its quota of camions. The matter of the failure by the French to deliver us hay as agreed had been the subject of our earnest discussion before Pershing and Pétain arrived. I had stated that because of that failure Harbord had just requisitioned 16,000 tons of hay from America — three shiploads. So I interrupted Payot to say, with the emphasis with which he was demanding camions from us, that if he would deliver us 16,000 tons of hay as a reserve we would give him these three ships full of camions for the inter-Allied motor reserve. I had been demanding, in view of the importance of saving tonnage, that the French withdraw their order preventing us from buying hay locally.

Now Payot and Pétain work as closely together as Pershing and myself. Immediately that he saw that I was to expose a shortcoming of the French — which, Heaven knows

At Coubert General Moseley told me he had advised General Pershing to send him to the front and put me in charge of the 4th Bureau of the General Staff in his place. General Pershing this morning also told me that Moseley suggested this. No higher tribute could be paid me than this by Moseley, but I know what my training fits me for and I stated that this would be a mistake of a very serious nature. General Moseley is a most able officer, and his commanding ability and long experience with our own Zone of the Advance render him indispensable in this place. Like of the French and American armies and of strengthening their common action, by his devoted collaborator and friend Colonel Payot, Aide-Major-General.

At G.H.Q. 24th July, 1918.

(Signed)

CH. PAYOT

tance of the coördination work of the Military Board of Allied Supply in the rear of the three armies, as well as the necessity for the closest touch with it by the General Staff of each army.

Desiring to keep Colonel Dawes as the American member, I have not followed his suggestion to substitute a member of my General Staff in his place, but have given him authority, in his discretion, to call in members of the Staff and chiefs of the services to assist him.

Therefore, in the case of the French and American armies there is the closest contact and coöperation of the General Staffs with the Military Board of Allied Supply. The British General Staff, however, does not have direct representation on the Board, since the British member represents the War Office alone.

Since, for the preservation of final authority of the respective Commanders-in-Chief over the lines of communications of their respective armies, Marshal Haig and I have not acceded to Marshal Foch's desire for central control of the rear under Colonel Payot, and since this Board provides a proper agency for central control, without lessening the final authority, I earnestly request that the British General Staff be given representation on the Board in addition to the War Office in order to further strengthen it in its important work.

If General Travers-Clarke should be directly represented on the Board as is a similar authority in the other two armies, much delay in its work would be avoided and its general purposes be effectively forwarded.

With expression of my high personal and official esteem, believe me,

Respectfully yours

JOHN J. PERSHING

Incl.

P.S. My previous correspondence on this subject was directed to the Prime Minister.

J. J. P.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. A. DRUM
Chief of Staff, First Army, A.E.F.

all unselfish and overworked men, he occasionally, working at such great tension, becomes discouraged. But he never falters. Much of our coming success will be due to his work.

General Pershing told me of his violent interview with Marshal Foch of last Saturday.¹ While notes were taken of the interview, they will never indicate how important and intense was the issue. At one time Foch told Pershing he would appeal to the President of the United States. It ended with John's success. But I will say here that if any weaker or less able man than John Pershing had been confronted with this crisis, the American army, which is the pride of our nation and will ever be in history, would have been dissipated and a common victory rendered less certain. And yet Foch and Pershing are great friends and will always be so. Each admires the other. Unusual men take unusual methods of expression at times, but they never misunderstand each other. The sincerity of both Foch and Pershing, their common and sacred purpose, their common ability, bind them closely together. But when General Foch said, "I accept," he had yielded the American army its proper place in history. This was due to General Pershing, and to him alone, under circumstances which no other man in any of the three armies in my judgment could have mastered. Pershing is incomparably the strongest character I have ever known.

Paris, September 5, 1918

HAVE just returned from the British aviation field where I saw my friend General Sam McRoberts start on his trip from Paris to London by airplane, and now have a few minutes' quiet.

At my request the Labor Bureau has been transferred to Tours to get it in closer contact with the operating con-

¹ The General was referring to his conferences of August 30 and September 2, both of which were devoted to the issue of the unity of the American army. (See General Pershing's Final Report to the Secretary of War, pp. 39 and 40.)

struction chiefs. Received a fine letter of commendation from S.O.S. for my accomplishment. When I took over the task of recruiting and organizing militarized civil labor for the A.E.F. in addition to my other work, it was with some misgivings. But with the able help of Jackson, Smith, Estes, and others the Labor Bureau of the G.P.A. has made good, and that task is done. We started about February 25 with nothing. Our task was to recruit, officer, feed, transport, discipline, and maintain laborers under organization, turning them over to the control of construction officers only when they were actually at work. On March 25 we had 6000; on April 23, 14,000; on May 23, 23,000; on June 25, 30,000; on July 23, 37,000; and on August 26, 45,251. Of this number 8000 are prisoners of war operating under the Labor Bureau. Our actual recruiting amounted to about 26,000. The other laborers we took over from others for organization and control. When we started, Europe had been thoroughly combed over. Spain, Italy, and Portugal all embargoed our recruiting. I do not understand yet how we did so well. But thank Heaven! it is done. I will attach letter from Smither conveying commendation of General Harbord and his own.¹

**¹ AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES OF SUPPLY**

31 August, 1918

From: Commanding General, S.O.S.

To: Colonel Charles G. Dawes, General Purchasing Agent

Subject: Labor Bureau

1. The Labor Bureau has been transferred to the newly organized Army Service Corps. The efforts of its procurement branch, being confined to the procurement of labor in Europe, will continue to operate solely under your direction, in the same manner as do the procurement divisions of all other Supply Departments in respect to supplies in Europe.

2. Upon the occasion of this passing of the Labor Bureau from your direct supervision and control, the Commanding General desires me to express to you his keen appreciation of the manner in which, under your able administration, the Labor Bureau rapidly grew from its inception to its present thorough-going organization. During that period it has been the agency which has enabled important projects to be continued under construction. Dealing with laborers of many different nationalities, a multitude of vexatious problems were involved in the successful manage-

Our laborers consist of Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Portuguese, French, Senegalese, Cabyles, Moroccans, Tunisians, Germans (prisoners of war), and some others under the caption "mixed," which may sound like piling Ossa on Pelion in the matter of designation. And then — and this should have been mentioned first — we have some 6000 to 7000 women, including "W.A.C.s," whom we brought from England. I still, however, must help recruit as per my orders.

The retreat of the Germans continues. We are straining every nerve to get the S.O.S. in the immediate rear ready for the advance. Harbord arrives this evening.

*Paris, Monday A.M.
September 9, 1918*

ARRIVED from visit to front 1 A.M. and leave for Coubert in a few hours, but had such an interesting trip shall make a note of it. Arranged the trip for McFadden, of War Trade Board, through our Military Board French officers. He has been a faithful and effective worker of great ability for the A.E.F., and had not as yet been to the front. Arranged to have the party, including Dr. White and Mr. Darrow, of Chicago, go to Coubert for dinner and the night at our headquarters, meeting me at Meaux yesterday morning, to which point I went (Sunday morning) with General Harbord, who stopped there for a celebration of the Battle of the Marne. Mr. Stettinius accompanied us. Went to Soissons, where we saw Mangin at his new headquarters near there into which he had moved that morning. Went about eight to ten kilometers beyond Soissons, where we looked at the artillery

ment of this organization. All of these you have met and solved in the most expeditious and capable manner.

3. Please permit me to add my personal appreciation, as I have personally watched this development from its beginning

By order of the C. G.:

H. C. SMITHER
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4

action. A French deputy who had preceded us at this point two hours before was killed by a shell which burst in his party. Looked at the shelling of the Chemin-des-Dames road. Brought back a French bayonet as a souvenir of this spot. It was lying near the body of a French hero—a private soldier. Went through Soissons—bombarded and deserted—and stopped for a minute in the deserted and ruined cathedral. Took the road as Mangin directed and got to the Oise by Noyon, but the bridge was blown down and we could cross only on a temporary footway. Noyon, like Soissons, is a stark ruin. The Germans are just out of it. The Noyon-Soissons road was somewhat rough from occasional shell-craters. Came back through Compiègne and then to Soissons again. Took dinner with General Mangin and his Staff. Clemenceau had been there in the afternoon on his way to visit the wounded deputy, who later died.

It was an interesting trip, as there was action everywhere in progress on the front, though comparatively light, owing to the rainy weather. We came into sight of it, however, only east of Soissons. Mangin again and again expressed his appreciation of the American troops. We traveled some two hundred and fifty to three hundred miles during the day according to McFadden's estimate.

At Military Board meeting this P.M. I expect to receive for the A.E.F. authority for it to buy hay locally in France, which we have desired so long and which should save us much tonnage. Have not heard of the results of Pershing's letter to Milner, which I am awaiting with interest. When General Travers-Clarke came to see me in Paris he brought with him and showed me the correspondence between Foch and Haig in connection with the former's request for the central command of the Allied rear. Considering this correspondence, considering the wisdom also of such a step, and the general situation, I do not see how the British can decline to accede to General Pershing's suggestion.

Discussed with Harbord Saturday evening the question of

ST. MIHIEL AND THE MEUSE

a central financial organization for the A.E.F. He and Kernan dined with me.

Paris, September 10, 1918

At Coubert for meeting of Military Board yesterday afternoon. Long and weary session. Got permission for the A.E.F. to buy hay in France along its line of communications which should help out our acute hay crisis. We have now only ten days' supply on hand.

Discussed the 60 c.m. railway situation and accepted principle of an inter-Allied Staff study and treatment of it including a school such as the M.B.A.S. has established at Rozoy for the Allied motor transport.

At the château in the evening Major-General Buat (Pétain's Chief of Staff), General Woodruff, English liaison officer at French G.H.Q., and Colonel Mott, our American liaison officer at Foch's Headquarters, dined with us. All are much interested in our work. Stayed all night at Coubert and then motored to Rozoy with the other members of the M.B.A.S. to see the inter-Allied Staff school we have established there in connection with the system of unification of the motor transports in the rear of the Allied armies. In the school there are thirteen American officers, ten English, ten French, five Belgian, and two Italian. We listened to the morning lesson. Payot addressed the school. Prepared a telegram to Pershing asking his ratification of the inter-Allied system of motor transport which we are putting into effect, as Foch desires to promulgate it immediately.

Had a sense of satisfaction in attending this meeting and seeing some of the results of the tremendous efforts which we have made to establish and empower the M.B.A.S. Its immense usefulness is at last generally recognized and I no longer have to apologize, threaten, or explain. It speaks for itself. It has been no light task to fit the yoke of a common purpose upon the necks of the proud and independent chiefs of the services of the three armies, but with the wonderful aid

and upon the initiative of our great Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, it has been done. For all my trials and disappointments and work in getting this inter-Allied agency started — and they have not been inconsiderable — I felt myself repaid this morning as I sat before the school engaged in a meditation made practicable by my inability to understand the lectures in French delivered by the instructors.

Returned to Paris as usual at forty miles per hour. I often wonder at my peace-time conservatism in regard to speeding. It makes a difference when you *have* to do anything. Theoretically nothing mapped out for our Services of Supply is possible considering the increasing importation of troops, but *practically* we will take care of them. Dwight Morrow's story is applicable. A father was telling his little boy a story. He said, "The alligator had his mouth open and was about to close it on the turtle, when the turtle suddenly climbed a tree and hid himself in the foliage." "But, papa," said the little boy, "a turtle can't climb a tree." To which papa replied, "But *this* turtle *had* to."

Paris, September 14, 1918 (11 A.M.)

GENERAL PERSHING and his army are winning a splendid victory, having wiped out the St. Mihiel salient.¹ When I

¹ *Telegrams exchanged between General Harbord and General Pershing on the occasion of the St. Mihiel victory*

GENERAL PERSHING,
C.-in-C., A.E.F.

September 13, 1918

Congratulations on your birthday and your fine work thereon. Nearly three hundred years ago Oliver Cromwell on the 13th day of the month, September, went into battle quoting Psalm 68, now the Episcopal morning prayer for that date, "Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered; let them also that hate him. Like as the smoke vanishes so shalt thou drive them away."

HARBORD

MAJOR-GENERAL HARBORD

September 19, 1918

Tours

Many thanks for your birthday telegram. Your old division might well be termed The Ironsides, though I doubt whether they went to battle quoting Psalm 68.

PERSHING

appeared at Coubert at the Board meeting yesterday afternoon all praised the first field army and its commander. Payot brought over a French field map from his headquarters with the American advance platted up to the last hour and the other members of the Board signed it and presented it to me as a remembrance of the occasion.

Colonel Beadon notified me that the English Government had agreed to comply with General Pershing's request to have the British General Staff represented on our Board, and that General Ford had been appointed.

Ford is one of the ablest men in charge of the British supply of the army rear. I think in our long fight for English coöperation he has constantly approved our plan. My recollection is that Lloyd George told General Pershing long ago that Ford favored rear coördination and suggested in our early efforts a consultation between Ford and myself. At any rate, England is now squarely "in for it" — and the world knows what that means for the success of any great effort.

At the meeting I was enabled to state that the American motor transport system was being reorganized as a result of the work of the Board and along French lines. Payot said Commandant Doumenc was at St. Mihiel then, and that our motor work was being carried on there under the more elastic plan of central control which the French follow. As our lines advance the subject of motor transport behind the lines is becoming of vast importance. The work which our Board has accomplished already in unification of circulation and general regulation of motor transports will be ever remembered. Then if we get our mobile automobile reserve of 24,000 camions, to operate under Foch, completed — and we shall if the war lasts a time longer — it will be a tremendously effective weapon in his hand. We established the Staff school for 60 c.m. railways at our meeting. I gave the Committee what the A.E.F. could contribute in time of emergency to Foch in light railway material, equipment, and personnel; also estimate of motors available for his reserve in October.

The great victory which John and his army is now winning will live in the history of the ages. It is difficult for me, however, to keep my mind from dwelling on the fact that it renders secure in every way my dear friend in the continuance of his great work. I think my nephew William must have been in a heavy tank in this fight, but am not sure.

Paris, September 15, 1918

GENERAL PERSHING'S victory is upon the minds and in the hearts of all. His military success will be that which appeals to the imagination and for which he will probably receive his greatest praise. And yet really his greatest achievement is the organization built up and held together during the past year under enormous difficulties. The great number of investigators and official visitors now among us are telling us how we can improve this and that in our system. They forget the difficulties with which we have been confronted. Results were always first in our mind — system second. As fast as we could apply system without lessening results, we did so. And upon results we asked to be judged as well as upon our system which we have evolved under the entirely new circumstances of an allied warfare. I therefore keep my patience when the young men from the War and Treasury Departments tell us what we should and should not do. Much of what they say is useful — much is nonsense.¹ Stettinius,

¹ Edward R. Stettinius brought to the assistance of the United States Government an unusual experience in connection with munitions of war. Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War, he organized and directed, for Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., all purchases in the United States of war supplies for the British and French Governments, which purchases reached an amount not far short of four billion dollars, and, by meeting the Allied deficit of munitions at a critical time, did much to save the Allied cause.

As Surveyor-General of Supplies, to which office he was appointed on February 13, 1918; as a member of the War Council, which he entered a month later; as Second Assistant Secretary of War, named by the President on April 6, 1918; as representative of the United States on the Inter-Allied Munitions Council, Paris, from July, 1918, to the Armistice; and as Special Representative of the War Department in Europe from August,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS

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however, who is extremely efficient, has a clear, logical, and helpful mind. Sent here to report on us, he is showing every appreciation of our past difficulties and his criticisms are always constructive and helpful. We have been trying to devise a central financial organization for some time. He has given every assistance in this work. It is a pleasure to have

1918, to December, 1918, he contributed with conspicuous success to the effective prosecution of the war.

His first activities in Washington were directed toward a solution of the munitions supply problem, and particularly toward the coördination of purchases and the adjustment of contracts for munitions and supplies to the military programme. When this situation had been effectively met by the centralization and coördination of the purchase, production, and supply of war material in the United States, he went overseas. He represented the United States War Department on the Inter-Allied Munitions Council and sat in conference with the Ministers of Munitions of England, France, and Italy, in the consideration of measures designed to exercise control over the munitions resources of the Allies and to direct their utilization in the general interest of the Allied cause.

In addition to discharging abroad other duties specifically assigned to him by the Secretary of War, he gave to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F., in the language of General Pershing's citation, "invaluable assistance in varied and important matters," these matters involving problems of supply, the administration of the financial transactions of the A.E.F., and, after the Armistice, the setting-up of organizations for the cancellation of contracts and the liquidation of the business affairs of the A.E.F. in Europe. Not the least of the services rendered by Mr. Stettinius were the signally successful negotiations with our Allies in the procurement of munitions which were required abroad in consequence of the large number of troops sent abroad in the spring, summer, and fall of 1918.

Subsequently Mr. Stettinius returned to the United States, and, as a result of his study and recommendations, the United States Liquidation Commission, War Department, was formed to assume general charge of the sale of supplies and the liquidation of the affairs of the A.E.F. in Europe. He made a second journey to Europe in the spring of 1919 with members of the Commission, assisting them in organization and serving in an advisory capacity until July, 1919.

For his services to the War Department he received the Distinguished Service Medal. The French Government, in recognition of what his labors had contributed, not only to the effectiveness of the French supply of munitions from the United States, but also to the whole Allied cause, conferred upon him the rank of Commander of the Legion of Honor. The Belgian Government conferred upon him the rank of Commander of the Crown.

him here. Both Pershing and Harbord, as well as I, feel this way about him.

Harbord spent much of yesterday with me. We had a conference with the French on the hay situation in the afternoon. John is biting into the S.O.S. for motors and personnel for the emergency at the front and Harbord is bearing a heavy load. But he is a great man and his shoulders are strong enough to carry it. He is a dear, faithful, and loyal friend.

This morning received a telegram saying that General Pershing had wired General Foch, as I suggested, indicating his acceptance of the motor transport organization behind the Allied lines. I certainly am rejoiced that John and I did not yield to discouragement in our long fight to establish our Board.

Received telegram saying Portugal had granted our request to recruit 5000 laborers there. "To him who hath shall be given." Victory is making our great task easier — though it is hard enough yet.

Paris, Wednesday
September 18, 1918 (9 P.M.)

STARTED for Chaumont (G.H.Q.) Monday afternoon by automobile with Logan. My purpose was to expedite the settlement of the differences on the minor details of the Allied motor regulations which still remain and which the General Staff has appointed a board to consider. When this is done, Pershing will approve and Foch issue the rules to the Allied armies. Everything is settled except a few details, and the delay is annoying. Hope to have the matter settled so that the order can be issued by Foch to the armies next week. As our lines advance farther from the railheads nothing is more important than this motor transportation system. While what I say here does not apply — thank Heaven — to Moseley and G-4, who are concerned in motor transportation, my patience and forbearance are at times strained to the limit by the narrow and bigoted attitude of some of our

American officers toward the French. So thoroughly is General Pershing in sympathy with, and possessed of knowledge of, the magnificent efforts which the French are making for us that in justice to these officers I feel that it would be unfair to them for me to indict them before the General, without their presence. This feeling alone keeps me from making a serious issue with some of them. However, since supply relations and negotiations with the French are largely in my hands, I am able to see that justice is done in almost every case. But it is exasperating, with knowledge of the sacrifices that these people are making and have made to help out the Americans, to hear prejudicial expressions from small natures reflecting upon them. Of course these men speak from only limited knowledge of our dealings with the French army and Government. Again to blame the French for an actual or alleged failure to do what they promised often serves as an excuse for their own dereliction or lack of energy. I state here that the record of French coöperation with the A.E.F., when it is understood, will ever be remembered to their credit. The attitude of a very few officers is something of a handicap to us at times in our inter-army and A.E.F. governmental negotiations.

The instinct of property universal in mankind makes difficult all questions of coördination in supplies. I have reflected on the comparative ease with which military coöperation is secured as distinguished from supply coöperation. Perhaps the answer is this: that military coöperation is dictated not only from motives of self-preservation, but as well because in the broader sense it works for the protection of supplies and property, and the property instinct therefore supports instead of opposes it. But it is curious to see an officer cheerfully acquiesce in the sending of men to lose their lives in the battle-line of an ally — as he should — and then favor a narrow policy in supply contribution.

Logan and I started late Monday afternoon, and took Colonel Mott with us as far as Foch's Headquarters. From

there Mott telephoned to Cirey-le-Château that Logan and I would be there for dinner. We lost our way and at 1.30 A.M. reached the château. We found Madame (Vicomtesse) Salignac-Fenelon and her daughter, Countess de Castres, sitting up for us. I had never met these charming representatives of French hospitality nor seen the wonderful château in which Voltaire lived and worked so long. But I put here a word of appreciation of these women who have turned over the use of this beautiful and historic home to our officers and aviators. The husband of the Countess de Castres is wounded and a prisoner in Germany. It is significant of the devotion of all of France to this cause that the delicate, sensitive, and refined Countess de Castres left this beautiful place to become a nurse, and for the first three months of her two years' work felt honored to wash the feet of the wounded and suffering *poilus* as they were brought to the hospital. After this preliminary experience and further training she became a regular nurse.

At Chaumont I spent a busy day. Took lunch with General McAndrew (Chief of Staff) and General Davis at John's château. John is at the front preparing for what I cannot here write. Logan and I left Chaumont Tuesday evening and went as far as Cirey-le-Château where we spent the night. General Frank McCoy also spent the evening there.

The plan of campaign being carried on by Foch is that which General Pershing used so strongly to advocate in his talks with me long before the July offensive started. But his plan of striking with the maximum force at the time of the enemy's greatest weakness, *which is now*, involves a policy of the rear as well as the front. It involves a policy of tonnage and sea transportation as well as troop movements. How few realize the full weight of responsibility which General Pershing carries! How many after the war will realize that in carrying out his plan he has to risk all in one sense. Suppose in carrying out this plan in order to get a blow of the maximum force possible this fall, he jeopardizes

DOOR AT CIREY-LE-CHÂTEAU

by his tonnage policy supply reserves necessary for his army next winter and spring. Suppose he does not thus jeopardize supply reserves, but plans for another full year of war and this makes it impossible to strike the *maximum* blow and end the war before Christmas! John is going to strike his maximum blow. He is taking his chances on his supply. He believes a reserve is meant to be used in emergency. This is why John Pershing is fit to command the finest army in existence. He carefully considers, and then acts without hesitation and with the sublime confidence in his power to achieve which is ever the mark of genius. May God be with him and his army during the next month.

*Paris, Saturday night
September 21, 1918*

DURING the course of a conference yesterday over transportation (rail — in Zone of Advance), General Ragueneau, of whom I am very fond, gave a lunch to those concerned and invited me. As Moseley and Payot were both present I took an unfair advantage of a social occasion, called Hodges and Roop by telephone to the restaurant (Voisin), led Moseley and Payot out of the lunch-room into an adjoining room, and there we settled a form of approval to be given by General Pershing of the motor transport regulations of the Allied armies which will enable General Foch immediately to promulgate them. While I subordinated etiquette to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by this accidental juxtaposition of powers, my friend General Ragueneau agreed with me that the end justified the means.

Since our army motor transport system is in course of re-organization under the plan of the M.B.A.S. no working time has actually been lost in the unreasonable delay in getting this matter of form settled. Such delays have their roots in human nature. In any large association of men engaged in a joint effort certain individuals in authority will be found whose narrowness of vision or personal selfishness

of power, associated with extreme competency in the administration of their particular unit of the machine, makes their unreasonable opposition to general measures of co-ordination difficult to deal with at times.

This afternoon took lunch with Payot and De Siéyès. Payot feels deeply the great injustice done him by the French War Department in not promoting him to Brigadier-General in accordance with the recommendation of Foch and Pétain. He is exercising powers equal to those of a General of an army like Mangin, but because these powers must be exercised in the rear they do not attract public imagination, and therefore poor Payot can be safely treated with injustice by civilian authority where the victorious army commander could not be. The history of this war will be written around achievement — not shoulder straps. But this does not comfort Payot.

Sent Colonel Hodges to Pershing's field headquarters with the copy of the motor regulations for his approval and signature to-day. These regulations are to govern, first, road traffic in the zone of operations; second, the hauling of material by mechanical transports; third, governing troop movements by mechanical transports. I think our new system will be in operation to a sufficient extent when our next advance occurs as to prevent some of the motor transport jams which occurred in the St. Mihiel offensive. However, Doumenc helped out that situation materially according to my present information. Instead of ten American officers as at present at our motor transport school Pershing has told McAndrew to send one hundred if possible.

Paris, September 23, 1918 (12.30 A.M.)

I HAVE not written anything before about our new offensive, which starts to-morrow,¹ because I did not dare trust it even to a paper which would remain on my person. But now there

¹ The beginning of the Battle of the Argonne. The attack was actually delivered September 26.

is not time enough left to have such an accident happen as to lose it. We shall have twenty-five divisions on hand under General Pershing available for the drive. Instead of striking at Metz — which we hope the Germans expect — our left flank, as I understand, will be in the neighborhood of Varennes, west of Verdun. We are bombarding Metz, but the General's eyes are elsewhere. St. Mihiel was but a preliminary effort. The next is our *great* movement.

Spent a very busy forenoon on supply and transportation matters. Prospects better for 60,000 animals from Spain.

11 P.M. At my room after spending evening with Major-General Ford, the new English member of our Board, and Lord Pembroke. General Ford reports three days' steady rain around Verdun which will probably delay our offensive. Ford has aggressive plans for the Board evidently. I no longer am apprehensive of a lack of British interest.

My nephew William Dawes is in the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion, A.E.F., with the British Army. Am anxious about his welfare in the recent fighting. General Ford offered to telephone British G.H.Q. to have them look him up and will do so in the morning.

Paris, September 25, 1918

RETURNED last night from meeting of our Military Board at Coubert. Delivered to the Board General Pershing's signed approval of the three sets of regulations governing motor transport of the Allied armies. The reorganization of the motor transport system of the American army for which the Board is responsible will in my judgment almost double the effectiveness of the transportation in the rear of the First American Army in the coming offensive. The Board is rapidly becoming what I always felt was inevitable — the coördinator of the Allied rear. Major-General Ford, of the British General Staff, who attended his first meeting, is an ideal member — experienced as a soldier, possessed of authority, and having a keen, alert, and practical mind. Through-

out all the delays of the English I have never lost faith in the idea that finally they would become enthusiastic coöperators in this great work. That time has now arrived. Ford, acting upon an expression in my letter to Pershing, transmitted by him to Milner, suggests the changing of the name of the Board more nearly to express its coördinating military power. He complains that the word "supply" creates the impression that we are dealing simply with something to eat. Being long habituated to covering military authority under civilian camouflage, and avoiding the encouragement of opposition in the effort to establish usefulness, I am more or less indifferent to names, but I agree that the Board is now so powerful and well recognized that its name makes little difference. As a matter of fact I am responsible for the English name.

Ford has proposed to the Board the consideration of railroad transportation. We established the sixty-centimeter school. The record of our meetings will indicate our growing activities.

While writing this received a code message from General Pershing asking me in person to make another appeal to the French for additional animals to help him in his operations at the front. Will do this later in the afternoon to M. Tardieu.

General Ford was kind enough to telephone British G.H.Q. and found that William is still all right.

Paris, September 29, 1918

EVENTS move so fast I cannot note all of them. I will detail one of the more important of them.

Pershing wired me on the 24th to make an appeal in person to the French for more horses for his army. I did so and Tardieu took up the matter with his customary energy. To-day I have wired Pershing that the French expect to send him 30,000 additional horses cutting them out of the French army. Marshal Foch is meeting the emergency. As I have always maintained, emergency is after all the greatest coördinator. Motor trucks and horses are the essential things for the hour.

A PART OF THE ARGONNE FOREST WITH ITS BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

Our lines advance. The army must follow closely the enemy. Delay in pursuit is disastrous. But the requirements in transportation facilities for a modern army are simply overwhelming. This is why what the French have done for us in the horse supply is so vital. I wired Pershing this morning, telling him that the French would furnish 30,000 more horses (they have already given us 136,000) and that the 30,000 was a reduction from the French army: "While this instance of extreme coöperation on the part of our noble ally is but one of many, it evidences her high confidence in your personal ability to effectively use in a crisis her most essential military resources."

General Harbord spent most of yesterday with me. Our lines advance everywhere. Foch is bending every energy to following up the enemy's slow retirement under pressure.

*Paris, Thursday night
October 3, 1918*

JUST back from a day at Coubert — two meetings of the Board. General Ford, the new member, is ideal — coöperates in every way, ignores irrelevant detail and has an eye always on results. He understands the relative importance of things. Railway transportation problem was the principal one under consideration. Arranged for a committee of officers representing the three armies to visit all fronts to report on the car-unloading methods with a view to their improvement. Committee will meet at my office Paris Monday morning and start immediately after a short consultation.

Discussed matters at rear of American First Army with Payot, who is coming to Paris to-morrow for a further consultation with me. If second conference confirms my impressions derived from the first, am thinking of going to General Pershing's Headquarters to make suggestions to him looking toward improvement. French claim that confusion of transports in our rear makes our rapid advance impossible. The problems of the rear in modern warfare are infinitely more

difficult than those involved in simple military strategy. Thus it is that General Pershing's mind has been, and is now, so much on the rear.

The military situation steadily improves, though the fighting has been terrible the last few days. We have now about 72,000 in hospitals. May the Lord bring this war to a close soon, provided its close marks an enduring peace! May all this sacrifice insure for centuries a peaceful world! But this war must be *fought to a finish* — not *negotiated* to one.

Payot goes from Pétain to Foch this month.

At my office Jay is doing splendid work in tightening down our system of coördination through purchases by category. He is an administrator and executive of the highest order of ability. Besides this he is a lovable character, a *strong man and a faithful friend*.

The longer I am connected with our Military Board the more I realize the tremendous advantage its earlier organization would have been to the Allied armies even before America entered the war. The lessons as to our own rear which we are now learning under such difficulty could have been mastered much sooner. We have not yet mastered them. I have no disposition to underestimate the difficulties of the handling of the rear in the Zone of the Advance. But some of our Staff officers are not ready enough in profiting by the experience of our allies, in keeping in that humble state of mind which does not regard the seeking of the knowledge of the experienced as derogatory to military dignity. This emphatically, however, does not apply to poor Moseley who has about the hardest and meanest task in the war. He learns where he can, and does the best he can.

Paris, October 4, 1918 (1 P.M.)

AFTER a morning of conferences too many to be enumerated — of crisis after crisis involving action, of long-distance telephoning, of a crowded office, one of those mornings in which one crowds a month of normal experience (even a nor-

mal month over here) — I find the room suddenly empty, and after a lunch on my desk have an inclination to make a few notes.

In the flush of victory after the war when only the more spectacular things or strategical things are remembered by the many, the memory of mornings like this will recur at least to me; for they indicate the quicksands that are ever under the feet of those in high responsibility. If they cross them, the world acclaims them. If they sink, the level landscape of the future will be unmarked by the evidence of their fruitless and heroic struggle. So in the advance, so in the rear. So with life and in battle; so with reputations both at the front and in the rear which must support the front.

Unquestionably the French and English desire to dissipate the American army to a large extent. While John is at the front, an attack is being made on his management of the rear. If he cannot advance his army farther because his rear is disorganized, they say, then why not let the French and English take over more of his troops in their sectors. The danger in the argument is that they are right — unless they are wrong about the state of the rear of the first field army. I believe they are wrong, but my idea is to be certain of it; and if they are right to make redoubled efforts to help straighten out the rear. That, of course, will be the General's view: for mixed armies do not fight as well as single armies provided that in military control they are in effect one army, and from every standpoint the solution — if the trouble really exists to the extent the French claim — is to make the rear stronger instead of the front weaker. But Clemenceau and Lloyd George seem to feel differently. I may be wrongly informed as to the depth of their feeling, but I believe it exists based upon reports they have received from our front.

Telephoned Harbord the situation fearing that in the interview Baker is to have to-day with the French this view would be pressed upon him without our side being represented. Harbord tried to get Pershing on the telephone, but he is in

the field. Harbord is coming to Paris this P.M. at Baker's suggestion and will see him. In the meantime I expect to meet Payot and develop the full strength of the French military criticism of our rear in the advance zone. This, of course, is not under Harbord. But as friends of the General as well as a matter of duty we are trying to develop the exact situation for his information and action. What I fear is that an effort will be made to attribute to bad management in the rear a situation chiefly created by natural obstacles and which no amount of good management could have avoided, and thus injure unjustly the reputation for efficiency which the army has so well earned by its wonderful work under its great leader.

I am jotting down the thoughts of the minute — they must not be considered as records of permanent opinion. One changes his mind as information changes, provided that information alters the foundation of correlated facts upon which opinion must always be builded. But we must be guided by facts. If we are justly criticized, we must do better. It is never helpful to waste time resenting criticism which is needed to discover whether it is well founded. Nobody cares about us — only how the thing comes out.

And now to work again.

Souilly, October 8, 1918 (4 P.M.)

RECEIVED orders to come to Souilly in accordance with my own suggestion, though I found on arriving that General Pershing had already written me of his own initiative to come. Arrived at Souilly from Paris with General McAndrew (C. of S.) by motor Saturday evening, October 5.

Have a few minutes now to record what I am working at this afternoon. Our general attack takes place to-morrow. Am trying through Payot at General Pershing's order to get ballast delivered by to-morrow for the normal gauge railroad nearly completed to Varennes — to be delivered from St. Dizier to Aubreville where the completed road ends. It is immensely important to hurry the railroad. At Varennes

MONTFAUCON

Observation Post of Crown Prince in foreground

(which I visited yesterday) several wagon-roads diverge which can supply our divisions if we can get the material there by rail as well as by camion. It has been raining hard this morning, though it is clearing now. Ballast must be had if possible. The French engage to deliver eighty cars to-day. Am asking for two hundred by to-morrow. Payot telephones he is after them. Germans are shelling Varennes this afternoon, but are missing the wagon-roads by about a hundred yards at last accounts. We will attack heavily to-morrow between the Meuse and the Aire; also in other places. Was in St. Mihiel this morning for a short time. Will try and write later as to occurrences between Saturday night and the present time.

Souilly, October 8, 1918

ON Sunday, having heard the General explain in detail (on Saturday night) to McAndrew and myself the plan of the coming attack of our troops, I went with Colonel Boyd, the General's aide, a man of great ability and military knowledge as well as personal charm, to look at the expected field of the action which will take place to-morrow (October 9). On the way to Montfaucon we called on General Bullard commanding the First Corps. Found camion transports being well handled everywhere. Found the town of Montfaucon under fire, so had to leave the automobile at the bottom of the hill on which the town — or rather what is left of it — stands. Troops were repairing road through the town, breaking stone by hand. Wounded were being carried down the hill as we passed. Boyd and I went on foot through the town and partly down the slope on the north side. There behind some signal corps camouflage we had a fine view of the country ahead. Our first line before us was being heavily shelled. Looked at the hills to the right, left, and ahead and realized as never before the extent of the task which has been allotted General Pershing. His men must go forward fired on from heights on three sides. Much of the fighting in the Argonne Woods and other woods is as severe as in Belleau Wood.

Instead of trying to describe his plans, after the attack is over I will attach the order of movement.¹

¹ *Secret*
Field Orders
No. 46.

1st Army, A.E.F.
7 October, 1918. 12 Hours

(MAPS: Same as Field Order No. 20)

1. No change in the hostile situation.
The Allied Armies continue their attack.
2. The 1st American Army will seize and hold the heights west of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon and the Côtes de Meuse east of Con-senvoye on October 8, 1918.
3. (A) *The 5th Corps*
 - (1) The 5th Corps, reinforced by the 1st Division and by one brigade of infantry of the 91st Division, will attack at an hour designated by the Corps Commander.
 - (2) It will capture the heights west of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon while covering its right by capturing and holding the Cunel heights. Special precautions will be taken to cover the left flank of the attack, especially on the front Fléville — Sommerance exclusive.
 - (3) Zone of action:
Right Boundary — No change.
Left Boundary — Baulny exclusive; Exermont inclusive; Montrefagne inclusive; Fléville exclusive.
- (B) The 17th French Corps will attack in accordance with F.O. No. 39.
- (C) 4th Corps, 2d Colonial Corps, 33d French Corps — No change in mission.
- (D) *The 3d Corps*
 - (1) The 3d Corps will protect the flanks of the attack of the 5th Corps and 17th Corps.
 - (2) It will push reconnaissances to the front and assist the attack of the 5th and 17th Corps with artillery fire. It will be prepared to attack and seize the heights in its immediate front upon orders from the Army Commander. The 33d Division will be held in readiness to carry out the stated plans of the 17th Corps.
- (E) *The 1st Corps*
 - (1) The 1st Corps will protect the left of the attack of the 5th Corps.
 - (2) It will push reconnaissances to the front and assist the attack of the 5th Corps with artillery fire. It will be prepared to advance upon orders of the Army Commander.
 - (3) Zone of Action:
Right Boundary — Baulny inclusive; Exermont exclusive; Montrefagne exclusive; Fléville inclusive.
Left Boundary — No change.

Returned over the road *via* Cheppy and Varennes, as the General wanted a report on the bridge work being done over the two mine-crater holes which are now being by-passed. At and around Montfaucon we were in the midst of the artillery, and a battery of 155's — four in succession firing within fifty feet of me — well-nigh burst my ear drums. This was after our return from our observation post. Much aerial activity and heavy anti-aircraft and machine-gun work directed at Boche machines was going on. My heart was heavy with pity for the wounded in the long lines of ambulances swaying along over roads so rough that at times their agony must have been excruciating. It was less difficult to look upon the dead. Some mother's son lay sleeping the last long sleep near our observation post. In the frightful noise all around he looked strangely peaceful and rested. Reached the train where we live and spent the evening with the General alone. Went over all Payot's suggestions as to our rear with him and discussed them fully.

Am not going to try to write about what happened in our long conferences until I get to Paris. On the way back saw General Summerall commanding 1st Division at his P.C. He was having hard fighting that day and had the same yesterday and to-day.

Souilly, October 9, 1918 (10.40 A.M.)

AM here with General Pershing, and as I am through with my work of getting information as to the rear in Zone of Advance,

(F) The Army Artillery will support the attack of the 5th and 17th Corps and will concentrate upon the hostile batteries and positions in the heights Bois de Gesnes west of Romagne and on the east bank of the Meuse.

(G) Changes in corps zones of action and the attachment of the 1st Division and one brigade of the 91st Division to the 5th Corps will take effect at 17 hours, October 7.

4. Administrative details — No change.

5. P. C.'s and Axes of Liaison — No change.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM
Chief of Staff

and of expediting a little part of it, make these notes. After a bombardment of nineteen hours (about) of the hill to the northeast of Montfaucon in which it was expected to use 500,000 shells, our attack started at 8.30 A.M. The news from the front will soon begin coming in.

As usual Payot made good, and at 9.30 last night received a telephone from him on the General's special train, where we live, that he would deliver at the rate of four trains of ballast to-day and to-morrow at Aubreville instead of two — (train 35 cars each, making 140 cars per day, instead of 80 as before arranged). I did this at General Pershing's direct order confirmed afterward by General Drum, Chief of Staff, First Army, although the order of General Pershing was delivered to me in Drum's presence. I make this note, as the Engineers complain this morning, I understand, that the ballast may be more than they can handle. How I wish I could put on boots and take charge of the pushing through of those few miles of vitally important railroad construction as in my old days at Big Run, Athens County! But I have done all I am ordered, and therefore able, to do. I found generally in the rear that Moseley has made splendidly good. Was especially pleased with the work of the M.P.'s, graduates of our school M.B.A.S., in handling motor supply trains at the crossroads at Varennes — a difficult spot. Good work is being done also at the difficult spots in the road. Hope the Germans are not getting the range of the vital crossing spots at Varennes. Then with the railhead brought there, as it will be soon, a supply basis for a considerable advance is provided if our attack to-day makes it possible.

On Monday, on my trip along the front and supply lines with Major Quekemeyer (an aide of General Pershing's), I went through the part of the Argonne Forest we have taken and over the supply road there. On that day went to La Forge and in the midst of active artillery again. Later in the day went over to Verdun and the supply roads there. Everything was in good shape, and I am convinced that as

OBSERVATORY OF THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE AT MONTFAUCON

our lines advance the necessary supplies can be brought up. But right here I again want to pay my tribute to the French for their wonderful coöperation. While they criticized a little, because for a day or so immediately after the victory at St. Mihiel things were somewhat blocked owing to the condition of the roads as well as to other temporary causes, they are now generous in their commendation of the way in which those things were mastered. Americans recognize no impossibilities in warfare. This army of ours is a wonderful organization. Pershing's attack last Saturday had already answered any criticism, as to the effect of which I had had some concern.

Drum like myself is wearing his stars for the first time. Am much impressed with his ability. Pershing is going to make another request of Clemenceau to do our friend Payot justice and promote him as he has so long justly deserved. Will stop here and read the messages from the attack.

*Paris, Saturday night
October 12, 1918*

REACHED Paris Thursday afternoon. Came by motor from Souilly, stopping at Châlons all night. As during my stay at the front I lived with the C.-in-C. on his train, and was with him much of the time, these impressions of him in action will be of interest hereafter, as the fighting he is now directing is the hardest which the American forces have yet done — barring Belleau Wood which equaled it. General McAndrew and I arrived in time for dinner Saturday evening, October 5. After dinner General Pershing explained to General McAndrew and myself his plan for the coming attack in detail. His grasp of the situation is in general and as well in exact and specific detail. Every foot of the ground over which the attack was to occur he knew. He is intensely concentrated mentally. Every unit to be engaged was at his tongue's end. Carefully and in detail he explained the method of attack and the reasons for each step. So exact is

his knowledge of the topography of the region that when on the next morning at his office he was further explaining his plans to me by reference to an elaborate and colored profile map, he suddenly challenged the accuracy of the map in which investigation sustained him. Extreme mental concentration and tension, combined with firmness and mental calmness and coldness, marked the great commander. As he finished his long exposition he said he thought everything was well and would go right. "But," he continued, "when my wife and I were in the Philippines she would ask, 'Jack, how do things stand?' I would say, 'Very well at present.' Then she would reply, 'Look out! Something is going to happen.' And," said the General, "something always *did* happen."

Late at night, as the General and McAndrew and I were still sitting around the table in the observation car, Boyd walked in with a telegram stating that Germany had asked for an armistice. I remarked to the General, "Here is the 'something' that has happened." The news which we are now receiving shows that the General's plans have succeeded. His gallant army responded to the demand as only the brave can do. Their precious blood is sealing the final and complete victory which now seems but a question of a short time.

Paris, Wednesday, October 16, 1918

MANY important happenings as usual the last three days. Yesterday was at a lunch given by Stettinius and Logan. Loucheur, Clémentel, Tardieu, Ganne, General Bliss, General Harts, McFadden, and others present. Bliss brought in the text of President Wilson's reply to Germany which he had just received. Was interested to note the great satisfaction of the French ministers present with the President's note.

Monday was at Coubert at a most important meeting of the M.B.A.S. — two sessions morning and afternoon. The work of this Board is becoming so varied and important that I will not try to cover any of it in these notes.

Yesterday (Tuesday) General Moseley called me up in

distress over an order of Foch's through Payot taking away camions from the first field army. He wanted to keep me advised of the situation. Large questions are involved. The C.-in-C. bears heavy burdens. If events prove this is an effort of Foch to assume command of the rear as well as the front, it will cause complications with both British and Americans. If so he is asking a control over the rear of the American and British forces which in his own army even he divides with civil authority. Until, however, I know all the situation I am in no position to judge of what is involved in this request or its propriety.¹

This I know: that John Pershing is being attacked in the rear while fighting at the front by those who would like so to divide the American army as to destroy largely its entity — something inconceivably unjust considering its great accomplishments and apparently without the excuse of military necessity. I cannot believe Payot desires this. Nor do I wish to infer that Clemenceau and Foch desire anything that does not advance the common cause in their judgment. It is only another one of the interminable succession of inevitable conflicts and compromises between the interests of the whole and the units composing it. Each is dependent on the other. As in the case of a wounded man, it is sometimes necessary to amputate an arm to save the body. But no reputable physician cuts off the arm without endeavoring to save the arm first if it seems possible. Thus also in military matters must decision be left to those in best position to diagnose what is and what is not indispensable in the relation of a unit to the whole. Therefore I refrain from further comment. In nothing is Pershing showing greater ability and wisdom in his handling of his army than in its relation to Foch and the Allies. In nothing is he confronted with more difficulty. His attack of October 4 silenced the French military critics. Now they are beginning again. Pershing has

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, October 22, paragraph 7, and November 4, paragraph 1. Appendix C, vol. II, pp. 205, 225.

been given the hardest part of the line. The most difficult in topography to attack, it has the greatest and most determined concentration of the enemy behind it now existing in France. That concentration has drawn much strength of the enemy from in front of the English and French lines and made their great advance of the last week possible. Our army with the hardest fighting is making possible great and gallant victories of the others while slowly, obscurely, and painfully forging ahead itself. Its work is not spectacular, but magnificent in its effects. But to-day John has men north of the Bois de Forêt, and I am hopeful that events will soon crown our devoted army with its proper reward and recognition and make their position and that of the C.-in-C. less difficult.

*Paris, Thursday night
October 24, 1918*

HAVE just returned from Military Board meeting at Coubert. For the last three days have been trying to find time to make these notes while the important events were fresh in my mind, but events themselves and not myself are masters of my time.

Last Friday noon, at the request of General Travers-Clarke, B.E.F., I left for B.E.F. Headquarters at Montreuil, taking Dwight Morrow and McFadden with me, as questions of tonnage as well as matters within my more direct province were to be discussed. It is no longer possible for me to take time to describe many of the important matters in which I am engaged, for they are too numerous to permit of it. The particularly bad one just now is *horses* to put artillery into action, and General Pershing has notified me that he places primary responsibility on me to get them. To-day General Travers-Clarke telephoned me of the first five thousand which have resulted from our efforts. But that is but an incident of the last week, and the report of my daily activities to General Harbord must supply the details of my work.

UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-09-2009

BATTERY C, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY, 28TH DIVISION, FIRING ON THE GERMANS FROM VARENNES



Just a word about our visit to our English comrades. Their entertainment of us was that of brothers meeting in time of mutual dependency and with a mutual affection. After our important conferences were over Saturday morning, McFadden and I went back (by motor, of course), *via* Arras, Bapaume, and Péronne, through the devastated district. Passed the Scotch marching through Arras with their bagpipes playing, and somehow it always brings tears to my eyes to see them. We reached Paris in the evening traveling as usual at "breakneck" speed. Sunday morning (October 20) my office was full of officers, General Moseley among them. Talked with him about his trip to Foch's Headquarters to see Payot and Weygand and the importance of maintaining the present agreeable relations with them. I then suddenly decided to leave for General Pershing's Field Headquarters to put before him the reports as to our rear supply system emanating from some French sources, which reports were unfounded but making trouble; this with a view to having him in touch with the real situation, which was a simple one as follows:

After the St. Mihiel attack and when our army was being hurriedly moved over to the west for the next attack, there occurred, owing to the condition of the roads and other ordinary causes, a congestion of supply trains which was not fully relieved for about a day and a half. Clemenceau happened to be at the front and saw it. Somehow the impression got abroad that the Americans could not renew their attack because of this temporary congestion, but such criticism immediately ceased from any responsible source when the Americans *did* attack on October 4. They have been attacking and advancing ever since. However, unfounded criticism having *started* from high sources, their ceasing it did not prevent the miserable gossips from causing us some annoyance. On my trip took with me my friend Lieutenant-Colonel Cushing, of my old regiment. We arrived at Souilly about 9.30 P.M. The General has moved some war maps to the

office in the car of his train so as to have them before him there as well as at the staff building in Souilly. The terrible battle is at its height and will probably remain so for some time. Our casualties so far in this movement have been 75,000. It is a greater Battle of the Wilderness. Some officers and Generals are weakening — but not so the Commander-in-Chief.

Paris, Saturday, October 26, 1918

INTERRUPTED last Thursday by callers, one of them Colonel Milton J. Foreman; also M. Ganne, who came from Clemenceau with the word that for the present he could not see his way clear to requisition additional horses for our army from France. I do not wonder at this, as France has already given us over 125,000. Lest I forget it, will say here that General Travers-Clarke telephones me to-day that we can now hope for up to 13,000 horses from the English. So I am getting a *start* on horses to get which I am turning heaven and earth. In this war quantities are so enormous and needs so critical all the time that I wonder how normal business conditions will seem to me after it is over.

After being at the front and looking at a German barrage laid on our first line, I know what artillery horses mean to our men. That is why I keep everybody on a tension of nervous effort and keep myself there. Ever since I have been here I have tried to visualize military emergency needs to keep myself at the highest pitch of effort. I have tried to see always a private soldier holding out his hands to me, and my beloved Commander-in-Chief smiling when I filled them. Now to resume:

Spent the evening when at Souilly with General Pershing alone. We stayed up until nearly one o'clock in the morning. He is in the midst of his greatest work, his most difficult test. After our talk he decided to go to Paris and see Clemenceau and to Foch's Headquarters. He started by his special train Monday evening while Cushing and I started by motor Mon-

day morning, October 21, as I wanted to see how our supply trains, etc., were functioning at the front. Took the road from Souilly to Varennes — everything running finely. We went up from Varennes as far as Fléville, near Grandpré — everything running smoothly. The reorganized transport system, A.E.F., is in partial effect and the graduates of our Military Board Motor Transport School are at work on the roads guiding traffic, although the orders actually authorizing the reorganization have not yet been issued by G.H.Q.

Moseley deserves great credit for the way our supplies reach our troops. He makes a great Chief of G-4, G.H.Q. To occasionally visit the front and see his work and that of our organization there always encourages me.

At Fléville, where we took lunch with the soldiers, the town was under shell-fire and Cushing had his first experience with it. It was very mild. But what our own batteries there were giving the Germans was another matter. We reached Paris Monday night. Tuesday General Harbord arrived in the city. I have been so busy on horses and everything else that I cannot remember — and have no time to try and fix the time — whether it was Tuesday or Wednesday night, but on one or the other General Pershing telephoned to us and we three took dinner at Fayot's (that is not spelled right, but the name sounds like that), where General Pershing often takes us. We had an interesting time. John was entirely satisfied with his trip. He feared, from what Clemenceau told him, what has since happened, that the former would not requisition additional horses for us.

Am writing very hastily, for callers are waiting, but I want to record my admiration for my nephew, Lieutenant William Dawes, who commanded a tank in the recent attack of the British and Americans upon the northern Hindenburg line. His ride in his tank, as I cabled his father, should become as much a matter of pride in our family as the ride of his great-great-grandfather with Paul Revere. Rockenbach tells me in our American tanks our percentage of casualties

among officers is very heavy. And here I also want to record what I have often meant to do before, that is my new admiration for my father and my Uncle Eph. Interrupted here — but will complete this later.

Paris, Sunday P.M.

October 26, 1918

To have taken the 6th Wisconsin through its charge upon and capture of the 2d Mississippi Regiment at Gettysburg, where every other man of the 6th was killed or wounded, and to have been in eighteen battles of the Civil War besides skirmishes, means something more to me now about my father. I have seen war as it is. To the memory of my brave Uncle Eph, shot through the jaw at Dallas, I also uncover. My experiences on the line are nothing as compared to theirs, but enough to give me knowledge of what a long continuance of such an experience entails in physical and nervous strain. Before the front-line private soldier and the front-line officers, the aviators and the tank men, a Staff officer, no matter how essential his work or high his rank, feels like standing at salute. At least I do.

I suppose peace is near at hand. General Pershing and all are here to-day. The conference on the terms of armistice to be offered by the Allies will be held at Versailles Tuesday. But like the runners at the end of a race, our heads are down in the effort and we cannot stop to concern ourselves with that which is not our business. To do one's own part is privilege enough.

If the German army breaks before the armistice is declared, Foch notifies us on the Board through Payot that the potential inter-army motor transport reserve which we have organized will be needed in pursuit. I think we can furnish 12,000 camions at least. We ought to have 24,000.

I am just as hard after horses as if the war was just commencing. It is our duty to keep at our maximum efficiency until the fighting actually ceases and peace is declared.

**SOUILLY: GENERAL PERSHING'S HEADQUARTERS FOR FIRST FIELD
ARMY DURING THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE**

**The Headquarters Building is the three-story building just at left of center
of picture**

*Paris, Monday (noon)
October 28, 1918*

HAVE just come from General Pershing's bedroom, where he is slightly ill of grippe or a cold. When I got back from the theater with Covell and Griscom last night received a note to call up the General's house immediately, which gave me a shock for fear he was seriously ill. He had wanted me to come there — and so I went this morning. His purpose was to talk over the attitude he is to take at the Versailles conference Wednesday which is to settle the Allies' terms for granting an armistice. He has made up his mind that his position will be that the only thing to do is to demand unconditional surrender. He told me what he had suggested at Foch's Headquarters last Thursday when he, Foch, Haig, and Pétain held a conference at St. Lys to compare notes on what the military terms of the armistice should be. The General after the conference carefully wrote out his personal suggestions and submitted them. Foch has a copy. He made his suggestions verbally at the conference and reduced them to writing afterward. Will not go into detail as to these terms, as all these things will be better recorded elsewhere, but was impressed with Pershing's suggestion in his proposal as to terms that the Allied armies should take possession of the east bank of the Rhine. At the conference Haig spoke of the French and English armies as somewhat tired. Foch took issue with this. Haig also made some slight reflections on the organization of the American army which John let pass without comment. But Foch, on the other hand, paid our army and its command the highest tribute.

What is forming in General Pershing's mind now is the form of his statement at Versailles. This he discussed at length. He will make a review of the military situation in connection with it. He is convinced that if civilization is to receive the full benefit of this terrible war it must end only with the unconditional surrender of Germany. The military

situation is such that in his judgment there can be no excuse for not obtaining unconditional surrender. Not even the quagmires of a Versailles conference can impede in my judgment its ultimate acceptance of the General's position as correct. I think the General will be able to get out of doors by to-morrow.

Paris, October 29, 1918 (2.30 P.M.)

HAVE spent the last two evenings with General Pershing who is still confined to his room with the grippe. He is, however, working as hard as ever. He read me the first draft last night of what he is to say at the Versailles conference, which has now been postponed to Friday. Told me of Major Robert Bacon's good work in connection with Haig's reflections on the A.E.F. made at the Foch conference. At that time General Pershing made no comment on them, but felt them deeply, which fact Bacon communicated to Haig. Sir Douglas did not really mean what he said at the conference, and sent General Pershing through Major Bacon a three-page letter saying so. Inasmuch as he had left a memorandum with Foch in which this slight criticism appeared, he sent a Staff officer and withdrew it substituting another statement. This is only another indication of the essential fairness and high-mindedness of Sir Douglas — and of all the English. They are stubborn and outspoken in argument, but at all times essentially helpful and coöperative. Bacon did a good service to Pershing and the A.E.F. and a greater one to Haig himself, who is justly honored by us all, and who last of all would wish to make a serious reflection on our advancing army which has already lost over 75,000 men engaging German forces on our front, some of which otherwise would have been fighting Haig and his troops.

The Commander-in-Chief (J. J. P.) seemed much better last night. He is preparing a brief and strong statement.

At noon yesterday I went to La Morlaye, about one hour distant by motor from Paris. There I took lunch with Payot

PERSHING'S VIEWS ON ARMISTICE 197

and his Staff, who are quartered in Baron Rothschild's fine country residence. Discussed with Payot important matters now before our board. Was absent from my office only about four hours, but had to work pretty lively the balance of the day in consequence. Am very fond of Payot. It is in times of greatest trial that the most enduring friendships are born.

Paris, Wednesday

October 30, 1918 (10.15 P.M.)

HAVE just returned from General Pershing's house. He leaves to-night for the front. He will resume the general attack with his armies day after to-morrow. The conference at Versailles Friday will not be held. Am glad things are being settled without a Versailles town meeting. The General attended a conference of the Prime Ministers at Quai D'Orsay this afternoon. House was there. The armistice terms for Austria-Hungary have been agreed upon and will be announced. Austria-Hungary has surrendered. The armistice terms of the Allies for Germany are still under discussion.

At the Foch conference at St. Lys, Pershing and Pétain handed their suggestions to Foch. He has handed his to the Ministers. The General said they did not differ much from those suggested by him, which were drastic. Notwithstanding there will be no general conference Friday, General Pershing to-day sent to the Supreme War Council at Versailles his views as to armistice. He argues against an armistice and for peace — that it may be enduring — by the sword rather than by negotiation. These are his views as a military adviser. He gave House a copy of them. Pershing's statement is a series of numbered paragraphs, clear, concise, and to the point, devoid of any attempt at rhetoric and designed only at clear presentation. He has worked hard in his sick-room. To-night he was dressed and feeling fit. Besides the armistice and peace conditions we discussed imminent supply situations, notably horses. The General thinks it will be nearly a year before he and I can go home,

even though an armistice is declared immediately which he thinks very likely.

Have had a very busy day. Payot came to the hotel and gave me a signed photograph of Foch this evening.

Paris, Friday

November 1, 1918 (1.30 P.M.)

NOTICE by the papers that meetings at Versailles are being held after all. Although Foch and Haig were present, with others for their Governments, the United States was not represented except by House and the navy chiefs. Owing to his care not to catch the grippe or other reasons, the Colonel has not leaned, and evidently does not intend to lean, heavily upon the General in connection with advice as to peace negotiations. The General's views are on record, however, as those of a military adviser.

Now that the war is about over, I am resigning myself to the inevitable future in which the critic and the politician take the center of the stage. If there is any way in which General Pershing *can* be attacked, they may be trusted to find it.

Attended Military Board meeting at Coubert yesterday. Took Stettinius and Colonel Dudley, of the Gas Service, with me. Senator Béranger, head of the French Gas and Oil Service, was present and we reached some agreements.

Am making some headway in the horse and mule supply. My work was never more exacting since entering the service, but my health keeps good.

Paris, Sunday

November 3, 1918 (morning)

YESTERDAY General Pershing was in the city. Attended the conference. Says Foch and Lloyd George have commended highly his written statement to the Versailles Supreme War Council. However others may think of it, it nevertheless expresses not only what should but what will happen — a

MARSHAL FOCH
Taken at the time of crisis, 1918

peace by victory, not by negotiation. Germany will soon be in a state of complete military and governmental collapse. Since peace terms under these conditions mean negotiation simply among the Allies between themselves, the so-called peace conferences are comparatively unimportant as shaping results. The troops at the front are furnishing these. Last night the telephone from Souilly to the General announced the splendid advance of our troops, which have at last broken through. How pitifully cheap now sounds the pessimistic chirp of the fireside crickets who have maintained that lack of organization in our rear, and not the fierce resistance at the front, has made our progress slow and painful up until yesterday when our break-through commenced. Let the casualty lists answer this lie. I am not going to concern myself with it further. Reports having come to General Pershing that House was repeating such views, he asked House about it and the latter denied it. At 5.30 last evening James Keeley brought Lord Northcliffe to my room at the hotel. The latter said Grasty, of the *New York Times* (who has proved a loyal defender of the General and a valuable one since he has been in personal contact with the conditions at the front), desired him to make a statement to the American people through the *New York Times* which would assist in quieting this unfounded criticism of our rear. He asked my opinion about the matter and the situation, and I gave it emphatically. As a result he went to his room, wrote a splendid article, which he submitted to me, and I in turn to General Pershing later in the evening. It has therefore gone forward.

Reported to the General that in my judgment we had established a weekly flow of animals to the First Army of about seven thousand. Hope this will be the last emergency work put upon me, as peace seems imminent.

John is well — very tense, very energetic, very determined. He made up his mind that the American army would break through and they and he accomplished it. Six new German divisions were put in against him in the last few days. Got

him to sign approval of the inter-army regulations for second-line telegraph and telephone system adopted by the Military Board of Allied Supply.

Smashed up in the automobile coming back from the General's train, on which he left at 11 P.M., and bumped my head, but not enough to prevent it working as usual.

Paris, Friday

November 1, 1918 (9.30 P.M.)

COLONEL MOTT has just told me that our attack has attained a depth in the center at last reports of seven to eight kilometers with 1200 prisoners. It started at 6 A.M. to-day. Germany internally seems in a bad way. Realizing that prophecy is generally unprofitable I have nevertheless been predicting for the last six months that finally the Allies in peace negotiations will have in Germany no better form of government with which to deal than Germany formerly had with Russia after the collapse of the dynasty. That enduring results for the good of humanity should arise out of this terrible war it will be best so.

Have had a busy day as usual.

To the future student and historian of the methods of allied warfare:

Largely for your assistance as well as because the information is of practical use at present for our armies, I am taking steps to have the Military Board of Allied Supply gather information as to the present military status of the three armies in regard to their supplies, transportation, lines of communication installations, etc., as of date October 31, 1918.¹ I hope one or more of you will be able to clearly demonstrate from these data the overwhelming advantages in allied army coöperation of a military unification of supply as well as of combat operations. The work of the Board, of course, has already

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, November 21, paragraph 10, and November 30, paragraph 4. Appendix C, vol. II, pp. 235, 245.

demonstrated many of these advantages. But you should be able to show that if from the first the Allies could have united their rear activities as well as those of the front the war would have been won long ago. To fully understand the situation you must thoroughly go over France itself. And you should also be able to show that the central control of the rear of any allied armies is as important as a central military control of their combat movements. The work I have done, with the splendid support of my able and generous Commander-in-Chief, in forcing the international consent for such unification of the rear as we have been able to effect through our Military Board, has been the most difficult of my varied experience here.

As you point out many things which could have been done in improvement of our allied military position — some of which I have fruitlessly labored for and of some of which I probably have never thought — it will be difficult for you, in considering their self-evident importance, to realize the enormous obstacles in the way of this kind of improvement, which we here to-day confront and have confronted from the first. You will realize them better when I state that if at the next meeting of the Board I should ask for an order to issue to the three armies requiring a report of the three Quartermaster Departments as to food supplies on hand, it would be impossible to get the unanimous consent necessary. Therefore I have asked for information on munitions first. So fearful are the Quartermaster Departments, especially the English, that a superimposed authority exercised for the common good might interfere in their separate control, that in my judgment they would veto even the gathering of information which might lead to a discussion of a betterment of conditions. The defeat of the English in front of Calais brought about the control of Foch, brought about the transport of the bulk of the American army by British ships, brought about a desperate struggle on the part of our proud and independent army elements to get together in many ways. In those dark days in April with their

ominous outlook was born my own effort to contribute to the effectiveness of the Allied armies by securing unity of supply and supply movement to match the unity of the front under Foch. Had the Allied armies been confronted from a supply standpoint with a situation as critical as their military position after the March offensive of the German army, my idea of a central control of the rear would have been adopted. It takes more than reason to bend national pride. Necessity must also exist.

But I persevered in my efforts, and General Pershing, intervening at a critical time by securing the Clemenceau agreement, rendered possible the partial adoption of the principle of proper inter-army Allied coöperation by the establishment of our great Board whose work even with its handicaps should ever make it remembered in history.

Paris, November 11, 1918 (6.15 P.M.)

THE greatest struggle of humanity ended to-day with the signing of the armistice by the Germans. Colonel Robert Bacon called me by telephone at eight in the morning saying it was signed at 5 A.M. After breakfast, on my way to my Headquarters at the Elysée Palace Hotel, was met by my faithful aide, Lieutenant Kilkenny, who said General Pershing wanted me to call him up immediately on the telephone at Chaumont. For the first time since being over here I did not anticipate an emergency, but thought his mind might be on the victory. It was characteristic of the Commander-in-Chief that he was hard at work, and what he wanted was to talk over the plan for a financial section of the General Staff. During our conversation I suggested that he should issue to the army chiefs of services an order relative to stopping immediately construction and purchases not essential to the A.E.F. under the new conditions created by the armistice. While the C.-in-C., Harbord, and I have all had this matter under consideration and have taken action therein as far as possible up to this time, it seemed to me that a statement by

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LIEUTENANT FRANCIS J. KILKENNY

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the C.-in-C., issued on the very day of the armistice, would not only result in a great saving through the prompter action of the chiefs of the services, but would indicate to the American people that the A.E.F. appreciated its duty to save everything possible in view of the enormous self-sacrifice which our nation had made in order to supply us.

At the request of the Commander-in-Chief I later dictated over the telephone such a suggested statement, first telephoning it to Harbord, who approved it. Am anxious to see how the Commander-in-Chief will finally issue the statement. In anything important he usually writes out the matter in long hand, then gives it careful revision. As a result Pershing's individuality is so apparent in his orders that I can generally tell from reading the ones he has personally prepared. He is a great master of English. When I congratulated him on his success he said he would not regard that he had succeeded until the army was safely back in the United States.

Went to lunch given at the Inter-Allied Circle by George McFadden at noon; present, Ambassador Sharp, Ganne, General Harts, Dwight Morrow, Auchincloss, Stevens of the Shipping Board, Atwood (who came with me), Stettinius, and others. Worked at office in the afternoon. The city has gone wild. Great crowds are everywhere. People are singing and cheering and carrying up and down the streets the flags of the Allied nations. The Place de la Concorde is jammed, especially in front of the Metz and Strasbourg statues. Clemenceau was to make the announcement of the signing of the armistice in the Chamber of Deputies to-day, but I made no effort to go.

Somehow — and I think it is true of almost every one else — I keep thinking of what I have seen and of those who made all this possible, but themselves cannot know of it as they sleep buried in the wheat-fields and by the roadways of northern France. I could not cheer to save my life, but I have to try hard all the time to keep from crying. Am waiting now for my dear friend Harbord who is coming by motor from

Tours to spend to-morrow with me. We plan to see General Pershing on Wednesday.

Last Tuesday I went by motor to Tours, spent the night and Wednesday there, staying at Harbord's house. Went with him on his special train on a partial tour of the ports. At St. Nazaire on Thursday, also at Nantes, at La Pallice on Friday in the morning and Bordeaux in the afternoon and evening. We arrived at Tours again Saturday morning. I reached Paris Saturday night. The achievements of the S.O.S. cannot be described by me here. General Walsh, General Jadwin, General McCawley, Colonel McCaw (Chief Surgeon, A.E.F.), Colonel Smither (A.C. of S. G-4, S.O.S.), and Colonel Wilgus were also on the train. Took Francis Kilkenny along with me at General Harbord's suggestion. Harbord has made good in the S.O.S. and that statement means something to any one who has seen the work accomplished.

General Pershing has asked me to go with him when he decorates Sir Douglas Haig with the "Distinguished Service Medal" of the United States. Will try hard to get things in shape to do it. To-night the General told me how much he had come to think of General Pétain, and of how stanch and able a soldier and good friend he was. The General has recommended McAndrew and Harbord for promotion to Lieutenant-General, but Baker replies that while he would be glad to do it, under the law they must be in command of line troops. It seems too bad that Harbord, who commanded the Marine Brigade at Château-Thierry and afterward the 2d Division, should now, because he has been placed at the head of 400,000 men in the S.O.S., be deprived of the rank which belongs justly to him. But history will take care of him. And so — as Pepys says — to bed.

Paris, Tuesday

November 12, 1918 (11.15 P. M.)

So much has happened since last night it seems as if it were a week ago. Others will tell of the world activities, but I am

near the center of the situation as it confronts our supply situation. The tremendous change in army supply policy, made necessary by the armistice yesterday, brings to us a series of questions so numerous and varied and at the same time of such far-reaching importance that there is not a minute's relaxation, which would normally follow a victory.

Taking up only one of the great questions considered to-day: General Merrone called at my office with a telegram from his Government saying that they (Italy) had 1,000,000 prisoners and 200,000 Austrian horses and were practically without food or hay for them. He asked immediate aid from the A.E.F. General Pershing had arrived this morning, but had gone to see Foch. I got General Rogers and took him and Merrone to the General's house where we met General McAndrew (C. of S.) and General Harbord. I proposed that the A.E.F. take over 100,000 Austrian horses in order to cut off the necessity of our Spanish purchasing now going on. At five o'clock General Pershing having returned, we all met again with him and went over the situation. He will help Italy with flour from our stock at Marseilles. After outlining about what we could do, he instructed me to handle the matter if possible through the Military Board of Allied Supply.

Germany is in revolution and appealing for food. Reports are that Switzerland is becoming disorderly. Washington is wiring us to be careful — not to sell to our allies, etc. We have got to act in the great emergencies which confront us as best we can, make decisions as best we can, and come out for better or for worse as we may, trying only to do our duty and act as far as possible under the highest authority at hand.

The day of the civilian is approaching, but it is not quite here. Since the Allied armies and governments always approach our army and General Pershing through myself in supply matters, the crisis which confronts all Europe is reflected in the daily happenings of my office.

As a result of the call of the Belgians and the conference I arranged for them, Rogers sold them about \$3,000,000 worth

of foodstuffs to prevent starvation. It was an emergency. But Washington through various channels is manifesting opposition to the army dealing with civilian or alien army relief. I feel that Washington is right on general principles and that these matters are properly for inter-Allied boards to handle, but we cannot wait while people may be starving for such machinery to start operations. The crisis, however, should soon be tided over.

The General (Pershing) had Davis (Adjutant-General) issue the order I suggested yesterday and had it wired to Washington showing that on the day of the armistice we had acted. To-day came a cable from the War Department suggesting what we had already done and instructing Stettinius to coöperate with us as representing the War Department. Harbord also to-day sent a comprehensive order to the chiefs of the Services of Supply so that we are getting the tremendous machine reversed.

To-night to get a little relaxation for all, I had General Pershing, General McAndrew, General Harbord, and Colonel and Mrs. Boyd for dinner at the Ritz and we afterward went to see "Zig-Zag" at the theater. We had a box and the General thought he was hidden, but somehow the audience must have learned he was in the house, for they did not leave at the close of the performance. Our party was taken by the stage entrance to our automobiles in the street, but a crowd had gathered at the side entrance to cheer the Commander-in-Chief. The streets are still packed with people. All day they have been parading and singing in the streets.

Had McAndrew and Harbord at lunch, as usual talking over the problems in which we are submerged. Last night Harbord and Atwood and I went to the same theater as did our party to-night. Then it was like a night in a madhouse, the audience and performers were so enthused with the victory announced yesterday morning.

GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD, A.E.F., NOVEMBER, 1918

Seated, left to right: Brigadier-General Charles G. Dawes, I
Chairman of Board; Colonel C. E. Stanton, Q.M.C.; Colonel
gineers; Colonel E. D. Bricker, Ordnance; Colonel D. P. Card, IV
Standing, left to right: Lieutenant-Colonel N. D. Jay, Q.M.C., A
Ralph Ward, Chemical Warfare Service; Captain H. H. Tolma

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Mount Ephraim, Faversham
November 2, 1918

MY DEAR GENERAL DAWES:

Thank you so much for your letter and for sending me copy of your telegram to Lieutenant-General Travers-Clarke and his reply to you. These telegrams will be preserved as a family heirloom, as I am proud to realize that through Ambrose our families are from the same root. The family which moved to America over three centuries ago is so honorably represented by you in the office of such great responsibility which you hold, and the next generation by William in the Heavy Tank Battalion.

My brothers Edwyn, Bethel, and Halford, and my son have served more particularly in Palestine. Halford has had some adventures; wounded Gallipoli, twice submarined in Mediterranean, he is now with the Murman Expeditionary Force. My uncle's son was a soldier before the war, so was out with the original expeditionary force and was badly wounded on the Aisne. As soon as he was patched up he was out again, then badly gassed. At present he is doing home service. When we look back to that awful period in March and regard the position to-day, what thankfulness we feel to America. America has brought a complete transformation. We all realized American strength, doggedness, energy, etc., but results are far beyond our greatest expectations. Then the President — what a wonderful man, the greatest statesman in any time! How grateful the world is that in these awful times there is one outstanding man to speak for the peoples and carry them with him unitedly. Our gratitude to the American arms and American statesmanship is greater than words can express. People have suffered since August, 1914 — their spirit was not broken — America has come forward with both arms and we see the wrong being paid for and a glorious end in sight and our hearts are uplifted and our gratitude is very great.

I was in Scotland in August and September — London and here since — and the feelings I have tried to express are the feelings on all sides. Governments try to express these feelings, but they are deeper down with all than words can satisfy.

In replying to my American cousin's kind letter, I have ventured in a poor way to add my thankfulness and gratitude. With best wishes

Believe me

Yours very truly

WILLIAM C. DAWES

P.S. If there are three or four convalescents — or on leave — you will personally train or send here, we will do our best to make their stay at Mount Ephraim as pleasant as present conditions allow.

November 14, 1918

MRS. MARY B. DAWES

508 Fourth Street

Marietta, Ohio

MY DEAR MOTHER:

It was a year ago in October, after my return from the Belgian front, that I wrote you the one and only descriptive letter in which I have had time to indulge since coming to France with the army. Not alone the pleasure it gave you, but the interest which one is sure to have hereafter in details liable to pass from memory unless recorded, both make me regret that I have not written you more often in this way. However, one cannot live a life of action over here and do much writing. My secretary, Lieutenant Mulloney, is taking this letter by dictation and in it I will describe something of the happenings of the last three days, covering those personal details which I am sure will interest the family as my ordinary short and hasty letters cannot do.

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The armistice was declared, as you know, at about 5.30 Monday morning, November 11. At eight o'clock Colonel

Robert Bacon, who has come to be a very good friend and whom you will remember as former Secretary of State and Ambassador to France, called me on the telephone at the hotel and announced the news. On my way to the office Lieutenant Kilkenny met me to say that General Pershing wanted me immediately on the telephone from Chaumont. For once I did not anticipate an emergency call and supposed he simply wanted to talk over the great victory. It was characteristic, however, of General Pershing that he was hard at work at his desk and wanted to discuss certain prospective changes in our General Staff organization covering a finance section and also the tremendous change of policy with which the American Expeditionary Force was immediately confronted as a result of the armistice. Under his direction my day was given (as was his and General Harbord's, we three being in constant telephonic communication) to reversing suddenly the tremendous business engine of the American Expeditionary Force. One does not know how many tens of millions of dollars saving to the people of the United States depended upon prompt and intelligent action. I only noticed casually the singing and cheering crowds on the streets and gave myself over unreservedly to the consideration of orders and instructions to the purchasing services under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General, Services of Supply. General Harbord left Tours by motor at noon and arrived in time to take dinner with me in the evening. General Pershing left Chaumont for Paris, arriving Tuesday morning November 12.

As I have told you practically all supply negotiations between the American Expeditionary Force and the Allied Governments, as well as many other governmental negotiations, center in my office. On the morning of the 12th my friend General Merrone, of the Italian army, who represents that army on our Military Board of Allied Supply, called with a telegram from the Italian Government stating that they had on hand one million Austrian prisoners and 200,000

horses with nothing to feed them and appealing to the American Expeditionary Force for help in the crisis which they feared might possibly precipitate them in a revolution. General Pershing in the transportation crisis at the front had put upon me the prime responsibility of animal supply. I had managed to get horses moving from Spain, and through a trip to British General Headquarters and by sounding "the call of the blood," had induced the English to rob their own home divisions of about thirteen thousand horses which were arriving. The Treasury Department is strongly objecting to our securing horses in Spain because of exchange conditions. I immediately put the proposition for consideration to the Italian Government, through General Merrone, that they loan us 100,000 of the Austrian horses if we could find transportation. I then secured a meeting between the Chief of Staff, Quartermaster-General, General Harbord, and myself, and got the situation ready to present to General Pershing upon his arrival from Pétain's Headquarters at five o'clock in the afternoon. As a result, just as we have recently let the Belgians have \$3,000,000 of food supplies, we are now in shape to furnish from our A.E.F. stock of flour at the Marseilles base enough to feed the one million Austrians for twenty days, to which General Pershing has given his approval, but asked me as a member of the Military Board of Allied Supply to conduct the negotiations if possible under the international authority possessed by it. I cite this as simply one of probably ten similar questions of policy, each as important, under consideration during the three days.¹

Again on the 12th it was in a dim and indistinct way that I was conscious of the tremendous celebration on the streets, and it was only when the conference between General Pershing, General McAndrew, Chief of Staff, General Harbord, Commanding General, Services of Supply, General Merrone,

¹ Revising the stenographic copy of this later enables me to say that Washington has notified Pershing to turn over the matter of sale of supplies by the army to Mr. Hoover, who is on his way here. The Italian matter, therefore, passes to his hands.

of the Italian Army, and myself had terminated at 6.30 P.M., with things pretty well cleared up, that I began to take more notice of things. I took General Pershing and the other American officers to dinner at the Ritz and then to the theater, where we had a box. We thought we had slipped the General in unobserved. He had been recognized in his automobile during the afternoon on the streets and there was such a demonstration of enthusiasm that his safety was really endangered. That night, however, when the curtain went down, the audience remained, and it was evident that in some way they had found out the General was there. It was necessary for us to go through a side entrance in an effort to get the General away, and even then the crowd had filled the side street cheering for him and making progress slow. This will give you a little indication of the scenes which have been going on.

As the General desired me to take the trip of which I am about to write you, I put in yesterday in getting all important matters in shape so that I could spend to-day away from the office. Last night I left with General Pershing on his special train for the Field Headquarters of Marshal Haig where the General was to decorate the Marshal with the American Distinguished Service Medal, acting under the authority and by the direction of the President of the United States. Other officers on the General's train were Colonel Quekemeyer, his aide, and Colonel Bacon. We left at eleven o'clock at night and reached the ruined town of Cambrai at about eight o'clock this morning. English officers waiting for us there took breakfast with us, and at 9.15 the General, Colonel Bacon, and I got into an automobile and started for Marshal Haig's Field Headquarters which were on a special train near a little town called Ewey, situated about eight kilometers distant from Cambrai. Before going the General told me that if I landed smoking at Marshal Haig's, he would not only invoke upon my head the combined maximum military penalties for capital offenses, but in ad-

dition would endeavor to apply personal chastisement on the spot. After this discussion the machine suddenly stopped in the fog and Field Marshal Haig appeared at the door on one side and General Lawrence, his Chief of Staff, on the other. The morning was quite foggy and one could not see a very great distance ahead. Haig and Pershing walked a little ahead of General Lawrence and myself, and in a few minutes turned off into a field where a large American flag attached to a pole made of a tall sapling was planted. Drawn up in a square around it was a brigade from the most famous division of the English army, the 51st Highlander Division, who presented arms. Then Marshal Haig and General Pershing stepped to the middle of the square, Marshal Haig being accompanied by General Lawrence and General Horne, Commander of the First British Army, and General Pershing being accompanied by Colonel Quekemeyer and myself. The General then briefly conferred the medal, pinning it on Sir Douglas Haig's coat, and Sir Douglas responded. Standing on the far side from us were General Davidson, head of the Operations Section of the British General Staff, and General Lord Clive, head of the Intelligence Section. Captain Demarenche, of the French army, Captain Thornton (who used to manage the La Salle Hotel and is now Quartermaster in charge of the General's train), and four or five English officers were present, and this was the entire audience save the magnificent Scottish Brigade. This ceremony took about five minutes, and then the American flag was moved about one hundred yards to the left and planted in the ground and we took up our stations for the review of the Brigade. The mist had cleared away enough to give a full view of this famous organization. The first battalion to pass was from the Black Watch and the fifty bagpipes which were stationed opposite Marshal Haig and General Pershing played the Black Watch air. All the troops were in the regulation Scotch kilts and held their heads high in the air as they turned "eyes left" in the customary salute when passing

FIELD MARSHAL DOUGLAS HAIG

the High Command. They were followed by the Argyll and Sutherland troops. Then I knew "the Campbells were coming," for the bagpipes suddenly started that air. As these magnificent and battle-worn troops passed, it was not of them that I thought, but of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry marching down the Emmitsburg Road on that Second of July with Father at their head, his fife and drum corps playing the same air with which, because of this, as you know, I had been familiar from my earliest childhood. I thought of the sudden order which came to him to stop the music and of the famous charge which followed in which he led his regiment on foot and captured the Second Mississippi Regiment in the railroad cut. He lost every other man killed or wounded in that charge over a space of only one hundred and seventy paces. Before no braver set of men was this Scotch air ever played than before the Sixth Wisconsin and those who were then passing before me in the mist. After the brigade had passed, we went back to our automobiles. Before we left, Sir Douglas Haig stepped over to me and told me what he had heard of me and my work and invited me to make him a visit when he returned from his Field Headquarters. I greatly missed seeing my good friends Lieutenant-General Travers-Clarke, and Major-General Reginald Ford of his Staff, who are absent, and of whom I have come to think so much. General Ford represents the English army on the Military Board on which I represent the American Expeditionary Forces.

We returned to Cambrai and left at 10.30 A.M. And this reminds me that the moving-picture operators of the Signal Corps were present, and not being able to take pictures as usual of the ceremonies, took pictures of us as we returned to the train and as we were seated at dinner. They also took a picture of General Pershing at his desk in his fine new office car which has recently been added to his special train. The progress of the train was very slow, as the track had been recently relaid, the Germans having destroyed the old track

in their retreat. This gave me a fine opportunity to see the general ground over which Lieutenant William M. Dawes fought in his tank. And here I want to say something of William, who knew the great dangers of the Tank Service before he entered it and before the attack in which he had persuaded his commanding officers to allow him to participate. Colonel Bacon, who was on the train, had been with the 27th and 30th American Divisions at the time of their first attack on the Hindenburg Line on September 29, and at the time of the second attack on October 8, just over the line, in which William participated in command of a tank manned by Englishmen. The old canal, after having been an unfinished project for many years and finally completed by Napoleon in 1802, runs through a tunnel between the villages of Bony and Bellecourt for a distance of about six thousand yards. It was across this ground that our divisions attacked under the concentrated fire of massed German artillery. On this first attack, September 29, to give you an idea of tank mortality, not one of the eleven tanks which progressed beyond Bony but was destroyed. I suppose I saw twenty demolished tanks from the train window. Judging from William's letter he must have started with his tank, October 8, from somewhere near Bony, and proceeded in the attack to some village to the north, the name of which he does not state. I understand there are several villages not far to the north of Bony. If you can corkscrew the further details of the operations from this modest young man, what I write here may be of more help to you in explaining his part in that tremendous and successful fighting on account of which the English so praise the bravery of their American cousins in the 27th and 30th American Divisions and the Heavy Tank Battalion.

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I arrived in Paris this evening at 6.30 and am dictating this at my room to-night. I know I shall always be glad that I took the time to do it, especially because I know it

will give you pleasure, to whom I owe so much. I think I wrote you when I was at the front between the Argonne Woods and the Meuse, in the midst of those terrible scenes, of how my mind reverted constantly to what Father and Uncle Eph had gone through in the Civil War. I could not at that time write of such experiences as I had along the line, and I am glad on some accounts that I could not do so. General Pershing and his troops fought here a greater Battle of the Wilderness, and history will, I think, record it as the greatest of American battles. To have been with him the time I was and where I was marked an epoch in my life. As you know I have been a number of times along the lines at the front, but the fighting before that, in the particular spots in which I was, consisted for the most part only of artillery activity. To see, however, the German shells put down on our front lines and to see the effects of them gave me my first true idea of what this war has been. There on the forward slope of Montfaucon in early October far in advance of our own artillery, I felt as far in the rear of our thin line ahead as the United States of America was in my rear. And so I take off my hat to Lieutenant William Mills Dawes who advanced in his tank in the face of similar artillery.

The service of Beman and Charles has been as honorable as that of William, although despite their efforts they did not succeed in getting so much service at the front. Charles, after his service in the Advance Zone with the Engineers, made the endeavor to get into Aviation, and finally succeeded, despite his youth, in getting into the American Expeditionary Forces Artillery School at Saumur where he is now stationed. The war has ended, however, before his course is completed. Beman's service at the front was before his enlistment when he was at the head of a motor transport unit for the French. At Beman's request I had about completed arrangements with my friend General Harbord to have him transferred to the Marine Brigade, when Harbord left that organization to take command of the Service of

Supply, which prevented their consummation. While to both these young men it has been a disappointment that their service has not been more on the line, they have both made very fine records. Beman has been promoted for merit and has been recommended for still further promotion, although I am afraid that the order recently issued by the War Department against any further promotions after November 11 in the American Expeditionary Forces will prevent his receiving his second promotion. He had been in charge of most responsible work and is at present at Marseilles, where, as I understand it, he is supervising part of the unloading and transportation system. The only reason that I am not writing more of the achievements of these two nephews is because I have not been recently in contact with them. What I say in praise of them is reported to me by their superior officers who have stated that their work has been noteworthy.

Returning again to myself: Those things for which I shall be best remembered in this war when its history is written will not be those which I shall remember best. In all the reviews, celebrations, and gatherings which may be before me in the future there will always be in my mind the picture of what went on to make them possible and the wonder whether the millions buried in the wheat-fields and along the roadsides of Northern France can know of them. There is no tie like the tie of blood, and while in our international deliberations the English and I have at times almost fought, it has all ended in our loving each other as brothers because we were sincerely united in a common purpose. I was touched to learn inadvertently that my good friend Major-General Ford, representing the British army on our Board, had been especially instructed by the English War Office to defer in every way possible to my suggestions in Military Board relations. This was not necessary, for I do not think General Ford and I could find any subject on which we did not agree. But I must not speak of my regard for the English without speaking also of my regard for the French. Out

MONTFAUCON: VIEW FROM THE SOUTH

of struggle, danger, and difficulty rise the enduring friendships. I find that General Pershing is deeply attached to General Pétain and regards him about as I do Pétain's great assistant, Colonel Payot. Payot recently brought me in, together with a picture of himself, a picture from Marshal Foch inscribed to me. These, together with a picture of the fight of the Marines in Belleau Wood, which General Harbord who commanded them gave me, I sent home by an American officer yesterday.

I do not know when I shall be through my army service. For the present I am needed here and General Pershing says he wants me to remain and return with him. I shall still have some months of work. The way my Staff Department of the army has been built up is something like this. I started in a single room doing things largely with my own hands. In this way I became acquainted with every detail and method. This was possible when the business of the American Expeditionary Forces was starting and comparatively small. When I had completed the machinery for coördinating and increasing the supplies of our army, General Pershing began to call on me in cases where great emergency existed. The first emergency was the organization of coal shipments from England and the distribution scheme in France. This I carried on simply to such a point as met the existing crisis in coal supply. Then came the emergency call for labor and a consequent building up by me of a Labor Bureau organization which I turned over, with nearly 50,000 militarized employees, to the Army Service Corps on the 1st of September. Because of similar emergencies referred to me I created the organizations of the Board of Contracts and Adjustments, the Technical Board which coördinates the electrical power of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, the Bureau of Accounts and the Bureau of Reciprocal Supply, all in addition to my original work as Chairman of the General Purchasing Board and General Purchasing Agent. In addition, with General Pershing's powerful assistance, I had

much to do with the creation of the Military Board of Allied Supply. With the dwindling load upon the General Purchasing Board, incident to the reduction of the army, as soon as I can get rid of these other organizations I feel that I can properly leave the service since the General Purchasing Board work is well organized. A financial officer of the General Staff is being named now that the war is over to take over two of my bureaus.¹ As fast as possible those organizations which have been built up, under the pressure of emergency, around my personality and because I was the only executive Staff officer in Paris, will be thrown back into the regular army organization where they properly belong, leaving me with only the General Purchasing Board, my membership on the Military Board of Allied Supply, and my duties in connection with inter-army supply negotiations as representing General Pershing and General Harbord; with the latter I must necessarily be engaged somewhat as long as I am in France. But I must complete my work and remain as long as duty requires. My deep attachment for General Pershing if nothing else would impel me to stay here until he is completely convinced that it is all right for me to go.

The General has now become one of the first figures in the history of our nation, but to me he is as always the faithful and affectionate friend and congenial associate of twenty-four years' standing. His head is not turned in the least. Every accession to his popularity arouses in him the fear of a reaction which may hamper him in that work which is nearest his heart—the proper handling, care, and return of his army to America.

.

In the length of this letter and the variety of subjects covered, you must not think I have forgotten after all my chief purpose in writing it, and that is to evidence to you, as I would try to do to Father if he were living, my desire

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, November 21, paragraph 8. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 233.

that you know now as always my impulse is to lay at your feet whatever accomplishments may be mine in grateful recognition of what you have always been to me in life.

Your affectionate son

CHARLES G. DAWES

Paris, Monday

November 25, 1918 (9.40 P.M.)

GENERAL PERSHING has just left my room at the hotel where we took dinner together and spent the evening. The pressure of the situation is lessening, and we have no longer the emergencies involving human life hanging heavily over our heads. He arrived in Paris this afternoon from the trip during which he entered Luxembourg with his army, and also went over to Brussels when the King of Belgium entered that city. At his home this afternoon I telephoned General Harbord to come to Paris to-morrow bringing Colonel Hull with him for a conference with the General on our policy of contract cancellation and methods of general liquidation. The bulk of the liquidation of material property left by the army in France we agree should be left to a civilian commission — at least, that is our present judgment as to the wise course to pursue.

Have been quite busy at important matters since my last note. A part of my work and experiences I covered in a letter to Mother dictated to my stenographer at length. My cousin Junior Ames (K. L., Jr.) visited me at the hotel. He has been in the fighting from St. Mihiel to the end and has done himself great credit. He is a Lieutenant in Colonel Foreman's old 1st Illinois, now an artillery organization. He, William, Gates, and Charles have all done well in the service.

Colonel Boyd told me this afternoon that the French Government, on the instance of the Chief of Staff, French Armies of the North and Northeast, had notified General Pershing of its desire to name me a Commander of the Legion

of Honor, and that the General had expressed his approval of the decoration. I appreciate greatly this action on the part of the French.¹

I am pushing my organization built up at such effort back into the regular organization of the army as fast as I can now

¹ *France, November 24, 1918*

COLONEL DUCHENE

Cabinet du Maréchal Pétain

Grand Quartier Général Français

MY DEAR COLONEL:

The Chief of Staff of the Armies of the North and of the Northeast has submitted to General Pershing a proposition to appoint to the grade of Commander of the Legion of Honor, General Charles G. Dawes, of our service, and to the grade of Chevalier of the Legion of Honor, 1st Lieutenants Thomas Cassady and Alexander Hune Keith.

General Pershing is very pleased to learn of the distinction which it is proposed to confer upon these officers, and would be glad to see them decorated provided these propositions still maintain.

Very truly yours

CARL BOYD

Colonel, A.D.C.

American Candidature for a decoration in the Legion of Honor

Proposition made by the President of the Comité Interallié des Ravitaillements

For the grade of: Commander of the Legion of Honor.

In favor of: DAWES, CHARLES G.

Grade: Brigadier-General.

Corps or Service: Engineer Corps.

Functions: President of the Purchasing Board, Representative of the American Army on the Comité Interallié des Ravitaillements.

Date of arrival in France: August, 1917.

Date on which relations were established with the French Service making propositions: April, 1918.

Duration of these relations: Still in course, nine months.

French decorations already received: None.

General appreciation: Has always had at heart to ensure the most intimate liaison and the most complete coöperation between the French and American Services; always endeavored to smooth out all difficulties and to assure the most cordial understanding between the two armies, as well as the most effective aid from the American Army to the French Army.

THE D.G.C.R.A.

President of the Comité Interallié des Ravitaillements

Signed: CH. PAYOT

OFFICE STAFF OF GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT, A.E.F.

Ft. S. Captain Sanborn, Second Lieutenant Morrow, Captain Cudebec, Maj
Ct Charles G. Dawes, Lieutenant-Colonel N
Jr. *Rear line, left to right:* Major Taylor,
Lieutenant Jahn, Captain Ives, Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn, Captain C
Captain Terry, First Lieutenant Spitzer, Second Lieutenant Osterberg,
Kreuger, Captain Cabell, Scout Dick Jones.

that the war is over, and the emergency is lifted. It was built around my personality and because I was the only executive staff officer in Paris and therefore in constant contact with the French Government whose attitude in regard to all our army matters was so important. Still it will probably be some months before I can leave the army for my old life. I want to stay until I have fully completed my work which I ought to do — and then get home as soon as possible.

At the Military Board of Allied Supply meeting next Friday, now that at the last meeting I secured the issue of orders to the three armies for a report of their condition as of October 31st in regard to men, supplies, ammunition, munitions, transportation, etc., I propose to ask for additional information to be preserved for the future consideration of military students of the war. While much of interest is transpiring around me, I have to force myself to keep notes. The merely spectacular in life will never lack description. What my notes have recorded for the most part is the current of that great river of effort, so far as I have had part in it, which has made possible all these spectacles. I long for peace and quiet for a time.

Paris, Tuesday
November 26, 1918 (9.30 P.M.)

I AM very tired after a day spent largely in conference with General Pershing, General Harbord, E. R. Stettinius, Special Representative of the Secretary of War, Colonel Hull, Judge Advocate and new Finance Officer of the A.E.F., in which was settled the plan to be recommended to the War Department and, so far as the A.E.F. is concerned, followed, in liquidating the immense property and plant of the American army in France. Was personally squarely up against the question of my duty to stay and help in the more prosaic but no less necessary work of liquidation. Much as I desire to return to home and business and to comparative rest, there was no alternative but to cheerfully acquiesce in the feeling of my

associates that I must stay until I am clearly not needed. Accordingly General Pershing had Harbord and me prepare an order in which Stettinius (*ex officio*), Colonel Hull, and myself were detailed as an Advisory Settlement Board of the A.E.F. "to consider and recommend policies connected with the disposition of war supplies, material and equipment pertaining to the A.E.F., etc.," under command of the Commanding General, Services of Supply. The liquidation of fixed property was recommended by cable to the War Department by General Pershing to be undertaken by a commission of five. Considered myself fortunate to have escaped the draft on the latter proposition.

I wish selfishly I could stop my military work at this juncture. Personally there is nothing to gain by success and much to lose by mistake. However, I did not enter the army as a pastime.

Late in the afternoon General Pershing, General Harbord, and myself and others went to the Signal Corps photographic plant and saw some wonderful pictures, including those taken of the trip when the General decorated Marshal Haig.

Harbord, Hull, and Lieutenant-Colonel Collins dined with me at the hotel.

Paris, Thursday

December 3, 1918 (9.30 P.M.)

At the last meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply, which was held at my office, I secured the issuance of orders to the three armies—also Belgian and Italian armies in France—for the preparation of the record of their respective Services of Supply from the beginning of the war, covering questions of policy, changes in policy and the reasons therefor, etc., for preservation in the records of the Board. General Ford, of the English army, demurred somewhat, maintaining that this could be done better after the war, to which Payot and I took the contrary view. Ford, with his customary good humor and spirit of helpfulness, then agreed. He states that it

will take the English army six months to complete its record report. General Harbord, who was present and addressed the Board, has already started the work for our own army, as has General Moseley of G-4, G.H.Q. I am sure that no literature of the armies will exist after the war so instructive and illuminating as this which I have been instrumental in having prepared — that is, from the standpoint of the Service of Supply and its relation to the conditions at the front and its military strategy. I think I have covered all the points upon which information will be chiefly desired — though, of course, I have probably omitted something.

In the great press of work of the last week my visits and work with Herbert Hoover remain in memory. He outlined his plans for feeding Europe so far as it has been possible to formulate them. His present liaison with our army is through my office. He shared my frugal lunch on the office desk the other day. General Pershing called me by telephone the other night. He is very much annoyed by the newspaper talk about him as a candidate for the Presidency and was contemplating a statement about it, strongly denouncing such gossip. He desired my opinion about making a statement. I advised it was not worthy of notice — at least at present. John will never be rushed off his feet. He sincerely deprecates anything of political kind. His future lies in his chosen work as he views it. I do not wonder, however, that he is talked of for this position. Many American statesmen in recent years have spread their sails for the popular winds. John, in any gale however severe, always lays his course by the compass.

My friend John McCutcheon is here and brought me a picture of my new grandson — now three months old. I am afraid it will be a long time before I see him, much as I should like to do so. William, Charles, and Gates, my three nephews — fine boys — have also visited me this last week.

*Paris, Sunday**December 8, 1918 (10 P. M.)*

DURING the last week, at the suggestion of our Advisory Liquidation Board of three, prepared a plan for the A.E.F. to follow, subject to the modifications which the War Department may hereafter impose, in liquidation of current supplies and assets. Read the plan over the telephone to General Pershing and to Harbord, both of whom approved it. The Board afterward approved it without change and it will therefore pass into orders. It is based upon the plan originated by General Pershing covering the acquirement of property, modified to provide for disposition of property.

The French Government has informally submitted to the A.E.F. for discussion the question of that Government taking over all our property, either to liquidate with concurrence of an American representative, or to pay a lump sum for it. We are considering this on both sides. Am in favor of something of the kind for many reasons. Attended many conferences, including one with Stettinius (who has done wonderful work) and Tardieu and Ganne.

I feel the load lifting and am no longer under a strain. General Harbord spent two days here this week. McFadden left to-night for the United States after a wonderful record of usefulness to the A.E.F. as the representative in France of the War Trade Board.

*Paris, Thursday night**December 19, 1918 (10.15 P.M.)*

AM just in from a four days' trip over the Services of Supply. Last Saturday President Wilson arrived. My headquarters office was filled to see him pass on the Avenue where he received a very great ovation from the French people. Harbord, General Ford (B.E.F.), John McCutcheon, and I spent that evening together. Sunday morning Harbord, Hull, and I conferred with General Pershing upon the situation created by the Comptroller of the Treasury, who has made a ruling

HERBERT HOOVER

making it impossible for our country to settle its business in France honorably without a change of law. General Pershing decided upon a policy and cables were prepared for transmission to the War Department by Colonel Hull. Harbord, General Ford, Mr. Hurley of the Shipping Board, John McCutcheon, and I then left for Coubert to attend the last meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply to be held at those headquarters. Hoover had expected to go with me, but Wilson called him into conference just as we were about to start. However, at the meeting I made the inquiry of Payot as to how much the French army could assist in transporting relief supplies to the devastated districts and arranged for conference between Payot and Hoover upon statement of former that the French army would assist.

Am meeting with some reluctance on the part of the English to immediately furnish information as to their rear service for reasons which they gave me in confidence and which I cannot disclose. However, in time we shall get it. They are anxious to coöperate in every way.

We arrived in Paris again Sunday evening. General Travers-Clarke and Major-General Ford met us there. They dined with us and at midnight we took General Harbord's special train for our trip. In the party were Harbord, Travers-Clarke, Carter, Ford, Colonel Maud, John McCutcheon at the start. At different points some fell out and new ones came in, including Senator Wadsworth of New York, E. N. Hurley, General McCoy, General Jadwin, and others. First day at Gièvres; second day, Bordeaux and surrounding installations; third day at St. Nazaire and Nantes; fourth day, Tours. The trip was arranged in honor of our British guests. It was a success. Enjoyed visiting the officers of my old regiment still at St. Nazaire.

General Ford brought an artist with him who is employed by the British Government. He started my crayon portrait for the British War Office collection, which I considered an honor.

While visiting the staff at Tours I received a tonnage statement showing that during the whole first six months of the existence of the A.E.F. in France, from June to December 31, 1917, only 347,653 tons of material were shipped to us from the United States. Last month alone (November)

**Statement of Transatlantic Cargo Unloaded in France
and Transatlantic Tonnage Saved by Purchases in
Europe to December 31st 1918 (Ship Tons)**

Thousands of Ship Tons

639,659 tons were shipped. What the A.E.F. would have done without the General Purchasing Board may be inferred from the fact that the United States shipped us only 4,826,516 dead-weight tons from June, 1917, to December 31, 1918, whereas we secured on this side during that period at least 8,300,000 ship tons and I think my final figures will raise this latter estimate to nearly 10,000,000 ship tons. I had

not fully realized, myself, how dependent upon my organization the A.E.F. had been for its supplies until I received these figures from the staff to-day as to shipments from the United States. The shipments from England amounting in the same period to 1,725,105 tons (June, 1917, to December 1, 1918) were secured during a critical period, and are in addition to the shipments from America. These latter shipments, however, were under the General Purchasing Board.

It can be inferred from the above how important has been coördination with our allies and good understanding with them in the matter of their aid in meeting our continual crisis in supplies. No wonder we had to "work on our toes" in the General Purchasing Board and the General Purchasing Agent organizations. While at times encountering among our own and the Allied representatives some distrust of each other and a tendency among subordinates to sometimes begot their true situation in supply dealing in order to get the best of a negotiation, I have always found the highest authority honest in statement. Thus I have always relied, in times of difficulty and supply emergency, upon this principle for comfort and inspiration for perseverance in effort: In supply negotiations between allied governments in war to understand is to agree. I therefore never feared to reveal at once our exact situation whether strong or weak.

July 22, 1919

Memorandum: For General Dawes.

I HAVE collected the following approximate figures concerning the amount of money expended by the A.E.F. for supplies procured in Europe. Exact figures cannot be obtained at the present moment, as many matters are still in suspension, in some cases amounting to very large sums, but the estimate is intended to cover the amounts properly due which have not yet been definitely fixed.

The figures are based primarily upon reports to you from the individual purchasing officers, which have recently been checked up again with these officers.

The following approximate estimate is submitted:

Quartermaster Corps	\$362,000,000
Ordnance Department	308,000,000
Engineer Corps	208,000,000
Air Service	65,000,000
Medical Department	50,000,000
Chemical Warfare Service	12,250,000
Signal Corps	10,750,000
Motor Transport Corps	8,000,000
	<hr/>
	\$1,024,000,000

J. C. ROOP

Lieutenant-Colonel, Engineers

Paris, December 23, 1918 (10.30 P.M.) .

GENERAL PAYOT (he was made General to-day), Herbert Hoover, and Lieutenant De Siéyès (interpreter) have just left my room, where we have spent the evening discussing means of transporting supplies to the devastated regions of France. Hoover is going to ask Pershing to allow me to be made the chairman of a military commission to take charge of the relief of the German civilian population. I do not know whether this task will come to me or not, but I have made up my mind that it is no time for me to shirk continued work in the face of the present need for action, and so I have given up thought of a return home for many months. I am impressed greatly with Hoover. He is clear, direct, intensely practical, fearless, and possessed of the widest perspective. He is essentially a man of action. In bringing him into contact with Payot I bring together the ingredients of immediate results.

I note by American papers received to-day (*Chicago Tribune*) that the Ordnance Department of the War Department is under criticism for not having supplied us with American ammunition. The great trouble was that America had not prepared for war and that she was not in the war long enough for her to get her stride. What was true as to ordnance was true as to airplanes and as to ships, and as to everything directly related to the supply of an army operat-

A CROWDED ROAD THROUGH ESNES NEAR THE MEUSE-ARGONNE FRONT

ing in a foreign country. One development of history will be the results achieved by our Services of Supply, A.E.F., and through the splendid coöperation of the French and English, which as yet are not fully appreciated. But the United States after all turned the tide of war. The support given our army by our Government was all possible for it to give. Again it will be developed to the credit of our governmental authority that, not being able to ship supplies as rapidly as needed, it gave the Allies that immediate financial and moral support that enabled them to continue until we could furnish the men. I cannot approve of the *ex post facto* criticism of the Administration. Granted that it erred in not forcing preparation long before the war, yet when the war came it did everything it could to forward it.

It was a vast undertaking which confronted America when she entered the war, and Rome was not builded in a day.

Paris, December 27, 1918 (11 P.M.)

SPENT much of to-day with the Commander-in-Chief, who arrived from Chaumont this morning, and left for a much-needed rest in the South of France this evening. Herbert Hoover saw him this morning and suggested my detail for duty in Berlin. In calling this morning upon him (Hoover) with General Long of the British Army (Director-General, Supplies and Transportation, B.E.F., at Saloniki), I learned that the Commander-in-Chief was non-committal as to my detail for this work. This afternoon and evening the Commander-in-Chief took up the matter with me. Am inclined to think he will not let me go, regarding my knowledge and experience in inter-army and inter-government matters as still needed by the A.E.F. In view of the disturbed conditions in Berlin and the interesting nature of the work, my sense of adventure is somewhat involved and the comparative inactivity in my office since the armistice makes the detail more attractive. However, I am in the hands of higher authority.

Harbord is here and we took lunch with Harjes. President Wilson has gone to England, where he is being received with the honor due him and our nation. My son-in-law, Captain Melvin Ericson, is here on his way with Major Cotchett to Bulgaria. He brought me some pictures of my new grandson whom I would much like to see in person.

Paris, Tuesday, December 31, 1918

RETURNED last night from a trip with General Harbord on his train to Neufchâteau, the advance headquarters of the Services of Supply and to Chaumont. We took Lieutenant William Dawes, my son-in-law, Captain Ericson, and Sergeant Bob Wallace with us. Left Paris Saturday night. At Chaumont yesterday I heard for the first time the headquarters band at guard mount. This band has been created by the competition and combing-out process of our army bands aided by the bandmasters' school established in connection with the plan by Damrosch. I was delighted, though not surprised, at the splendid results of the effort as evidenced by this great band. General Pershing, Collins, and Boyd have all taken a great interest in the matter of army music and the reorganized band owes its existence to General Pershing's first suggestion and continued attention. I think the band ought to be named for him. It should have a distinctive insignia and be known as the official band of the A.E.F. Yesterday called on my good friends of the General Staff at Chaumont. Discussed with General Davis policy of Distinguished Service Medal awards to our allies.

*Paris, Sunday
January 5, 1919 (9.15 P.M.)*

GENERAL MCANDREW, Chief of Staff, called on me yesterday morning and said one of the purposes of his trip to Paris was to talk to me about Hoover's request for my detail to Berlin; that from what General Pershing had written him he feared that the General's warm friendship for me might result after

all in his letting me go; that John was not sure he was doing right by me if I wanted to go; that John did not think I could be spared and that he (General McAndrew) and Harbord were agreed that it was not right for me to leave my present service at this time. I was touched by the way he spoke and his reference to what the General called "my career." Told him, "Career be damned; that if they felt that way about it they could not drive me away with a club." Called up Hoover on the telephone and asked him to drop the matter. I know I should stay here if only to complete my Report upon which I am at work.

When I leave the army my great department with all its files is an orphan. Superimposed on the regular army organization — the creature of temporary (during the war), but while it lasted a continual and overwhelming succession of emergencies — the ending of the war ends all but its record. And its record will be appreciated, remembered, or forgotten according to the way I now compile and complete its elements.

Now that the pressure of emergency is over I have to spur myself to work. I believe I am naturally inclined to indolence when off a red-hot stove, where I have sat for the last two years at least. Am enjoying the visit of Tiffany Blake and the keen and able appreciation he has of our army situation and the problems it has involved.

Paris, Saturday
January 11, 1919 (11.45 P.M.)

JOHN McCUTCHEON, Tiffany Blake, Percy Hammond, and Floyd Gibbons have just left my room, where its atmosphere has been rended for three hours by *post-bellum* discussion immodestly led by myself. As I am too much awake to go to sleep for a while I shall resume these neglected notes.

While measured by pre-war standards my present life is made up of incidents suggesting the propriety of their preservation in writing, they all seem trivial compared to anything that happened prior to November 11, 1918. However,

spurring myself constantly I am working daily a little on my Official Report covering the last sixteen months. One of the most difficult things for a man to do is to refrain from accepting undeserved credit. Notwithstanding experience and reflection confirm the dangers of silence when over-praised, and the specter of merited reaction haunts the inner soul, still it is hard to pursue the path of duty and wisdom and be loyal to the truth to the extent of so holding the minds of others to it that undeserved halos drop from one's own head. But in my Report that is what I must do — and be careful in doing it thoroughly. The whole thing is so important. When John named me "General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.," he seems to have created the idea that I bought everything of the 10,000-000 odd tons which we secured on this side of the ocean, whereas I never even bought a lead pencil. However, in such a statement I go to the other extreme in creating a wrong impression. My Report must show what the independent services did, and what my control of them did and did not do. It is not an easy task. Again, my Report must not be construed as reflecting upon the splendid accomplishments of the War Department. It must also pay the tribute due to our allies. My best efforts will be given to give a true picture.

I received to-day the notice of the award to me,¹ by the

¹ GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
PERSONAL DIVISION

France, January 9, 1919

From: The Adjutant General, American E.F.
To: Brigadier-General Charles G. Dawes, U.S. Army.
Subject: Distinguished Service Medal.

I. Cablegram number 2414-R received from the War Department January 8, 1919, announces the award to you, by the President, of the Distinguished Service Medal for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service as set forth below:

Brigadier-General Charles G. Dawes:

For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services.

He rendered most conspicuous services in the organization of the General Purchasing Board, as General Purchasing Agent of the American Expeditionary Forces, and as the representative of the United

President, of the Distinguished Service Medal of the United States in accordance with the recommendation written by the Commander-in-Chief himself.

Not being in an especially modest frame of mind, therefore, I may as well proceed to extremes and tell of an occurrence to-day which appealed to my amusement and pride as much

States Army on the Military Board of Allied Supply. His rare abilities, sound business judgment, and aggressive energy were invaluable in securing needed supplies for the American Armies in Europe.

2. You will be informed later in regard to the time and place of the presentation of the Medal awarded you.

By command of General Pershing:

J. A. ULIO

Adjutant-General

**AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**

France, March 28, 1919

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHARLES G. DAWES

General Purchasing Agent

American E.F.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

Now that active operations have ceased, I desire to convey my sincere appreciation and heartiest congratulations to you and the members of your splendid organization on the great results accomplished and invaluable assistance rendered to our cause. Due to the tireless, patriotic efforts of yourself and your highly competent assistants, your organization has not only succeeded in securing a vast amount of supplies greatly needed in the course of operations, but has accomplished this object in a scientific, business-like manner that warrants more laudable expressions than ordinary terms of commendation.

With unswerving zeal, coupled with the gift of picking assistants who possessed the highest degree of specialized ability in multifarious lines of endeavor, you had built up an organization that stood unparalleled; fulfilling every demand made upon it with celerity and thoroughness.

The magnitude of your task was enormous; the innumerable demands made upon your organization would have disheartened any other but unselfish, patriotic, able Americans; yet you and the men of large affairs who responded so readily to the call have achieved success.

Likewise may it be said of the lesser personnel in your organization, who, actuated by a high sense of duty, have performed their work so admirably. In the name of the American Expeditionary Forces, I thank them one and all. These few words of appreciation are indeed but small reward for the magnificent service you rendered the common cause.

Sincerely yours

JOHN J. PERSHING

as anything that has happened for a long time. I took Charles M. Schwab over to call this noon on General Pershing, who has just returned from a few days' rest at Nice. In the ante-room we met General Fox Connor, of the General Staff, a regular of regulars, a most able and efficient, albeit precise, officer. Schwab in his remarks said, "Well, I notice one thing over here, and that is that Dawes does not seem to be thoroughly disciplined." "No," replied General Connor, "and in the early days a number of regular general officers got ready to hand him something, but after looking him over once decided not to do it." General Connor, I may add, did not give the impression that this decision was based altogether upon motives of personal consideration for me. It amuses me to think of what must have been the first impressions of me of these splendid officers and dear friends — so used to conventional military methods of statement and address — when, breathing fire and brimstone, I made my incursions into the system after results, my mind fixed upon the red-hot poker of dire necessity pressed against the lower part of my back and oblivious to nicety of expression or conventional forms of military salutation. Well, it is all over. And now I am by degrees relapsing into more placid and dignified ways befitting the banker and business man of the old days. But shall I ever get quite back?

To impress Schwab with two things — first, the terrible supply emergency with which the A.E.F. contended, and, second, what he and his Shipping Board had done to help us — I told him, what is the fact, that in the month preceding the armistice he had shipped us from America over twice as many tons of supplies as had been shipped us during the entire first six months of the existence of the A.E.F.

And so, as Pepys says, to bed.

Paris, Thursday, January 30, 1919

ON Friday noon, January 17, started to Tours with my friends John McCutcheon and Tiffany Blake, both of whom re-

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**CONFERRING OF DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL BY GENERAL
PERSHING, TOURS, JANUARY 18, 1919**

**GENERAL PAYOT, REPRESENTING MARSHAL FOCH, CONFERRING
CROIX DE GUERRE AT LA MORLAYE, JULY 16, 1919**

turned to Paris on General Pershing's train Saturday. At Tours at General Harbord's house all night. On Saturday morning, January 18, was decorated with ten other Generals, including General Harbord and General Kernan, with the Distinguished Service Medal. General Pershing gave the medals and the ceremony took place before troops in the Headquarters enclosure. Balthasar Gracián made a remark several hundred years ago to the effect that it is not the applause which greets one on entrance, but on exit, which is important.

The anticlimax which the inexperienced and over-vain bring upon themselves by encouraging newspaper self-exploitation upon assuming important duties is one of the chief causes of a subsequent failure. The censor happily protected the A.E.F. from much of this sort of thing, but many in the United States were destroyed, or destroyed their own usefulness themselves, by it. I have been so accustomed to associating ceremony with non-accomplishment, since in civil life it is the chief resource of those desirous of publicity whether deserved or not, that I confess I was not over-impressed on this occasion. To be sure, this was a case of applause on exit, but the receiving of conspicuous applause at any time should be avoided on principle as dangerous and involving one in a mental trial as to his comparative merit by every disappointed competitor. The court being prejudiced and the decision therefore against him, one accumulates prejudices which endure, while from the minds of those not directly concerned remembrance of the distinction soon vanishes.

The value of ceremony as a social power is unquestioned. It cannot be dispensed with without destroying one of the great incentives to human effort, and one of the useful agencies of proper governmental and social discipline. At times the individual must use ceremony as the best means to noble ends. But let every wise man beware of too much ceremony whether it is directed toward the submerging or toward the exploitation of his own individuality. In all my negotiations

as an army officer in inter-Allied conferences I have fought it as a bar to progress and quick understanding. In proportion as men are right-minded and intelligent, ceremony is unessential in their relations.

Left Tours Saturday night for a visit to the Riviera. My son-in-law and Major Cotchett, on their way to Bulgaria, through General Harbord's kindness went on the special train with us to Marseilles, stopping at Bordeaux. General Harbord, General Langfitt, General Rockenbach, and General Russell were in the party beside myself. This all-star aggregation landed at Monte Carlo Monday night. Every day except two it exhausted itself in a chamois-like game of golf on a rough portion of the Alps. The first two days, after five hours' hard exercise on each day, I was pretty stiff, but by the end of the week got well limbered up. We had a delightful time, though the discipline under which we moved could not have been stricter. We could not even visit the Casino, being in uniform.

Returned to Paris last night. While writing this received a telegram from Harbord that I had received the decoration of Commander of the Legion of Honor. I certainly am pleased. How difficult it is to keep vanity under the harness of the intellect.

Paris, Friday
February 14, 1919 (10 P.M.)

WE buried Colonel Carl Boyd to-day. Only a week ago he was in good health. His loss is a heavy one to General Pershing who relied upon him greatly. He was a noble character. He leaves a wife and daughter with whom we all mourn.

Am somewhat depressed as I force myself to these notes. Secretary Baker having suggested that I be the military member of the Liquidating Commission, General Pershing, who had the matter already in mind, bore down irresistibly, and here I am head over heels in a mean and thankless task, but one which I have no honorable right to decline. Had I not

long ago decided to sink personal considerations in this war service, I should have avoided this position as I would small-pox. The "going is good" for me to leave the army now, but to stay as a member of a commission to sell its assets is to work hard without the incentive of a war purpose; to be away from my family and business; to run the risk of making serious mistakes which will result in attack upon one's motives; in other words, to risk the reputation for success which I now have for no adequate personal purpose. However, the way the thing has been put up to me I should feel like a skunk if I did not do it. There is no patriotism in what I am doing — only a desire not to shirk what I really am qualified to do and that I ought to do. Somehow it is not so inspiring to work at saving money for one's Government as to work at helping to save its life.

Am working hard at my Report as General Purchasing Agent; next must come my Report as American Member of the Military Board of Allied Supply. In the meantime am working already as a member of the commission. And *this* is the time I looked forward to as that when I should be about leaving for America.

And so to bed.

Paris, February 16, 1919

THE continued deaths and dangerous illnesses of my army friends and associates depress me greatly. This morning Webster Otis is critically ill and I have had to wire his father that the outcome is very doubtful. He is a dear fine boy and has done his part well. Have been in daily communication about him with the doctors for a week.

Spent the morning trying to catch up with some of my personal mail, and also worked on my Report.

Last night at a dinner given to Hoover was decorated formally as Commander of the Legion of Honor by Clémentel, French Minister of Commerce, who inexpressibly horrified me by kissing me on both cheeks before a large audience of

which the American part must have been tremendously amused. Hoover made a telling address. This man has earned the highest possible place in history. As we sat at the table together I told him our old friends in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Marietta, Ohio, who knew us better, would never have made the mistake either of making us so prominent or of kissing us.

Paris, February 28, 1919 (10 P.M.)

I TO-DAY finished my Report to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, as General Purchasing Agent and Chairman of the General Purchasing Board, A.E.F. This has been an absorbing and difficult task. Now that it is over I wonder whether anybody will read it. Impressed myself with a sense of its public and historical importance, I have exercised great care and given the best there is in me to its preparation. Owing to constant interruption in my office I have done much of the work in my room at night. The final figures of tons of material secured on this side of the ocean, from the beginning of the A.E.F. to the date of the armistice, stand at 10,000,000 ship tons as against 4,400,000 dead-weight tons shipped us from the United States. If any one had told us at the beginning that this task confronted us, we should not have believed it possible of accomplishment. As David must have kept his mind upon his sling-shot instead of on the size of Goliath, so it was with us.

And now in extra hours I must prepare my Report as the American Member of the Military Board of Allied Supply.

Two of my colleagues on the Liquidation Board of the A.E.F. — Senator Hollis and Mr. Homer Johnson — have arrived. After talking with them I am impressed with their breadth of view and their competency. I feel sure that within a very few months it will be possible for me to make way for General Krauthoff as a member and complete my army work. It is only because I felt I might help a little, through my long experience in general Allied supply negotiation, in getting the Board more rapidly acquainted with the real environment

GEORGE WEBSTER OTIS, 17TH ENGINEERS

Died in France

**He represented all that is cleanest and best in the young
American soldier and his memory is enshrined
in the hearts of his comrades**

1. 1941
1941

in which its work must be performed, that I became at all reconciled to the idea of becoming the military member. Now after meeting them I know that they have every personal quality I possess, and after giving them whatever information I have, it will be possible for me to go without embarrassing the work. I really should not stay long, for I find it increasingly difficult to be patient with others when my will is crossed — as of course I should be. It is only that I have worked under pressure so long. But after an explosion is over — and they are only occasional — I force myself to humble apology for whatever is improperly personal in my reflections.

The Commander-in-Chief and I are occasionally given in our close friendship to shutting the door and indulging in strong comments upon a hostile world — after which it is always easier to deal meekly with it.

I regret the gradual but increasing neglect of these notes, the interest of which hereafter I realize. Since starting them I have never read any of them over.

The General Headquarters band from Chaumont, which they now call "Pershing's Own," delights me. Because of the method of forming it I believe it to be unique in the world to-day. It is the most virile and stirring band to which I ever listened. Including the 26 trumpeters and the accompanying drums, there are in all 106 in the organization. Collins and I (who with Damrosch worked over its plans) went to hear it the other night. It should be kept alive after the war as a national asset, and if the people of America ever are allowed to hear it there is a possibility of arousing enough sentiment behind it to secure the legislation necessary. On the spur of the moment I think I shall suggest to some public-spirited citizens to start such a movement right away.

Paris, Sunday, March 9, 1919

A WEEK ago to-day I left for Tours to meet the Commander-in-Chief on last Monday. The purpose of my trip was to get

action on the delayed promotions in my old regiment, the 17th Engineers, as it sails in a few days for the United States. Am glad to say I was successful — General Pershing telephoning to General McAndrew about it. Lieutenant-Colonel Coe becomes Colonel and takes the boys home.¹

Spent Sunday night with Harbord. Read him my Report as General Purchasing Agent which I left with him. General Pershing arrived Monday. I left with him on his special train at noon on an inspection trip of the troops. Monday afternoon we were at Saumur. Was with him until Thursday morning when we reached Paris. He inspected troops at Gièvres, Is-sur-Dun, Châteaureaux, and other places in their general vicinity. Troops inspected numbered about 25,000. Part of the time as we walked between the lines we were in mud so thick that we had trouble in pulling out our feet. No heels were "clicked" this trip. Reviews were held at some places. The General made short and effective addresses after inspection to the men at all places. At Is-sur-Dun, just before we took our motors to leave for the next point, the General said that he had not asked for the aviators to fly, as when he and Baker were there before one of the men lost his life in exhibition flying. But our young eagles came out notwithstanding and flew for a long distance over and beside

¹ *Telegram*

HEADQUARTERS

SEVENTEENTH ENGINEERS (RAILWAY)

BASE SECTION No. 1, S.O.S., A.E.F.

March 9, 1919 (1.30 P.M.)

BRIG.-GEN. CHARLES G. DAWES

General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

Paris

It is with deep regret that the officers and men of the Seventeenth Engineers bid farewell to their former Lieutenant-Colonel. Each and every member of the original Seventeenth, as well as the replacements, consider you as their own true friend. Your personal magnetism, combined with your rare executive ability, has won for you the friendship and admiration of all. We are unable to express in words the thanks which we owe to you for the service rendered to the regiment. We wish you continued success in your great undertaking. Good-bye.

COE

our automobiles. It was not until evening on the train that we learned that one of the boys who flew alongside our machines made a dive and was killed. It seemed so unnecessary. We were greatly grieved. I did not learn the name of the aviator.

The Peace Conference moves slowly along. McFadden, whose work with it naturally grows more important with time, complains that when Wilson is away our delegates, since there are several of them, generally remain comparatively silent during important discussions, since in Wilson's absence leadership is not established among them. The foreigners, therefore, shape the trend of things for the time being. I do not know how the peace conferences are conducted, for I have too much to do to concern myself with securing information about them. As time passes and public opinion presses for a conclusion, it will operate to hasten agreement. During the war in our inter-Allied conferences, whenever I happened to represent our Commander-in-Chief and our army, which was frequently, I soon came to employ certain methods to secure early decision. Where the conference was confronted with the necessity of agreement on something involving a sacrifice to one of the parties and a bitter difference was inevitable, I always endeavored to precipitate immediately the issue in the clearest and most distinct way. By smoking cigars, by great emphasis, by occasional profanity no matter how dignified the gathering or impressive the surroundings, I generally got everybody earnestly in discussion of the very crux of the question in the first half-hour. My disregard of the conventions was studied and with a purpose. It was not only to save precious time by dissipating that atmosphere of self-consciousness in which men so often commence their negotiations, but by having the session start in comparative acrimony the foundation was laid for a natural reaction to good feeling later in the session which would cause every one to leave the conference in comparatively better humor than if the fight occurred just before the ending.

If the difference between conferees is vital and important enough, it will be strongly contested. A perception of this at the beginning of a conference and a courageous meeting of the situation creates rough sailing for a time, but steadily smoother until the end; whereas weak men, or vain or conventional men, or even strong men at times, by over-politeness, by over-deference to a non-essential environment or strange and dignified surroundings, carefully avoid ruffling the waters at first only to ride later into the inevitable storm. In such cases all leave the conference annoyed, some by the decision and some by the others. In a common cause and a common emergency men should come out of a conference not only with a decision, but as friends. Among sincere and honest men in an emergency involving the common interest, the quicker disagreeable truth involved in decision is met, the surer will be an honest and quick settlement of respective duty.

In the above I am not speaking of ordinary conferences among ordinary men, but of vital conferences upon which hang great events.

Paris, Sunday
March 30, 1919 (10.30 P.M.)

TO-DAY I handed to General Pershing my Report as the American Member of the Military Board of Allied Supply. We read over the more important parts together and he seems satisfied with the Report over which I have very carefully worked. We had a meeting of the Board during the week. I regard the Report as my most important contribution to the military literature of the war, and the most important document which I have ever prepared. However, it may be years before anybody digs it up and appreciates it for what it is. The world is in a crisis and Europe will remain in one indefinitely, so that the minds of this generation will not largely concern themselves with retrospect.

My prediction of a year ago that if the Allies won they would have no more of a government in Germany to deal with

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT

than Germany had in Russia, bids fair to be realized within sixty days. The war has broken up the central control of the Continental Empires, and left the alien peoples to define their own relations, which they will proceed to do by the usual process of wars. The phrase-makers, politicians, idealists, and pacifists may now realize that whether democracy is safe or not depends upon the people in question, and that in parts of Europe self-government is as impossible in certain stages of development in the life of a particular people as in the Philippines.

Self-government in our own dear land is safe, but right-minded people, and not alone the demagogues and time-servers, must be active to keep it so. The ultimate judgment of the American people is sound, provided the checks and balances of our Constitution are kept in existence so that ultimate and not hasty or temporary judgments may pass into law.

My two Reports are now finished. My work on the Liquidation Commission is important, but as responsibility is divided and life and death for others is not involved, the mental strain under which I have been so long is lifting.

On Friday, for the first time in my army service over here, I faced an American audience at a banquet given to a delegation from the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce by Homer Johnson, of our Commission. General Pershing, Secretary Daniels, M. Loucheur, and others spoke.

Last night (Saturday) I entertained at dinner at the Ritz and afterward at the Olympia Vaudeville the Generals of the First Army whom Harbord had taken over the S.O.S. General Pershing was present; also Lieutenant-General Liggett, commanding the First Army; Major-Generals Warner, Bailey, McNair, and Smith, Brigadier-General Hulit, and in addition Major-General Harbord and myself and aides of the party — in all twenty-six. My friend General Payot was present. Before dinner General Pershing conferred the Distinguished Service Medal on George McFadden, which he certainly has brilliantly won.

During the week, under the direction and delegation of General Pershing, I pinned the Distinguished Service Medal of the United States upon the uniform of my associate, Major-General Reginald Ford, of the English army — a brave and successful officer of the line on the Somme and afterward a most efficient member of the British General Staff.

Paris, Friday
April 11, 1919 (10.30 P.M.)

I REGRET that the disinclination to write has prevented me from commenting on the many interesting and historical characters whom I constantly meet. To-night I have been so interested in my talk with the Grand Duke Alexander of Russia that I will try to make a few notes of it. The Grand Duke lives here at the hotel and met me because of his interest in an interview of mine in the *Stars and Stripes* in which I spoke of the coöperation of the French with our army supply efforts. He has had me at dinner with him twice this week, to-night having also Mr. and Mrs. McFadden and Countess Olga. Alexander is a brother-in-law of the late Czar. Three of his brothers have been murdered by the Bolshevists. He told me seventeen of his family had met this fate. His son-in-law, Prince Yusopoff, murdered Rasputin.

Alexander is in a position to know what he is talking about, and to-night being in distress of mind about the Crimea where the Bolshevists are advancing, and where a number of his children are living still, he opened his heart freely to me. He is outraged because the Allies are taking no steps to restore order in Russia. He says that while the Germans were there they at least preserved a semblance of order. He says that the abandonment of Russia by the Allies means only one thing — the future coöperation of Germany and Russia; that within a year or so the old régime must be established in Russia by the force of events and the reaction against the present terrible

anarchy. He is an intelligent, forceful talker. Wilson declined to see him; England will not allow his family to go there. He thinks America would not receive him if he asked permission to take his children there. His property has been confiscated, and he is tired of "Grand Duking." He is an extremely likable man, and though my short acquaintance with him does not enable me to pass judgment upon him as a statesman, I would trust him as a man.

The home papers announce the arrival in America of my old regiment.

We are hard at work on the Liquidation Commission. Warren Pershing, the General's boy, is on his way here. I am so glad for John's sake. Tardieu has cabled a résumé of my *Stars and Stripes* interview to America. If it is published there it will be the first time the fact has been made public that we secured two thirds of the tonnage consumed by our army on this side of the ocean. Harbord asked me to give the interview and same was first submitted to him.

Coblentz, Germany, April 24, 1919

HAVE been on a trip with General Pershing since Sunday. In the party besides the General are the Secretary of War, General Harbord, Leopold, the Crown Prince of Belgium, the General's aides, and myself. General Harbord and I left Paris Sunday morning, April 20 (Easter), and arrived at Chaumont in the afternoon. Dined with the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary and left for Is-sur-Tille Sunday night with the party.

Of the events of this unusual trip I will mention the march past of the 33d Division (chiefly from Illinois) which took place in a magnificent natural amphitheater near Die Kirch. It took about six or seven miles of walking to complete the inspection which the General made, his party including myself accompanying him. After the decorations were conferred — among them one to Colonel Sanborn, of Evanston — the review took place. The ground was so level

that the entire division in movement could be seen at once. The setting sun shone upon the blue steel of the bayonets of the twenty-three thousand men as they approached us, and at a distance it gave the appearance of a bluish mist just above the brown of the helmets. The massed regimental bands played well. It was unquestionably the most impressive and inspiring sight of my life. The review next day of the 89th Division was also very wonderful, but not so many men by about one half were in line.

This trip is the first the young Prince Leopold has ever been allowed to take alone. He is seventeen years of age — a very natural, modest, dignified, and altogether likable boy. He is greatly enjoying himself and tells me he is writing all about it to his mother.

Am finding the Secretary of War an extremely agreeable companion. His speeches to the men are admirable. His critics will pass into oblivion, but his accomplishments under great disadvantages will always be remembered in our history.

The week before I started on this trip at Paris was a busy one. Spent much of two days with General Pershing. Went with him to the studio of Jo Davidson, an American sculptor who is making a bust of the General. Was so pleased with it that I purchased the first one finished. I think it will become the standard bust of General Pershing, as it is by all odds the best yet made of him — especially when looked at in profile.

One night last week dined with General Botha, the Prime Minister of South Africa. We were both guests of General Bethel of the English army.

Our great army is rapidly being reduced in numbers. This sojourn on occupied German soil, however, may continue some time for the Third Army.

Paris, Sunday, May 4, 1919

OUTDOORS this morning for the first time in three days, having been down with a mild but exasperating case of ptomaine poisoning. Took lunch with Generals Harbord, Drum, and



GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING
(Clay model by Jo Davidson)



Hagood, Grand Duke Alexander, and Mrs. George McFadden.

The early part of the week was at Tours, where with other officers of the A.E.F. was made a Companion of the Bath at ceremonies, Lieutenant-General Henderson, of the B.E.F., conferring the decorations. Harbord was made a K.C.M.G.

Our Liquidation Commission is immersed in its difficult problems. Am much impressed with the abilities and high characters of my associates. They are high-minded, practical men, and influenced only by the highest motives. Am much impressed by their earnestness and sincerity.

On our return from the trip to Germany I had the party on the train — excepting General Pershing and Secretary Baker — at dinner and afterward at the theater. General McAndrew and Colonel De Chambrun were also with us, as was the young Belgian Crown Prince Leopold.

At Tours on Tuesday at Harbord's house, where I stayed, Julius Kahn, the new Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, was a guest. He is able and constructive and should be a great asset to our country in the new army reorganization which should follow the war.

The peace treaty is about ready for the signatures of the Germans which probably will be forthcoming, since if they are not our armies will march forward. But when the peace treaty is finally read the world will know that peace-treaty-making is not an exact science.

Received cable that my brother Beman will be here this month. Shall be rejoiced to see him, as I should be the other dear members of my family from whom I have been separated now for nearly two years. Have been worried about my dear mother's health, but a letter this week from her reassures me.

Paris, Friday, May 9, 1919

THE Liquidation Commission is struggling with its great task. Roughly estimated at the heavy war costs, we have on

hand army supplies and installations of a nominal value of \$1,500,000,000. It is scattered all over France. Our nation is pressing for a return of our soldiers. The United States has also a surplus of war supplies at home estimated at \$2,000,000,000. Great Britain has about \$2,000,000,000 or over in France. France itself has a tremendous stock. Transportation facilities are limited. The value of the stocks is lessening with time. France as a government is in financial straits, and yet it is the only logical purchaser of our property. Our negotiations are rendered more difficult by the complicated inter-governmental credit situation. It is necessary to deal upon the highest plane and with great energy. Whatever we do will be criticized, but I want to be criticized for doing *something* rather than nothing.

Johnson, Hollis, and I met Tardieu last night. Tardieu is now over his hardest work with the Peace Conference and can put his powerful shoulder to the wheels of our cart. He fully agrees with us as to the necessity of a sale of the whole to France both for the interests of his country and our own. The member of our commission who has shown the earliest and clearest appreciation of the wisdom, indeed necessity, of dealing with France in bulk has been Johnson, for whose abilities I have a constantly increasing admiration. The country is fortunate in having three such able and clean men on the commission as Parker, Johnson, and Hollis. I do not pretend to take the laboring oar; but am trying to be of some help to my associates who are doing most of the work. General Pershing called me by telephone yesterday about the liquidation situation. It concerns the question of the time when we can release all our troops. Earlier in the week the General gave me a sword which he had personally selected — and had duly engraved — which I shall always value, it is needless to say.

On Wednesday I dined with Major-General Thwaites, of the B.E.F., at the Hotel Majestic. After dinner I met Lloyd George. I told him that when after a few months he

got time to read it, I wanted him to look over my Report on the Military Board of Allied Supply which he had helped to create. Told him he would be interested because it was, with its unanimous-consent provision, practically a "League of Nations" operating just behind the Allied line of battle. If anybody hereafter (and this is probable) maintains that the League of Nations has no real power because unanimous consent must be the basis of its effective action, the record of what our military "League of Nations" actually did do and was about to do will refute them. He agreed. I now reflect that if I had allowed him to do more of the talking these notes would be of greater moment.

The peace terms have been handed to the Germans. They are certainly stiff enough to satisfy the extremists. But I am free to say that this commission has probably done the very best it was *possible* to do in the environment in which it acted. When the environment is forgotten and the unconquerable necessities of an actual situation do not confront the critic, there will be much international literature devoted to the demonstration of how much better a treaty would have resulted if the nations had summoned the critics to the conference instead of their greatest men. The highest art in criticism as a rule is developed only in those personally incapable of constructive accomplishment.

Paris, May 23, 1919

THESE notes have become a more or less perfunctory matter with me, but I realize that hereafter I shall regret it. Harbord and I were talking last night about the "after-the-war" adaptation of ourselves to the usual environment of humanity, and he referred to having used the expression to General Pershing, "*only* eight hundred thousand troops now left in France." His idea of size in armies has altered in two years. The fact of the matter is that we all are passing every day through intensely interesting situations and experiences which, measured by our old pre-war mental atti-

tude, would have been engrossing. But this after-the-war reaction makes people and things seem relatively unimportant. When in a year or so we "come to," so to speak, we shall regret not having made a better record of these armistice days.

Harbord has again become Pershing's Chief of Staff, much to his gratification and that of all of us. W. D. Connor becomes Commanding General, Services of Supply. There are no better men made than Harbord. A great soldier and a great man, he is a faithful, loyal friend to those in whom he believes, and the waning fortunes of a friend only make him his stronger advocate. The world is filled with fawning sycophants these days, and they only emphasize the natural majesty of sincerity and naturalness. The true friend is always the most active in our greatest need of him. General Pershing has been here most of the week. Have taken lunch nearly every day with him and his aides at 73 Rue de Varenne.

Owing to the fact that peace is still hanging fire the General had to cancel the trip to England on which I was to accompany him. Accordingly had to telegraph Mr. William C. Dawes, at Mount Ephraim, Faversham, Kent, postponing the date of the christening of my English godson.

We are struggling away on the Liquidation Commission with one of the big business trades of all time. General McAndrew, the old Chief of Staff, has had a wonderful career of usefulness in his position. He is respected and beloved by us all. He leaves to take up work in the War Department — head of the War College, I think. Everybody hates to see him leave.

Paris, Sunday
June 1, 1919 (10.30 P.M.)

BEMAN and Bertie arrived last Wednesday from the United States. General Pershing telephoned from Chaumont to bring them there for the Decoration Day exercises at Beau-

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

mont and Romagne. Bertie was too fatigued to go, but Beman and I went by automobile Thursday to Chaumont, dined with the General and Harbord, and left with them and others of his Staff by train that night for the Argonne battlefield. The General did not intend to speak at Beaumont in the morning, but after the impressive ceremony conducted by Chaplain Moody ended, and the infantry had fired the three volleys over the long row of newly made graves marked by their white wooden crosses, he stepped down from the platform into the little gathering of French people before him. An old French civilian, the Mayor of the little near-by village, surrounded by a group of French children carrying wild flowers, then spoke to him in a simple way saying that the people of the neighborhood would always care for the graves of the lads sleeping so far away from their homes who had given their lives that the village might remain under France. The tears rolled down the General's face as he said, as near as I can remember: "It is very hard for us to say 'Good-bye' for the last time to our dear comrades whom we now leave forever. But since they cannot go home with us, there is no land save their own in which we would rather have them rest — no people with whom we can more surely leave their ashes to tender care and lasting memory than the dear people of France. I thank you in the name of their bereaved and in the name of our whole people who are mourning them to-day and whose hearts are here."

Somehow this incident overshadowed in my mind all the more formal ceremonies both at Beaumont and later at Romagne, where the General made his formal address before a great assemblage of soldiers.

Beman and I left the party at Romagne and returned to Paris by motor, arriving about midnight. I took him to Montfaucon where I found the observation post on the north slope of the hill, where on October 6 poor Boyd and I watched the battle from a spot near the Crown Prince's old dugout. We returned through Varennes, Châlons, Rheims,

Château-Thierry. They are rapidly cleaning up the terrible débris at Rheims.

Our troops are rapidly leaving for home. The curtain is falling on this great episode over here.

Paris, June 7, 1919

By July 1 our understanding with the French Government as to our cession of material to them and the settlement of reciprocal accounts will either be completed or in such agreed state that I can no longer be kept as indispensable to their proper completion. After long negotiations we are now practically in accord with the French on everything and await only the completion of certain inventories. The work has been most responsible, but others have borne the heaviest burden of it. Many hundreds of millions of dollars are involved and I have been at times concerned as to the outcome. I feel, however, that we have considered the situation from every angle, and that the conclusion reached will be the fairest and best possible under most difficult conditions. Have kept closely in touch with all matters of policy and decisions relating to it, but have not attempted detail work.

My associates on this commission are most exceptional and strong men. They have worked hard and honestly and shown great ability.

Will leave for Brussels to-morrow for a day or so to say "Good-bye" to Van de Vyvere, my faithful friend, who helped our army so much last year. He is no longer in office.

Paris, June 13, 1919

ARRIVED in Brussels last Sunday night with Colonel Cushing. Next morning Colonel Sewell came over from Antwerp where he is Base Commander (also at Rotterdam) and remained with me during my visit. My friend Van de Vyvere came over from Ghent and we three took lunch together. My trip was taken chiefly to indicate to Van de Vyvere my personal regard and respect. Tuesday went by motor to

Antwerp with Sewell and after an interesting day left that night for Paris arriving Wednesday morning.

The balance of the week rather busy. Conferences with Liquidation Committee and others. General Pershing is here and we spend considerable time together in pleasant visiting in contrast to the old strenuous days.

This morning (Saturday) took part in the ceremonies in court of the Invalides, with which General Lewis, representing the President, and the Commander-in-Chief decorated my friend Varaigne and other French officers with the Distinguished Service Medal before French and American troops. Beman and Bertie were present. In addition to keeping up with the Liquidation Commission, the plans for final demobilization of the Military Board of Allied Supply and of my own office require thought and careful attention. Am experiencing exasperating delays in securing from the Allied armies the detailed information desired and ordered as to their condition on October 31, 1918.

Made Commander of the Order of Leopold

ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE
MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE
DIRECTION DES
VOIES DE COMMUNICATION

Bruxelles, June 17, 1919

From: MAJOR HAINAUT, *D.V.C., War Office*

To: GENERAL DAWES, *American Member of the Inter-
Allied Supply Committee
Elysée Palace, Paris*

DEAR SIR:

I beg to inform you that, in agreement with the American authorities, His Majesty the King of the Belgians has decided to confer upon you the Commandery of the Order of Leopold.

You will only receive the necessary chancellery documents in a little time, but I hope to have the great honor to bring

you the jewel myself at the next meeting of the Inter-Allied Supply Committee.

With my best congratulations

I remain, dear Sir

Yours respectfully

HAINAUT

Letter to my mother

June 30, 1919

OWING to the fact that our negotiations with the French Government for the sale of our surplus army property will require a few weeks longer to terminate one way or the other, my departure for home will be delayed until the 20th of July. This is a disappointment to me, but I feel that you would not want me to leave until I had taken my full share of responsibility in this important matter. If I should ask to come sooner it would seem that I was leaving upon my colleagues the full onus of a very difficult situation and decision, in which it is my duty not only to our Government but to them that I fully participate. What I hope will be the final negotiations with the French Government will commence to-morrow. And so I am dictating to you an account of my trip to England which will be of interest to you during the three weeks' longer delay in my expected return.

A week ago Sunday at Paris occurred the dedication of the Pershing Stadium, which was presented by America to the Government of France. After attending this exercise in the afternoon, I left with General Pershing and his personal aides for Le Mans, where we spent Monday attending the opening of the International Rifle Contest. We left on the General's special train for Boulogne Monday night and took the Channel boat on Tuesday morning, arriving in London about noon. I did not go with General Pershing to Oxford, where he received the D.C.L. degree on Wednesday, desiring to remain in the city and visit my dear friends Lieutenant-

MAJOR-GENERAL J. W. McANDREW
Chief of Staff, A.E.F.

General Sir Travers-Clarke and Major-General Sir Evan Carter, as well as my younger friend Captain Frank Covell. General Travers-Clarke, General Carter, and Captain Covell took dinner with me at the Carlton Tuesday and Wednesday evenings, as did also Colonel Beeuwkes, one of General Pershing's aides. In my report as Chairman of the General Purchasing Board and General Purchasing Agent of the American E.F., when you finally receive it, you will find my tribute to English coöperation with my department of the Staff, for which General Travers-Clarke and General Carter were so largely responsible. My friend, Major-General Reginald Ford, now in command of the Service of Supply of the British Army in France, had expected to visit London with me, but was detained in France by an important inter-army conference. It is impossible for right-minded and earnest men to be associated for so long and in matters of such vital importance as those which have engrossed General Travers-Clarke, General Ford, General Carter, and myself, without having the warmest friendships develop. When General Pershing placed upon me the responsibility of securing animals for our army during the action in the Argonne, I shall never forget the earnest way in which General Travers-Clarke, under the authority of Marshal Haig, assisted me. As for General Carter, from the very beginning of our participation in the war he has been an ever-present help in time of trouble.

I spent some time at the British War Office in the company of these men. On Wednesday evening Beman arrived from Brussels and joined me at the Carlton Hotel. The same evening also Captain Sandys Dawes, the father of my new godson, arrived in London to pilot us down to Mt. Ephraim the next morning. At ten o'clock Thursday morning General Pershing and his aides, including Colonel Griscom, our Military Attaché at London, joined us at the Carlton Hotel and, together with General Carter, Beman, and Captain Covell, we left by motor for Mount Ephraim, Faver-

sham, for the christening. General Pershing and I went in the first car. My association with the General is so constant and in all his actions he is so entirely the natural and close friend of the long years, that I find myself forgetting how important he is and what a central figure of interest he has become everywhere. We were both surprised as we rode up to Mount Ephraim about 12.30 to note the road decorated with the Allied flags and to find upon our arrival at the house the military band of the 8th British Hussars. We were greeted by Mr. William C. Dawes, the present head of the English family, and his wife; Colonel Bethel Dawes, a magnificent old army officer of eighty years and a brother of the late Sir Edwin Sandys Dawes; Captain Sandys Dawes, his wife and my little godson, together with Betty and Lancelot, Captain Dawes's sister and brother; besides other collateral members of the family. We started immediately for the old Norman church in Hernhill village near by, built in 1120, where generations of the Daweses, probably more pious than the present, have worshiped for centuries and are now buried. I went in the first car with the father and mother of the boy and the grandmother, Mrs. Dawes. General Pershing, Mr. William C. Dawes, Beman, and General Carter followed in the second car. The villagers had gathered in the little church. The old rector in his red robe, Rev. Dr. Springett, who with an assistant performed the ceremony, is the uncle of Captain Sandys Dawes, having married the sister of Mr. William C. Dawes. General Pershing, Betty Dawes, the eighteen-year-old sister of Captain Sandys Dawes, and I, who were the sponsors and godparents of the child, occupied a little pew immediately in front of the rector. Beman sat with the rest of the family and Charles Ambrose William to our right.

We returned to the house for lunch, which was attended by the family and a few of the leading residents of the section of the country, including the Lord High Sheriff of the County of Kent and the Mayor of Faversham. After lunch the school-

children of the village called to present an address to General Pershing. After that was over, Mr. Dawes asked me to step before the children — about eighty of them — who proceeded to sing "Auld Lang Syne," which Mr. Dawes said was the village custom when a member of a family returned after a long absence. The General and I were much impressed and found ourselves choked up a little several times. The General left in time to catch the four-o'clock boat for France at Dover, which is but a short distance away, and General Carter, Colonel Beeuwkes, Captain Covell, Beman, and I remained at Mount Ephraim for the night. While the surroundings of the family were impressive and magnificent, they were quite simple and unaffected people — as should always be. The grounds were thrown open to the villagers in the afternoon, who came to listen to the military band and walk in the beautiful gardens which surrounded the house. Beman, General Carter, and Colonel Beeuwkes and I remained until afternoon. In the morning the entire family accompanied me around the grounds, the hunting stables, the beagle kennels, the greenhouses where orchid-raising is the great specialty, and over some parts of the estate which sweeps down the hill from the house as far as the ocean, about three miles away, I should say. We passed near the house an oak-tree by which a tablet was placed stating that it had been planted in 1815 by Charles Dawes to commemorate the allied victory in the Battle of Waterloo. Mr. Dawes then took us to a spot where all the family and the servants were gathered by previous arrangement so that I could plant the tree which would commemorate the signing of the peace in the present Great War. This tree must be regarded as having been theoretically, but not entirely, planted by me, for after I had thrown in a certain amount of earth it occurred to me to suggest that the gardeners, of whom there were a number there, could proceed with it more scientifically, a view in which after watching me they thoroughly concurred. Some of the family took a kodak of the tree-planting, which when they send it to me I will for-

ward to you. I hope that the picture of old Colonel Dawes is a good one, as for some reason he did not appear in the first group, which was taken the day of the christening, by the local photographer.

During the morning Mrs. William Dawes, Betty, and I went over to the old church where we looked at the gravestones of the Dawes ancestors. The Daweses came to Mount Ephraim from Westmoreland, where they had lived for centuries, in the early 1600's and have lived there ever since, except for a short space of ten or fifteen years. During this time an iconoclast rector took up three of the flat Dawes gravestones of the seventeenth-century period in the floor of the church, and after imperfectly chipping off the inscriptions placed them in the walk just outside the church. A brass tablet, however, has been placed inside the church above the old graves. I noticed the grave of Major William Dawes, who fought in the English army in the Revolutionary War. So that here was the case of an American William Dawes and an English William Dawes in opposing armies. In one of the old Dawes homes at Westmoreland over a gateway was an inscription, the facsimile of which Sir Edwin placed over one of the gates at Mount Ephraim. I shall always remember it — "Keep your eyes toward the sunlight, and the shadows will fall behind you." Sir Edwin is buried in the old churchyard. Two commemorative tablets on the walls of the old church and the memorial chapel built by his son are a tribute to his memory. It was his interest in the Dawes family which led him twenty years ago to write to me and suggest a reunion of the two branches. The American family has never been interested up to the present generation in old Ambrose Dawes, the father of William Dawes of Sudbury, the founder about 1620 of the American family. I hope that hereafter both the American and the English family will regard his memory as an asset.

The Daweses showed me the Siwash Indian relics which Rufus some years ago sent to the children, who are very proud of them. They referred often to the pleasant visit which

CHRISTENING PARTY AT MOUNT EPHRAIM, FAVERSHAM, KENT

Seated, left to right: Major-General Sir Evan Carter, Hon. Beman G. Dawes, General Dawes, General Pershing, Mrs. William C. Dawes, Mrs. Selby, Mrs. Springett, Lady Harris. Next to inner left-hand column stands William C. Dawes, on his left his son, Captain Sandys Dawes, and in front of extreme right-hand column Mrs. Sandys Dawes.

Rufus and Helen made them some years ago. The family is a patriarchal one. The old butler has been with them for fifty years and is as much a member of the family as any one of the blood. The servants cheered when the tree was planted and acted and were treated in all respects as members of the family. Mr. Dawes took me to a blacksmith shop to call on a blacksmith whose family for three hundred years have been at the same work in the same place.

On Saturday afternoon, the next day, I drove with General Carter to his home thirty miles out of London to meet his family. Lady Carter was ill in bed, so that I did not see her, but the two children were as unaffected and simple as had been all of the younger people that I met during the trip.

Captain Sandys Dawes has just returned from Palestine where he served with the English army. He is not entirely tamed after this experience. On Saturday night the family came up and dined with me at the Carlton Hotel during the celebration over the signing of the peace that afternoon. At dinner time Captain Sandys Dawes, although naturally quiet and dignified, arose fully in the most energetic Dawes fashion to the exigencies of that somewhat hilarious occasion. When Colonel Beeuwkes, General Pershing's aide, who had remained in England with me, sat solemnly down, after having delivered an alleged toast, he landed in a plate of meat and gelatine thoughtfully placed on his chair for him by the Captain, who then and during the entire evening, while keeping all his faculties, seemed to rise to every occasion. Being over middle-aged and admitting it, I withdrew at eleven o'clock and went to bed, leaving the somewhat worried elder Mrs. Dawes to feebly but continuously cope with the high spirits of the children, including Lancelot Dawes, fourteen years of age, who was present. The next morning Colonel Beeuwkes told me that it was nearly two o'clock in the morning before she could persuade them to leave for the night motor ride back to Faversham. The tremendous celebration of peace in London I shall not attempt to describe, as the papers have in-

formed you of it. On Saturday night the Daweses brought me up photographs which the village photographer had taken of the gathering at the house and of the General and myself with the family. There are a great many of them and I am sure you will be interested in seeing them.

I have tried to write this letter in detail in the way which would please you. It was really an occasion which moved me very much at times. Like the two countries in which they live, the two branches of the family have been at times estranged and on opposite sides, but like their countries I hope they have come together not again to be divided in spirit. While William Dawes of Boston, the fourth from William Dawes of England, rode with Paul Revere in the fight against the English, William Dawes of Evanston, the eleventh from William Dawes of England, rode on the Hindenburg Line in command of a tank manned by Englishmen, fighting with them against a common enemy. This fact, as well as because little Charles Ambrose William Dawes is named after William Dawes, the present head of the English family, after Ambrose, the common ancestor, and after myself, your eldest son, would indicate a complete reunion of a fine old stock in common purpose hereafter. I only wish that the old William Dawes and Father and Uncle Eph and the others, who have done so much in America to make the family name stand for accomplishment and earnest purpose, as well as all the old English Daweses, could know of it all.

Your affectionate son.

Paris, July 4, 1919

ON Wednesday our Liquidation Commission received the first offer of France for our surplus supplies in France at a conference with Paul Morel, the Minister charged with the matter of liquidation for the French. The offer was 1,500,000,000 francs. This is much too small a price, and we of course rejected it. We have now to continue negotiations, but they should be concluded within the month — at least as to the

aggregate price. Our surplus material is worth under favorable conditions in my judgment about \$1,000,000,000, less what we have sold and used and otherwise disposed of during the period of inventory. Suppose we assume \$750,000,000 as the value we should fix as the starting-point in the trade as against the less than \$300,000,000 which the French offer; I think we shall finally agree on about \$400,000,000 to \$450,000,000 as the proper price under the difficult conditions in which both sides negotiate.

Filed with the Commission a memorandum giving my views as to the absolute necessity of selling to the French Government. Cabled home postponing my departure until later in the month. Very busy with the Commission during the first three days of the week. Am preparing my papers and work preliminary to leaving for home.

Tuesday, July 4, our national holiday is being celebrated as only our French allies can celebrate. No people surpass them in sincere gratitude and generosity in the graceful and touching expression of it.

Attended the reception to General Pershing given by the City of Paris at the Hôtel de Ville yesterday afternoon — a most magnificent affair. Attended in the evening the dinner given by the French Government to our military and naval representatives, with General Pershing as the guest of honor, at the Pré Catalan, in the Bois de Boulogne. Marshals Foch and Pétain were present and about eighty other officers equally divided between the French and Americans. The speeches of the French Ministers and of General Pershing were perfect in their adaptation to what was really an historic occasion.

To-day is filled with celebrations in honor of our nation. At the Pré Catalan banquet was pleased with the music of the French military (*poilu*) band and engaged it for my dinner to Payot and the Military Board of Allied Supply which I am to give Tuesday night, at which I shall say "Good-bye" to my dear friends on this side of the ocean.

Paris, Sunday
July 6, 1919 (11.30 P.M.)

AM rather depressed at leaving this life of activity, strenuous endeavor, and unusual environment as the time for my sailing draws near. Took lunch with the Commander-in-Chief and his aides. Harbord and Collins dined with me. The week has been one of numerous celebrations most of which I have escaped. In my younger days I suppose they would have appealed to me more. When Harbord brought me this evening the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief to ride as a member of his Staff in the Peace Parade, I experienced the usual internal conflict between vanity and common sense, the latter finally prevailing. No one will regard my being in the parade as an incident of it except myself — and to ride in it means that I cannot see it.

Am pushing the gathering of information as to the Services of Supply of the three armies as hard as possible, having sent Colonel Hodges to the General Headquarters of the other armies. Our own information is mostly in. On Tuesday night, after the meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply, I shall give a dinner to General Payot and the other members at the Ritz. I certainly shall miss my faithful friend General Payot when I go.

Harbord wants me to go to Armenia with him as a member of his commission. I should like to help found a better condition of things as an agent of our great country in the land where Will Shedd and Uncle John and Aunt Jane did so much for others — Will finally giving his life. To be useful is to find whatever of happiness there is in life — and there is little enough at best. I used to feel sorry for Will Shedd who was spending his life helping people in Persia, and enduring hardships in order to be able to do it. He should have felt sorry for me.

"Vanity of vanities, all is vanity, saith the preacher." As a matter of fact, if we did not have vanity — which is the commonest of human characteristics — and saw ourselves as

GENERAL PERSHING AND GENERAL HARBORD PASSING THROUGH THE ARC DE TRIOMPHE, VICTORY PARADE

others see us, we should probably starve to death as a race, not regarding our existence as worth the effort to maintain it. Such is the reflection induced by the antics of individuals during a time of international pomp and circumstance in peace celebrating. Humanity sets out killing each other, and succeeds in filling millions of graves with the best portion of it. Then a good section of what is left of it proceeds to celebrate in champagne and pre-historic dancing. "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity, saith the preacher." And so to bed. If there is less humidity in the atmosphere to-morrow morning I shall probably take a brighter view of things.

If I had not mentioned my coming dinner for Payot, what I have written before would seem more consistent. But, thank Heaven, I never stayed a pessimist overnight in my life!

Paris, July 6, 1919

THE heart-burnings among our officers who have not received the Distinguished Service Medal, when they unquestionably deserve it, leads me to question the advisability in our country of any governmental system of decoration even for military or civil accomplishment.¹ Apart from the unwisdom in a Republic of establishing a system tending toward the creation of classes, the disappointment of the unpreferred is apt to be directed toward the Government as well as toward its agent in decoration distribution. The Decoration Board of the A.E.F. is swamped with thousands of requests for reconsideration of disapprovals of the D.S.M. As a matter of fact it has been impossible, and always will be impossible, to discriminate justly in the distribution of awards in a large army — from the very vastness of the task which prevents consideration of all the cases from the viewpoint of the same minds. An officer of the A.E.F. who has succeeded in his task, been promoted, been commended by his superior officers and associates, should not feel himself reflected upon because he

¹ See Report of Daily Activities, December 31, paragraph 3. Appendix C, vol. II, p. 251.

has not received one of the few hundred Distinguished Service Medals distributed among millions of men. And yet some of them do, and I greatly regret it. The "world will little note nor long remember" even our names — much less the minor things relating to our personal vanity. I suppose, as one who has received much more recognition than he deserves, it is easy for me to recommend philosophy to those who have been unjustly treated. But when I find disappointment so keen and rage so blinding that I have to endure patiently an attack on the system and everybody connected with it, including intimations that I have not been duly active for my friends — all because I have failed in a strenuous recommendation to have the D.S.M. awarded where it was deserved — I come to realize that the system is questionable.

How little any one cares to hear of our failures and grievances! If the world was not cold, human vanity would demand all its time and energy expended in sympathizing with grouches. Realizing, especially this morning, that this is a very cold world after a conversation with some officers who did not get the D.S.M., I suggested to them the following paraphrase: "Weep, and the world laughs at you. Laugh, and you laugh alone." This did not seem to comfort them, their sense of humor being submerged along with their other faculties in deep pessimism.

*Paris, Friday evening
July 11, 1919*

ON Tuesday occurred what will be the last, but one, meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply. It was held at my headquarters at the Elysée Palace Hotel. The representatives of the four armies were present. General Payot presided. I am happy to say that the compilation by the different staffs of the information as to supply systems has so far progressed that the great composite picture of the Allied army supply system in France will be preserved for the military students of all time.

On Tuesday evening at the Ritz I gave a dinner in honor of General Payot and the other members of the Board at which about one hundred guests were present. I paid as best I could my tribute of respect and affection to my dear friend General Payot, whose wonderful ability and experience were given so devotedly to our army whenever required. General Moseley also paid him a splendid tribute, as did General Connor who made his speech in excellent French. Connor always makes good in the army and elsewhere, but I trembled for him when he tackled this job.

I had opportunity to thank publicly some of those present for what they had done to help me in my work — Van de Vyvere for the Belgian locomotives; Davidson for himself and others for the Portugal railroad ties; General Chevalier for saving our wood situation; Ganne, Oppenheim, and Varraigne most important of all, and Doumenc for helping in motor transport work. I made each get on his feet while I spoke to him, like a class at school. But I taught a pleasing lesson. Lieutenant-General Cowans sat at my left and recounted in his speech our former differences out of which a firm friendship had sprung.

Payot announced my citation in the orders by Marshal Foch. The next day I received the notification of the Marshal through a letter of Weygand, Chief of Staff.¹ The

¹ LE MARÉCHAL
COMMANDANT EN CHEF
LES ARMÉES ALLIÉES
ETAT-MAJOR
2^o SECTION
PARIS, 4 BIS BOULEVARD
DES INVALIDES
No. 3132.

Le 6 Juillet, 1919

LE MARÉCHAL DE FRANCE, *Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées*
TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHARLES G. DAWES, *Representative of the American Army on the Military Board of Allied Supply, 104 Ave. des Champs-Élysées.*

I have decided to cite you to the order of the army, in recognition of the eminent services you have rendered during the operations to the Franco-American coöperation and to the general cause of the Allies.

Marshal designated Payot to deliver the Croix de Guerre, which he will do at La Morlaye on the 16th. The citation as given in Payot's letter is too comprehensive in my own fair judgment. It is, however, an honor for which it is difficult for me to express my full appreciation.

The French have increased through Minister Paul Morel their offer for our army material in France from 1,500,000,000 francs to 2,250,000,000 francs. This is still somewhat too low.

Bought to-day at a bookstore De Chambrun's and De Marenches's book in French, "The American Army in the European Conflict." Was pleased with their reference to the work of my department of the Staff. They are both men of

Being obliged to absent myself, I regret not to be able to present to you myself the Croix de Guerre before your departure.

I have delegated General Payot to present it to you in my name.

By order:

WEYGAND

Chief of Staff

COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF
DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES
ETAT-MAJOR GÉNÉRAL
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE
DES COMMUNICATIONS ET
DES RAVITAILLEMENTS
AUX ARMÉES

Le 8 Juillet, 1919

No. 578/C.R.

LE GÉNÉRAL PAYOT, *Directeur Général des Communications et des Ravitaillements aux Armées, Président du Comité Interallié des Ravitaillements.*

TO MONSIEUR LE BRIGADIER-GÉNÉRAL DAWES, *Membre du Comité Interallié des Ravitaillements.*

I have the honor to inform you that by order No. 3127, dated July 6, 1919, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has decided to cite you in the orders of the Army.

I am happy to quote you below the *motif* of your citation:

"In the course of the operations of 1918, has assured a complete union over the supplies between the American and French Armies. By his breadth of spirit and his constant effort to put in common the resources of the two armies, he has permitted to be realized under the best possible conditions the community of efforts which conducted the Americans and French together to Victory."

CH. PAYOT

AMERICAN BATTLE FLAGS IN VICTORY PARADE IN PARIS. JULY 14, 1919

MARSHAL FOCH AND MARSHAL JOFFRE AT HEAD OF VICTORY PARADE

General Payot is the mounted officer immediately below the second
standard from the right

unusual ability, and certainly no one saw the American effort from a closer view than they did.

I expect to sail on July 26th. Paris is a mass of flags and crowded with people from outside to see the peace parade. Beman and Bertie left for home Wednesday. I have greatly enjoyed their visit.

Paris, Saturday, July 19, 1919

I EXPECT to sail July 28th and so I am entering upon my last week here. What John McCutcheon once said to me, at about the time America entered the war, is true: "This war is so great that everything that happens after it in our lives will be in the nature of an anticlimax." Therefore I feel my usual disinclination to describe the celebrations of the last week.

The Victory Parade, July 14, which I witnessed from the stand reserved for the French General Officers, was of course the most impressive of history and will not lack describers. Its arrangement and execution from start to finish were perfect. Nor did the tribute to the dead fail to reach the perfection of that to the living. In this the dear and noble French people never fail. It has been a privilege to have lived two years among this heroic and martyred people in such relations that one gained an understanding of them impossible to the casual visitor. As I saw them by the tens of thousands quietly dropping the single flowers before the memorial to their dead, there formed in my mind the picture of them which shall last through my own life.

General Pershing and General Harbord left for England Monday night. On Wednesday noon I went to La Morlaye — General Payot's headquarters — where he gave a farewell lunch in my honor. As I drove up to the building General Payot and other French and Allied officers were waiting and several platoons of *poilus* with trumpeters were drawn up in a double line. The ceremony of decoration was held immediately, several others being decorated, among them the son of Minister Clémentel, the latter being present. In the name of

Marshal Foch, General Payot gave me the Croix de Guerre with a palm, reading the citation to the Order of the Army. We went to the country residence of Baron Rothschild, in which General Payot and his staff live, where lunch was served. My friend General Ford and a number of other English, Italian, and Belgian officers, besides Payot's Staff, were present, among them General Nation, Lord Pembroke, Commandant Doumenc, Commandant Lescannes, Colonel Hodges, my Chief of Staff as American Member of the Board. Ford had to take a ten-hour motor ride from the British army line to attend the ceremony — an attention which I certainly appreciate.

Last night, Friday, Mr. and Mrs. Homer Johnson gave a dinner at the Ritz for some thirty-five guests which turned out to be in my honor, though I had not been told of it until Mr. Johnson announced it at the table.

The sale of our surplus supplies to the French is about agreed upon. No essential difference longer exists. I shall leave France with a sense of having "stayed through."

Am making every effort to facilitate the gathering of the final information to complete the great picture of the Allied armies in France and their supply systems. No one will ever realize what persistence this has taken on the part of Hodges and myself for the last nine months. At present there are already on file documents covering approximately one million words besides maps, picture charts, etc. Pershing and Harbord will see the thing through in the thirty days they remain after I leave, by supporting Hodges in his work.

Last night received a telegram from Harbord from London saying John wanted me to come over to-day for the parade and return with them Thursday and that Beman and Bertie were still there. It came too late, however, for me to get to London for to-day. John is unquestionably receiving in England the public acclaim which no living American has better earned.

Paris, July 24, 1919

M. PAUL MOREL, the French Minister of Army Stocks, to-day formally offered the United States \$400,000,000 for our surplus army supplies in France. This offer will be formally accepted by our commission. It is advantageous both to the United States and to France. The offer was foreshadowed by the discussion which took place at M. Ganne's apartments Tuesday evening at a dinner which he gave as a farewell to me. The only other men guests were M. Tardieu, Commandant Oppenheim, Commandant Varaigne, and the members of our Commission — Judge Parker, Senator Hollis, and Mr. Johnson. In the discussion all the cards were laid on the table by both sides. We all took part. For six months we have been engaged in this work. All have participated, but on our side the work of Judge Parker, our Chairman, has been the most laborious and the most effective of all of us. Senator Hollis did a great service under most difficult and embarrassing conditions in his large sales to the liberated and neutral countries. From the start the commanding ability, breadth of view, and eminent fairness of Mr. Johnson, together with his business knowledge and common sense, made him invaluable in the negotiations. All these men were strangers to me — except Hollis whom I knew slightly — at the beginning of our work together. Our views were at first divergent at times, but they were all honest, and as we gained more knowledge of conditions, steadily approached each other, until after the six months' association our opinion is now unanimous on all essentials. I shall always remember my association with Parker, Hollis, and Johnson with pleasure, and I cherish for them the highest respect as courageous, constructive, and sensible men.¹

¹ In a letter dated June 3, 1920, Judge Edwin B. Parker, Chairman, wrote me as follows: "On the whole I have heard very little criticism of the work done by the Commission and quite a number of complimentary things said about it." The amounts involved in settlement (i.e., claims against the A.E.F.) aggregated \$893,716,093.26, while the amount of all sales totaled \$822,923,225.82.

My boxes are packed and my office force and I leave for Brest on Sunday. The Commander-in-Chief arrived from London this morning and I took lunch at the house with him, Harbord, and his aides, including Colonel Collins, who is going to sail with me. After lunch the General and I had one of our visits and discussed the near future. Dear old John, nothing changes him from what he has always been. His feet are always on the ground.

Payot came in and took dinner with me last night. We could n't talk to each other having no interpreter, but we just sat around together and felt bad about separating. I have had Jo Davidson make a bust of him.

U.S.S. Leviathan — At Sea
August 2, 1919

My last day in Paris, Sunday, July 27, I spent mostly at General Pershing's house, taking lunch there and having a last conference with my dear and faithful friend. He has the power and, what is more, the courage, of severe self-analysis and criticism. We discussed the future, of course. Several times during our long visit we both were greatly affected, but it was when we spoke of the sorrows in our life, not of anything material that there may be left in it for either of us. Later in the afternoon Harbord, Frank McCoy, and I went over to the Louvre, where I wanted to show Harbord some Roman antiquities and to see again the Winged Victory of Samothrace, the beauty of which I had never fully realized until I saw the original on the prow of the ship. The figure needs its setting to fully bring it out.

As usual I spent most of the time among the Roman statues. Then Harbord and I went to the hotel, where my faithful and dear friend General Payot met us. We three, with Colonel Ryan of my old regiment, took dinner together. It was the third time during this last week that Payot had come in to see me all the way from La Morlaye. At 8.30, after shaking hands with my friends the waiters at the hotel—the

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most of them *poilus*, and many of them wounded — we went to the train. Of my dear friends there to see me off were General Pershing, General Harbord, General Payot, General Moseley, Colonel Collins, Colonel Ryan, Commandant and Mrs. Varaigne, Captain and Mrs. Pesson-Didion, George Dept (the assistant head waiter at the hotel), and Captain Frank Pershing. I had with me my faithful and able assistants, Lieutenant-Colonel Roop, Lieutenant Francis Kilkenny, and Lieutenant Dalton Mulloney, who left with me for Brest. Harbord had wired ahead to Brest, and when we arrived there Monday morning our matters were expedited. Besides my personal staff I have a convoy of five soldiers who are taking with them twenty-two boxes of my official records.

Colonel Collins arrived at Brest Tuesday morning. We sailed on the Leviathan Wednesday evening. Major-General Biddle, Major-General Lassiter, Brigadier-Generals Craig, McKinstry, and myself are the General officers on board. The 39th Infantry and 12th Artillery of the Second Division, many casual officers and welfare workers, in all about seven thousand, make up the passengers.

Lieutenant Morrill (of Chicago), of the Navy, is in charge of "Boat Drill" which they now call "Abandon Ship Drill." I had a copy of my old "Boat Drill" and we compared the two with interest. There has been an evolution in boat drills so far as I can see only in the preparations for it made by the navy people which, when the 17th sailed, had to be made by the regimental commander of boat drill. For instance, the "Boat Drill" routes from the hold to the decks are fixed permanently and indicated by painted signs on the wall as well as in the Drill Book handed the army officers. But one oversight in the Drill Book of the Leviathan I noticed: no provision had been made for oil lamps or lanterns to be strung along the boat-drill routes to be used if the torpedo explosion should put the ship's dynamos out of commission, leaving them in darkness.

Well, it is all over now, anyway.

APPENDIX A
REPORT
OF
THE AMERICAN MEMBER
OF
THE MILITARY BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY
TO
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
March 27, 1919

APPENDIX A

March 27, 1919

From: The American Member, Military Board of Allied Supply.

To: General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American E.F.

In accordance with your instructions, I submit my report as the member representing the American Expeditionary Forces on the Military Board of Allied Supply.

The effort to secure military control of the Allied Service of Supplies was suggested by the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, during the darkest days for the Allies of the entire war, in a letter to you dated April 13, 1918, which outlines the situation and remedy therefor. This letter follows:

Paris, April 13, 1918

From: The General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F.

Subject: Military Control Allied Service of Supply.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

From the time that you landed in France you have exerted an influence for coördination of effort and centralization of authority in inter-Ally activity which has had the most far-reaching results. You have exerted this influence among the Allies during the time that you were creating a co-ordinating and centralizing system in your command. To carry out the purpose of the centralization of purchase and supply in your own army, to become connected with which effort you called me from St. Nazaire, you have as a matter of fact devised the plan the extension of which to the entire Allied operations would seem now vitally essential to Allied success in the war. What I am to suggest to you arises from conclusions based upon knowledge and experience gained in the position in which you have placed me. Even with the

conviction which I have of the vital importance of the matter I would hesitate to call it to your attention, were it not for your constant demonstration of the desire to subordinate everything, including your own personal authority as an independent commander, to the common purpose of an Allied victory. To willingly sacrifice individual authority and individual prestige in time of emergency for the sake of a common cause is the highest test of greatness and one which, in all your actions over here, you have stood. The power and influence of the great people of the United States and their assets in men and material with which to secure victory are in the hands of the President and yourself, and you have rightly interpreted their spirit when you notified General Foch to do with you and your army as he might desire. In this offer you have already taken the step, the proper carrying out of which I am going to suggest in this letter. The peculiar position of the United States in this situation, including your own relation thereto, is such that upon the initiative of our Government alone is it possible to accomplish it.

The general proposition is this: that just as there is now a unified military command of the Allies at the front, in other words a merging and consolidation of three distinct independent military authorities into one military authority (General Foch), there must be a corresponding merging of all separate individual authority of the Allies in reference to the Service of Supply into one military authority responsible to the corresponding military authority at the front. One is just as necessary as the other. In fact, for every argument for the necessity of the Foch command at the front, there exist two arguments for a similar authority for supply and transportation in the rear. I mean by this supplies from America, supplies from England, supplies from France, and the land and sea transportation therefor, warehousing and handling thereof. The Foch command at the front necessitates similar control of the rear, and in this case the rear means France, England, the United States, and perhaps Italy. Before discussing the method of accomplishing this let me illustrate in a manner which has no doubt often occurred to you its overwhelming importance. The United States is at this time using an immense amount of tonnage for the purpose of building enormous warehouses and dockage facilities. It is doing this notwithstanding the ware-

houses of France and England are being emptied and will continue to grow emptier. The French Government has used to a very large extent private warehouses for storing of supplies. Owing to the steadily lessening amount of supplies there is a large amount of French warehouse capacity now idle, and at the same time we are proceeding, at the heavy expense of current tonnage, on plans to immensely increase our warehouse facilities. Who is there, with authority to act, to determine from a bird's-eye view the relation of existing English and French warehouse capacity in France to the present warehousing and transportation projects of the A.E.F.? It cannot be done, except in a haphazard and inefficient way, unless by one man with military authority extending over all the Allies. This man, for the same reason that led to the selection of General Foch, must be a Frenchman and England and the United States must accept him. He must be given exactly the same authority toward the ocean and land transportation, engineering, and supply activities of the entire Allied forces which you have given me in connection with purchase and supply and certain other activities of the A.E.F., his authority being created by the same method. The position of General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F., you built up by a system of compelling the partial cession of independent authority. The weight of your own great powers and personality was thrown into the effort of compelling the creation of this authority, and when any independent head showed signs of not recognizing the necessity for it or bending to it, you broke him on the cross. What has made the success of the organization of my office is its now unquestioned power and authority over independent agencies. I never have had a meeting of the General Purchasing Board except on minor matters such as the distributing of office space or matters relating to the collection of information — never on the determination of action. Our organization is military. The reason why our Allied Boards fail is because action has to be by a board and not by an individual. The organization of the entire transportation and supply of the Allies must be military in its nature and not based upon the principles of either oligarchy or democracy. I do not have to argue this to a man like you. Some time after this war is over get Herodotus and read the discussion of the seven Persian generals when they were riding horseback on their way to Persia discussing the best form of

government for them to set up in the place of the monarchy of an assassinated king. If we do not have military management and military control we may fail and a German army at the ports may save us the trouble of unloading some of our engineering material from ships, thus devoted, which should have been bringing men and food to have stopped our enemies where they are now. It may be that our present plans may not have to be abandoned or materially altered, but the point I make is that it is impossible with this great multiplicity of civil boards, crisscross authority between the Allies, and lack of coördination in supply effort to properly determine the matter or properly act after its determination. Take the question of joint supplies. Impelled by the same emergency pressure that compelled unity of command at the front, the French and the English are calling upon me for information as to supplies of our army, with intimations of the necessity of pooling, etc. I am working the best I can in coördination with the French and English in all these matters, but I am in a position where I realize that these questions can be settled, in time to be of avail, only by military authority which, gathering its information, acts, and does not discuss. Who knows to-day, considering the Allied forces as one army, whether or not the great supplies of steel, oil, barbed wire, rubber tires, chloroform, sugar, picks and shovels, forage, clothing, etc., existing in France, England, and the United States are being marshaled in Foch's rear by the quickest routes to proper points, to warehouses built or to be built, considering both present and future needs and the present military emergency? In this present great military emergency shall we again pursue the time-worn policy of appointing an Allied Board to secure this information, and then, after long delay, subject the self-evident conclusions arising therefrom to the discussion of three separate authorities, influenced by personal or national considerations, personal ambitions, and counter-purposes?

In writing this way I almost feel as if I were insulting your intelligence, who have been the chief leader and have made the greatest personal sacrifice in the effort to apply remedies for this sort of business. If the suggestions herein you cannot force into adoption with the weight and prestige of your country and your own personal power, then we must go back at this time to a new effort to concentrate authority in a new Board of the Allies to do by common consent and

town-meeting methods that which should come at once from central military authority extending over all. No one knows better than you what this means in delay, and what delay may mean in a time like this, in a war like this. Can you not force the Allies to agree to adopt immediately the principles involved in the relations of your own Military Purchasing Board to the entire Service of Supply of your own army through which this entire Allied supply and transportation situation shall be placed in the hands of a French military officer with the same kind of authority over the Generals in command of the different services of the rear of the Allies that your General Purchasing Agent has over the separate purchase and supply services of the American army? The authority for the French command of these services could be created by the same method through which you have placed authority in me for our purchase and supply situation in the A.E.F. The three Generals in command of the Allied rear should be coördinated and controlled by French military authority as are the members of the General Purchasing Board by the General Purchasing Agent. As in the case of the purchasing board of the A.E.F., this does not mean the radical interference with the conduct of current activities. It does not even mean the lessening of current activities. It means their proper coördination and intelligent direction, and above all it means that when once a necessity is determined, the authority is in existence to compel its immediate relief. The influence of such unified military command of the service of the rear of the Allies upon the question of tonnage, use of material, economy of construction, and general betterment of conditions, must be self-evident. To go with unified military action at the front must come unified military support at the rear. You are the only man that can bring this about. If it was anybody else than you, even under the tremendous pressure of the present emergency, I should hesitate to suggest it; for human nature is weak. Nothing but the weakness and ambition of human nature prevented the unification of military command which you have always advocated until the death of hundreds of thousands and continued military failure brought individual and national ambition under the yoke of a common necessity involving existence itself.

General Harbord took dinner with me last night and spent the evening and I presented these views to him. He did not

conviction which I have of the vital importance of the matter I would hesitate to call it to your attention, were it not for your constant demonstration of the desire to subordinate everything, including your own personal authority as an independent commander, to the common purpose of an Allied victory. To willingly sacrifice individual authority and individual prestige in time of emergency for the sake of a common cause is the highest test of greatness and one which, in all your actions over here, you have stood. The power and influence of the great people of the United States and their assets in men and material with which to secure victory are in the hands of the President and yourself, and you have rightly interpreted their spirit when you notified General Foch to do with you and your army as he might desire. In this offer you have already taken the step, the proper carrying out of which I am going to suggest in this letter. The peculiar position of the United States in this situation, including your own relation thereto, is such that upon the initiative of our Government alone is it possible to accomplish it.

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houses of France and England are being emptied and will continue to grow emptier. The French Government has used to a very large extent private warehouses for storing of supplies. Owing to the steadily lessening amount of supplies there is a large amount of French warehouse capacity now idle, and at the same time we are proceeding, at the heavy expense of current tonnage, on plans to immensely increase our warehouse facilities. Who is there, with authority to act, to determine from a bird's-eye view the relation of existing English and French warehouse capacity in France to the present warehousing and transportation projects of the A.E.F.? It cannot be done, except in a haphazard and inefficient way, unless by one man with military authority extending over all the Allies. This man, for the same reason that led to the selection of General Foch, must be a Frenchman and England and the United States must accept him. He must be given exactly the same authority toward the ocean and land transportation, engineering, and supply activities of the entire Allied forces which you have given me in connection with purchase and supply and certain other activities of the A.E.F., his authority being created by the same method. The position of General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F., you built up by a system of compelling the partial cession of independent authority. The weight of your own great powers and personality was thrown into the effort of compelling the creation of this authority, and when any independent head showed signs of not recognizing the necessity for it or bending to it, you broke him on the cross. What has made the success of the organization of my office is its now unquestioned power and authority over independent agencies. I never have had a meeting of the General Purchasing Board except on minor matters such as the distributing of office space or matters relating to the collection of information — never on the determination of action. Our organization is military. The reason why our Allied Boards fail is because action has to be by a board and not by an individual. The organization of the entire transportation and supply of the Allies must be military in its nature and not based upon the principles of either oligarchy or democracy. I do not have to argue this to a man like you. Some time after this war is over get Herodotus and read the discussion of the seven Persian generals when they were riding horseback on their way to Persia discussing the best form of

government for them to set up in the place of the monarchy of an assassinated king. If we do not have military management and military control we may fail and a German army at the ports may save us the trouble of unloading some of our engineering material from ships, thus devoted, which should have been bringing men and food to have stopped our enemies where they are now. It may be that our present plans may not have to be abandoned or materially altered, but the point I make is that it is impossible with this great multiplicity of civil boards, crisscross authority between the Allies, and lack of coördination in supply effort to properly determine the matter or properly act after its determination. Take the question of joint supplies. Impelled by the same emergency pressure that compelled unity of command at the front, the French and the English are calling upon me for information as to supplies of our army, with intimations of the necessity of pooling, etc. I am working the best I can in coördination with the French and English in all these matters, but I am in a position where I realize that these questions can be settled, in time to be of avail, only by military authority which, gathering its information, acts, and does not discuss. Who knows to-day, considering the Allied forces as one army, whether or not the great supplies of steel, oil, barbed wire, rubber tires, chloroform, sugar, picks and shovels, forage, clothing, etc., existing in France, England, and the United States are being marshaled in Foch's rear by the quickest routes to proper points, to warehouses built or to be built, considering both present and future needs and the present military emergency? In this present great military emergency shall we again pursue the time-worn policy of appointing an Allied Board to secure this information, and then, after long delay, subject the self-evident conclusions arising therefrom to the discussion of three separate authorities, influenced by personal or national considerations, personal ambitions, and counter-purposes?

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town-meeting methods that which should come at once from central military authority extending over all. No one knows better than you what this means in delay, and what delay may mean in a time like this, in a war like this. Can you not force the Allies to agree to adopt immediately the principles involved in the relations of your own Military Purchasing Board to the entire Service of Supply of your own army through which this entire Allied supply and transportation situation shall be placed in the hands of a French military officer with the same kind of authority over the Generals in command of the different services of the rear of the Allies that your General Purchasing Agent has over the separate purchase and supply services of the American army? The authority for the French command of these services could be created by the same method through which you have placed authority in me for our purchase and supply situation in the A.E.F. The three Generals in command of the Allied rear should be coördinated and controlled by French military authority as are the members of the General Purchasing Board by the General Purchasing Agent. As in the case of the purchasing board of the A.E.F., this does not mean the radical interference with the conduct of current activities. It does not even mean the lessening of current activities. It means their proper coördination and intelligent direction, and above all it means that when once a necessity is determined, the authority is in existence to compel its immediate relief. The influence of such unified military command of the service of the rear of the Allies upon the question of tonnage, use of material, economy of construction, and general betterment of conditions, must be self-evident. To go with unified military action at the front must come unified military support at the rear. You are the only man that can bring this about. If it was anybody else than you, even under the tremendous pressure of the present emergency, I should hesitate to suggest it; for human nature is weak. Nothing but the weakness and ambition of human nature prevented the unification of military command which you have always advocated until the death of hundreds of thousands and continued military failure brought individual and national ambition under the yoke of a common necessity involving existence itself.

General Harbord took dinner with me last night and spent the evening and I presented these views to him. He did not

express himself, but I judge from his demeanor that he was not entirely unimpressed. I understand from Harbord that you may be here within the next few days. I had intended to come to Chaumont to present verbally what I am writing here. There is probably nothing in this letter which has not already been considered by you. However, now that unification of military command at the front has been secured, I am sure that the application of your General Purchasing Board idea to the service of the rear of the Allies is that which will go farther just now in bringing a successful conclusion to this war than any other thing.

Yours

CHARLES G. DAWES

Colonel, Engineers, N. A.

On April 19, 1918, in connection with this subject, you addressed a letter to M. Clemenceau, President of the Council, Republic of France, and on the same date cabled the Adjutant-General at Washington. Copies of this letter and cable, together with the answer of the Chief of Staff at Washington, follow:

France, April 19, 1918

The Président du Conseil
République Française

DEAR MR. CLEMENCEAU:

Referring to our conversation of yesterday, permit me to confirm my suggestion that all supplies and war materials that are used in common by the Allied armies be pooled and that the principle be extended as far as possible to the civil populations of the Allies in Europe.

After many disappointments in Allied endeavors to secure coördination in the operation of the Allied armies, we have finally come to recognize the absolute necessity for the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, with full power to give all necessary directions for unity of command.

The defects of present methods of handling supplies have long been recognized in similar manner, but each of the Allied armies continues to think only in terms of its own requirements independently of the other armies. While it is fully realized that there are many classes of supplies that are used

**MAJOR-GENERAL HARBORD, COMMANDING GENERAL SERVICE
OF SUPPLY, WITH THE GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT**

by all the Allies which could be pooled and issued to a particular army as required, a practical solution to the problem has not yet been reached.

I consider this subject of vital importance. The next three or four months are going to be difficult and combatant units from the United States should have every possible ton of shipping that can be saved by utilizing available Allied supplies and materials. The A.E.F. has recently reduced or postponed its requirements in tonnage to the lowest limit to save sea transportation, and a study of the subject leads to the conclusion that our allies could also do much more than is now being done.

While some attempt has been made through coördinating Allied committees, including the Supreme War Council, these bodies are only advisory and hitherto each has considered only one subject. A bird's-eye view of the whole problem of supply is lacking, and the authority to order the allotment and distribution of supplies to the different armies does not exist. This authority should be vested in a military chief.

The classes of supplies and material that are common to all armies are many, but too much detail should not be undertaken. The subject should be viewed broadly. The following classes of supplies, naturally, would be included: aviation materials, munitions as far as practicable, horses, oats, hay, meat, flour, coal, gasoline, wagons, harness, motor transport, depots, warehouses, lumber, and timber. Such concentration or control of supplies would probably result in economy of port construction, especially in storage facilities.

To meet the situation in question, I propose the designation of one military chief occupying a position as to supplies and materials similar to that of General Foch as to military operations, who shall have authority to decide just what supplies and materials shall be brought to France by the Allies and determine their disposition.

May I urge that this matter be given early attention? Permit me to suggest that Colonel Dawes, Purchasing Agent of the A.E.F., be called into consultation with such officers of the French army as you may designate to discuss this important subject.

I remain, with high personal and official esteem,

Your obedient servant

JOHN J. PERSHING

Cablegram

April 19, 1918

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

Washington, D.C.

Paragraph 1. For the Chief of Staff. No. 953.

The matter of tonnage is so vital to success of Allies that every possible ton is being cut from our requirements during the next three or four months as already indicated by reductions reported. A careful study of Allied demands for tonnage as a whole makes it evident that further reduction can be made if we pool all supplies that are in common use by Allied armies and certain reductions could also be made in supplies for civil populations of Allied countries. We have at last combined military forces under the supreme command of one man and should do the same thing as to supplies and war material. The appointment of many coördinating boards has led to confusion and loss of positive action. Strongly urge that supply question be placed in the hands of one military head with power to determine and decide on disposition and distribution of Allied supplies in Europe and determine what shall be shipped from United States. Much information necessary for prompt action is already available, but no one has power to decide. Supreme War Council comes in the same class with other boards in its lack of power. One man in military control of Allied supplies is necessary. Principle involved is foundation of A.E.F. Purchasing Board. The next three or four months should at least be covered by this arrangement. The class of supplies such as: aviation (which has been taken up in my cable No. 904); munitions (as far as possible considering different calibers); coal, horses, gasoline, oats, hay, meat, flour, shoes, sugar, wagons, tentage, demountable barracks, lumber, timber, supply depots, and warehouses are the principal items that could be pooled. Such pooling would affect material saving in our construction programme including railroad construction. Have presented this suggestion to Mr. Clemenceau, who approves. Shall go to London Sunday to adjust questions relative to handling our troops that go to British. While there shall submit pooling plan to Mr. Lloyd George. Have designated Colonel Dawes, who made this study, to confer with French representatives to be named by Mr. Clemenceau. Shall report progress later.

PERSHING

Cablegram

May 3, 1918

No. 1231-R

PERSHING, *Amexforce*

Paragraph 4. With reference to paragraph 1 your 953. The plan of pooling supplies for all Allied forces, operating under the supreme command of one military commander, is undoubtedly correct in principle, but such plan involves certain military, political, and economic features which will require careful consideration and considerable negotiations. The working details of such plans are not at once apparent, but can be worked out after all phases of the methods of operation, proposed by you, are fully presented. The project will be given careful study, awaiting more details from you, after your consultation with Allied representatives, referred to in your cablegram.

MARCH

In your further consideration of this subject you again wrote M. Clemenceau, under date of May 3, 1918, as follows:

France, May 3, 1918

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL
Paris

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Referring again to my note on the subject of pooling supplies, I wish to say that, after further thought and a full discussion of the tonnage situation with the Shipping Board, it would appear advisable to suggest the consideration of the important subject of control of allotment of tonnage space in connection with the pooling of supplies by the committee of military men that you were kind enough to propose.

I had hoped to have an opportunity to mention it to you in person at Abbéville, but the pressure of other business prevented. I shall, therefore, convey to you in the following paragraphs what I wrote to Mr. Lloyd George on the subject.

As you are no doubt aware, a very careful study shows that for the year 1918 there will be a deficit of 2,000,000 tons dead-weight tonnage unless some of the programmes can be reduced. Obviously the military programme on the Western

Front must be given first consideration and cannot be reduced. Actually it will be increased as American participation increases.

It would seem possible as recommended in substance by the Inter-Allied Maritime Council:

- (1) That the use of merchant tonnage by Allied navies might be materially reduced by joint reconsideration of naval programmes;
- (2) That considerable tonnage might be saved by suspending or reducing military activities in theaters of war other than the Western Front;
- (3) That further reductions in civilian imports carefully considered by Inter-Allied criticism can release additional tonnage.

It would appear desirable that these two subjects — pooling supplies and control of shipments — should be under military direction and that one executive head be given charge of both. It is believed that a very great increase in efficiency will result from such centralized executive management.

I would therefore suggest that the officer whom you select as the French representative on Supplies be also instructed to discuss the question of control of shipments.

With renewed expression of esteem and respect, I remain,
Yours faithfully

JOHN J. PERSHING

And to myself, on May 5, 1918, you addressed the following letter:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

May 5, 1918

COLONEL CHARLES G. DAWES
General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.
Paris

DEAR COLONEL DAWES:

With reference to our conversation as to the scope of authority that should be given the executive control of Allied army supplies and overseas shipments under the pooling arrangements contemplated, I am of the opinion that, generally speaking, authority should be absolute. However, in its exercise, I do not conceive that there would ever be conflict

of authority, inasmuch as no radical decision would be likely without the approval of all parties.

So that the real basis of the executive committee's acts is coördination and coöperation founded upon mutual confidence among the controlling Allies themselves, and upon the judgment of the committee they have selected. In principle it should bear the same relation to Allied supplies that the Purchasing Board of the A.E.F. bears to the various supply departments in our own army.

I am firm in my view that the members of this executive control should be military men of as broad business experience as possible, and hope the preliminary conference for the discussion of plans and organization of this committee may take the same view.

As to the duties, there are three main features which have been clearly outlined in our discussions and which fall naturally within the scope of the controlling agency we hope to create:

- (1) The pooling and allocation of all bulky supplies that are used in common by all Allied armies.
- (2) The groupment and allocation of military labor and transportation facilities, including motor and field transport.
- (3) The control of overseas shipments of all Allied military supplies and material.

The idea set out in paragraph 3 should be definitely separated from control of shipping by the Allied Shipping Boards, whose authority extends to the allocation of shipping itself, as distinguished from the direction necessary to control shipments of particular classes of supplies and material.

The foregoing is a mere outline, the details of this important work being left to you and those selected to work with you.

Sincerely yours

JOHN J. PERSHING

M. Clemenceau having appointed M. Loucheur, the French Minister of Armament, to confer with me relative to the formation of a plan for presentation to yourself and M. Clemenceau, conference was had between us on May 2, 1918. The following is a statement of its results as drafted in agreement by M. Loucheur and myself, which was afterward read at the Inter-Allied Conference:

Conference of May 2, 1918, between M. Loucheur, Minister of Armament, and Colonel Charles G. Dawes

Colonel Dawes presented to M. Loucheur General Pershing's ideas concerning a unified command of the Service of Supplies. General Pershing feels that it is not sufficient to pool the resources, but that there must be one man in a position to have a bird's-eye view of and power over the entire supplies for all the armies. This man should, General Pershing believes, have absolute military power amounting to a dictatorship, and should be a Frenchman. He does not wish the final decision to rest with a committee, but with this one man.

M. Loucheur replied that he had been appointed by M. Clemenceau to study the matter and present a plan; M. Clemenceau's idea is to appoint an American to direct the new organization. M. Loucheur considered that, with the mingling of troops on different parts of the front, the present method of separate supplies for each ally is a mistake. He cited the case of the difference in oat ration between English and French horses. Some materials, such, for example, as uniforms, would have to be different, but other materials, such as food, munitions, gasoline, etc., can be handled in common.

The following agreement was reached, subject to the approval of M. Clemenceau on the one hand and of General Pershing on the other hand:

- (a) The Americans and French will unite their resources, including warehouse space, materials, etc., and the distribution and transportation of these resources. The French will write to the British stating that the Americans and French have discussed a plan of unified control for Services of Supplies and that they invite the British to join.
- (b) One man, a Frenchman, will be placed in charge. The Americans and French will each appoint a staff composed of officers representing the various lines of activity in the Service of Supplies. It will be the duty of these two staffs to carry out the orders of the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of Supplies.

As a result of all the above correspondence and personal conferences held in connection therewith, the Inter-Allied

Conference of May 6, 1918, met at Paris to consider the unification of the Service of Supplies of the Allied armies. The French Government was represented by M. Jeanneney, M. le Contrôleur-Général de Lavit, M. Ganne (Director of Central Office of Franco-American Relations), and Colonel Payot (Chef de la Direction de l'Arrière au G.Q.G. Français); the British Government by Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowans (Quartermaster-General), Mr. Andrew Weir (Surveyor-General of Supplies), Mr. James J. Currie, Major-General A. S. Croften-Atkins (Director of Supplies and Transport), and Brigadier-General F. G. T. Cannot; the Italian Government by General Merrone; and the American Government and the Commander-in-Chief, American E.F., by myself under your nomination.

At this conference the American initiative to secure coördination of Allied supply and the activities of the rear of the Allied armies under a central military control met, from the majority of the heads of Allied civil and military authority, with immediate acceptance as a principle, but desperate opposition in detail. The attitude taken by you, as Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F., that you would relinquish the military control of the rear of your own army to secure this coördination, was not reflected in a similar attitude on the part of the English. It immediately became evident to me as your representative at this conference that, everything considered, coördination of the civil agencies of Allied supply through a central military control, however imperative, was impossible. The only possible coördination of civil authority in supply procurement and transportation — as up to the time of the military unification at the front had been the case with military movement and strategy — was that which could be effected by common understanding of necessities through discussion without the loss of any authority on the part of any of the negotiating agencies.

At the conference of May 6, 1918, it was agreed that each ally should prepare a reply to the three following questions:

- (1) Are General Pershing's propositions filed herewith accepted by the other governments?
- (2) How can the unity of the distribution and transportation of all supplies to the different Allied armies in France be realized?
- (3) How can unity in the collection of the resources of all the different Allied countries be realized?

This gave me an opportunity of submitting a written argument upon the entire situation in which I endeavored to focus the discussion upon matters affecting the immediate military rear of the armies, over which the authority to create a central control existed in the conference by the delegation of existing military authority alone as distinguished from civil authority. This letter was addressed to M. Jeanneney, the Chairman, and was written immediately after the conference. In it I advocated that the first step taken be the transfer of the control of the rear of the Allied armies to a board consisting of one member from each army, whose unanimous agreement as to the necessity of a coördinating order should be the basis for its issuance to the Allied armies in France. By this arrangement a military authority over the rear of the three armies could be established by unanimous agreement, the power of veto upon any measures suggested for the common benefit existing in the representation of each army. This letter, which was revised by yourself and received the general consideration of the members of the conference before the holding of the next meeting, is given herewith:

Paris, May 8, 1918

To M. Jeanneney, President Inter-Allied Conference of May 6, 1918 (called to consider General Pershing's proposition and plan for military unification of the Allied Services of Supply).

Relative to the three questions the conference proposed at its first meeting and in accordance with your suggestion that comments be filed thereon, I submit the following:

General Pershing's plan, in so far as it involves the co-ordination of military supply, transportation, and construc-

tion now located in the immediate Allied rear, is susceptible of adoption by the military commands as distinguished from the civil as a strictly military measure of coördination involving activities now wholly under military control, but as yet not coördinated between the three armies. To this extent the plan may be considered as presented by the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., as a measure of military action affecting the immediate rear and therefore as only necessary in this particular phase to be discussed in its relation to the several existing military as distinguished from civil authorities.

The plan, in its more general application, involving the coördination of activities now under civil control, must be first approved by the Government of the United States as well as by England and France. But since the first conference on this subject of prime importance has developed some hesitation as to their authority on the part of members of the conference, I deem it my duty as General Pershing's representative at this conference to place on file the following statement as applying simply to the coördination of the immediate activities of the Allied rear now possible under his plan if approved by the existing military authorities alone.

Before my submission to the conference of General Pershing's plan looking to the military unification of the services of the Allied rear to match the military unification at the front, he had obtained the verbal acceptance of the principle by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. The duty of this conference, therefore, was to devise a plan, not to suggest obstacles to its consummation — to which most of its time was devoted at the first meeting. The letter of General Pershing, addressed to myself and submitted to the conference, considered together with the detailed statement of his plan, indicated that his desire is such to secure military unification of the Services of Supply of the Allied rear, that while he would prefer final authority to be located in one man he would acquiesce in an agreement by which the military authority of the proposed committee could be set in motion only by the unanimous consent of its three members. This suggestion should of itself sweep away the objections raised at this conference to this procedure. General Pershing's contention is that if British and American lives can be trusted to French control, so can British and American material. This military central control of supply service is as essential to maximum effectiveness of effort against the

enemy as unified military control of the front. The recent reverses during the first days of the last offensive were sufficient to sweep away the arguments against Allied military unification suggested by national pride and prestige for the last four years. With the difficult months ahead of us, and the urgency of unity of action and mutual coöperation, minor considerations should not now be raised against a plan involving a principle so indisputably correct that it is immediately adopted upon presentation by those first in authority and committed to us to work out and not to combat.

Given a military control committee of three, one each representing the British, French, and American armies, with authority through military channels to collect full information and then with power to put into effect by military order a unanimous decision improving the coördination of the rear, what harm would result? If it did nothing else this military committee would be a clearing-house of information, thus facilitating the now clumsy efforts born of overwhelming necessity, to coördinate the activities of the Allied rear. Each Government retaining its control over its member could, through his veto power, save from any possible alteration its entire system of intermingled civil and military control so jealously exploited in the discussions of this conference. So vast are the possible accomplishments of good from the military unification of the Allied Services of Supply, under one man or military committee, extending throughout England, France, Italy, and the United States, properly to be regarded as the "rear" in this effort, that we are instinctively prone to dwell constantly on the impossibility of obtaining it, overlooking the possibilities of obtaining most important advantages in the immediate rear of the armies without necessarily cutting any governmental system of internal red tape and using only existing military authority.

As charged by General Pershing with the duty of making recommendations to him looking toward the coördination with our allies of the army activities of the American rear, if this military committee is formed, and even if contrary to his advice its military authority could not be set in motion except by unanimous consent, I would ask and expect from it unanimous action resulting in the transmission of the necessary orders as follows:

(1) Ordering information from the departments concerned

of the three armies as to the status of the present warehouse capacity of the three armies in France, and if it is found sufficient to provide for the present and future requirements of the Allied armies considered as one, an order to the American army not to waste tonnage, material, work, and men in building new warehouses where sufficient empty warehouse space exists.

- (2) Ordering information from the concerned departments of the three armies as to the total present unloading capacity of the docks of France (including transportation from the docks to the front of the unified Allied army) and the amount of material now being transported to the front from these docks so that it may be intelligently determined whether the American army is building unnecessary docks and thus diverting material, work, and men from more important service.
- (3) Information ordered from the three concerned departments of the total amount of civilian and militarized labor now at the disposal of the three armies, so that if it were ascertained that the present supply, if used in proper coördination is sufficient, orders be issued for its proper use and for the A.E.F. to cease the continued importation of civilian labor from adjoining countries, thus putting a further tax upon the local resources of France.
- (4) Ordering information from the concerned departments of the three armies as to the present status of motor transports in France and upon the development of the situation the issuance of immediate orders preventing any one army from consuming shipping space by bringing camions to France when sufficient are available or can be manufactured here for the unified army at the front.
- (5) Information with appropriate orders as to whether central distributing depots for the joint use of the three armies do not now exist to that extent which will render possible an intelligent reduction of American construction projects in this connection.
- (6) Information with appropriate orders as to the collective situation of freight cars and locomotives, the use to which they are being put at present, whether economical to that effect as would render it impossible for us to cut down requisitions of this nature from America.

- (7) Obtaining information regarding normal supplies common to the three armies with a view to their equitable distribution as needed, in order to prevent unnecessary use of tonnage, to accumulate unusual quantities during the present crisis in shipping.
- (8) And many more subjects of importance — the above being only a few important illustrations.

That the members of this conference, instead of devoting themselves to a discussion of the methods necessary to carry out a plan accepted in principle by the Prime Ministers of England and France and proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., confined themselves chiefly to the suggestion of the obvious difficulties in the way of a complete international application of the idea, resulted in this first conference in a comparative lack of discussion of certain practicable steps of greatest importance related to the immediate rear of the armies. General Pershing has made this proposition in no spirit of distrust. It must be realized, however, that if as suggested at this conference the partial pooling of supplies and resources now going on under the pressure of necessity is continued through subordinate or separate controls as distinguished from a military central control, an insuperable obstacle is raised to a fair and complete solution of the problem. This insuperable obstacle to complete perception of the necessities of a common situation and the application of the necessary remedies in connection with it lies in the fidelity of the subordinate in charge of a particular supply to the unit which he supplies. The conception of such a subordinate of a common necessity is determined primarily by its effect upon the need with whose satisfaction he is charged as a matter of military duty.

While the disposition seems to exist to combat the logical extension of the idea of authority in this time of emergency and war to a military dictatorship of the entire Allied Service of Supply, as suggested by General Pershing, it is well to point out that if that idea was accepted by the three Governments the central authority being charged with the responsibility for the whole would conceive and carry out these responsibilities in terms of the whole and not in terms of three separate armies. Is it possible that France, England, and the United States will trust under French command their men and hesitate at trusting their material? This question must not be discussed except upon the assumption that if the

central control is established, it will be impartially administered. Objections to it must be upon the ground alone of the impossibility of creating the machinery.

If I have wrongly interpreted the conservatism in this conference, it is not because of any lack of appreciation of the spirit of coöperation, as evidenced by the treatment which the Americans have received from Services of Supply in France. Generosity and quick response to our suggestion of any necessity have ever marked the attitude of our allies. All freely bring to the common cause the limit of resources in wealth and precious lives. The people from the highest to the lowest are one in complete self-sacrifice. The question, therefore, is only one of natural steadfastness and conservatism. But this conservatism and steadfastness should not now be allowed to interfere with the consummation of the common victory. General Pershing has placed his authority over his Military Service of Supply at the disposal of the Allies for its proper coördination and to insure the maximum effort against the enemy. This action on his part is the highest expression of his confidence in the justice and fairness of our allies and is the best indication of his belief that the plan which he has proposed, notwithstanding all the arguments raised at this conference against it, is possible of accomplishment if it is met in a similar spirit.

In conclusion, let me say that the matters to which I am calling specific attention, and which demand coördination, are matters affecting the immediate military rear of the armies. The authority to create the military central control, absolutely necessary to deal with them effectively, exists or can be made to exist in this conference by the delegation of existing military authority alone.

As military men we have no right to screen our responsibilities for a bad situation as regards coördination in the immediate rear of the armies by raising smoke about civil interference and extending unduly the scope of the discussion of a comprehensive and unquestioned principle. It is our fault and our fault alone if we do not correct the situation. Civil governments have delegated us both duty and a full authority with which to accomplish it. Concessions of independent military authority must be made to a central control. The American Commander-in-Chief in his plan places his at the disposal of the Allies. The present lack of military coördination of the Allied Services of Supply of the

immediate rear of the armies prevents the maximum use of our military resources against a thoroughly consolidated enemy. If as military men we fail to correct this we are responsible in blood and lives and possibly defeat — and we alone.

CHARLES G. DAWES

Colonel, Engineers, N.A.

At the second Inter-Allied Conference which was held May 14, 1918, at Paris, and presided over by M. Clemenceau, the representatives of the British Government did not appear, but filed objections to the plan, suggesting that the Supreme War Council at Versailles, a purely advisory body, could be used to accomplish its purposes. At this second conference M. Clemenceau presented a plan in behalf of the French embodying the principles suggested in my letter, which, in response to a question by him, I accepted for the American E.F. under your authority.

Plan adopted in Conference by French and Americans

1. An Inter-Allied Board of three members will revise the organizations of supply and evacuation actually established in view of meeting the requirements of each of the Allied armies.
2. It brings to notice all means of unifying, coördinating, and increasing the efficiency of the above organizations. It is also qualified to point out the supplies, either for civil or military use, in regard to which the existing quantities of each nation are notoriously below the minimum requirements and to propose all modifications of the actual inter-Allied allotments.
3. The decisions unanimously taken by the aforesaid Board, as a sequel of its studies, have immediate force of law provided:
 - (a) they concern clearly defined matters.
 - (b) each member has previously received from his Government special power to agree to them.The reports covering these decisions should be supported by all documents on which they are based.
4. The Board will have at any time authority to claim from the Allied armies or Governments all necessary information. It proceeds on the spot to any complementary inquiries.

Had the Inter-Allied Conference allowed the situation to remain at that point, your personal intervention afterward would not have been necessary to save the plan. The French, however, added a statement which they proposed for discussion by civil authority involving the extension of the principles of the plan. Upon my presentation to you of the report of this conference, you properly decided in view of the attitude of the English, who had not yet agreed to the principles of the plan, that the continued discussion of the details of the extension of its principles over civil authority meant that it was in a fair way to meet the sad fate so often accorded constructive suggestions in inter-Allied negotiations. You saved the failure of the effort at this juncture by personally rewriting the essentials of the plan and adding a provision, — "That further details of the organization by which the above plan is to be carried out shall be left to the Board, subject to such approval by the respective Governments as may at any time seem advisable." This plan you personally took to M. Clemenceau, who approved and signed it with you, thus binding the French Government and the American army. The effect of this action was not only to bind together the French Government and the American army in the plan, but to rescue it from the certain failure to secure English coöperation which would have resulted from an attempt to have its details of operation fixed and its field of activity extended by an inter-Allied conference. The constitution of the Military Board of Allied Supply, prepared by yourself and afterward ratified by the French, English, Belgian, and Italian Governments, is as follows:

May 22, 1918

It is hereby agreed among the Allied Governments subscribing hereto:

1. That the principle of unification of military supplies and utilities for the use of the Allied armies is adopted.
2. That in order to apply this principle and as far as possible coördinate the use of utilities and the distribu-

tion of supplies among the Allied armies, a Board consisting of representatives of each of the Allied armies is to be constituted at once.

3. That the unanimous decision of the Board regarding the allotment of material and supplies shall have the force of orders and be carried out by the respective supply agencies.
4. That further details of the organization by which the above plan is to be carried out shall be left to the Board, subject to such approval by the respective Governments as may at any time seem advisable.

We agree to the above and wish it to be submitted to the British and Italian Governments.

G. CLEMENCEAU
JOHN J. PERSHING

You then directed me to go to England and present the plan to the British Prime Minister and the other English authorities and to secure if possible their acquiescence in it. Your letter of May 24, 1918, which I delivered to Mr. Lloyd George, is as follows:

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

May 24, 1918

MR. LLOYD GEORGE
Prime Minister of England, London

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

With reference to my letter of April 28, 1918, permit me to enclose copy of the preliminary articles of agreement between the Président du Conseil République Française and myself, which we believe set forth the principles upon which unification of military supplies and utilities should be based.

I have designated Colonel Charles G. Dawes to represent the American Government in this matter. If you feel so inclined, I should be pleased if you would have a member designated to represent the British Government.

My idea is that in the beginning only such articles as can well be supplied by common issue should be covered, and that the future development of this idea should be left to circumstances. With great respect, believe me

Faithfully yours

JOHN J. PERSHING

When I presented the plan to the British Prime Minister he stated that he entirely acquiesced in it and would call a meeting of the War Council at which the British Quartermaster-General and other authorities who would be affected by it would discuss the matter with myself in the presence of the Council as an aid to their decision. He gave his consent, however, to a preliminary discussion by me with General Sir John Cowans, British Quartermaster-General, who, upon being reassured as to certain points, gave his acquiescence. In the meantime Mr. Paul D. Cravath had secured the acquiescence of the Right Honorable Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War. These three authorities being in agreement the call for the meeting of the War Council was canceled and Lord Milner prepared a letter accepting the plan and embodying the explanation made by me in securing the agreement of the British Government.

In this connection I desire to call attention to the very effective aid given by Mr. Paul D. Cravath, Mr. Dwight Morrow, and Mr. Martin Egan in aiding to secure this agreement. Mr. Cravath had been most active in explaining our purposes before my arrival in England and I do not believe the acquiescence of the British Government would have been secured without his aid and coöperation. The letter from Lord Milner accepting the plan follows:

*War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1
29 May, 1918*

MY DEAR GENERAL:

Colonel Dawes has handed me the memorandum of May 22, 1918, signed by M. Clemenceau and yourself. We have all been in hearty accord with your aim to coördinate, so far as possible, the use of facilities and the distribution of supplies among the Allied armies in France. Doubts, however, have been expressed by our Supply Departments as to the extent to which a unification of supplies and facilities would be practicable. I am glad to find that our hesitation, based on these doubts, has been due to a misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of your proposal.

We now understand from your memorandum and Colonel Dawes's explanations:

1. That your plan is intended to apply only to supplies and facilities of the armies in France.
2. That the avoidance of duplicate facilities in docks, warehouses, and railroads, and the proper distribution of labor supplies, are among the things of immediate importance. It is not intended that the proposed Board shall interfere with the ration or with the distributing machinery of the respective armies, nor, indeed, with any other matters relating to their internal administration.
3. That the requirement that the decision of the proposed Board shall be unanimous has been introduced in order to leave each army free to determine whether the principle of coördination is or is not applicable in any given case. For instance, your army might have what seemed like a surplus of foodstuffs on hand, but which was not a real surplus because of your distance from your base and the period that might elapse before further supplies arrive. The same might be true in the case of our army. The representative of each army on the proposed Board is therefore left free to exercise his own judgment in voting on such questions.
4. That the decisions of the Board, when unanimous, are to be communicated, through proper military channels, to the chiefs of the appropriate departments of the respective armies, and shall be given effect only through them.

If I am right in the above interpretation of your views, I shall be happy to give the proposed system an immediate trial and to nominate a representative on the Board. I assume that the Italians and Belgians will also be invited to be represented on it.

Yours sincerely
MILNER

GENERAL J. J. PERSHING

Thus, while falling immeasurably short in its possibilities for improvement of the Allied military condition which was inherent in our original plan for a central military control of

Allied Supply, there was at last established a Board possessing certain broad military powers over the rear of the Allied armies.

The military field of authority of this Board was the rear of the British army in France, the rear of the American army in France, and the rear of the French army only in the Zone of the Advance. The French Zone of the Rear, as distinguished from the French rear in the Zone of the Advance, was under French governmental civil authority operating upon military lines. A unanimous agreement of the Board, therefore, could not affect the French Rear outside the Zone of the Advance without negotiation with and the concurrence of French civil authority. The important military results accomplished by the Board under these great limitations upon its powers, constantly functioning as it did under the eye of jealous and watchful independent authority on all sides fearful of an invasion of its prerogatives, is a demonstration, not only of its great utility, but of the incomparably greater results which could have been obtained from a proper establishment of central military authority as we first proposed.

The Headquarters of the Board and its Inter-Allied Staff was established at Coubert, France.

The orders which as Commander-in-Chief you issued to the American army establishing the relations of the American Expeditionary Forces to the Board and to myself as the American member are given herewith:

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

France, June 20, 1918

General Orders

No. 100.

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Sec. 3. Par. 1. In order to unify, as far as possible, the supply of the Allied forces, the principle of closer coöperation in the distribution of supplies in common use among the armies has been unanimously adopted by the Allied Governments. For the purpose of putting this principle into oper-

ation, the appointment of a Military Board of Allied Supply, consisting of one representative of each of the Allied armies, has been agreed upon. In its capacity as the representative body of the several supply departments of the respective armies, this Board is expected to study questions of supply, and adopt all proper measures for the coördination of Allied resources and utilities.

Par. 2. The Services of the Board of Allied Supply thus created will be fully utilized by officers of the various Supply Departments of the A.E.F., who are enjoined to seek through this agency the equitable allotment of such supplies, and, in coöperating with corresponding supply officers of the Allied armies, to take the most liberal attitude, to the end that every economy in the management and unification of Allied supply systems may be accomplished.

Par. 3. Colonel Charles G. Dawes, E.C., N.A., is designated as the representative of the A.E.F. on the Military Board of Allied Supply.

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By Command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. MCANDREW
Chief of Staff

From: Commander-in-Chief.

To: Colonel Charles G. Dawes, A.E.F. Representative,
Military Board of Allied Supply.

Subject: Establishment of staff, etc.

1. As the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, you are authorized to establish a permanent staff at the Headquarters of the Board, to enable you to carry out the instructions contained in Section III, G.O. 100, c.s., these Headquarters. This staff will consist of one or more representatives to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Commanding General, S.O.S., and such other personnel as you may consider necessary.
2. You are authorized to direct such travel by members of your staff as may be necessary in the performance of their duties, using this letter as your authority for issuing the necessary orders.
3. Under the provisions of Section III, General Orders No. 100, c.s., these Headquarters, which authorizes the Military Board of Allied Supply to make decisions, it

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has been directed that such decisions as you make with reference to supplies be communicated to G.H.Q. for execution.

4. Such information as may be required from time to time by the Board will be furnished by the Supply Departments or other agencies of the American E.F., upon your request.
5. The mail address of the permanent headquarters of the Board is "Section Franklin, Secteur Postal 141, via American Post Office 702." The telephone and telegraphic address is "Franklin."

By direction:

LEROY ELTINGE

Deputy Chief of Staff

A general summary of the activities and accomplishments of the Military Board of Allied Supply, during the period of its existence from June 28, 1918 (the first meeting), to the present time is as follows:

1. The first composite picture of the motor transport of the Allied armies in France was made, conclusions arising from which were self-evident and materially affected the policy of the American E.F.
2. It took up the study of the question of motor transport circulation in the rear of the Allied armies and established:
 - (a) Inter-Allied regulations governing road traffic in the Zone of Operations.
 - (b) Inter-Allied regulations governing troop movements by mechanical transport.
 - (c) Inter-Allied regulations governing the hauling of material by mechanical transport.

The above were approved by the General in command of each Allied army as well as by Marshal Foch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies.

3. It established an elaborate school at Rozoy for the instruction of motor transport officers in connection with the inter-Allied regulations governing motor transport

in the rear of the Allied armies which it had put into effect. This school was of great benefit in giving the American motor transport officers information and training which they afterwards used in our active military operations.

4. It studied the question of a mobile automobile reserve behind the armies for use by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, as well as a plan to create a flying column of ten divisions including their artillery and means of supplying them in rapid and long movements. The original plan was to create a potential inter-Allied motor transport reserve of 24,000 camions. At the date of the armistice this potential reserve consisted of 11,000 automobiles.
5. By its order the ammunition at the front was pooled between the French and American armies. What this meant to the American army is indicated by the fact that it fired of French 75 mm. alone about 6,000,000 rounds. On September 27, October 4, 9, 14, and November 1, our five heaviest firing days, 1,158,940 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition were fired by our First Army. The importance of entire freedom of access of the American army to French advance ammunition dépôts and dumps cannot be overstated.
6. It made the first composite study of the forage situation of the Allied armies in France. As a result thereof you reduced the American forage ration to the British standard and issued additional regulations against waste, thus tending to relieve a later forage crisis among all the Allied armies.
7. For the first time since the beginning of the war it prepared a map showing the complete installations in the rear of the three armies with details as to capacity, etc.
8. It secured information as to the common situation of inter-Allied reserves of 60 c.m. railway material and

personnel, creating a liaison of officers in charge of them in such a way as to generally improve the coördination between the Allied armies.

9. It secured Allied agreement for the construction and maintenance of second-line telephone and telegraph systems to enable all General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, to be linked together during the contemplated advance. With the signing of the armistice this agreement provided the channel by which telephonic and telegraphic liaison was provided in the occupied territories. In this connection it issued inter-Allied instructions designed to cover —

- (1) The establishing of general principles to be followed in connection with the construction of telephonic and telegraphic systems between the Allied armies, and between these armies and the rear and the employment and coördination of present systems in reconquered territory.

- (2) To make known to all the Allied armies the amount, as well as the methods of the coöperation that each army should extend to the other armies.

This included:

- (1) General rules governing the establishment of communication, under which were —

- (a) General rules of construction.

- (b) General rules of operation.

- (2) Assistance to be rendered by the Allied armies in the establishment of communications.

10. It established a school of instruction for regulating officers (railroad) of the Allied armies by which it secured coördination in the use and understanding of the French railroad and supply systems in the zone of the armies.

11. It provided for the regulation of the gasoline supply in the zone of the armies and the pooling of gasoline cans

and thereby simplified and expedited the operations of the inter-Allied petrol conference.

12. It investigated the labor situation in France and the armies and demonstrated the impracticability of pooling the same. This resulted in a stimulus to the activities of the independent agencies of recruiting in the American E.F.
13. The consideration of the general wood and tie situation by the Board, while it precipitated coördination in this particular connection between the Minister of Armament and the American E.F. instead of through the Board, unquestionably greatly contributed to the reaching of a satisfactory understanding with the French on this subject which solved at the time the wood emergency confronting the American E.F.
14. It prepared the study setting forth the ration and other demands of the various armies which would have enabled a reduction in tonnage to be made to the absolute minimum should the war have continued and the transport crisis further developed.
15. It is securing by order a statistical statement of all troops, supplies, and means of transportation of the Allied armies in France, as of date October 31, 1918.
16. It is securing a coördinated statement and comparative study of the supply systems of the Allied armies in France for future military study.
17. It demonstrated, in a number of other matters than those referred to above, that through it alone could a coming crisis in supply transportation and technical military handling of the Allied rear be measured so as to indicate and to justify the necessary and appropriate preparation for it on the part of each army.
18. Lastly and of great importance, members of the General Staff or chiefs of independent services of the American E.F. and of the other armies, attending at different times the meetings of the Board and listening to the dis-

cussion of the Allied situation as a whole, derived a more intelligent understanding of how their activities, whether under authoritative direction or not, could be conducted in better coördination with similar activities of our allies.

*Strength of Allied Armies in France in Men and Horses
on October 31, 1918*

The following completed figures as to the Allied armies in France, as of date October 31, 1918, are given from reports received by the Military Board of Allied Supply. They apply:

- (a) To the American, English, and Italian armies for the forces in France.
- (b) To the French army for the forces in the Army Zone.
- (c) To the Belgian army for the forces in the field and bases, to the exclusion of hospitals and formations behind the lines.

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Horses</i>
American Army.....	1,903,000	164,000
English Army.....	1,965,000	420,000
Belgian Army.....	200,000	42,000
French Army.....	2,813,000	643,000
Italian Army.....	45,000	6,500
Total.....	6,926,000	1,275,500

Brigadier-General George V. H. Moseley

You were most fortunate in having for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, G.H.Q., Brigadier-General George V. H. Moseley, whom you had placed in his important position by reason of his experience and special fitness. General Moseley showed a remarkable perception of the necessity for a complete understanding with the head of the French Fourth Bureau, General Payot, and the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply. Preserving that openness of mind in seeking information, which is a distinguishing mark of real military or civilian leadership, General Moseley drew upon

the immense experience of our allies which had been obtained at such great cost. A bigoted mind or one sensitive as to the effect of a request for information upon personal prestige, as the head of G-4, G.H.Q., would have wrought incalculable damage. With General Moseley results were always uppermost, and while not disregarding his military prerogatives he at all times subordinated them to Allied exigencies at the front. Both General Moseley and the American member were sensible of the dual jurisdiction in certain cases of the General Staff and the superimposed organization of the Military Board of Allied Supply. While they were never in disagreement upon any specific proposition, their fear of possible disagreement was such that as Commander-in-Chief you at one time considered two arguments, each made without the knowledge of the other disputant; one by General Moseley that the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply should take his place as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, G.H.Q., and one made by the American member that General Moseley should also act in his place upon the Military Board of Allied Supply. Your conclusion from this circumstance was the obvious one, that no disagreements were liable to arise between the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply and the General Staff and that no change need be made of personal assignment in consequence.

My letter of August 24, 1918, to you upon the activities of the Military Board of Allied Supply and the relation of the American member to the General Staff, American E.F., is given here not only as containing this suggestion relative to General Moseley and as outlining the situation of the work and environment of the Board at that date, but because it formed the basis of a request by you made by letter to Lord Milner, under date of September 2, 1918, that the British General Staff be given representation on the Board in addition to the War Office, which request was granted as evidenced by the following letters from yourself to Lord Milner and from Marshal Haig to you:

Left to right: BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANK McCOY, MAJOR-GENERAL J. G.
HARBORD, BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE VAN HORN MOSELEY

August 24, 1918

From: The General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F.

Subject: Activities of the Military Board of Allied Supply and
Relation of American Member, Military Board
of Allied Supply, to the General Staff, A.E.F.

I. The Military Board of Allied Supply, the formation of which by the Governments was due to your initiative and strenuous efforts as Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F., has now been in existence for two months. Its activities may be summed up as follows:

First. The first composite picture of the motor transport of the three armies has been made, the conclusions arising from which are self-evident and are to-day affecting our army policy. It has considered the question of a mobile automobile reserve behind the Allied armies, securing the information for the respective Commanders-in-Chief in their determination of it.

Second. For the first time a system for the proper circulation and handling of automobile transports, considering the Allied armies as a whole, is being studied and arranged and will soon be put into form to be submitted for your approval.

Third. The first composite study of the forage situation has been made and in connection therewith you have reduced the American forage ration to the British standard and issued additional regulations against waste, thus tending to relieve a later forage crisis among all the Allied armies.

Fourth. Ammunition between the Americans and the French has been pooled along the front.

Fifth. For the first time a map has been prepared showing complete installations in the rear of the three armies as to locations. When the final details of capacity are secured the importance of this map in connection with the consideration of the construction policies of the three armies is manifest.

Sixth. The creation of an inter-Allied reserve of 60 c.m. railway material and personnel is under consideration, which, whether it results in action or not, will for the first time give such information as to the common situation as to greatly and beneficially affect the individual policy of each army.

Seventh. The investigations of the Board in connection with labor have demonstrated the impracticability of pooling

the same and therefore stimulated the independent agencies of recruiting.

Eighth. The consideration of the general wood and tie situation, while it precipitated coördination in this particular connection with the Ministry of Armament instead of through the Board, unquestionably greatly contributed to the reaching of the recent satisfactory understanding with the French on this subject.

Ninth. It has demonstrated that through it alone can a coming crisis in supply, transportation, and technical military handling of the Allied rear be measured so as to indicate and to justify the necessary and appropriate preparation for it on the part of each army.

Tenth. Lastly, and of great importance, no member of the General Staff or chief of independent service of the A.E.F. has attended one of the meetings of the Board and listened to the discussion of the Allied situation as a whole without having derived in my judgment a more intelligent understanding of how his activities, whether under authoritative direction or not, can be conducted in better coördination with similar activities of our allies.

The importance of its work from a tactical, supply, and military standpoint, in spite of great opposition, is self-evident.

2. In some respects the name Military Board of Allied Supply is unfortunate. It is apt to create in the minds of the chiefs of services the idea that it is an organization primarily to pool and divide supplies; in other words, an organization through which somebody is trying to deprive the A.E.F. of a portion of its already inadequate supply or through which the A.E.F. is seeking to secure replenishment from the inadequate supplies of the other armies. Facing an approaching inadequacy of supply, the chief, with this conception of the Military Board of Allied Supply, naturally sees in its existence no possible good and only a menace. We encounter a natural fear in all the armies of a possible authoritative action of any outside body enabled to interfere with supplies. This feeling ignores the useful activities of the Board in connection with the coördinated use of transportation from a tactical standpoint and of construction coördination, to say nothing of other important matters entirely disassociated with any question of pooled supplies. As a matter of fact, however, with each army, confronted as it is by insufficient

supplies, a situation is indicated in which in the future the existence of this Board and its powers is rendered of supreme importance not only to the A.E.F., but to the other armies as well. The continued importation of American troops and the present condition of supplies will inevitably create a crisis. Through the force of your personality constantly exercised and through continued and stern admonition, you have taught the A.E.F. already to think in terms of emergency and deficit rather than in terms of surplus, for no one has realized better than yourself that the time is rapidly approaching when a surplus will turn to a deficit and finally an acute deficit. At such a time the military machinery upon which reliance must be placed is the Military Board of Allied Supply. The continuance of the importation of troops during the fall, unless accompanied by a coördinated importation of supplies — apparently impossible — will unquestionably at times create points and situations along the fighting line where military authority and not common consent must be relied upon to insure such a distribution of supplies as will maintain the troops actually at the front. In the distribution of supplies this Board may not commence to function until the absence of its functioning means in a way that is evident to all that fighting troops must leave the line. We must look ahead. If one feels that there will not be a different situation than exists at present about the division of food supplies when related to the continuance of actual military operations, it is only necessary to recall the attitude of our friends the English in connection with ships up until the time of the German victory around Calais, after which they turned Allied defeat into certain Allied success by the sea transportation of the bulk of the American army. When the time of real crisis arises this Board is the agency through which an intelligent view of the situation is practicable and through which proper measures can be taken. It is also the only body, by reason of its common knowledge, which can give advance notice of approaching emergencies and make the suggestions to the armies useful in the attempt to avoid them. If, from the minds of all, there could be removed the shadow of apprehension that an outside authority was looking with designing eyes upon our insufficient stocks, it would contribute to the feeling of earnest coöperation with the Military Board of Allied Supply. As the segregation of the troops into armies of different nationalities does not affect in

any way the desirability of central military control of movement, so the fact of the existence of a large field army of the United States should not be allowed to overshadow the necessity in times of emergency, for the support of that army, of a central Allied control over certain transportation and supplies especially in the military zone. Upon the basis of the retention by the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies of the final authority for the distribution and transportation of supplies to their respective armies, it will still be through the machinery of the Military Board of Allied Supply which you have created, and which cannot be set in motion without your approval, that part of the supply and transportation business of the Allied armies which is inseparably connected with general tactical movements will be provided for without interfering with such final authority.

3. Largely because of the personality of such men as McAndrew, Moseley, and Eltinge, with whom I chiefly work, there is between the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply and the General Staff the closest co-operation and understanding. The crisis of the present situation from the supply and transportation standpoint will probably be reached within from sixty to ninety days. To properly meet it the Military Board of Allied Supply and the General Staff must practically function as a unit. The authority actually existing in the Military Board of Allied Supply in connection with matters of coördination, under the terms of the agreements which you secured from M. Clemenceau, is great and it is necessary that it should be. Power governing the rear of the three armies cannot be exercised by the staff of a separate army nor can the powers of the Military Board of Allied Supply be set in motion in the way that you intended unless its decisions, approved directly by you and based upon a common viewpoint (impossible to be obtained by a staff not represented on the Board), are accepted by each army as automatically and in as unquestioned a manner as a direct order from a Commander-in-Chief himself. Conflicts having their roots in human nature, which are inevitable between two bodies with concurrent jurisdictions, one acting under one authority and one under another, must be avoided. A very sure prevention for this between the General Staff and the Military Board of Allied Supply is to have the supreme authority of the unit, to wit, yourself or the General Staff, represented authoritatively on any outside

board which is created to coördinate and regulate the unit. It is a tribute to your great Staff that as yet the Military Board of Allied Supply has experienced from it only the closest coöperation and understanding. If this does not continue, it will arise out of the fact alone that there cannot be between the General Staff and myself as the present member of the Board continuous juxtaposition and common knowledge of all the elements of a problem. The first viewpoint of the Staff is properly the necessities of the A.E.F. irrespective of necessities directly counter of the three armies considered as one. With the General Staff in possession of the complete knowledge in detail, derived from the composite pictures of the necessities of the three armies presented by the Military Board of Allied Supply, a more proper military coördination and coöperation will be reached. As you yourself have indicated, the A.E.F. may be in a position under certain circumstances and at certain times where it must subordinate and subrogate its temporary needs for the common good in order to make sure in the long run its own existence through final victory. The General Staff cannot be the judges of what is in the long run for the interest of the A.E.F. until it is put in a position by knowledge of the facts relating to the three armies as to what is essential and what is not essential for the A.E.F. to do as a unit in its own best interest. I therefore suggest that you personally appoint as a member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, either in my place or as an additional member, either the Chief of Staff, General Moseley, or Colonel Eltinge. I am of the opinion that to have the American and French rears properly coördinated, an authority to match Colonel Payot's, who is in command of the French rear in the Zone of the Advance, should exist in the representation of the A.E.F. upon this Board. The gentlemen named have had experience arising not only out of military service, but continued contact with the technical rear of our own army, neither of which I have had. They also have the bird's-eye view of the operations of the rear of the A.E.F., which is as essential to a proper understanding of its necessities as is the knowledge arising only out of a membership on the Military Board of Allied Supply of the necessities of the rear of the Allied armies considered as one. An order of the Military Board of Allied Supply thus constituted would produce a mental *status quo* on the part of the chiefs of the American services much more

conducive to prompt and efficient action than would otherwise be the case. If the Military Board of Allied Supply was known by the army to be expressing the conviction of the Commander-in-Chief personally, which of course is always the case, since its every action is first submitted to you, attention would be given primarily by the chiefs of the services to carrying out its mandates with less discussion of their wisdom which tends to delay.

CHARLES G. DAWES, *Colonel, Engineers*

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

France, September 2, 1918

RT. HON. VISCOUNT MILNER, G.C.D.

*Secretary of State for War
London, England*

MY DEAR LORD MILNER:

The attached letter of Colonel Dawes clearly sets forth the importance of the coördination work of the Military Board of Allied Supply in the rear of the three armies, as well as the necessity for the closest touch with it by the General Staff of each army.

Desiring to keep Colonel Dawes as the American member, I have not followed his suggestion to substitute a member of my General Staff in his place, but have given him authority, in his discretion, to call in members of the Staff and Chiefs of the Services to assist him.

Therefore, in the case of the French and American armies there is the closest contact and coöperation of the General Staffs with the Military Board of Allied Supply. The British General Staff, however, does not have direct representation on the Board, since the British member represents the War Office alone.

Since, for the preservation of final authority of the respective Commanders-in-Chief over the lines of communications of their respective armies, Marshal Haig and I have not acceded to Marshal Foch's desire for a central control of the rear under Colonel Payot, and since this Board provides a proper agency for central control, without lessening the final authority, I earnestly request that the British General Staff be given representation on the Board in addition to the War Office in order to further strengthen it in its important work.

If General Travers-Clarke should be directly represented on the Board as is a similar authority in the other two armies, much delay in its work would be avoided and its general purposes be effectively forwarded.

With expression of my high personal and official esteem, believe me

Respectfully yours

JOHN J. PERSHING

P.S. My previous correspondence on this subject was directed to the Prime Minister.

J. J. P.

*General Headquarters,
September 14, 1918*

From: The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force.

SIR:

I have the honor to bring to your notice that, acting under instructions received from the War Office, I have appointed Major-General R. Ford, Deputy Quartermaster-General at my General Headquarters, to be Senior British Representative on the Inter-Allied Supply Board.

I feel sure that this action on the part of the War Office will meet with your entire approval, since it means the direct representation of each Allied General Headquarters on this Inter-Allied Board, which now assumes the character of an Inter-Allied Army Board.

I have the honor to be, Sir

Your obedient Servant

D. HAIG, *Field Marshal*

Commanding-in-Chief

British Armies in France

Beneficial Activities of the Board in coördinating Army Services

Before comment upon the accomplishments of the Board, achieved through the issuance of direct orders, the indirect inter-army coördination resulting from the operations and existence of the Board demands consideration. Notwith-

standing the regulations for Allied motor transport in the rear of the armies and the pooling of French and American ammunition which resulted from specific orders of the Board, related as they were to direct military effectiveness, it is not too much to say that the indirect coördinating influence of the Military Board of Allied Supply was its chief service to the Allied cause. As was stated before, coördination of the independent military and civil authorities of the Allied Governments and armies was possible to obtain because of the fine spirit of coöperation which existed in connection with the common purpose, provided the act of coördination did not involve submission to a superimposed central authority, but was arrived at by joint consideration of, and mutual agreement upon, a common situation. There was no opposition of consequence to the securing of information by the Board as to a common situation from the three armies. There was also no difficulty experienced by it in bringing promptly together the independent heads of the separate services of the Allied armies for a mutual consideration of, and agreement upon, measures of coördination. The Board was enabled in this way, through meetings of the chiefs of the separate services of the armies, to have considered the common situation, and the intelligent heads of the services coördinated their activities in many instances as a matter of plain common sense and patriotic duty. The pitiful inadequacy of the measures for securing a bird's-eye view of the Allied military situation of the rear in transport, supplies, warehousing, etc., may be realized from the fact that it was the Military Board of Allied Supply, after nearly four years of warfare, which prepared the first map showing the complete installations in the rear of the Allied armies in France. What could have been accomplished in the way of a saving of duplication in building, transportation, and construction efforts of all kinds by the establishment of a body like the Military Board of Allied Supply at the beginning of the war, which, even if it had no extended military authority, could at least order the chiefs of

the independent services into contact and outline a common situation which would have resulted in more general coördination of activities as a matter of common sense, cannot be overestimated.

It was impossible for the intelligent heads of the different services of the three armies or their representatives to meet under the auspices of the Military Board of Allied Supply and compare notes without having the picture created by the collection of the information of the needs of a common situation profoundly influence toward better coördination the separate activities of the armies. From the beginning of the war there was, of course, interchange of information from time to time between the respective chiefs of the services of the different armies, but often it was haphazard and sometimes accidental. The Military Board of Allied Supply, having a bird's-eye view of Allied necessities in the rear of the armies, would from time to time consider taking up certain matters requiring coördination and encounter a barrier in the shape of a French civilian agency of government having a particular matter under its jurisdiction, and which therefore would not allow its consideration by the Military Board of Allied Supply whose authority covered only the French Zone of the Advance.

It is to be noted, however, that in no case did the Military Board of Allied Supply propose to take up any important question where its jurisdiction was protested by some independent agency whose acquiescence was essential to complete coördination, without a stimulus having been given to more efficient and prompter consideration of the matter under the authority of the independent agency.

An examination of the voluminous reports of the subcommittees of the Military Board of Allied Supply, which committees were composed of representatives of the different Allied army services called together by the authority of the Board and instructed to make recommendations, will indicate the great value of information collected under emergency by the enforced juxtaposition of the chiefs of the services of the

different armies dealing with the same matter. A written record of all these conferences was not made. These reports were the only method by which a coming emergency could be forecast and each army impressed with the necessity of making provision therefor. To such an extent was this the case in the matter of the forage report that it resulted in the reduction of both the British and American forage rations. The most strenuous opposition was encountered in this connection from our own Remount Service, and it was only overwhelming reasons based on emergency, which the Board alone was enabled to present, which led to the action. It must be remembered that the viewpoint of the chief of a unit cannot of certainty be the proper viewpoint in allied warfare. The chief of the independent service lacks perspective which his situation generally makes impossible. An incident reflecting this occurred long before the formation of the Military Board of Allied Supply when, through me as the General Purchasing Agent of the A.E.F., the French made an appeal for oats for French horses which were perishing at the front. The answer of the chief of the American service to the General Purchasing Agent was that oats could not be spared since the A.E.F. had on hand only a few days' supply. The fact that the loss of a French horse at the battle-front was then immensely more detrimental to the Allied cause than the loss of an American horse not yet in service at the front did not strongly impress the chief of the American service. At that time the American troops had not been in action sufficiently to have brought the chief of the service into contact with the emergencies which afterwards confronted him. When the matter was appealed by me to you as Commander-in-Chief, it resulted in the immediate cession to the French of several thousand tons of oats. In your position you had a better perspective and viewpoint of the relative necessities of the entire military situation than was possible to the chief of the service. The time came in the A.E.F. when with hay it was a question of nine days' surplus on hand and less. With the French army it at times

came down to two days' surplus and less. The terms of emergency were so immeasurably different from any preconceived idea of men who had not been face to face with it that naturally our own chiefs of the services were at times distrustful of the wisdom of any decision of superior authority in which they had no part, in taking action based upon the experience of our allies and a knowledge of their situation.

This is said with no idea of creating an impression that the machinery created did not improve conditions and that increasing knowledge and experience did not bring the chiefs of the different services of the Allied armies into a closer mutual coördination. It was the experience of the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, whenever the independent chiefs could be brought together and an Allied situation outlined, that in almost all cases an improvement in policy looking toward coördination resulted. These reports of the subcommittees of the Military Board of Allied Supply also showed that only a body with military authority acting in time of emergency can best determine those priorities of shipments and in distribution of supplies which are absolutely essential to the highest military effectiveness. The changes in relative necessities at the front, especially in time of battle, were immediate and imperative. The conclusions of the subcommittees of the Military Board of Allied Supply, in which the chiefs of the different services of the Allied armies were represented, resulted in various beneficial changes of policy in the administration of the rear of the armies which were never reflected in an order or even in a formal conclusion upon the minutes of the Military Board of Allied Supply.

Like the invaluable school of instruction at Rozoy, created by the Military Board of Allied Supply for the enforced coördination of motor transport and the education of officers of the three armies in connection therewith, every subcommittee meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply resulted in a better thinking along inter-Allied lines as distinguished from thinking along the lines of a single army by itself. War is a

condition, not a theory. The experience which comes from contact with conditions is an invaluable teacher. The study of the reports of the subcommittees of the Military Board of Allied Supply also afford conclusive evidence of the disadvantages which the Allied armies constantly suffered throughout the war prior to its formation from the lack of the continued existence of a central body acting over all agencies both military and civil, even though it had only the military power to call together the chiefs of the independent services and Governments for consultation and the preparation of information alone regarding common situations.

The occasions upon which the chiefs of the services of different armies met after the first programmes had been determined were often simply the result of a pressing emergency where joint action was absolutely essential to any possible solution. The eyes of the chiefs of the services of necessity were so closely trained upon their own work that only emergency would lead them of their own volition to seek to unite for common discussion. Questions of transportation generally were an exception. These imperatively required agreement and coördinated action at the very inception of effort and thereafter. It may be stated as a general proposition that many emergencies and crises developed in supply situations which could have been avoided had there been in continuous existence a military board of the armies charged with the responsibility of general coördination which would have foreseen them and suggested means for meeting them.

The attitude of the officers of both the French and British armies toward the American army was that of unqualified friendliness and desire to coöperate. As one who attended innumerable conferences between American officers and officers of the other Allied armies and Governments, the American member will state here that the attitude of the American officers was almost without exception the proper one of humbleness of opinion where they lacked experience and an honest desire to receive all possible information from those who had

been longer in contact with the problems and situations of the war. Very much of the achievement of the A.E.F. resulted from this anxiety to receive and profit by the information received from our allies which was freely and generously given whenever asked. As your representative not only upon the Military Board of Allied Supply, but in the many negotiations involving supply procurement and coördination between the A.E.F. and our allies, the American member can properly testify to the splendid spirit of coöperation which prevailed while at the same time he calls attention to the still greater results which could have been obtained because of it, if your original plan for a central military control of the rear through one individual could have been adopted.

The greater amount of activity in securing coördination was necessary between the French and American armies. The English army was operating within a short distance from its own base of supplies and for that reason was much less dependent upon French coöperation for its satisfactory functioning than was the American army. The latter army, three thousand miles from its base, confronted not only with the necessity of transporting its supplies shipped from America over a long line of communications in France, but also with the necessity of securing the bulk of its material and supplies in France itself, was in a position where close coördination and coöperation with the French were essential to existence itself.

*Coördination of G-4, G.H.Q., American E.F., and the
Fourth Bureau, French G.H.Q.*

The closeness of coöperation and complete understanding between General Charles Payot, Directeur Général des Communications et des Ravitaillements aux Armées, and Brigadier-General George V. H. Moseley, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, G.H.Q., American E.F., resulted in an enormous amount of coördinating work being done directly between the French and American armies through their offices. The fact that

General Payot was President of the Military Board of Allied Supply, as well as the complete understanding at all times between General Moseley and the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, both operated to secure unity of action between the French and American armies in the joint situation.

Pooling of Ammunition

On the 20th of July, 1918, General Payot (then Colonel), President of the Board, addressed the American member as follows:

Secret

July 20, 1918

From: Col. Ch. Payot, President.

To: Col. Charles G. Dawes, representing American Army.

The General Commanding-in-Chief the Armies of the North and Northeast has received the following information which he has transmitted to the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies:

Ammunition delivered up to this date to the American services by the French services of the Interior would amount to —

3,162,000 cartouches of 75

430,000 shots of 155 Court Schneider

24,000 shots of 155 G.P.F. (Grande Puissance Fillaux)

Of these quantities —

1,206,000 cartouches of 75 } more or
and 89,000 shots of 155 court } less

would be actually at the disposal of the American army in the French general reserve warehouses, in addition to the ammunition destined for the Armies of the North and Northeast.

The remaining part has in effect been delivered to the American services.

No new delivery on these stocks has been made to the American divisions, whose supply is secured in the same conditions as the one of the French divisions, by drawing from ammunition at the disposal of the General Commanding-in-Chief the French armies.

The actual situation of the French stocks necessitates the putting in common of the ammunition supplies.

There is, therefore, an immediate interest that the munitions belonging to the American army, mentioned above, which remains in the general reserve warehouses, remain in the common reserve as well as those that could exist actually in the American dépôts, and it would be necessary for you to have all the necessary information on the importance and location of these dépôts so that we could treat the question.

CH. PAYOT

General Payot and the American member being in agreement, at its meeting of July 22, 1918, the Military Board of Allied Supply took the following decision in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Convention of May 22, 1918, between the Allied Governments:

1. The supplies of similar munitions of French manufacture, in the French and American armies, are placed in common.
2. Tests will be made by French artillerymen on the use of munitions of American manufacture.
If these tests are favorable, these munitions will also be placed in common.
3. The French and American munition dépôts will serve indiscriminately the French and American armies. Requisitions upon French dépôts will always be made by the French Direction of the Rear; those upon American dépôts by the 4th Bureau of the American G.H.Q., to whatever army they may be destined.
4. The French and American armies will communicate with each other periodically the situation of the above-mentioned munitions existing in their respective dépôts as well as the anticipated output for the manufacture of these munitions.

Unquestionably this order, with the consent of the English Representative on the Board, would have been extended to the English army had not the different calibers of the English guns prevented. Much American ammunition manufactured in France had been delivered to the French ammunition dépôts in boxes marked for the A.E.F. As the amount of ammunition used by the American army of its own was small compared with the total amount of French ammunition fired

by American guns, this arrangement operated to the salvation of our military effort.

As a matter of fact, except in so far as the granting of some ammunition storage space benefited the French, this pooling worked all to our advantage. From the time we entered the line as a unit to the day the armistice was signed, we fired over 6,128,635 rounds of French 75 mm. In weight, this amounts to over 135 million pounds, of which ammunition 1,158,940 rounds were fired on September 27, October 4, 9, 14, and November 1, our five heaviest days.

At the time that the pooling of ammunition went into effect, July 22, 1918, the French had delivered, or assigned to our credit, 3,162,000 rounds of 75 mm., of which amount 1,206,000 rounds were still in French reserve dépôts, as shown by General Payot's letter to me.

From the French were also received and fired more than 1,200,000 rounds of 155 mm., of which amount about 317,000 rounds had been received prior to the 20th of July, 1918, when pooling was started.

The ease with which this pool was effected and the entire lack of opposition to its creation, notwithstanding its immense and overshadowing military importance, indicates again the overwhelming influence of emergency upon an inter-allied disposition toward coördination and pooling. Had the war continued and had the general supply emergency along the front become such that the indiscriminate rationing from dépôts of adjacent troops, whatever the army to which they belonged, was essential to keep them fighting in the line, the pooling orders for other supplies would have been agreed upon with as little hesitation as were the orders for pooling ammunition. As an existing machinery, ready at any time to function in case an acute military supply crisis overrode the natural disposition of each army to proceed on "its own," the Military Board of Allied Supply, in view of the tremendous man programme of the United States, would probably soon have inaugurated more extensive pooling operations along

the front similar to the ammunition pool and the potential camion reserve, had not the armistice intervened.

Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve

The transportation factors involved in the field operations of a modern army are more complicated than in any of the armies of the past. The enormous amount of metal thrown by the guns, the immense number of troops to be maintained upon the line, and the fact that a long period of stationary warfare may pass suddenly into a war of movement, all make central control and complete coördination of transportation one of the most important elements in any military operation. There are to be considered, first, the problems relating to the transportation of men, artillery, ammunition, and supplies from the bases and reserve dépôts to the front. When a normal gauge railhead is reached another set of problems intervene. The question of transport by camions and animals of artillery, ammunition, and supplies from the railheads to the line, including the operations of 60 c.m. railway distributing systems from normal gauge railheads, the proportion of animal and motor transportation in artillery movement, the substitution of secondary means of transport where the primary and best means are absent, and the changes in transportation methods and facilities required when troops are advancing as compared with troops at rest in the line, all involve in their proper treatment the highest order of military genius.

In the Zone of the Advance the control of transportation by central military authority in each army was, of course, absolute, but the division of the French rear into a Zone of the Advance under military authority and a Zone of the Rear under civil authority operating along military lines, eliminated from the authoritative jurisdiction of the Military Board of Allied Supply transportation in the French rear as far as the French Zone of the Advance. The successful treatment of this great question of motor transportation in the rear of the

Allied armies by the Military Board of Allied Supply, in the field where it had complete authority, well illustrates the accomplishments which the Board could have achieved in other lines if it had been given additional jurisdiction. As the war seemed rapidly resolving itself into one of movement, for the purpose of creating an invaluable instrument for offense in Marshal Foch's hands, the Board almost immediately commenced the formation of an inter-Allied automobile reserve which among other purposes would be ready at any time for quick use in the transportation of troops, including their artillery and supplies, as a flying column in attack or for pursuit. The purpose of the Board was to build up an eventual potential reserve of 24,000 automobiles for this purpose and it had succeeded at the time the armistice was declared in building up a reserve of 11,000.

At its meeting of August 2, 1918, the Military Board of Allied Supply made the following decision, the terms of which were drawn by General Payot:

*Decisions made by the Board at the Meeting of
August 2, 1918*

First. The Board considers it to be of prime importance to place at the disposition of the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, an Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve for the purpose hereafter indicated. This reserve will enable the supply of subsistence and munition stores for forty divisions to be assured at a distance of over fifty kilometers from railways. It should be able, at the same time, to assure the transport of ten complete divisions with their artillery.

It must be foreseen that the Germans will evacuate part of the French territory at the moment when the Allied armies will take the offensive. This evacuation will be advantageous to them in permitting them to shorten their front and to husband their supplementary reserves. Furthermore, in the zone thus voluntarily evacuated they can carry out a systematic destruction of structures and create ahead of their new front a veritable desert. This is the maneuver which they have already effected at the beginning of 1917.

In this devastated zone our armies will be able to draw the resources, which will be necessary to enable them to live and fight, only from the rear, and these resources can only be brought to the vicinity by automobile, the destruction of the structures rendering difficult and slow of execution the reestablishment of railways.

By this evacuation, prepared in advance, the Germans may hope that we shall be unable for a long time to take up again offensive operations against their new front on account of the difficulties in establishing our communications. The only means of outplaying these calculations is to be able to assure by automobile the transport of all that is necessary to be able to attack immediately this new front, and with this in view the formation of an Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve appears more indispensable than ever.

In order to achieve the result indicated, it is necessary that this reserve amount to at least 300 groups, divided as follows: 160 groups — that is, 4 groups per division — to assure the supply of 200 tons per day per division at more than 50 kilometers from the railways; 140 groups to transport 10 divisions complete with their artillery.

The automobile group which serves as the basis of the division above is taken to include 80 trucks. The Inter-Allied Reserve should, therefore, consist of 24,000 trucks. As there are trucks of different capacities the truck of 3-tons useful capacity is that used as a basis for calculation.

Second. To make up this reserve of 24,000 trucks it appears reasonable that each of the Allied armies should furnish a quota proportional to the forces which they have engaged. This quota might be as follows:

8000 trucks should be furnished by the French army
8000 trucks by the American army
7000 trucks by the British army
and 1000 trucks by the Italian army

Third. In each army the formations within the above limits, which are designated to form a part of the Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve, will remain under normal conditions at the complete disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the different armies.

But the make-up of these formations, their organization, and the conditions under which they are used, would be regulated in such a way that they could always be immediately withdrawn to be placed temporarily at the disposition

of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, for operations which he has determined upon.

Fourth. The formation of the Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve should be pressed with the greatest energy, each of the Allied armies indicating at the first of each month the situation of their own formations forming a part of this reserve.

In total this reserve should have at least the 300 groups indicated as necessary in paragraph 1 before the first of December, 1918, in order that the formations composing it may be amalgamated and trained in such a manner as to be completely available by the end of January, 1919.

Fifth. In view of the eventual formation and use of an Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve, it is necessary to proceed from now on —

- (a) with the preparation of rules governing the process of making transports, embarkations, debarkations, etc., to be conformed by the formations constituting the Inter-Allied Automobile Reserve;
- (b) with the study and determination of uniform rules of circulation applicable by the different Allied armies operating on all the roads of heavy traffic in France.

For this purpose a Bureau d'Etudes will be formed as quickly as possible in connection with the Allied Supply Board and will prepare an elaboration of the regulations herein indicated.

Sixth. Several series of officers belonging to the different Allied armies should be called to go to the Bureau d'Etudes, the formation of which is indicated above, to be instructed concerning the new rules and to be able to follow rapidly the application of them as soon as they are put in force.

The resolving, during the last months of the war, of a warfare largely stationary into one of movement, immensely emphasized the importance of this measure of the Board. Although every apparent effort was made by the Allied armies through volunteer effort to create this reserve, the need of a central military authority operating over the Allied rear, having a bird's-eye view and therefore best informed as to the matter of relative necessities, is again demonstrated. So great might have become the importance, had the war of movement longer continued, of creating flying columns of pur-

suit, that the veto power of independent army organization against the common use under central supervision of motor transportation would certainly have resulted in a lack of maximum military effectiveness.

The more the American member of the Board came into contact with the general situation in the rear of the Allied armies and the possibilities of a vast increase in military effectiveness by a central military control of the Allied rear, matching that at the front, along the lines originally proposed by yourself as Commander-in-Chief and by the American member as your representative at the first inter-Allied conferences, the more did he appreciate the immense loss in the military effectiveness of the Allied armies incident to the failure to have the original plan adopted in its entirety.

A process of evolution went on in the methods of every army as well as in the relation of the Allied armies. The slowest of all evolutions in allied warfare was the military coördination of the armies in the field, the very place where it was most needed. It was the application to allied warfare in France of certain principles and practices, which were evolved from the long experience of the French army, that Marshal Pétain had in mind in his remarks at the meeting of the Military Board of Allied Supply on September 2, 1918, at which you were present.

General Pétain said he wished to express his appreciation of the excellent work the Committee had been doing toward the pooling of all the resources of the Allies in motor transportation. He observed that the Allies had been led to the conclusion that such a pooling was necessary by the experience that had been made in the French armies since the beginning of the war. In the first part of the war, he stated, every division, army corps, army commander in the French army wanted to have his own motor transportation. The result was a tremendous waste of trucks. Units at rest retained material which was much in excess of their requirements whilst units engaged in active operations were short of transportation. The total amount of available trucks was inade-

quate; the Commander-in-Chief had not at his disposal the transportation he required for active sectors of the front. Therefore they were led to centralize motor transportation

1st. In each army.

2d. For the whole of the French armies.

The results were most satisfactory. He wished to point out that the principle which was true for motor transportation was also true for all sorts of resources, material, and facilities. He pointed out the question of artillery material and recalled the fact that units engaged in active operations required a quantity of artillery far greater than those in quiet sectors. The first thing to study, when large units are to be engaged in such operations, is the amount of artillery that must be given to them in excess of their normal allowance. This has led to the creation of the French General Reserve of Artillery, which is at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief to be distributed as he sees fit among his armies. He believes in the necessity of extending that principle, and creating a General Inter-Allied Reserve of Artillery, at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies. His conclusion was that the pooling principle was the only way to economize all sorts of material, and therefore have the material available when and where necessary. Of course its application is difficult, therefore the Committee are entitled to our gratitude for the very complicated and useful work they are doing.

General Pershing said he wished, too, to express his appreciation of the work the Committee were doing. The idea of the pooling of resources, he recalled, had been initiated by the Americans in connection with the sea tonnage. They had always considered it to be a most important factor in economy of tonnage; one that should enable the Allies to take advantage of any excess in available shipping for the general prosecution of the war. Starting from that basis, the Americans had always encouraged the principle of unification in all branches of resources and effort. He wished to state, that in his opinion the object of the activities of the Committee was not to take away resources belonging to an Allied army to turn them over to another army. Their object was chiefly to establish practical rules and methods enabling the Allied armies, when it was decided to be necessary, to use the common resources in the most intelligent and effective manner. He finished by thanking the Committee for the work they were doing.

Rozoy School

One of the useful and effective aids to the motor transport situation in the American rear was given through the agency of the school established by the Board at Rozoy, at which were trained the officers of the Allied armies in connection with the Inter-Allied Reserve and the coördination and economical use of motor transport. This school was especially valuable to the American army in the education of many of the road traffic officers on duty with the First Army in the Argonne. The reorganization by General Moseley, G-4, G.H.Q., of American motor transport was in progress, but not completely effected, at the date of the armistice, as the officers of the First Army advised against risking the chances of confusion incident to a change of the system during the continuance of the Argonne offensive. This reorganization was based upon the French system which had itself been built up as a result of experience. Under the original organization of American motor transport, camion transportation was assigned to units, and when a unit was at rest its motor transportation was also largely at rest notwithstanding the acute need for constant movement of all camion transportation. As explaining the principles of this reorganization proposed by General Moseley, which was one of the results of the close coöperation between the French rear under General Payot and the American rear under General Moseley, I insert herein the memorandum from General Moseley to the Chief of Staff, A.E.F.:

G.H.Q., A.E.F. Sec. 4, G.S., Sept. 6, 1918

Memorandum for C. of S.:

1. Recent developments have made it necessary for us to call on the French Army for a large amount of truck transportation. The total which they have either loaned us outright or given us to use under their general supervision is over 5000 capacity tons.

2. The French have been able to furnish us this assistance, principally on account of the flexible organization of their motor transportation. This organization allows them to

function efficiently with the minimum of truck transportation. Their allowance of trucks for their army is about two thirds of the allowance which Tables of Organization would give to our army, yet by their method of assignment they have obtained a degree of flexibility and efficiency in operation of their truck transportation which under our present organization we could not attain even if all our authorized transportation were available and assigned.

3. We cannot continue to receive this degree of assistance from the French; in fact, under conditions the reverse of those now existing, it is probable that the French will make demands on us for assistance. It is equally impossible for us to lend such aid to them, or even to be entirely self-sustaining during active operations, unless we revise and improve our method of distributing and handling our trucks. Already this matter has come before the Military Board of Allied Supply and they have asked us how many trucks we can place at the disposal of General Foch, in the event conditions change and our army is not all actually engaged, but the attack is being made elsewhere.

4. Certain general principles underlie the French system. It is proposed to adapt these principles, with suitable modifications, to our own army, and on the basis of them proceed with a reorganization of our truck transportation which will immensely increase its flexibility and efficiency.

5. The principles which it is proposed to adopt in our service are as follows:

- (a) A division or other organization shall have at all times assigned to it sufficient transportation to enable it to move on the road as a combatant unit, and to enable it to supply itself as far back as and including the field and combat trains.
- (b) All additional truck transportation needed for the functioning of an army shall be removed from its present rigid assignment, and organized into uniform companies and larger groups for general transportation purposes.
- (c) Such portions of this group of transportation as are necessary at any given time to assure the functioning of divisions, corps, and armies shall be attached for the time being to such divisions, corps, and armies; subject to continual modification, as the conditions under which these units are operating vary.

COLONEL HARRY L. HODGES
Chief of Staff of American Member of the Military Board of
Allied Supply

- (d) Any excess which may remain at any time, after such temporary assignments have been made to divisions, corps, and armies, shall be under direct control of G.H.Q. The entire group of transportation, whether operating directly under G.H.Q. or for the time being with lower organizations, shall be considered as *potentially* a part of the same general transportation group, any or all of which is at all times available for assignment where most needed.

6. The present organizations which would thus become a part of this general reserve, are: Supply and Ammunition Trains of divisions; Supply and Transport Trains of Corps; Army Trains and Supply Trains of Armies; and such portion of the Corps and Army Artillery Parks as is designated purely for transportation purposes.

7. It is recommended that the above general principles be approved, as the basis on which to proceed with a reorganization of our system of truck transportation. Under the terms of the foregoing, trucks will be interchangeable for the purpose of transporting either supplies or ammunition. After careful consideration of this matter it seems an unwise policy to continue to make a special truck for carrying ammunition. The special truck now being supplied for this purpose is reported as unsatisfactory. Circumstances arise where ammunition trains are not needed at all due to the development of light railways, and again it often happens that trucks assigned to ammunition trains are wholly insufficient, and ordinary supply trains must be used for carrying ammunition. Wherever we can eliminate a special vehicle and put in its place a standard vehicle of commercial design, we should do so.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY
*Brigadier-General, G.S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4*

Condition of the Allied Armies in France on October 31, 1918

As the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply I was instrumental in having an order issued by the Board for the presentation to it of the condition of the Allied armies in France as of date October 31, 1918. This information is not yet fully completed. My purpose in doing this

was not only the present one of presenting this composite picture of Allied resources to the different supply authorities of the armies in connection with a possible interchange of surplus supplies, but the important one of preserving in a collected and coördinated form, easy of access to military students, the entire military situation in France under the incomplete system of coördination which existed, a study of which is absolutely essential to a proper conception of the problems involved in future warfare. From this collected information there may be developed further evidences of the enormous loss to the Allies of military effectiveness due to the lack of a greater coördination of supply and transportation under military control. The fact that pictures of this kind were not started at the beginning of the war and continued through every month of its existence is responsible, in my judgment, for the waste not only of property, transportation, and supplies, but, more important than all, for the loss of the lives of many soldiers due to longer continuance of war.

*Report on Formation and Theory of the Supply Organization
of the Allied Armies in France*

The American member secured the issuance by the Board under unanimous agreement of an order requiring the armies in France to make a report on the formation and theory of their supply organizations.

At the time of writing this Report the documents covering the history and theory of the separate supply organizations of the Allied armies have not been completed by all the armies and therefore cannot be usefully discussed here. The General Staff, both at General Headquarters and at Headquarters, S.O.S., of the American army, have most earnestly coöperated in the preparation of this information relating to the American army. The admirable way in which the information is being presented by the staffs of the A.E.F. under the general supervision of the chief of my own staff on the Military Board of Allied Supply, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry L. Hodges, G.S.,

has led me to send Colonel Hodges to the Headquarters of the different armies with a view to making certain suggestions in order that a general coördination in the form of the presentation of information may eventually be had. This preparation involves much work, and, as has proved the case in all efforts of coördination, it is sometimes difficult for the chiefs of the services of the independent armies to fully realize the value of information relating to all the armies, to complete which a contribution from them is necessary. Even in the gathering of information the eternal difficulty of inducing perspective on the part of those charged only with responsibility for a part of the common enterprise necessitates a constant stimulus from those in higher authority. The picture presented by this report when finally made should prove of great future use to the students of military science, and, if unhappily war should again confront the world, to those charged with allied preparation for it.

General Charles Jean Marie Payot

The leader of the Military Board of Allied Supply was General Charles Jean Marie Payot, who for three years had been in control of the rear of the French armies. Under his skillful direction it is not too much to say that the administration of supply and transportation of the French army, considered by itself, was surpassed by no other army engaged in the war. Combining common sense, military experience, executive ability, great determination, and untiring energy, General Payot was equal to all of the difficult situations created in the French rear by the great German advance of the last year of the war, as well as to all other situations before that time. Had not the dispositions of the French rear been planned to meet all contingencies the German advance of last spring and summer would have completely disarranged them.

General Payot in the rear of the armies well seconded the efforts of his illustrious commanders at the front, Marshal Foch and Marshal Pétain. The American member of the

Military Board of Allied Supply endeavored in every way to emphasize and support the initiative of General Payot in connection with the operations of the Board. A reading of the minutes of the different meetings will emphasize the unquestioned leadership and the high ability of this great master of the strategy of army supply. It was no small tribute to his wonderful achievements in the rear of the French army that during the latter days of the war he was called to the Staff of the Allied Commander-in-Chief and in that position and through his chairmanship of the Military Board of Allied Supply devoted his attention to the improvement of the conditions of the entire Allied rear. Intolerant of incompetency, grateful and appreciative of honest effort and service, by nature a born commander, he was an invaluable factor in Allied success in the war, and to his ever-faithful and invaluable coöperation and sympathy the American army and the American nation owe a great debt. Of no other officer of the French army did the American member, under your direction, so frequently ask coöperation and assistance in the plans of the American army. In the multitude of requests which he preferred to General Payot he can recall not a single case of entire non-compliance. When the American member at Souilly was ordered by you, during the Argonne battle, to endeavor to provide ballast for the invaluable standard-gauge rail extension from Aubreville to Varenne, at which latter point three divisions were being supplied, a request made one afternoon of General Payot resulted in the delivery the next morning of eighty cars of gravel. To that able and resourceful commander of the American rear, General Moseley, most timely aid in periods of acute crisis was rendered by General Payot. The close understanding and entire coöperation at all times between General Payot, General Moseley, and the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply, continuing through the last four months of the war, made the coördination in the advance rear of the French and American armies as complete practically as could have been obtained by a

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. H. BEADON, B.E.F.
First representative of the British War Office
on Military Board of Allied Supply

single military control. This, however, was only possible through constant contact.

General Errico Merrone, Major Cumont, and Major Hainaut

General Errico Merrone, of Italy, representing the Italian army in France, Major Cumont and Major Hainaut, his successor, representing the Belgian army, were most earnest, useful, and active members of the Board and coöperated to the highest degree in its work.

Colonel R. H. Beadon

Colonel R. H. Beadon was one of the charter members of the Military Board of Allied Supply, representing the British War Office on the Board. His high ability and fine spirit of coöperation contributed very greatly to the success of the Board. After a useful service on the Board he retired owing to the decision of the British Government to change its representation from the War Office to the General Staff.

Major-General Reginald Ford, British E.F.

On September 14, 1918, the representation of the British on the Board having been changed from the War Office to the General Staff of the British E.F., Major-General Reginald Ford became a member. This able, experienced, and resourceful officer came to the Board with many suggestions of the desirability of the extension of its activities, only to be met in the most of them by the objection to the jurisdiction of the Board, raised by the French civil authorities in control of the French second Zone of the Rear. Earnestly coöperating in the great work of the Board in regulating and systematizing motor transport of the Allied armies in the rear, General Ford made suggestions relative to the unification of Allied rail transportation, which, in the judgment of the American member, would have resulted in an immense increase of effectiveness had rail transportation been as completely

within the jurisdiction of the Board as motor transportation in the Zone of the Advance. The freeing by the British advance of the Port of Dunkirk led this officer to make valuable suggestions as to a redistribution of port facilities involving a possible change in relative army locations, but here again concurrence in the matter of jurisdiction was made impossible by the division of French authority. Clear of mind, direct in statement, coöperative to the highest degree, General Ford was an invaluable element in the later activities of the Board. Like his chief, General Sir Travers Clarke, he was such an aid at all times to the American army that the conferring of the Distinguished Service Medal upon him was a most appropriate and deserved evidence of appreciation.

Staff of the American Member

The American member desires to call your attention to the excellent service rendered by his Staff at the Headquarters of the Board at Coubert.

The Chief of Staff was Lieutenant-Colonel Harry L. Hodges, G.S., who came from the General Staff, G-4, Chaumont, thus providing the liaison between the American member and the General Staff. The duties of Colonel Hodges were varied and complex and were ably performed under many difficulties and embarrassments. Upon him devolved largely the responsibility of supervising the form of presentation of information by the American chiefs of services or their representatives at the coördinating conferences ordered by the Board to be held by the military authorities of the different armies. The great industry and high ability of Colonel Hodges in this work contributed very largely to the success of the Board. Special attention is called to his careful and detailed report of its activities and the environment in which they took place, which is attached hereto.

From the Staff of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, there were detailed to the Staff of the American member, Lieutenant-Colonel Fred D. Griffith, Cavalry, and

Lieutenant C. B. Gibson, F.A., to represent the Headquarters, S.O.S., and that great executive and able officer, Colonel H. C. Smither, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, S.O.S. To the faithful and able services of these officers the American member desires to pay tribute.

In addition to these members the American member appointed on his staff Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Roop and Major C. W. Adams. Both of these officers rendered most useful, able, and arduous service. To Colonel Roop and Major Adams were entrusted many difficult negotiations. Owing to the great necessity for the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Roop in the other work of the American member in the army, he was withdrawn from the Staff at Coubert to become Assistant General Purchasing Agent of the A.E.F. The American member has always found in Lieut.-Col. Roop, both in his service at Coubert and in Paris, an invaluable aid.

Through the work of Lieutenant-Colonel Hodges, Major Adams, and Lieutenant Gibson in the preparation of the detailed report of the operations of the Military Board of Allied Supply much of value to the military students of the future has been put in accessible, clear, and convenient shape.

Colonel H. C. Smither, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, S.O.S.

The place in the gratitude and admiration of his army associates held by Colonel Smither is everywhere recognized. Upon his unfailing interest and loyalty the American member of the Board constantly and heavily drew. To enumerate the instances of his coöperation with the Military Board of Allied Supply would be impossible within the proper limits of this Report, but the American member desires to state that Colonel Smither gave invaluable coöperation in the accomplishments of the Board.

Conclusion (Inter-Allied Coördination)

As has been indicated throughout this Report, the difficulties of securing inter-Allied coördination in time of war by

mutual agreement, as distinguished from military or central authority established by agreements between the Allies, were enormous.

The purpose of the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply in pointing out the immense field of useful effort from which national pride and individual jealousy of authority excluded the Military Board of Allied Supply is not to minimize the great accomplishments of the Board, but to emphasize, as one of the lessons to be derived from this experience, the absolute necessity hereafter in allied warfare of a complete centralization under military control of the supplies and facilities of the rear as well as a centralization of authority for troop movement at the front.

The coördination of military units under separate command by liaison arrangement and voluntary joint agreement as to a policy or action required by a given situation, always has been, and always will be, a defective way to carry on military operations. Such was the method under which, up until the time of the military unification of the Allied forces under Foch, the Allied armies operated. Military students of the war, when its full history can be written, will no doubt properly interpret the immense loss of military effectiveness experienced by the Allies during the period of separate and independent army command. To give common sense in inter-allied military coördination the supremacy over human pride and jealousy, only great emergency and the instinct of self-preservation as a rule will suffice.

Whenever a coördinating action was asked the first question naturally arising in the mind of the officer consulted was whether it would result in a lessening of his individual authority. If the action meant no lessening of individual authority, but only a shaping of policy under the same authority to accord more closely with the object of common effort, this acquiescence could usually be secured. If, however, the measure of coördination involved the cession of authority on the part of a commander of a unit to a superimposed control

COLONEL HENRY C. SMITHER
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, S.O.S.

operating in the common interest, a stern opposition immediately developed. This opposition did not wholly develop from individual selfishness and jealousy of prerogative, but because there often existed a sincere belief that the cession of authority would result in a lessening of the effectiveness of the unit in a way detrimental to the interests of the whole. In other words, the man in charge of a unit often felt that he was a better judge of what was necessary to be done in the interests of the whole than a superimposed control of the whole which had a better view of the entire field to be coördinated. The fight against coördination resolved itself often into a fight for the *status quo*.

Reinforcing the officer or Government official asked to cede authority for the common interest were national pride and race prejudice. Those charged with the difficult duty of securing coördination were often tempted to turn back in dismay at the obstacles which an independent chief of a service would immediately raise in opposition to a proposed measure of coördination. Before the last year and one half of the war, during which time the United States was involved in it, a process of natural selection under great emergency had been at work in the Allied Governments and armies long enough for a very strong and independent set of men to come into power and position. The very competency and success of these men in their individual tasks — the valuable results which they had achieved under great difficulty in their respective departments of work — and their ability to present a case, made them most difficult and dangerous antagonists when they opposed coördinating effort.

As stated in the beginning of this Report, in proposing a central military control of allied supply effort, you, as the American Commander-in-Chief, and I, as your representative in the conferences, advocated a plan so indisputably correct that upon presentation it was accepted as a principle, but the innumerable arguments adduced against the feasibility of its adoption were such that, good or bad, they could not be

resolved. In this connection it must again be remembered that the Allies were practically beaten to their knees by the Calais defeat before even a central military authority could be established along the Allied front. The retarding of success, the loss of lives, and the unnecessary suffering of the Allied people which resulted from failure to establish military control of the Allied front until so late a date, is one of the tragedies of history. No less important from the very beginning of the war than the central military command at the front was this principle of a central military control of the Allied resources and the rear of the Allied armies. The effort for a central military control of the Allied rear and of Allied supply, which resulted in partial success through the formation of the Military Board of Allied Supply, was made immediately after the military control of the front was effected under Foch. It was clearly seen that if a military unification was not achieved at the front, an overwhelming and disastrous defeat was inevitable. Under these circumstances, face to face with death and disaster for their armies, the proud spirit of the nations and their army commanders at last bent themselves into lines parallel with common sense. That the American effort to compel the adoption of these same common-sense principles in the matter of Allied supply did not succeed to a greater extent was because the necessity of this coördination was not emphasized by something analogous to the defeat at Calais.

Had the war continued along with the failure to properly coördinate the supply and transportation of the three armies, until without the pooling of supplies men would have been compelled to leave the fighting front, then the relation of the question to victory might have enabled the effort to coördinate food and supplies to more fully succeed. And yet even the necessary degree of military unification at the front, had the war continued, would have been impossible without the unification of the rear of the armies under a central control analogous and subordinate to that exercised by Foch at

the front. The Allied armies at the end of the war were in the anomalous and disadvantageous situation of having a Commander-in-Chief who had theoretically unlimited power over the movements of troops with no power at all over the lines of communication save that of the particular army of which he was chief. The failure to agree upon a military control of the rear with its lines of communication and supply dépôts made it impossible in fact for the Allied armies to be fought as one, but compelled Marshal Foch to maintain practical segregation of them in separate sectors. Experience in this war has probably demonstrated that such segregation resulted in the highest fighting effectiveness as a rule, but there were occasions upon which the principles of segregation had to be abandoned as a matter of acute military emergency, and the extent to which at times this occurred emphatically demonstrates the limitations imposed upon the Allied Commander-in-Chief by his inability to control the transportation and supply of the Allied armies as if they were a unit.

Shortly after the establishment of military control of the front under Foch certain French troops were moved northwest by him to the British front and certain British troops southeast to the French front. As a result filled trainloads of supplies at one time passed each other in opposite directions — from French dépôts in the southeast to French troops in the northwest and from British dépôts in the northwest to British troops in the southeast, with a waste of transportation facilities in consequence. This was afterward corrected by agreement instead of by direct orders. It was manifestly impossible to make any very large shiftings of troops which might be regarded as desirable and have them economically and properly supplied when the lines of communication were fixed for separate armies and over which the man who shifted the troops had only a limited control.

As has been stated before, the greatest necessity for continued coördination existed in the operations of the French and American armies, since the formation of the American

army was in juxtaposition to the French army and not to the English army. The American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply was not in Europe at the beginning of the war and therefore cannot testify first-hand as to the degree of common consultation between the French and English chiefs of services in connection with the army transportation and supply programmes of the French and British armies. From his observation, however, of the situation since arriving in France, during almost the entire time of American participation in the war, he would judge that it could have been improved upon.

It is a fair assumption and one fully justified from the later observation of the American member of the Military Board of Allied Supply that these two proud and independent nations, which had many times been at war with each other, did not feel it necessary to seek to learn the lessons of each other which the Americans were anxious and eager to learn of both. In the breasts of our allies in Europe were the hereditary influences of centuries of military and commercial contest among themselves. The American for that reason had perhaps less of instinctive distrust of the policy of cession of independent authority than existed with our allies. At least the records will indicate that the Americans constantly preached coördination even if at times the instincts of human nature of an individual officer rendered him obstructive in specific instances. The sacrifices which the magnificent armies of France and Great Britain made in the common cause and at times for each other, the splendid way with which they rallied to each other's assistance and mingled their efforts and blood upon the most terrible battle-fields of the world, and finally came together, as defeat threatened, under one military control, would indicate that the reason for any lack of Allied coördination is to be found in the elemental depths of human nature and national life and could not be fully eradicated until that life itself was placed in danger. The American member cannot refrain from paying an in-

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. C. ROOP
Assistant General Purchasing Agent, A.E.F.

adequate tribute here, not only to the magnificent battle qualities of the great British nation and to the supreme self-sacrifice shown by all classes of its citizens, but to that final subordination of their independent military authority to that of a commander of the army of an adjacent and in the past a rival nation in order that victory for the common cause of Liberty might be won. Whether it was caused by the instinct of property and the habits of thought engendered thereby, whether the clearness of the relation of supply and transportation coördination to victory was not manifest enough, or whether other reasons intervened, the fact nevertheless remains that the greatest war in the world and for the greatest cause, fought by the greatest nations of the world, having their all at stake, was carried on by the Allies without proper coördination in the rear of their armies. The coördination that existed, and reached through mutual agreement, was so far short of that which would have been reached through a central military authority extending over both the front and rear of the armies from the beginning of the war, that an incalculable waste of military effectiveness characterized it.

There were, of course, at the beginning of the war many conferences between the chiefs of the Allied services and those high in authority relative to general policy of supply, construction, and transportation. But with all the armies there should have been an arrangement made by which better facilities for a continuance of the juxtaposition of independent authorities and chiefs of services were secured so that programmes originally agreed upon could be modified to meet the constantly changing environment.

The effort to correct this situation, starting with the broadest statement of the ideal plan by you and presented to all the Governments, finally resulted in the establishment of the Military Board of Allied Supply as being the only possible step in advance which could be taken. Considering the fact that this effort was initiated when there existed an emergency making coördination imperative, the like of which had never

before occurred in history; that it was presented upon your initiative representing the American army, with the approval in principle of your Government; that it was immediately approved in principle by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain, and that in the consideration of it the highest administrative and ministerial authority of France and Great Britain was represented as well as the full military authority of yourself, it may be considered as one made under every possible advantage so far as its chances of success were concerned. Because especially of this environment of emergency in which it was made, when imminent and complete disaster impended, the Military Board of Allied Supply probably represents in its principle of organization and mode of operation the farthest advance in connection with allied military supply coördination which it was possible to obtain in the present development of civilization. It was a machinery by which this coördination could be attempted by voluntary agreement without a vital cession of independent national or army authority. It provided the means of securing the information and general outlining of the common situation in the rear of the armies which gave independent authorities the best possible opportunity to clear away their misunderstandings and develop all the issues of any question upon which a mutual agreement was desirable. It then provided the means for immediately enforcing an agreement.

The American member believes that the literature and reports of the Military Board of Allied Supply from the time of the inception of the effort made to create it until its dissolution, including the discussions relating to its principles and the actual results obtained in the rear of the Allied armies, will be for all time of importance to the students of military science and of governmental and international policy. 2, 3

CHARLES G. DAWES

Brigadier-General, Engineers

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